Filed 9/22/20 Collins v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

OLUFEMI S. COLLINS et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION,

Defendant and Respondent. B295474

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. KC070209)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Peter A. Hernandez, Judge. Affirmed.

Olufemi S. Collins, in pro. per., and Wanda D. Collins, in pro. per., for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Parker Ibrahim & Berg, Bryant S. Delgadillo, Mariel Gerlt-Ferraro and Jenny L. Merris for Defendant and Respondent.

__________________________

Plaintiffs Olufemi S. Collins and Wanda D. Collins appeal from a judgment of dismissal following an order sustaining the demurrer of Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) without leave to amend. Plaintiffs challenge the order vacating Fannie Mae’s default. Plaintiffs also contend the trial court erred in sustaining Fannie Mae’s demurrer without leave to amend and denying their motion for reconsideration. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Foreclosure of the Property
B.
In June 2003 plaintiffs obtained a loan from SCME Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (SCME Mortgage), secured by a deed of trust encumbering plaintiffs’ Pomona home (the Property). (Collins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (Apr. 16, 2014, B244252) [nonpub. opn.] (Collins I).) Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) was the beneficiary of the deed of trust. (Ibid.) On March 10, 2010 a notice of default and election to sell was issued after plaintiffs began to miss loan payments. (Ibid.) MERS later assigned its beneficiary interest in the deed of trust to JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase) and recorded the assignment in the Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office on April 6, 2010. (Ibid.) On April 21, 2010 a substitution of trustee was recorded appointing Quality Loan Service Corporation (Quality) as the trustee under the deed of trust. (Ibid.)

On June 10, 2010 Chase assigned its beneficiary interest in the deed of trust to Fannie Mae, and the assignment was recorded on March 28, 2011. (Ibid.) On June 11, 2010 Quality recorded a notice of trustee’s sale of the Property. (Ibid.) On March 23, 2011 Fannie Mae purchased the Property at the trustee’s foreclosure sale. (Ibid.) Quality recorded the trustee’s deed upon sale on March 28, 2011. (Ibid.)

C. The 2011 Action (Collins I)
D.
On May 31, 2011 plaintiffs filed an action against Chase, Fannie Mae, Quality, and SCME Mortgage alleging causes of action for slander of title, tortious violation of Penal Code section 470 (forgery), quiet title, and declaratory relief. (Collins I, supra, B244252.) Plaintiffs alleged defendants “had conspired to foreclose on the Deed of Trust and obtain title to their house by fraudulently executing and recording documents to make it appear that Chase was the successor beneficiary and Quality the successor trustee under the Deed of Trust.” (Ibid.) Plaintiffs claimed Margaret Dalton, who signed the assignment of beneficial interest on behalf of MERS and the substitution of trustee on behalf of Chase naming Quality as the trustee under the deed of trust, did not have authority to sign the documents. (Ibid.)

On April 27, 2012 Chase and Fannie Mae moved for summary judgment. (Collins I, supra, B244252.) In support of their motion they submitted Dalton’s declaration in which she stated she was authorized as vice-president of MERS to sign the assignment of beneficial interest, and as vice-president of Chase she had authority to sign the substitution of trustee. (Ibid.) On July 17, 2012 the trial court granted Chase and Fannie Mae’s summary judgment motion, finding plaintiffs “had provided no evidentiary support for their allegation that Dalton was not authorized to act on behalf of Chase and MERS but relied solely on conjecture and speculation.” (Ibid.) On August 1, 2012 the trial court entered judgment in favor of Chase and Fannie Mae. Division Five of this district affirmed. (Ibid.)

On October 24, 2012 the trial court entered a default judgment against SCME Mortgage on the slander of title cause of action, awarding plaintiffs $400,000 in noneconomic damages.

E. The 2015 Action (Collins II)
F.
On May 19, 2015 plaintiffs filed a complaint against Chase, Fannie Mae, and other defendants alleging “deprivation of [plaintiffs’] due process rights in violation of title 42 United States Code section 1983; deprivation of their procedural due process rights under Civil Code section 52.1; unlawful eviction based on defendants allegedly not possessing title to the real property; fraud based on defendants allegedly filing false documents to acquire the real property; and quiet title based on the alleged false documents recorded with the Los Angeles County Recorder.” (Collins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (Feb. 16, 2017, B267394) [nopub. opn.] (Collins II).) On September 9, 2015 the trial court sustained Chase and Fannie Mae’s demurrer without leave to amend, ruling plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim. (Ibid.) On February 16, 2017 Division Five affirmed the judgment, finding the demurrer was timely filed and plaintiffs’ failure to raise any argument on the merits forfeited their challenge on appeal. (Ibid.)

