Filed 12/24/19 Crestview Mobile Home Estates, LLC v. Baca CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
CRESTVIEW MOBILE HOME ESTATES, LLC,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
FRANCES BACA,
Defendant and Appellant.
D074222
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2018-00008268-
CU-PT-NC)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Jacqueline M. Stern, Judge. Affirmed.
Frances Baca, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Dowdall Law Offices and Terry R. Dowdall for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2014, Crestview Mobile Home Estates, LLC, doing business as Crestview Estates Mobile Home Park (Crestview), applied to a pilot program (Pilot Program) offered by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) through which the local public utility, San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E), would replace Crestview’s aging private gas and electric system (legacy system) with a new, publicly maintained system. Crestview was accepted into the program but Frances Baca (Baca), a resident at the park, objected and refused to permit entry onto her space for the removal or replacement of the gas and electric meters thereon. After several unsuccessful attempts to negotiate with Baca, Crestview filed a petition for injunctive relief seeking her compliance. The superior court granted the request and, among other relief, issued an injunction allowing Crestview and/or its authorized agents to enter Baca’s space to replace the aging gas and electric system.
Baca appeals and asserts: 1) Crestview unreasonably delayed by waiting 18 months after the dispute arose to file its petition; 2) the superior court erred by allowing Crestview to amend its petition and holding a hearing more than 15 days after the initial filing; 3) Crestview lacked standing to enforce the Crestview’s Estate Rules and Regulations (the Park Rules and Regulations) against Baca because she did not have a written rental agreement; 4) Crestview lacked standing to enforce the Pilot Program because it was a state-sponsored program between SDG&E and the CPUC; and 5) the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because only SDG&E had standing and Baca had no relationship with SDG&E. Crestview in turn asserts the work is complete and, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed as moot.
For the reasons set forth herein, we decline to dismiss the appeal, but find no error and affirm the superior court’s order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Original Tenancy and Requests for a Written Rental Agreement
In August 2003, Roberto and Margaret Baca (collectively the Bacas) expressed an interest in purchasing a mobile home located at space number 101 at Crestview. Crestview could not locate a copy of the written rental agreement then in place for space number 101 but indicated the tenants had signed a 15-year assumable lease and that eight years remained. Crestview offered to allow the Bacas to assume the lease, so long as they were approved as tenants and Roberto and Margaret applied. They listed themselves as the “Applicant” and their adult children, James and Frances Baca, as “persons residing with you.” Crestview accepted their application and listed the lease term as “Month to Month” on the acceptance form. The record does not contain a copy of the assumed lease or any other written rental agreement with respect to the Bacas’ original tenancy in 2003.
The Bacas purchased the mobile home that was on the space and Roberto, Margaret, and Frances Baca took title as “Joint Tenants with Right of Survivorship.” The following May, Crestview sent them a notice of violation regarding a remodel project they had begun. Baca responded by letter and stated, in part, “The only document that we have received after acceptance of our rental application is ‘Crestview Estate Rules and Regulations.’ Your rules and regulations does [sic] not have a provision for this violation and it’s [sic] conditions. As we were not provided with a rental agreement, we would like a copy at this time.” In July Baca sent another letter stating they had not yet received a copy of their rental agreement and asking if they were eligible for a new lease.
Dispute Over Written Rental Agreement
Shortly thereafter, Crestview sent the Bacas a “Notice Regarding Long Term Leases” along with copies of Crestview’s own five-year lease and a 15-year San Diego County Standard Mobile Home Park Lease. The standard lease indicated the utilities would be sub-metered and billed by Crestview, but also included a provision that stated, “[t]he method of charging for Utilities may be changed from time to time on no less than sixty (60) days’ written notice to the Homeowner(s).” Crestview asked the Bacas to elect one of the leases, or to inform Crestview if they wanted a shorter term, and to return the executed lease to the office. The record does not contain an executed copy of either lease.
