Filed 8/10/20 Centex Homes v. D.L. Walton CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
CENTEX HOMES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
D. L. WALTON ENGINEERING,
Defendant and Respondent.
F077446
(Super. Ct. No. VCU263786)
OPINION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. David C. Mathias, Judge.
Newmeyer & Dillion, Philip D. Kopp, Clayton T. Tanaka and Jason Moberly Caruso for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Van De Poel, Levy, Arneal & Serot, David V. Pipal, Nicolet E. Corliss for Defendant and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Plaintiff Centex Homes (Centex) obtained a $1.4 million default judgment against defendant D. L. Walton Engineering. Defendant filed a motion for relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473. The trial court granted the motion for relief, concluding the default and default judgment were void because Centex did not comply with the statute authorizing substitute service. (See § 415.20, subd. (b).) Centex appealed.
We conclude the trial court did not err in determining the address to which the summons and complaint were delivered was not the defendant’s “dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address.” (§ 415.20, subd. (b).) Consequently, Centex did not comply with the requirements for substitute service, which renders the default and default judgment void.
We therefore affirm the order granting relief under section 473.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Centex describes defendant D. L. Walton Engineering as “a sole ownership” and Donnie Lee Walton as its agent of service. Donnie Walton’s declaration states he “was a licensed contractor and sole owner of sewer and storm drain piping company DL Walton General Engineering,” which ceased doing business around 2008. Nothing in the record indicated the business was ever formally organized as a corporation, limited liability company or other entity. Accordingly, for purposes of this opinion, we treat Walton’s business as a sole proprietorship and use “Walton” to refer to both Donnie Walton and the business he conducted under the name D. L. Walton General Engineering.
Centex, a Nevada general partnership qualified to do business in California, develops residential subdivisions. From 2006 through 2014, Centex developed a 450-home residential community in Visalia known as “Shannon Ranch II.” The development included constructing homes, common areas, streets, and underground utilities, including sewers and storm drains. Centex did not perform the construction work itself; instead, it entered written contracts with various trade subcontractors to perform the work.
Walton operated his sewer and storm drain piping company from 1983 until 2008. Walton worked as a Centex subcontractor on at least 20 projects between 1995 and 2008. In 2008, at the beginning of the economic downturn, Walton ceased operating his business.
In September 2006, Centex and Walton signed a 28-page contract for the installation of underground sewer and storm drain piping on property described as Shannon Ranch II Phase 4. Walton contends that in 2007 he completed the work and it was inspected and approved by (1) Centex’s soil engineers and (2) the City of Visalia’s building inspection department.
Centex alleges it discovered problems with the soil compaction along one of the streets in the development. As a result, on January 7, 2016, Centex filed a complaint against Walton, P & G Communications, Inc., P & G Contractors, Inc. and unnamed Doe defendants. The complaint set forth causes of action for negligence, breach of contract, equitable indemnity and declaratory relief relating to the duty to indemnify. The complaint alleged the compaction problems damaged asphalt pavement, subgrade materials, landscapes, and streetlights. The complaint alleged Centex incurred costs and expenses in excess of $1,029,000 resulting from the defects, which included the cost of repairing the damage caused by the compaction problems and attorney’s fees.
On January 11, 2016, the attorney who filed Centex’s complaint directed staff to send a letter to Walton at his home address on Balch Park Road in Springville. The letter did not mention the lawsuit filed four days earlier. Instead, it asserted “we tendered Centex’s claim for defense and indemnity to D L Walton Engineering (‘DL Walton’) back on April 10, 2012, without ever receiving any response from DL Walton” and enclosed a copy of the tender letter. The letter’s last paragraph stated: “Accordingly, Centex hereby reminds DL Walton of its duty to indemnify Centex pursuant to the parties’ written contract and demand DL Walton to indemnify Centex for all fees and costs, including legal fees, costs and vendor fees, arising out of DL Walton’s work at said project.” Walton received the January 11, 2016 letter by certified mail and provided it to his insurance broker.
Centex’s counsel hired First Legal Network to serve process on Walton. First Legal Network made two attempts to serve Walton at his home on Balch Park Road in Springville—the first on February 6, 2016, and the second on February 10, 2016. The process server’s affidavit of due diligence stated the address was in the foothills, the residence was situated approximately 300 yards off the roadway, the gate was locked, vehicles were present, there was no activity, and there was no response when the process server honked his horn. After two unsuccessful attempts, Centex’s counsel searched for other addresses where Walton might be served. His search identified two addresses in Visalia and unsuccessful attempts were made at those addresses.