G. This Action
H.
1. The complaint
2.
On April 16, 2018 plaintiffs filed this action as self-represented litigants against Fannie Mae and Monterrico Investment LLC (Monterrico), alleging causes of action for fraudulent conveyance, interference with due process of law, and voidable transfer of title. Plaintiffs asserted they were the lawful owners of the Property based on (1) a preliminary injunction issued in the 2011 action prohibiting Fannie Mae and other defendants from proceeding with foreclosure, eviction, or possession of the Property pending resolution of Collins I; (2) plaintiffs’ recording of a notice of pendency of the 2011 action; and (3) plaintiffs’ recording of an abstract of judgment against SCME Mortgage following the trial court’s October 24, 2012 entry of a default judgment and award of damages against SCME Mortgage in the 2011 action.

As to the first cause of action for fraudulent conveyance, plaintiffs alleged Fannie Mae applied for a writ of possession to avoid compliance with the preliminary injunction and conveyed title of the Property without paying the judgment lien against SCME Mortgage. As to the second cause of action for interference with due process of law, plaintiffs alleged Fannie Mae’s disregard of the preliminary injunction and fraudulent conveyance of title without payment of the judgment lien interfered with due process of law, delayed justice, and deprived plaintiffs of their property interests. As to the third cause of action for voidable transfer of title, plaintiffs alleged Fannie Mae and Monterrico were not “holders in due course and do not maintain such interest in the . . . Property as to justify conveyance of the [t]itle of the . . . Property.” Plaintiffs also alleged Fannie Mae and Monterrico conspired to convey voidable title of the Property without resolving the lis pendens and judgment lien encumbering the Property.

3. Entry of default and Fannie Mae’s motion to set aside the default
4.
On June 6, 2018, upon plaintiffs’ request, the court clerk entered a default against Fannie Mae. On June 25 Fannie Mae filed an ex parte application for an order setting aside the default or for an expedited hearing on a noticed motion. The trial court denied the ex parte application without prejudice, finding there was no emergency warranting ex parte relief.

On July 12, 2018 Fannie Mae filed a noticed motion to set aside the default under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivisions (b) and (d), in which it argued entry of default was a clerical mistake because Fannie Mae had filed a meet and confer declaration pursuant to sections 430.41 and 435.5 on May 25, 2018, prior to entry of default, which extended its time to respond to the complaint to June 28, 2018. Fannie Mae argued its attorney had made a good faith attempt to meet and confer with plaintiffs prior to filing its demurrer and motion to strike, the meeting never took place, and it was entitled as the moving party to an automatic 30-day extension of time in which to file a responsive pleading under sections 430.41, subdivision (a)(2), and 435.5, subdivision (a)(2).

The trial court granted Fannie Mae’s motion, ordering the default “stricken as void” because “the entry of default was procedurally defective” pursuant to section 430.41, subdivision (a)(2). The court deemed Fannie Mae’s demurrer and motion to strike, which were attached to the motion to set aside default, filed as of August 7, 2018. The court took plaintiffs’ application for default judgment off calendar.

5. Fannie Mae’s demurrer to the complaint
6.
Fannie Mae demurred on the basis the causes of action alleged in the complaint were barred by claim and issue preclusion because the 2011 and 2015 actions adjudicated plaintiffs’ claims relating to the foreclosure and Fannie Mae’s title to the Property. Fannie Mae also argued plaintiffs’ causes of action failed as a matter of law because neither Fannie Mae nor Monterrico were debtors under the judgment lien; the judgment lien against SCME Mortgage was recorded after Fannie Mae had obtained title to the Property; and the preliminary injunction and lis pendens issued in the 2011 action were extinguished after the trial court determined the foreclosure sale was valid, which was affirmed in Collins I. Fannie Mae filed a request for judicial notice in support of its demurrer, requesting the court take judicial notice of the unpublished opinions in Collins I and Collins II, as well as the relevant recorded documents. In their opposition, plaintiffs argued the court clerk had entered a default against Fannie Mae, and plaintiffs asserted (incorrectly) that Fannie Mae failed to lodge its demurrer with its motion to set aside the default.