In the fall of 2007, Crestview filed an unlawful detainer action against the Bacas with respect to another space they had rented, space number 30. The Bacas’ attorney made multiple requests for copies of the written rental agreements for both spaces. In November 2007, he represented, in writing, that the attorney for Crestview had advised him that Crestview could not find a copy of the original lease for space number 101 but would not concede that one did not exist.
In December 2007, the Bacas began withholding rent for space number 101 in light of Crestview’s continued refusal to provide a copy of their written lease agreement. In December 2008, Crestview gave the Bacas a “Three-Day Notice to Perform Covenants or Quit” and a “Sixty (60) Day Notice to Termination Possession” of space number 101. In response, Margaret Baca again requested a copy of the written lease agreement so that she could tender full payment before the expiration of the three-day notice. The record does not contain a copy of Crestview’s response or the requested lease agreement but does indicate the Bacas tendered full payment on December 19, 2008.
The Bacas made several more written requests for a copy of the written rental agreement for space number 101 over the following years.
Baca Becomes the Sole Tenant on Space Number 101
At some point, James Baca moved out of the shared mobile home and Roberto and Margaret Baca passed away. Thereafter, Baca remained as the sole tenant in the mobile home at space number 101. Records from the State of California Department of Housing and Community Development indicate the title to the mobile home was transferred to Baca in August 2012.
SDG&E Pilot Program
In March 2014, the CPUC began the Pilot Program, under which local public utilities would replace aging private utility systems with new publicly maintained systems. Crestview’s private utility system was nearing the end of its useful life, so it applied and was accepted into the program.
Crestview informed the residents of their intention to participate in the Pilot Program in May 2016. Soon thereafter, on June 22, Crestview entered into a contract with SDG&E regarding its participation in the Pilot Program. Under the terms of the agreement, Crestview was responsible for disconnecting and removing the old equipment, and SDG&E would bear the cost of installing the new utility equipment in the common area and at each individual space so long as each tenant consented to the installation by February 2017.
Construction began in July 2016 and the construction company provided each resident with an authorization form for entry and inspection of their mobile homes. Baca did not consent. On July 5, 2016, Baca gave written notice to Crestview indicating she would not consent to the alteration of the gas and electric meters on space number 101, and that she refused to permit entry onto her space for that purpose. Baca asserted Crestview had not provided her with a written rental agreement or any documentation explaining the conversion or identifying any associated charges she may incur as a result.
Crestview responded via a letter from its attorney dated September 1, 2016. Crestview informed Baca it had the legal right to access the land on which Baca’s mobile home was located, at any reasonable time, to maintain utilities or to protect the mobile home park, pursuant to Civil Code section 798.26, subdivision (a). However, Crestview noted SDG&E would also need to enter Baca’s mobile home to connect the new utilities, and that neither Crestview nor its agents had a legal right to enter Baca’s dwelling without her consent. In addition, Crestview informed Baca that the installation of the new system was almost complete, the legacy system would be shut down soon, and Crestview could not guarantee that Baca would continue to receive gas and electric if her home was not connected to the new system. Crestview included a “Permission to Enter and Perform Work” form.
SDG&E also wrote Baca on September 12, 2016, urging her to allow connection of the new lines so as to avoid an interruption in service. In addition, SDG&E informed Baca that there would be no charge to her if she allowed them to connect the utilities at that time, but that she would be charged $9,322 for the connection of services after the current crew completed its work on September 16, 2016.
In a letter to Crestview dated September 14, 2016, Baca stated she would authorize the repair or replacement of her current meter with the same type of meter, but that she would not authorize entry onto space number 101 for replacement of the existing meter with a “smart meter.” She again listed a number of concerns, including that the new system would result in increased utility bills, that residents would not receive a rent reduction even though Crestview would no longer have to pay for servicing the legacy system, and that there was no disclosure to the tenants that the new smart meters would “land lock” their mobile homes making it cost prohibitive to move them. She also claimed that Crestview had unlawfully entered her property, that someone had gone under her mobile home and shut off the main electrical breaker, and that she was forced to put a lock on her crawl space and her meters as a result.