On February 16, 2016, a process server attempted service at a residence, 14490 Avenue 256, in Visalia. The front door was answered by a woman who stated she was Walton’s daughter. The process server’s declaration asserted he asked Walton’s daughter if Walton lived or received mail at the address and she responded that Walton received mail there and owned the property. The process server gave Walton’s daughter the summons, complaint and related documents and explained the nature of the documents. His declaration asserted that he instructed another process server affiliated with First Legal Network to mail a copy of the same documents to 14490 Avenue 256. Attached to his declaration is a copy of a proof of service by mail stating the documents were mailed to 14490 Avenue 256 on February 18, 2016. The daughter’s declaration states she never received the summons or complaint through the mail.
Walton’s daughter told him that documents from Centex had been hand-delivered to her home. Walton immediately contacted his insurance broker and was advised that there was nothing he needed to do until the summons and complaint were properly served. The next day, February 17, 2016, Don Jackson, an adjuster with Financial Pacific Insurance Company (Financial Pacific) telephoned the law firm representing Centex. He informed a paralegal at the firm that Walton had received the complaint and that he had questions about the claims stated in the complaint. The paralegal passed Jackson’s inquiry along to an attorney at the firm.
On February 24, 2016, Jackson called Centex’s counsel again, acknowledging that he had received and processed the subpoena that Centex had served on Financial Pacific on January 14, 2016, and that the documents setting forth Walton’s business insurance with Financial Pacific would be available for production soon. Five days later, the law firm obtained the documents, which were voluminous.
Default
On May 11, 2016, approximately three months after the summons and complaint were delivered to Walton’s daughter, Centex filed a request for entry of default on mandatory Judicial Council form CIV-100. A deputy clerk of court entered the default as requested.
On December 20, 2016, Centex filed a request for dismissal of the Doe defendants without prejudice and a request for court judgment in the amount of $1,402,124. The request for court judgment was supported by a statement of facts, interest computation, and request for attorney fees. In January 2017, the trial court filed an order denying the application for default judgment. Among other things, the order stated that the requested judgment exceeded the amount claimed due in the complaint and there was no notice to the defendant of the amount claimed as required by section 580.
In March 2017, Centex’s counsel filed a declaration stating that Centex’s request for default and its subsequent application for default judgment had been served by mail on Walton at 14490 Avenue 256. This assertion of fact is contradicted by the declaration of Walton’s daughter, which states she never received these documents via mail.
On April 19, 2017, the trial court filed a default judgment against Walton in the amount of $1,402,124. This amount consisted of $1,029,784 in damages, $266,615 in prejudgment interest, $103,728 in attorney fees, and $1,997 in costs.
On December 20, 2017, Walton first learned of the default judgment when he received a telephone call from an attorney advising him the default judgment had been entered. Walton contacted counsel, who began working on a motion for relief and a request to declare the judgment void.
Motion for Relief
In January 2018, approximately nine months after the default judgment was filed, Walton filed a motion for relief from the default and default judgment. The motion asserted Centex failed to comply with the statutory requirements for substitute service of process and, therefore, the default judgment was void as a matter of law. The motion also asserted costs, fees and penalties should be imposed against Centex for its bad faith conduct in handling service of process, the request for default, and the subsequent default judgment. The motion was supported by declarations from Walton and his attorney.
Centex filed an opposition to the motion for relief and supported its opposition with declarations from the process server, its counsel, and a paralegal. Walton’s reply to the opposition was supported by additional declarations from him and his attorney and by a declaration from his daughter.
On February 22, 2018, after issuing a tentative ruling to grant Walton’s motion for relief, the trial court held a hearing. During the hearing, the court’s questions to counsel focused on whether there had been compliance with the statutory requirements for substitute service. After hearing arguments, the court determined service had been improper. Later that day, the trial court entered a minute order adopting its tentative ruling to grant Walton’s motion for relief from the default and default judgment. The contents of the written ruling are described in part II.A. of this opinion. Centex filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. BASIC PRINCIPLES
A. Relief from Void Judgments
Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), provides a trial court “may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” The use of the word “may” in this provision establishes that the authority granted to the trial court is discretionary. (Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1020.) A default judgment may be void as a matter of law for a variety of reasons, including lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and the amount of the judgment exceeding the amount demanded in the complaint. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2020) ¶ 5:485, pp. 5-138 to 5-139.)