On November 7, 2018 the trial court granted Fannie Mae’s request for judicial notice, sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and granted the motion to strike punitive damages from the complaint. The court found claim and issue preclusion barred relitigation of the validity of the transfer of the property, which was determined in the 2011 action and affirmed in Collins I. The court also found plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to state claims for fraudulent conveyance, interference with due process, or voidable transfer of title. The court reasoned plaintiffs recorded the abstract of judgment against SCME Mortgage on November 21, 2016, after Fannie Mae had recorded the judgment it obtained in in the 2011 action on July 11, 2013. Further, plaintiffs’ default judgment against SCME Mortgage “was merely a judgment of damages” and did not convey title to plaintiffs. In addition, the lis pendens and preliminary injunction were no longer in effect after the trial court entered judgment in the 2011 action in favor of Fannie Mae.

On December 4, 2018 the trial court entered an order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and granting the motion to strike; it entered a judgment of dismissal on the same date.

7. Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration
8.
On December 11, 2018 plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and granting the motion to strike. Plaintiffs contended Fannie Mae did not file and serve a timely responsive pleading to the complaint; the court clerk entered a default against Fannie Mae; plaintiffs’ application for default judgment was scheduled to be heard at the September 27, 2018 case management conference; and Fannie Mae did not file a case management statement or appear at the conference. In its opposition, Fannie Mae argued the motion for reconsideration was untimely, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion, and plaintiffs failed to establish any new or different facts to justify reconsideration.

After holding a hearing, on January 16, 2019 the trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. The court determined it had no jurisdiction to consider the December 11, 2018 motion after entry of judgment on December 4. Further, the motion was untimely under section 1008 because it was not filed within 10 days after service of notice of entry of the order. In any event, plaintiffs did “not raise any new facts that could not with reasonably diligence have been raised at the previous hearing.” The court also explained Fannie Mae did not appear at the September 27, 2018 case management conference because the court continued the conference to November 7.

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Properly Vacated the Default
B.
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in granting Fannie Mae’s motion to set aside the default. Fannie Mae responds the order is not appealable because the trial court never entered a default judgment against Fannie Mae before granting its motion. Both are incorrect.

1. The order vacating the default is appealable
2.
An order setting aside entry of default, in the absence of a default judgment, is not separately appealable. (Misic v. Segars (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1154 [“When a trial court grants a motion to vacate a default, an appeal does not lie in the absence of entry of a default judgment.”]; Veliscescu v. Pauna (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1521, 1522 [“no appeal lies from an order granting a motion to vacate a default upon which no default judgment has been entered”]; Leo v. Dunlap (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 24, 25 [“an order granting a motion to vacate a default upon which no judgment was given . . . is not an appealable order”].) However, plaintiffs may challenge the order setting aside default because they appeal from the December 4, 2018 judgment of dismissal. (Veliscescu, at p. 1523, fn. 1 [“Any issue relative to the granting of defendant’s motion to set aside the default can be presented on appeal from the judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a).).”]; Leo, at p. 25 [“The propriety of such an order, however, may be raised in the appeal from a judgment adverse to the party resisting the motion.”].)

3. Governing law
4.
“Section 473(b) contains two distinct provisions for relief from default. The first provision . . . is discretionary and broad in scope: ‘The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.’ (§ 473(b).)” (Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 838 (Even Zohar); accord, Zomora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 254 (Zamora).) “‘A ruling on a motion for discretionary relief under section 473 shall not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse.’” (Zamora, at p. 257; accord, Minick v. City of Petaluma (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 15, 24.)

“The second provision is mandatory . . . and narrowly covers only default judgments and defaults that will result in the entry of judgments.” (Even Zohar, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 838; accord, Zamora, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 257 [“The purpose of this provision ‘was to alleviate the hardship on parties who lose their day in court due solely to an inexcusable failure to act on the part of their attorneys.’”].) The mandatory relief provision provides the trial court “shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” (§ 473, subd. (b).) When the applicability of the mandatory provision does not turn on disputed facts, it is subject to de novo review. (Hernandez v. FCA US LLC (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 329, 336; Gee v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 477, 485.)