Baca did not respond to SDG&E. On September 20, 2016, SDG&E left a written notice for Baca on the door of her mobile home indicating they would be installing new gas and electric meters on space number 101 on September 27. Baca responded via a letter to Crestview stating she had not given any authorization for the work and any new installation would be a trespass on her property and would be dismantled and removed. When the crew arrived on September 27, Baca threatened them and stated that she would go and get her gun. The security guard on site called the police.
2017 Lease Agreement
On January 9, 2017, Crestview sent Baca a written rental agreement. The cover letter stated, “[b]ased on your previous correspondence, it would appear that you do not have a written rental agreement for Space No. 101.” Crestview therefore considered Baca to be a month to month tenant, without a written rental agreement. The enclosed rental agreement indicated Crestview was billing tenants for gas and electric, but that Crestview would cease to provide that service within the year, and that tenants would instead be required to obtain gas and electric directly from the local public utility. As required by law, Crestview attached copies of the California Mobilehome Residency Law (MRL) and the Park Rules and Regulations to the written lease agreement. (See § 798, et seq.; § 798.15, subds. (b), (c).) Baca did not sign the lease agreement.
Crestview sent her another letter on March 27, 2017, stating, “you currently have a month-to-month tenancy. Pursuant to section 827, the landlord has the right to unilaterally change the terms of any month-to-month tenancy, following at least 30 days written notice to the tenant. Accordingly, pursuant to . . . section 827, your amended rental agreement is enclosed with this letter. If you remain in possession of Space
No. 101, that amended rental agreement will take effect on May 1, 2017.” The attached rental agreement was similar to the one sent on January 9, 2017, except for the term.
Seven-Day Notice to Comply with Park Rules and Regulations
That same month, Crestview informed Baca they would need to take legal action if she did not consent to the installation of the new utilities. Crestview offered to pay for the full cost of the installation and to provide Baca with a cash payment of $5,000 to avoid litigation. Baca did not consent.
On May 5, 2017, Crestview served Baca with a seven-day notice to comply with the Park Rules and Regulations. The notice states, “[t]he Park’s rules and regulations were in place prior to your parents applying for residency at the Park in September of 2003 and have remained in place at all times since September of 2003.” Crestview alleged three violations of the referenced rules. First, Crestview alleged Baca failed to obey all city, county and state laws, as required by rule B(5) when she refused to allow management or its agents to enter space number 101 to maintain and replace failing gas and electrical systems. Second, Crestview alleged Baca violated rules B(5) and B(8), as well as California Code of Regulations sections 1183, 1220, and/or 1226, by placing a locked box around her gas and electric meters and failing to provide an unobstructed path to the meters. Third, Crestview alleged the box obstructed a portion of the handicap ramp causing the ramp to be less than 36 inches wide, in violation of California Building Code section 1133B.
In response, Baca asked for a copy of the original 2003 rental agreement, denied the allegations regarding the box and ramp, stated an independent inspection determined the old meters were in good working condition, and demanded Crestview reimburse her $350 for the cost of that inspection. She asserted Crestview agreed to be a direct provider of utility services in 2003 and had done so for 13 years, and that any discontinuation of those services would be “unlawful and actionable.”
60-Day Notice to Terminate Possession
Crestview did not reimburse Baca, so she deducted $350 from her July rent. Following receipt of the reduced payment, Crestview sent Baca a three-day notice to pay rent or quit and a 60-day notice to terminate possession. A week later, on July 18, 2017, Crestview sent Baca a 60-day notice of termination of her tenancy, citing the same three rule violations and noting Baca’s refusal to allow for the removal of the aging legacy system posed a danger to all residents of the park.
