Case Number: BC475336    Hearing Date: July 18, 2014    Dept: J

Re: Cornelio “David” Chavez, et al. v. City of El Monte, et al. (BC475336)

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ADJUDICATION

Moving Parties: Defendants City of El Monte, Officers Jonathan Edwards, R. Vargas, M. Gonzalez, Martha Tate, C. Tello and R. Abbot

Respondents: No timely opposition filed

POS: Moving OK

Plaintiffs allege that City of El Monte police officers used excessive force in arresting Plaintiff Cornelio Chavez. The Complaint, filed on 12/15/11, asserts causes of action for:

1. Civil Battery
2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
3. Violation of CC § 52.1 – Bane Act and other Civil Rights Violations

Procedural Note: The case was stayed while Plaintiff Cornelio Chavez defended the criminal case. On 9/11/13, he was found guilty.

FSC is set for 7/31/14. Trial is set for 8/5/14.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE:

The court takes judicial notice of a copy of the court’s docket website of Plaintiff Cornelio Chavez’s criminal case entitled People v. Cornelio David Chavez, Case No. KA095073-0 with Plaintiff’s Criminal Conviction. (Ev C § 452(d).)

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ADJUDICATION:

Defendants City of El Monte, Officer J. Edwards, Officer R. Vargas, Officer M. Gonzalez, Officer Martha Tate, Officer C. Tello and Officer R. Abbot (collectively “Defendants”) move for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of issues.

Defendants bring the motion on the grounds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving parties are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law as to all remaining causes of action within Plaintiffs’ Complaint, or in the alternative for summary adjudication on the causes of actions and issues for the following reasons:

1. Plaintiff’s criminal conviction establishes that reasonable force was used, thus barring his battery claim;
2. Plaintiff’s criminal conviction establishes that reasonable force was used, thus barring any claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress from the battery claim; and
3. Plaintiff’s criminal conviction establishes that reasonable force was used, thus barring his CC § 52.1 claim.

A defendant moving for summary judgment must “show” that either one or more elements of the “cause of action … cannot be established,” or there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) Once the moving party has met the initial burden above, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce admissible evidence showing a triable issue of fact exists. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).)

BACKGROUND:

On December 15, 2011, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint alleging Civil Battery, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 – Bane Act and Other Civil Rights Violations. The matter was stayed on April 2, 2013, pending the outcome of Plaintiff Cornelio Chavez’s criminal trial. Plaintiff’s criminal matter and this civil matter both surround the event of June 24, 2011, whereby Plaintiff was arrested and charged with Penal Code Violation §§ 148, 69 and 243.

The only remaining Plaintiffs are Cornelio Chavez and Margarita Jacobo. Plaintiffs Yesenia Reyes and Jonathan Reyes filed their dismissal of their entire action on March 24, 2013.

The first cause of action alleges battery upon Cornelio Chavez as against all named Defendants. (Complaint ¶¶ 31-36.) The second cause of action is by the two remaining Plaintiffs for intentional infliction of emotional distress as against all Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 37-43.) The third cause of action is sought by Cornelio Chavez for Civil Code § 52.1(b) against all Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 44-51.)

DEFENDANTS’ EVIDENCE:

On June 21, 2012, Defendant Police Officers Jonathan Edwards, R. Vargas, M. Gonzalez, Martha Tate, C. Tello and R. Abbot went to the Chavez home. (DSS ¶ 1: Ferguson Decl., Exh. 1, Complaint ¶ 18.) Plaintiff Cornelio Chavez was discovered in the bedroom. (DSS ¶ 2: Ferguson Decl., Exh. 1, Complaint ¶ 21.) Plaintiff Cornelio Chavez claims the officers battered him during the course of his arrest. (DSS ¶ 3: Ferguson Decl., Exh. 1, Complaint ¶ 32.)