Section 473, subdivision (d), provides a trial court “may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” “The trial court’s determination whether an order is void is reviewed de novo; its decision whether to set aside a void order is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1020; accord, Nixon Peabody LLP v. Superior Court (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 818, 822.)

5. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the default
6.
Section 430.41, subdivision (a), provides for a 30-day extension of time in which to file a responsive pleading if the demurring defendant files a declaration stating a good faith attempt to meet and confer was made and explaining why the parties were not able to meet. As discussed, section 435.5, subdivision (a), has a similar provision applicable to a motion to strike. On May 25, 2018 Fannie Mae filed a meet and confer declaration pursuant to sections 430.41 and 435.5, which extended its time to respond to the complaint to June 28, 2018. Notwithstanding Fannie Mae’s filing of the declaration, the court clerk entered default against Fannie Mae on June 6, 2018. The court therefore properly struck the default “as void” on the basis the entry of default was procedurally defective pursuant to section 430.41, subdivision (a)(2). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Fannie Mae’s motion to vacate the default.

C. The Trial Court Properly Sustained Fannie Mae’s Demurrer Without Leave To Amend
D.
1. Standard of review
2.
“‘In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.’” (Matthews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768; accord, King v. CompPartners, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1039, 1050.) “‘“‘“We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . . We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.” . . . Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.’”’” (Matthews, at p. 768; accord, Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010.)

“If the demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, we consider whether there is a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the defect in the complaint could be cured by amendment.” (King v. CompPartners, Inc., supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1050; accord, T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162.) A trial court abuses its discretion by sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend where “‘there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.’” (Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1100; accord, City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 865.) “The burden is on plaintiffs to prove that amendment could cure the defect.” (King, at p. 1050; accord, Sierra Palms Homeowners Assn. v. Metro Gold Line Foothill Extension Construction Authority (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1127, 1132 [“‘The plaintiff has the burden of proving that [an] amendment would cure the legal defect, and may [even] meet this burden [for the first time] on appeal.’”].)

3. Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action
4.
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. But plaintiffs provide no legal argument, thus forfeiting their claim of error. (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 363 [“If a party’s briefs do not provide legal argument and citation to authority on each point raised, ‘“the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration.”’”]; In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 227 [“‘Issues not supported by citation to legal authority are subject to forfeiture.’”].) We acknowledge a self-represented litigant’s understanding of the rules on appeal are, as a practical matter, more limited than that of an experienced appellate attorney. Whenever possible, we do not strictly apply technical rules of procedure in a manner that deprives litigants of a hearing. But we are required to apply the rules on appeal and substantive rules of law to a self-represented litigant’s claims on appeal just as we would to those litigants who are represented by trained legal counsel. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.)

Even if plaintiffs had not forfeited their arguments, their contention the trial court erred lacks merit. The trial court properly sustained the demurrer without leave to amend based on plaintiffs’ failure to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Plaintiffs allege Fannie Mae fraudulently conveyed the Property to Monterrico because it failed to pay off plaintiffs’ judgment lien against SCME Mortgage. “‘A fraudulent conveyance is a transfer by the debtor of property to a third person undertaken with the intent to prevent a creditor from reaching that interest to satisfy its claim.’” (Kirkeby v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 642, 648 (Kirkeby); accord, Potter v. Alliance United Ins. Co. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 894, 903.) Plaintiffs’ cause of action fails as a matter of law because the abstract of judgment against SCME Mortgage was recorded on November 21, 2016, more than four years after Fannie Mae obtained title to the Property at the March 23, 2011 foreclosure sale. Further, Fannie Mae is not a judgment debtor in the recorded abstract of judgment. Thus, Fannie Mae’s transfer of title of the Property to Monterrico in September 2017 was not a transfer by a debtor to avoid payment of a creditor’s claim.

We treat plaintiffs’ cause of action for voidable transfer of title as another fraudulent conveyance claim. (See Civ. Code, § 3439.04, subd. (a) [“A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation as follows: [¶] (1) With actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor. [¶] (2) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor either: [¶] (A) Was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction. [¶] (B) Intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor’s ability to pay as they became due.”]; Kirkeby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 649 [under Civ. Code, § 3439.07, subd. (a)(1), “a creditor who makes a successful fraudulent conveyance claim may obtain ‘[a]voidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim’”].)