Termination of Gas to and Purging of the Legacy System
In September 2017, Baca demanded Crestview and SDG&E remove the dangerous condition noted in the July 2017 eviction notice by disconnecting the old gas and electric systems. However, when Crestview asked Baca if she would consent to removal of the legacy system from her space, she said no. Baca indicated she wanted Crestview to shut down the gas and electricity in the legacy system at every space in the park except her own. Crestview informed her that was not feasible as the system was interconnected.
On September 27, 2017, SDG&E indicated Crestview had breached the Pilot Program agreement by failing to disconnect the legacy system. On October 2, SDG&E gave Baca notice that they would be conducting an inspection on October 6, but Baca again refused access. SDG&E discovered a leak in the gas line of the legacy system and shut off all associated regulators. SDG&E could not isolate the leak without access to Baca’s space, so they kept the regulators off, stopping the flow of gas to Baca’s space.
On October 25, Crestview once again asserted it had the legal right to enter Baca’s space to maintain the utilities or to protect the park in accordance with section 798.26, subdivision (a), and stated it had retained a licensed and insured contractor to install the new system at space number 101 at no cost to her and that the contractor would start on October 30, 2017. Baca refused to allow access to her space and stated any further attempt to enter her space would “be resisted by my placing a 911 call to the Fallbrook Sheriff Department for assistance.”
Shortly thereafter, on October 27, Baca informed Crestview that she was under the care of a cardiologist, was undergoing a 21-day heart monitor study, and that any interruption to her electrical service between then and December 7 would interfere with the testing. Crestview agreed to delay the work and offered to pay for Baca to stay at a hotel during the removal of the legacy system. In a follow up letter dated November 3, 2017, Crestview informed Baca it would begin purging the legacy system on November 6 but that it would attempt to accommodate her request to delay work at her space until the 21-day study was complete.
Baca responded by stating she would not obstruct or interfere with the “unauthorized force [sic] entry onto . . . Space No. 101, scheduled for November 6, 2017” but that “[a]ll legal rights and entitlement are preserved.” Crestview informed Baca that it had not scheduled any work on her space on November 6, but that it was starting work throughout the park to purge the legacy system that day and remained willing to replace her meters with either a smart meter or an analog meter compatible with the new and safer system at no cost to her at any time.
On November 20, 2017, the County of San Diego sent Crestview a Notice of Intent to Suspend Permit to Operate as a result of the ramp blocking access to the utilities on space number 101. In response, Baca removed the portion of the ramp and box surrounding the legacy utility meters but continued to refuse to permit Crestview to access her space to replace the meters. The County of San Diego agreed the removal of the ramp cured the November 20, 2017 violation.
Petition for Injunctive Relief
Unable to obtain Baca’s consent to remove and replace the meters, on February 14, 2018, Crestview filed a petition for injunctive relief in accordance with sections 798.87 and 798.88 of the MRL. Among other requested relief, Crestview asked the superior court to find that Crestview and its authorized agents were entitled to enter Baca’s space, pursuant to section 798.26 and rule B(5) of the Park Rules and Regulations, to replace the legacy system with a new and safer system; to enjoin Baca from interfering with any associated work, inspection, testing, or reading of the new meters; and to require Baca to either allow Crestview to hook up the new utilities or to retain her own licensed contractor to hook them up. In addition, Crestview asked the court to require Baca to remove the existing portions of the now partially dismantled ramp and replace it with a new code-compliant permitted ramp. Crestview relied on section 798.26 and rule B(5) of the Park Rules and Regulations to support the request regarding the gas and electric systems, and further relied on rules B(5) and C(3) to support the request regarding the ramp.
