19-UDL-00152 CHARLES HAMILTON VS. TATYANA DREVALEVA, ET AL.

CHARLES HAMILTON TATYANA DREVALEVA
JOSEPH K. BRAVO PRO/PER

Defendant Tatyana Drevaleva’s Special Motion to Strike a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer (C.C.P. §425.16) TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s special motion to strike Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to CCP § 425.16 is DENIED.

The court looks to the pleadings and declarations to determine whether Plaintiff’s unlawful detainer action is based on Defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges an unlawful detainer cause of action based on failure to pay rent and failure to cure following notice of default. Defendant’s declaration asserts that “this lawsuit is a retaliatory eviction lawsuit for expressing my First Amendment right for free speech in connection with the public interest after I called the police and reported Mr. Victor Scheff for yelling into my face from a close distance.” [Drevaleva Decl., ¶ 6] Defendant also asserts that she attempted to make payment after the notice period expired. Plaintiff does not present a declaration in response.

Based on the pleadings and affidavits, Defendant has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff’s unlawful detainer action “arose from” Defendant’s actions in reporting Mr. Scheff’s conduct to the police. Defendant has presented circumstantial evidence with respect to the timing of Plaintiff’s complaint and the fact that Plaintiff refused to accept payment on February 11 and 12, after the notice period expired. The fact that Plaintiff refused payment after the notice period expired, however, does not indicate that the complaint arose from Defendant’s protected speech because Plaintiff was not obligated to accept late payment. Further, the fact that Plaintiff’s complaint followed Defendant’s exercise of her free speech rights does not, by itself, establish that the complaint arose from that activity.

In Navellier, the Supreme Court explained, “the mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citation.] Moreover, that a cause of action arguably may have been ‘triggered’ by protected activity does not entail that it is one arising from such. [Citation.] In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity. [Citations.]” (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d 703, certain italics added.) Therefore, merely because Tenant’s lawsuit for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and negligent interference with prospective economic relations preceded Landlord’s unlawful detainer action does not mean that the unlawful detainer action arose from Tenant’s protected activity in bringing the prior lawsuit.

Olive Properties, L.P. v. Coolwaters Enterprises, Inc., 241 Cal. App. 4th 1169, 1176 (2015). Accordingly, Defendant has failed to meet her prima facie burden of showing that Plaintiff’s cause of action for unlawful detainer arises from Defendant’s act in furtherance of her right of free speech. Defendant’s claim is more properly evaluated in the context of a claim for retaliatory eviction.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, Defendant shall prepare a written order consistent with the court’s ruling for the court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and the California Rules of Court.