Plaintiffs allege Fannie Mae and Monterrico conspired to transfer title to the Property without resolving the judgment lien and lis pendens recorded in the 2011 action. But plaintiffs’ judgment was against SCME Mortgage, not Fannie Mae or Monterrico, and the abstract of judgment was recorded after Fannie Mae obtained title to the Property. Nor did plaintiffs’ recording of the lis pendens provide plaintiffs an interest in the Property because “[a] lis pendens does not give the [recording party] any rights in the property in and of itself.” (Integrated Lender Services, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 867, 877; accord, Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp. v. Reed (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1318 [“a notice of lis pendens does not make the person who recorded it a secured creditor”].) Further, a lis pendens creates a cloud on the title to property only until the litigation is resolved. (Integrated Lender Services, Inc., at p. 877; Mira Overseas Consulting Ltd. v. Muse Family Enterprises, Ltd. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 378, 384.) Here, the litigation was resolved in Fannie Mae’s favor when judgment was entered in 2011 action and affirmed on appeal. Thus, plaintiffs’ allegations do not support their second fraudulent conveyance claim.

Plaintiffs also allege a cause of action for interference with due process of law, which is not a cognizable tort. In any event, plaintiffs’ allegation that Fannie Mae interfered with due process of law by obtaining a writ of possession in violation of the preliminary injunction cannot support any tort claim because the preliminary injunction issued in the 2011 action was dissolved by operation of law after Fannie Mae obtained a judgment against plaintiffs in the action. (Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 646, 661, fn. 14 [“Since the pending matter was finally determined in favor of defendant, the injunction dissolved even without the necessity of formal motion.”]; City of Oakland v. Superior Court (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 565, 569 [“[W]hen a judgment is entered in favor of the defendant, the preliminary injunction dissolves without the necessity of a formal motion to dissolve.”].)

Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show how they could amend their complaint to cure the legal deficiencies in their causes of action. (King v. CompPartners, Inc., supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1050; Sierra Palms Homeowners Assn. v. Metro Gold Line Foothill Extension Construction Authority, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1132.) Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs leave to amend.

E. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration
F.
Section 1008, subdivision (a), provides that “a party may make a motion to reconsider ‘based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law.’ ‘A party seeking reconsideration also must provide a satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time.’” (Yolo County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Myers (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 42, 50; accord, Torres v. Design Group Facility Solutions, Inc. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 239, 243.) “We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion.” (Torres, at p. 243; accord, Schep v. Capital One, N.A. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1331, 1339.)

Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in denying their motion for reconsideration. It did not. Plaintiffs filed their motion for reconsideration on December 11, 2018, seven days after the court entered judgment on December 4. “After entry of judgment, the superior court did not have jurisdiction to entertain or decide a motion for reconsideration.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 859, fn. 29; accord, Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 265 [“‘A trial court may not rule on a motion for reconsideration after entry of judgment.’”]; Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 187, 192.) Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded it had no jurisdiction to consider the motion.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Fannie Mae is to recover its costs on appeal.

FEUER, J.

We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

DILLON, J.*

Parties and Attorneys
Collins et al. v. Federal National Mortgage Association
Division 7
Case Number B295474
Party Attorney

Olufemi S. Collins : Plaintiff and Appellant
580 W. Monterey Ave. #2527
Pomona, CA 91769 Pro Per

Wanda D. Collins : Plaintiff and Appellant
580 W. Monterey Ave. #2527
Pomona, CA 91769 Pro Per

Federal National Mortgage Association : Defendant and Respondent
Jenny Lee Merris
Parker Ibrahim & Berg LLC
695 Town Center Dr Fl 16
Costa Mesa, CA 92626

Bryant S. Delgadillo
Parker Ibrahim & Berg LLC
695 Town Center Drive
16th Floor
Costa Mesa, CA 92626

Mariel A. Gerlt-Ferraro
Parker Ibrahim & Berg LLC
695 Town Center Drive,
16th Floor
Costa Mesa, CA 92626

Attorney General : Information only
Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General-Appellate Coordinator
300 South Spring Street
North Tower, 5th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90013

Contact Name: Consumer Law Section