March 23, 2018 Hearing and Amended Petition
The superior court held a hearing on Crestview’s petition for injunction on
March 23, 2018. Because the hearing was more than 15 days after the filing of the petition, in violation of section 798.88, subdivision (d), the court took the matter off calendar and ordered Crestview to file an amended petition with a timely hearing date. The court further specified that Crestview would need to personally serve Baca with all papers associated with the amended petition within the appropriate timeframe. Crestview obtained a new hearing date of April 12, 2018, for its petition, and filed its amended petition for injunction on March 28, 2018, within 15 days of the hearing date. Crestview hand-served Baca with a copy of the petition that same day, as the superior court had previously ordered.
Baca filed a response on April 9, 2018. Therein, Baca alleged that she had continually resisted the installation of the new meters based on Crestview’s refusal to provide her with a copy of her written rental agreement and documentation regarding the Pilot Program. She conceded Crestview sent her parents a written lease agreement in 2004 and included an unexecuted copy, but alleged Crestview never provided a fully executed copy. Based on these allegations, Baca argued Crestview could not unilaterally modify or enforce the lease.
Grant of Injunction
The superior court issued a tentative ruling on April 11, 2018, granting Crestview’s petition. At the April 12 hearing, the court confirmed its tentative ruling and issued the injunction as requested by Crestview.
Baca appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. The Appeal is Not Moot
II.
At the outset of this appeal and in the context of opposing Baca’s request of an extension to file her opening brief, Crestview asserted all work required by the injunction had been performed and asked the court to dismiss the appeal as moot. This court treated Crestview’s response as a motion to dismiss, Baca opposed the motion, and the court deferred the motion to be considered concurrently with the appeal. Both parties further addressed the mootness issue in their briefing on appeal.
A. Applicable Law
B.
An appeal becomes moot, and subject to dismissal, when an event occurs that renders it impossible for the appellate court to provide any effectual relief. (Giles v. Horn (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 206, 227 (Giles); City of Cerritos v. State of California (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1031.) For example, in the context of injunctions, courts have often dismissed cases where the petitioner seeks to enjoin an act, the relief requested is denied, and the act the petitioner sought to enjoin occurs during the pendency of the appeal. (Giles, at pp. 227–228 [listing several examples]; Cerritos, at p. 1031.) However, where the appellate court can provide some relief, even if it is not full relief, the appeal is not moot and should not be dismissed. (Cerritos, at p. 1032.)
C. Analysis
D.
Crestview argues the appeal is moot for several reasons. First, Crestview alleges this court cannot provide any relief because the gas and electric system at space number 101 has been replaced and the new utilities are available. However, Baca alleges at least a portion of the work, the installation of the new meters, has not been completed and Crestview appears to concede this point as it argues Baca refuses to comply with the portion of the injunction requiring her to inform Crestview of her preferences for the connection of the new utilities. Moreover, Crestview does not address the provisions in the injunction that do not involve the utilities, including, for example, those related to the removal of the remaining portions of the wheelchair ramp, nor is there any evidence in the record to suggest Baca has complied with those provisions. Therefore, it appears there is still some relief this court can provide, and the work that has been completed is not sufficient to render the appeal moot. (See Cerritos, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1032.)
Next, Crestview alleges the appeal has been rendered moot by the termination of Baca’s tenancy, and asks us to take judicial notice of a summary judgment order in an unlawful detainer action. In response, Baca asks us to take judicial notice of a more recent order reversing the judgment in the unlawful detainer action. We grant both requests and take judicial notice of both orders. (Evid. Code §§ 452, subd. (d), 459; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252.) The second order, issued on March 7, 2019, reverses the first order and orders the unlawful detainer action dismissed. Accordingly, the present appeal has not been rendered moot by the unlawful detainer action. (See Cerritos, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 1032.)