B. Jurisdiction and Service of Process
Before a court can enter a valid personal judgment, it must have both jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person. (Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII v. Changzhou SinoType Technology Co., Ltd. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 125, 138 (Rockefeller).) Service of process on a party is the means by which a court with subject matter jurisdiction asserts its jurisdiction over the party and notifies the party of the action. (Id. at p. 139.) “ ‘Process’ signifies a writ or summons issued in the course of a judicial proceeding.” (§ 17, subd. (b)(7).) Service of a summons is governed by a five-article chapter in California’s Code of Civil Procedure. (§§ 413.10–417.40.)
“[F]ormal service of process performs two important functions. From the court’s perspective, service of process asserts jurisdiction over the person.” (Rockefeller, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 139.) From a defendant’s perspective, service of process provides notice of the pending action and gives him or her an opportunity to present a defense. (Ibid.) Stated another way, “[s]ervice of process … protects a defendant’s due process right to defend against an action by providing constitutionally adequate notice of the court proceeding.” (Ibid.)
Accordingly, “compliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. [Citation.] Thus, a default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute is void.” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444; see Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544 (Ellard).)
The present appeal involves substitute service, a type of constructive service described in section 415.20, subdivision (b): “If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served …, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the household …, at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left.” (§ 415.20, subd. (b).)
In Ellard, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th 540, the court recognized that “[s]tatutes governing substitute service shall be ‘liberally construed to effectuate service and uphold jurisdiction if actual notice has been received by the defendant.’ ” (Id. at p. 544, quoting Bein v. Brechtel-Jochim Group, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1392.) “To be constitutionally sound the form of substituted service must be ‘reasonably calculated to give an interested party actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard … [in order that] the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice implicit in due process are satisfied.’ ” (Zirbes v. Stratton (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1407, 1416 (Zirbes); see Bein v. Brechtel–Jochim Group, Inc., supra, at p. 1393.)
C. Standard of Review
When analyzing a motion to set aside a void judgment, courts usually distinguish between (1) judgments that are void on the face of the record and (2) judgments that appear valid on the face of the record but are shown to be void through consideration of extrinsic evidence. (OC Interior Services, LLC v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1318, 1326.) “This distinction may be important in a particular case because it impacts the procedural mechanism available to attack the judgment, when the judgment may be attacked, and how the party challenging the judgment proves that the judgment is void.” (Ibid.)
Where the party seeking relief alleges defective service, the distinction between facially void judgments and facially valid judgments is relevant to identifying the applicable standard of appellate review. If a trial court determines the defect in service appears on the face of the record, appellate review “is of necessity de novo.” (Ramos v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1440 (Ramos).) In contrast, if a trial court decides a contested motion by reviewing extrinsic evidence, such as declarations, affidavits or oral testimony, appellate review is governed by the abuse of discretion standard. (Id. at pp. 1440–1441.) Under the abuse of discretion standard, appellate courts defer to the factual determinations made by the trial court where the evidence is in conflict. (Id. at p. 1441; see Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711 [deference called for by the abuse of discretion standard varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review] (Haraguchi).)
In the present appeal, the parties submitted declarations addressing the propriety of service. The declarations contain descriptions of events that directly contradict one another and also support conflicting inferences. As a result, the trial court did not decide the default judgment was void on the face of the record. It follows that the abuse of discretion standard of review applies and we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact to the extent that those findings are supported by substantial evidence. (Ramos, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1440–1441; see Haraguchi, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 711.)
D. Timeliness of Motion
“Where a party moves under section 473, subdivision (d) to set aside ‘a judgment that, though valid on its face, is void for lack of proper service, the courts have adopted by analogy the statutory period for relief from a default judgment’ provided by section 473.5, that is, the two-year outer limit.” (Trackman v. Kenney (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 175, 180, quoting 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, § 209, pp. 814–815.) Here, timeliness is not an issue because the motion for relief from the default and default judgment was filed approximately nine months after the default judgment was entered.
II. SUBSTITUTE SERVICE WAS DEFECTIVE
A. Trial Court’s Decision
The trial court’s written ruling described substitute service as a three-step process. The first step requires a copy of the summons and complaint to be left “at the person’s dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address.” (§ 415.20, subd. (b); see Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶ 4:206, p. 4-34.) The court found Centex failed to comply with this requirement and, as a result, service was improper and the default judgment was void as a matter of law.