Plaintiff Cornelio Chavez was criminally charged with two counts of Penal Code § 69 (resisting upon Officers Edwards and Gonzalez) and two counts of Penal Code § 243(b) (battery on Officers Edwards and Gonzalez. (DSS ¶ 4: Ferguson Decl., Exh. 3, Official Docketing Statement of Case No. KA095073, Page 1.) Plaintiff Cornelio Chavez was convicted of violating Penal Codes §§ 69 and 243(b) on September 11, 2013. (DSS ¶ 5: Ferguson Decl., Exh. 3, Official Docketing Statement of Case No. KA095073, Pages 24-25.)

FIRST AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION:

Civil rights or tort complaints are barred if any judgment in the plaintiff’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of an underlying final criminal judgment. (Heck v. Humphrey (1994) 512 U.S. 477 (“Heck”) and Yount v. Sacramento (2008) 43 Cal.4th 885 (“Yount”); Susag v. City of Lake Forest (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1401.)

In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that when a state prisoner seeks damages in a section 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. (Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.) Thus, in order to pursue a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that would undermine a prior conviction, plaintiff must prove that the underlying conviction has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal …, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” (Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-477.)

In Yount, the California Supreme Court held that the principles established by Heck apply to state law claims for assault and battery. “In light of the fact that Heck and California law express similar concerns of judicial economy and the avoidance of conflicting resolutions, we conclude that the [Heck] analysis … applies equally to [plaintiff’s] common law claim for battery.” (Yount, 43 Cal.App.4th at 902.) The Yount court explained it could not “think of a reason to distinguish between section 1983 and a state tort claim arising from the same alleged conduct,” since both claims required proof that the officers used unreasonable force. (Id.)

The Yount court explained that to determine “whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction”, a three-part analysis is made: “First, the court must determine, using the substantial evidence test, what acts or omissions may have formed the factual basis for the plaintiff’s obstruction conviction. Second, the court must ascertain what alleged misconduct by the officer forms the factual basis for the civil rights claim (e.g., excessive force). The final step is to consider the relationship between the plaintiff’s acts of obstruction and the officer’s alleged misconduct.” (Yount, 43 Cal.App.4th at 894, citing to VanGilder v. Baker (7th Cir.2006) 435 F.3d 689, 691.)

Penal Code § 69 provides: “Every person who attempts, by means of any threat or violence, to deter or prevent an executive officer from performing any duty imposed upon such officer by law, or who knowingly resists, by the use of force or violence, such officer, in the performance of his duty, is punishable by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”

Penal Code § 243(b) provides in pertinent part: “When a battery is committed against the person of a peace officer… engaged in the performance of his or her duties… the battery is punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment.”

The evidence submitted by Defendants demonstrate that Plaintiff Cornelio Chavez was convicted of violating Penal Codes §§ 69 and 243(b) on September 11, 2013, and that Plaintiffs’ claims against the Defendants in this case arise out of the same incident as the criminal matter. Thus, the conviction in the criminal matter negates any argument that Defendants were using unreasonable force and bars the first and third causes of action. Plaintiffs did not oppose the motion. Thus, the motion for summary adjudication of the first and third causes of action is granted.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:

Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires (1) outrageous conduct by defendant; (2) intentional or reckless causing emotional distress; (3) severe emotional distress; and (4) causation. (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal. App. 4th 1228, 1259.) Conduct is extreme and outrageous when it exceeds all bounds of decency usually tolerated by a decent society, and is of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress. Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590; see also Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 494.)

The evidence submitted by Defendants also demonstrates that Defendants’ conducts were not “outrageous.” Plaintiffs did not oppose the motion. Thus, the motion for summary adjudication of the second cause of action is granted.

CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT CITY OF EL MONTE:

“Except as otherwise provided by statute,” a public entity “is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Gov C § 815(a).) Government tort liability is dependent on the existence of an authorizing statute or enactment. (Searcy v. Hemet Unified Sch. Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802.)

Plaintiffs have failed to set forth any statutory basis for liability against Defendant City of El Monte. (See Plaintiffs’ Complaint.) Plaintiffs did not oppose the motion. Thus, the motion for summary judgment on this basis as to Defendant City of El Monte is granted.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Based on the above, the motion for summary judgment is also granted.