Finally, Crestview asserts the appeal is moot because Crestview no longer owns the park and therefore cannot take any action. Crestview provides no citation or support for this assertion. The March 7, 2019 order in the unlawful detainer matter indicates Crestview declared “acquisition/change of an ownership interest in the Crestview Estates Mobilehome Park” but that “the declaration is silent as to whether [Crestview] continues to own Crestview Estates Mobile Home Park.” The order does not provide any further details and we note that Crestview remained a party to that action, along with the new entity. Thus, Crestview has not established that it no longer has any ownership interest in the park, or that the new ownership structure precludes Crestview from enforcing the injunction. Moreover, at least one such provision, set forth in paragraph 4, directs Baca to take action independent of Crestview, namely removing the remaining portions of the wheelchair ramp.
In her reply brief, Baca herself states that the appeal is moot and that she agrees with Crestview’s request for dismissal. However, Baca also asserts the work is not complete and contends Crestview’s arguments regarding mootness support her own arguments regarding standing. At the conclusion of her brief, she requests this court deny the motion to dismiss and to reverse the order. Thus, it appears Baca’s intention was to oppose the dismissal and to maintain her position the superior court’s ruling should be “dismissed” or, rather, reversed.
For these reasons, we conclude the appeal has not been rendered moot and deny Crestview’s motion to dismiss.
III. Appellant’s Burden
IV.
Before turning to the merits of the appeal, however, we note that many of Baca’s arguments lack clarity and are not adequately supported by citation to applicable legal authority. It is the appellant’s burden to establish reversible error. (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574.) “We are not bound to develop appellants’ argument for them. [Citation.] The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contention as waived.” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830; see also Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 (Benach) [appellant bears the burden to provide legal authority and the court may treat unsupported contentions as waived].) A litigant, such as Baca, that is “appearing in propria persona, . . . is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys.” (Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638 (Nelson).) We address the arguments raised by Baca with these principles in mind.
V. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Allowing Crestview to Amend the Petition
VI.
Baca contends the superior court erred by allowing Crestview to amend its petition and by hearing the petition more than 15 days after the original filing date. We disagree.
Section 798.88, subdivision (b) allows the owner or manager of a mobile home park to file a petition for an order enjoining a continuing or reoccurring violation of the park’s rule and regulations. Subdivision (d) of the statute states that “a hearing shall be held” on the petition within 15 days of its filing date.
Here, Crestview filed its original petition on February 14 and the initial hearing was not scheduled until March 23. Accordingly, the superior court took the hearing off calendar as untimely and ordered Crestview to file an amended petition with a timely hearing date, and to personally serve Baca with the amended petition on the same day it was filed. Crestview filed its amended petition for injunction on March 28, 2018, and the court held a hearing on the amended petition exactly 15 days later, on April 12, 2018. Relying on the original filing date of February 14, Baca contends the hearing was held 27 days after the filing date, exceeding the 15-day period set forth in the statute.
Crestview asserts Baca forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the superior court. Baca does not dispute this assertion, nor does the record before us indicate that she objected on this ground in the superior court. Thus, it does appear that she has forfeited the argument. (See Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 247, 265–266 [general rule is that arguments not raised in the trial court are forfeited or waived].) Regardless, though, even if the argument was not forfeited, we would not find it persuasive.
The superior court has discretion to allow a party to amend “any pleading, after notice to the adverse party . . . upon any terms as may be just.” (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).) Here, Crestview was originally unable to obtain a hearing within the 15-day period set forth in the statute, so the superior court properly exercised its discretion, after giving notice to Baca, to allow Crestview to amend its petition to correct the error. Baca asserts the superior court’s order was in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 537.6, but no such provision currently exists, and she provides no other authority for her assertions. (See Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852) [appellant bears the burden to provide legal authority and court may treat unsupported contentions as waived]; see also Nelson, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d at p. 638.)
In any event, it is difficult to conceive of any prejudice to Baca as a result of the order permitting Crestview to file an amended petition. The superior court did not issue an injunction until April 11, after Crestview refiled and re-served the petition, as directed, with a timely hearing date. The amended petition does not differ from the original petition in any material way and we see no reason why, in the absence of the amendment, Crestview could not have simply filed a new, separate petition seeking the same relief on April 11. Thus, if anything, the superior court’s order gave Baca an advantage by offering her additional time to prepare for the hearing.