The trial court found that from 1983 until Walton stopped doing business, his business address was 14602 Avenue 256 in Visalia, which was also his home address. In July 2010, Walton and his wife moved to a residence on Balch Park Road in Springville, about 45 miles from Visalia. At the time Centex attempted to serve Walton at 14490 Avenue 256 in Visalia, it had corresponded with him by certified mail to his Springville address. That letter addressed tendering Centex’s request for indemnity to Walton’s insurance company. Based on this correspondence, the court found “Centex was aware at the time of service of its complaint in February of 2016 that Mr. Walton now lived in Springville. Nonetheless, Centex proceeded to serve the complaint … at an address that was wholly unrelated to [his] business, mailing address, and/or usual place of abode.”
The facts explicitly addressed in the trial court’s written ruling were not the only grounds for its decision to grant Walton’s motion. In a concluding paragraph, the ruling stated: “Based on the foregoing and the reasons stated in the moving papers, including the supporting declarations, … Walton’s motion for relief from default and default judgment and request to void judgment is granted.” (Italics added.)
B. Analysis
1. Step One: Location of Service
Subdivision (b) of section 415.20 provides for substitute service at four locations—specifically, “the person’s dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United State Postal Service post office box.” Centex’s interpretation of this provision is set forth in its opening brief: “Substitute service may be made at an address at which the person receives mail, other than a U.S. post office box.” Centex contends it “effected substitute service at just such a location.” We disagree.
The trial court found that 14490 Avenue 256—the address where the summons and complaint were delivered to Walton’s daughter—was wholly unrelated to his business, his mailing address or his usual place of abode. The court found Walton’s business and residential address was on Balch Park Road in Springville. These findings of fact are supported by the declarations submitted by Walton and his daughter. We conclude the declarations constitute substantial evidence and, therefore, we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact on these matters. In short, the trial court rejected Centex’s version of the facts—specifically, that 14490 Avenue 256 was an address at which Walton received mail. Based on the foregoing findings, the trial court correctly determined that Centex did not complete the first step of the three-step process for substitute service required by subdivision (b) of section 415.20. (See Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶ 4:206, p. 4-34.)
2. Step Three: Mail Other Copies
The documents Centex presented to support its opposition to Walton’s motion for relief included a proof of service by mail stating the summons, complaint and related documents were mailed to 14490 Avenue 256 on February 18, 2016. This assertion of fact is contradicted by an inference drawn from the declaration of Walton’s daughter, which states she never received the summons or complaint through the mail. The trial court stated it was granting the motion for relief based on the grounds set forth in the moving papers, including the supporting declarations. From this statement, we infer the trial court found the third step in the substitute service process—that is, the mailing of a copy of the summons, complaint and related documents—was not completed. (See Bonzer v. City of Huntington Park (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1479–1481 [declarations that notice was not received in the mail].) This implied finding provides a separate ground for upholding the trial court’s determination that Centex did not comply with the statutory requirements for substitute service. (Ramos, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1441 [appellate courts defer to trial courts’ factual determinations where the evidence is in conflict].)
C. Liberal Statutory Construction
We next consider Centex’s implied legal argument that the statutory phrase “usual mailing address” should be interpreted to include any address at which the person receives mail, provided that the person receives actual notice of the summons and complaint. Centex suggests such an interpretation is appropriate because California courts do not require strict compliance with the statute and, “in deciding whether service was valid, the statutory provisions regarding service of process should be liberally construed to effectuate service and uphold the jurisdiction of the court if actual notice has been received by the defendant.” (Gibble v. Car-Lene Research, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 295, 313.)
1. Limits on Liberal Construction
The term “liberal construction” does not convey unlimited power to the judiciary. Rather, “the doctrine of ‘liberal construction’ has its limits.” (Adoption of M.S. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 50, 58.) The basic constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers among the three coequal branches of government prevents the judiciary from rewriting statutes enacted by the Legislature. (See Cal. Const., art. III, § 3 [enumeration and exercise of the powers of state government].) Consequently, a court may not, under the guise of construction, rewrite the law. (DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 992.) Section 1858 also limits the authority of the judiciary when construing statutes. It provides in part that “the office of the Judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained [in the statute], not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted.” (§ 1858.)
2. Meaning of Usual Mailing Address
Our interpretation of the phrase “usual mailing address” begins by referring to the dictionary definition of “usual.” (See Wasatch Property Management v. Degrate (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1111, 1121-1122 [courts appropriately refer to dictionary definition in attempting to ascertain ordinary meaning of a word].) The word “usual” means “such as accords with usage, custom, or habit : of the character or amount in common use;” “commonly or ordinarily employed” and “such as occurs in ordinary practice or in the ordinary course of events.” (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 2524.)
