Case Number: BC635178 Hearing Date: August 06, 2018 Dept: 61

Plaintiff Christian Lee Ray’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Expenses is GRANTED in the amount of $14,025.00. The court awards costs of $1,808.55.

OBJECTIONS

Ray in Reply has raised objections to the declaration of Matthew Proudfoot submitted with Ford’s Opposition to this motion, primarily concerning Proudfoot’s testimony regarding the litigation strategy of Ray’s counsel, Knight Law Group (“KLG”), in this and other lemon law cases against Ford. The court SUSTAINS Objections No. 9–11, which relate to testimony speculating as to the fees recovered for the present case based on another contingency retainer agreement from another firm. All other objections are OVERRULED.

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Ray here seeks $16,515 in attorneys’ fees with a 0.5 multiplier, for a total fee award of $24,772.50. (Motion at p. i.) Ray also seeks costs in the amount of $1,808.55. (Motion at p. i.)

Parties to litigation must generally bear their own attorney’s fees, unless they otherwise agree. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.) However, the Song-Beverly Act provides for the award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing plaintiffs as follows:

If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.

(Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).)

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.) In exercising its discretion, the court should consider a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in handling the matter, the attention given, the success or failure, and the resulting judgment. (See id.)

In determining the proper amount of fees to award, courts use the lodestar method. The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the total number of reasonable hours expended by the reasonable hourly rate. “Fundamental to its determination . . . [is] a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . in the presentation of the case.” (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48 (Serrano III).) A reasonable hourly rate must reflect the skill and experience of the attorney. (Id. at p. 49.) “Prevailing parties are compensated for hours reasonably spent on fee-related issues. A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.” (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635 (Serrano IV).) The Court in Serrano IV also stated that fees associated with preparing the motion to recover attorneys’ fees are recoverable. (See id. at p. 624.)

Ford opposes the present motion for fees on the following bases. First, it argues that Ray’s counsel are already compensated for their work by the contingency agreement in this case. (Opposition at p. 4; Proudfoot Decl. ¶ 13.) Ford next argues that the rates charged by Ray’s attorneys are unreasonable, and that the amounts billed indicate unreasonable hours spent preparing what ought to have been form motions and form discovery. (Opposition at pp. 5–7.) Ford also argues that Ray cannot recover fees for claims not related to the Song-Beverly Act, such as the fraud claims which were the subject of Ford’s Demurrer in this action. (Opposition at p. 6.) Ford finally argues that the circumstances of this case do not warrant any multiplier. (Opposition at pp. 7–8.)

The rates involved in this case on Ray’s end ranged from $250 to $500 per hour. (Mikhov Decl. Exh. A.) The court finds that these rates are within the range of what is reasonable for similar work in the community.

The court agrees with Ford that the fees must be allocated to some extent, depending on the cause of action for which they were incurred.

When a cause of action for which attorney fees are provided by statute is joined with other causes of action for which attorney fees are not permitted, the prevailing party may recover only on the statutory cause of action. However, the joinder of causes of action should not dilute the right to attorney fees. Such fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation of an issue common to both a cause of action for which fees are permitted and one for which they are not. All expenses incurred on the common issues qualify for an award.

(Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of San Francisco (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1133.) The court agrees that the above authority requires removal of the $2,490 spent on Ford’s Demurrer to the Complaint, which exclusively concerned the adequacy of Ray’s fraud claims.

Ford has directed this court to various “form” motions and letters which it argues cannot furnish a basis for an award of the fees claimed. (Opposition at pp. 6–7.) Ford has provided examples of nearly identical discovery requests, meet-and-confer correspondence, and attorneys’ fees motions from other cases, indicating that Ray’s request for fees on the same are inflated. (Proudfoot Decl. ¶¶ 7–8, 10.) These documents involved 3.9 hours of work (discovery requests), 9.5 hours (meet-and-confer letter), and 5.3 hours (motion for attorneys’ fees). (Opposition at pp. 6–7.) Ray does not contest the use of form documents, but argues the hours billed accurate reflect the time spent reviewing each new work. (Reply at pp. 8–9.)

The court finds that Ford has not rebutted the reasonableness of these billings. The court will credit Ray’s claim that his attorneys’ spend a reasonable amount of time ensuring that his legal papers are tailored to his case. Likewise, the court notes that the 9.5 hours spent on a meet-and-confer letter is more accurately characterized as 9.5 hours reviewing Ford’s discovery production. (Mikhov Decl. Exh. A.)

However, the court agrees with Ford that, given the highly structured nature of this case, a multiplier is not warranted. .) “Once the court has fixed the lodestar, it may increase or decrease that amount by applying a positive or negative ‘multiplier’ to take into account a variety of other factors, including the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented.” (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank., N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 833.) As demonstrated by the multitude of form-papers in this case, the present action was neither particularly novel nor complex. Although Ray’s counsel may have taken the case on a contingency basis, the court regards the risk inherent in that arrangement adequately accounted for by the actual contingency arrangement itself and the provision for reasonable attorneys’ fees in Civil Code § §1794.

The court therefore takes the lodestar submitted by Ray — $16,515.00 — and subtracts the amount ($2,490.00) spent litigating Ford’s Demurrer to Ray’s fraud claims, leading to a lodestar of $14,025.00. The court declines to apply a multiplier to this amount. The court also grants Ray costs in the amount of $1,808.55, as stated in his memorandum of costs filed July 11, 2018.