VII. Crestview Did Not Unreasonably Delay the Filing of its Petition
VIII.
Next, Baca argues the 18 months Crestview waited to file its petition after learning of the dispute was unreasonable, and asserts the superior court therefore erred by hearing the untimely petition.
The defense of laches can be asserted in injunction cases, but the defendant must establish both unreasonable delay and prejudice resulting from the delay. (Finnie v. Town of Tiburon (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1, 14.) Here, Baca does not provide any authority to support her position that the delay was unreasonable or that it prejudiced her in any way, and we are not persuaded that it did. (See Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852; Nelson, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d at p. 638.)
The record establishes that Crestview remained in contact with Baca throughout the 18-month period and tried several times to gain her consent without seeking legal recourse. During that time, the legacy system continued to deteriorate, but when Crestview informed Baca the system had become dangerous and had to be removed, Baca asserted any disruption of electrical services would interfere with cardiac monitoring she was under. Crestview agreed to delay the work to accommodate the testing but, by the following February, Baca continued to refuse access and Crestview could not delay any longer. As the delay was caused, at least in part, by Baca, it was not unreasonable, and she was not prejudiced as a result.
Baca also asserts the delayed filing belies Crestview’s claim that there was an urgent need to remove the legacy system. However, the superior court issued the injunction based on Baca’s violations of California law and the Park Rules and Regulations. It made no findings regarding the immediate urgency of the situation. Regardless, Crestview filed the petition within four months of SDG&E’s initial determination that the legacy system was no longer safe, and the regulators were shut off during the entirety of that four-month period. As discussed, the legacy system was already nearing the end of its useful life when Crestview applied for the Pilot Program, and it is likely that it continued to deteriorate thereafter, concurrent with Crestview’s attempts to negotiate a solution with Baca. Unable to gain Baca’s consent to remove the increasingly dangerous legacy system, or to install working utilities at her space, Crestview was eventually forced to seek the assistance of the courts.
IX. Crestview Had Standing to Pursue the Injunction
X.
Baca argues Crestview did not have standing to pursue the injunction against her for two reasons. First, she asserts Crestview never provided her with a written rental agreement as required by section 798.15 and therefore could not enforce the Park Rules and Regulations against her. Second, she asserts that if anyone had standing, it was SDG&E, since the new utility system was to be installed and maintained by SDG&E.
A. Written Rental Agreement
B.
Section 798.15 of the MRL governs mobile home park leases and specifies, “[t]he rental agreement shall be in writing” and must include, among other items, the rules and regulations of the park.
Here, the record suggests Crestview attempted to provide a written agreement on at least two separate occasions. First, Crestview provided Baca’s parents with two options for written lease agreements in July 2004; and, second, Crestview provided Baca herself with a proposed written rental agreement in January 2017. Each lease complied with the requirements set forth in section 798.15, and each included a copy of the Park Rules and Regulations.
Although Crestview was not able to produce a copy of a fully executed written lease agreement, it appears Baca did have an unexecuted copy of the July 2004 agreement in her possession. In addition, in her response to the amended petition, Baca stated, “Respondent [Baca] firmly believes that the Petitioner [Crestview] holds a fully executed lease on Space No. 101 for his own protection in compliance with [the MRL] section 798.15.” Thus, while we are troubled by Crestview’s intermittent refusals to provide Baca with a copy of the written rental agreement, we are not convinced that no such agreement exists.
More importantly though, we disagree with Baca’s assertion that Crestview could not enforce the Park Rules and Regulations absent a fully executed written rental agreement. Section 798.88, upon which Crestview relied in seeking the injunction, permits the management of a mobile home park to file a “petition for an order enjoining a continuing or recurring violation of any reasonable rule or regulation of the mobilehome park” and the petition must include proof of such violation “by the named homeowner or resident.” (§ 798.88, subd. (b).) This provision does not make any reference to a written rental agreement or a tenant or lessee, and, instead, refers to violations of the rules and regulations by a “named homeowner or resident.” (Ibid., emphasis added.)
