Filed 6/18/20 Marriage of Nwosu CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re Marriage of IFEYINWA ROSE and DAVID CHUKA NWOSU.

B294509

IFEYINWA ROSE NWOSU,

Appellant,

v.

DAVID CHUKA NWOSU,

Respondent.

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BD539701)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Rolf M. Treu, Judge. Affirmed.

Ifeyinwa Rose Nwosu, in pro. per., for Appellant.

No appearance for Respondent.

__________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Ifeyinwa Rose Nwosu appeals a judgment awarding property to her former husband, David Chuka Nwosu, as his separate property. We affirm.

During Ifeyinwa and David’s marriage, they purchased property located on Arlington Avenue (the Property). About a decade later, Ifeyinwa filed a petition for dissolution of marriage.

At a status conference, the parties told the court the Property was at risk of foreclosure, but there remained a dispute over its ownership. At the court’s suggestion, the parties stipulated to an order to list the Property for sale and hold the proceeds in escrow until they reached an agreement or the court ordered distribution.

The Property had not been sold as of the subsequent trial setting conference. The parties again agreed to sell the Property and then “fight about who gets what.” David claimed the Property was his separate property and he should get all the proceeds; Ifeyinwa claimed the Property was community property and the proceeds should be divided evenly.

The same day, the parties filed a stipulation for order providing as follows: “Property located at . . . Arlington Avenue . . . to be listed and sold. [¶] Proceeds of the Property when sold to be retain [sic] by the ESCROW and any EQUITY to be divided equally 50/50 and Escrow to issue checks to each party or at the determination of the Court as to the percentage of division.” The court signed the stipulated order.

On the first day of trial, Ifeyinwa told the court David refused to sign a purchase agreement for the Property, in violation of their prior agreements and court orders. The court ordered David sign the purchase agreement, noting the only issue remaining was how to divide the proceeds of that sale.

At trial, David testified that he and Ifeyinwa purchased the Property during their marriage and it was initially recorded under both spouses’ names. A few years later, Ifeyinwa executed an interspousal transfer deed, which transferred her interest in the Property to David as his sole and separate property. In exchange, David transferred his interest in another property to Ifeyinwa. David explained they made the transfers because they were having marital problems.

Ifeyinwa acknowledged signing an interspousal transfer deed, but she explained she did not intend to transfer her interest in the Property to David. According to Ifeyinwa, she executed the transfer to force David to manage and take responsibility for the Property.

Ifeyinwa’s counsel argued David waived his right to claim the Property is separate property by signing the stipulation agreeing to divide the equity equally. When the court pointed out that the stipulation permitted it to order a different division, counsel asserted David could move for such an order once the Property is sold. The court replied that it was not necessary to wait until the sale to decide how to divide the proceeds. Ifeyinwa’s counsel then agreed with the court that if there were a proper transmutation of the Property, it would belong to David and all the proceeds of its sale should go to him.

The court entered judgment of dissolution of marriage and awarded the Property to David as his separate property. The court noted the interspousal transfer deed expressed a clear and unequivocal intent to transmute the Property. Ifeyinwa timely appealed.

On appeal, Ifeyinwa argues the court erred in refusing to follow the parties’ stipulation that the Property be characterized and treated as community property. As best we can tell, her argument is premised on the fact that the stipulated order states the equity in the Property shall be “divided equally.” She overlooks, however, that the stipulated order also grants the court the power to determine a different “percentage of division” of equity. It does not expressly characterize the Property as community property; nor does it implicitly require the Property be treated as such. Ifeyinwa’s counsel, in fact, conceded at trial that if there were a proper transmutation, the Property would belong to David and the entire proceeds of its sale would go to him. The court’s finding that the Property is David’s separate property does not violate the terms of the stipulated order.

Ifeyinwa alternatively suggests David conceded the Property was community property by listing it in his “Community and Quasi-Community Property Declaration.” We are not persuaded. Initially, Ifeyinwa forfeited the argument by failing to raise it below. (In re Marriage of Olson (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1, 15 [“ ‘As a general rule, issues not properly raised at trial will not be considered on appeal.’ ”].) In any event, it appears David simply made a mistake in listing the Property on that particular form. He proposed in the same declaration that the court award him the entire value of the Property. At subsequent hearings, moreover, he consistently claimed the Property was his separate property.

Ifeyinwa’s reliance on Stockton v. Knock (1887) 73 Cal. 425, is misplaced. In that case, a husband and wife stipulated that the wife waived all claims to certain property if the court granted her a divorce. (Id. at p. 427.) The wife subsequently argued the court did not have authority to award the property to the husband because he was not an “innocent party” in the divorce. (Id. at pp. 428–429.) The court rejected the argument on the basis that the wife had stipulated to such an award. (Id. at p. 429.) Here, in contrast, the parties did not stipulate to any particular division of the Property; instead, they expressly gave the court discretion to determine how to divide its equity.

DISPOSITION

We affirm the judgment. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

BIGELOW, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GRIMES, J.

WILEY, J.