Based on these dictionary definitions, we liberally construe the reference in section 415.20, subdivision (b) to “the person’s … usual mailing address” to mean that “a person may have more than one ‘usual mailing address.’ ” (Goettemoeller v. Twist (2011) 161 Wash.App. 103, 109, [253 P.3d 405] [interpreting Washington’s substitute service statute].) In other words, a person through usage, custom or habit may have established more than one address where that person receives mail. For example, a defendant may customarily receive mail at a home address, a work address, and a third address that is neither the defendant’s home nor place of business. (See Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶¶ 4:206–4:210, pp. 4-34 to 4.35.) Consequently, the fact that Walton’s residence on Balch Park Road is a usual mailing address does not necessarily preclude him from having other usual mailing addresses.
Next, we consider whether the phrase “usual mailing address” can be liberally construed to include 14490 Avenue 256. Here, the trial court impliedly found Walton’s statement that he “never received any item of mail that was sent to me at [14490 Avenue 256]” was credible and accurate. Accordingly, the issue of statutory construction presented by the facts of this case is whether the phrase “usual mailing address” can include an address that was not actually used by the defendant as a place to receive mail. We conclude that, even liberally construed, the phrase “usual mailing address” requires that the person must have actually used the address in question as a place for receiving some mail. Stated from the opposite perspective, if a person has no history of receiving mail at the address in question, that address does not qualify as a “usual mailing address” for purposes of section 415.20, subdivision (b). Treating such an address as a “usual” mailing address would, in effect, rewrite the statute by eliminating the modifier “usual.” Eliminating a word from a statute is not a form of liberal construction. (See § 1858.) Thus, we agree with the Washington court’s statement that a “ ‘usual mailing address’ must mean some level of actual use for the receipt of mail or arrangements contemplating an actual use for receiving and forwarding mail.” (Goettemoeller v. Twist, supra, 161 Wash.App. at p. 109.)
3. California Cases
Our interpretation of the phrase “usual mailing address” does not contradict the principle of liberal construction or published opinions addressing substitute service. The application of the principle of liberal construction is illustrated by Ellard, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th 540. In Ellard, the plaintiff learned from the United States Post Office that the defendants’ forwarding address was a private post office. (Ellard, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 543.) The process server (1) went to the private post office, (2) spoke with the manager who told him the defendants received mail there, and (3) left a copy of the summons and complaint with the manager. (Ibid.) Later that day, the process server mailed a copy of the summons and complaint to the defendants at the private post office. (Ibid.) The appellate court considered the statutory language referring to the person’s “usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box.” (Id. at p. 545.) The court noted “there are no California cases addressing whether substitute service at a private/commercial post office box is proper.” (Ibid.) The court concluded the statute authorized service at a private/commercial post office box because, had the Legislature intended otherwise, it would have referred to “any” post office box rather than preceding “post office box” with the descriptive language “United States Postal Service.” (Id. at p. 546.) Thus, the court did not infer the specific reference to post office boxes maintained by the United States Postal Service was meant to cover all post office boxes. Such an inference would have violated the principle of liberal construction.
In Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193 (Hearn) the court discussed and approved the interpretation adopted in Ellard. (Hearn, supra, at pp. 1202–1204.) In Hearn, the process server went to the address listed on the defendant’s letterhead, which also was the address appearing “for her on the California State Bar’s Web site.” (Id. at p. 1198.) The process server learned the address was a post office box rental store. (Ibid.) On his third visit to the store, the process server left a copy of the summons and complaint with the store clerk and subsequently mailed the documents to that address. (Ibid.) The court concluded the process server had complied with the requirements for substitute service. (Id. at p. 1202.) Thus, Hearn supports the view that the phrase “usual mailing address” includes an address listed on the defendant’s letterhead, even when that address is a private post office box rental store. Establishing a private post office box is an “arrangement[] contemplating an actual use for receiving and forwarding mail” and, therefore, constitutes a usual mailing address. (Goettemoeller v. Twist, supra, 161 Wash.App. at p. 109.)
In summary, the principle of liberal construction cannot be invoked to validate service of process at an address where Walton had never received mail and “was wholly unrelated to [Walton’s] business, mailing address, and/or usual place of abode.” Therefore, we conclude the trial court properly determined Centex did not comply with the requirements for substitute service.
DISPOSITION
The order granting relief from the default and default judgment is affirmed. Defendant shall recover his costs on appeal.
FRANSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
DETJEN, Acting P.J.
SMITH, J.