Here, there is no dispute Baca has been a resident and homeowner at Crestview for more than 15 years. During that time, she received numerous copies of the Park Rules and Regulations, and those rules and regulations did not change in any material way. On the very first page, the Park Rules and Regulations state, “[v]iolation of these rules will give CRESTVIEW ESTATES cause to evict anyone living in the mobilehome,” and that a notice of any such violation will be sent to any registered or legal owner of the mobile home. Thus, Baca had ample notice of the Park Rules and Regulations, and that she was bound by them as a resident and mobile home owner. With that knowledge, Baca continued to reside at Crestview and accepted all of the associated benefits. Having done so, she is bound by the governing rules and regulations. (See § 1589 [“A voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the obligations arising from it”]; Walmsley v. Holcomb (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 578, 581–582 [sublessee bound by terms of written lease agreement even absent written assignment due to voluntary acceptance of benefits].)
C. SDG&E Pilot Program
D.
Next, Baca contends Crestview did not have standing to enforce the Pilot Program because it was a state-sponsored program between SDG&E and CPUC. Crestview asserts Baca is prohibited from raising this argument because she did not raise it in the superior court. Although Baca does not dispute this assertion, a plaintiff’s lack of standing to sue is a jurisdictional issue that may be raised for the first time on appeal. (Cummings v. Stanley (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 493, 501; Blumhorst v. Jewish Family Services of Los Angeles (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 993, 1000 (Blumhorst).) Regardless, we do not find the argument persuasive.
To have standing, a plaintiff must have a real interest in the ultimate adjudication of the issue presented. (Blumhorst, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001.) The plaintiff must have suffered or be about to suffer an ” ‘ “injury of sufficient magnitude reasonably to assure that all of the relevant facts and issues will be adequately presented.” ‘ ” (Ibid.) When the relief sought is in the form of an injunction, the “plaintiff must show a likelihood he will be harmed in the future if the injunction is not granted.” (Id. at
p. 1004.)
Here, Crestview had a direct and substantial interest in the injunction it sought. Crestview did not seek an injunction to enforce the Pilot Program, as Baca asserts, but rather sought an injunction to protect its own interest in maintaining its business. As the owner of the mobile home park, Crestview had an interest in improving the park and ensuring the safety of the residents. In addition, Crestview had an interest in complying with its contractual obligation with SDG&E by removing the old utility system, and in gaining the full benefits of the new system. More specifically, Crestview had a direct interest in ensuring each space it rented in the park had access to gas and electric utilities. Absent an injunction, Crestview would have been harmed by the loss of a fully operational utility system. Therefore, Crestview had standing. (See Blumhorst, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1001, 1004.)
XI. The Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction
XII.
Finally, Baca asserts the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because she did not have a contractual relationship with SDG&E.
Crestview asserts Baca also waived this argument by failing to raise it in the superior court but, as with standing, arguments regarding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal. (Alliance for Cal. Bus. v. State Air Resources Bd. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1060 (Alliance).)
Regardless, we do not find merit in this argument either. Once again, Baca does not provide any authority to support her position. (See Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852; Nelson, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d at p. 638.) Moreover, it appears the arguments she does make are merely a continuation of her previous arguments regarding standing, as they are premised on the assertion that only SDG&E had standing to pursue the injunction. As SDG&E was not a party to the petition for injunction and we have already determined that Crestview had standing to pursue the injunction in its own right, Baca’s assertion that the court somehow did not have subject matter jurisdiction with respect to SDG&E is inconsequential.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. In the interest of justice, the parties will bear their respective costs on appeal.
BENKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
GUERRERO, J.