Case Name: County of Santa Clara v. Jiang
Case No.: 18CV340005

Defendant Guanfeng Jiang (“Defendant”) moves to quash service of summons and complaint in an action brought against her by plaintiff County of Santa Clara (“Plaintiff”).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This is an action to collect on a debt for medical services rendered to Defendant at Santa Clara Valley Medical Center in January 2016. Per a proof of proof of service filed by Defendant on January 11, 2019, service of the summons and complaint in this action was effectuated on Defendant on January 8, 2019 via substitute service. On February 15, 2019, Defendant filed the instant motion to quash service of the summons and complaint on the ground that proper service on her of the foregoing items was not made. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

II. Defendant’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons

Defendant moves to quash service of summons pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, which provides that a defendant, on or before the last day of her time to plead or within any further time that the court for good cause may allow, may move to quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her. (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a).)

“When a defendant challenges the court’s personal jurisdiction on the ground of improper service of process the burden is on the plaintiff to prove … the facts requisite to an effective service.” (Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413.) The plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that proper service of the summons and complaint was effectuated. (Boliah v. Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 984, 991.)

Plaintiff maintains that proper service was made, and directs the Court’s attention to the very proof of service reflecting substitute service that Defendant disputes. The filing of a proof of service that complies with applicable statutory requirements creates by itself a rebuttable presumption that service was proper. (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1441.) According to the proof of service, Defendant was served by substitute service with the summons and complaint on January 8, 2019 at 767 Lakehaven Drive, Sunnyvale, a residential property. (Declaration of Jeremy Avila in Support of Opposition to Motion to Quash (“Avila Decl.”), ¶ 9, Exhibit B.) Copies of the summons and complaint were purportedly left with one “Tyler Chi,” who is identified as a “roommate,” by independent process servicer Jason Burke (“Burke”) of Hilton Investigations. (Id.) According to Burke’s declaration submitted in support of Plaintiff’s opposition to the instant motion, he first attempted to effectuate personal service on Defendant at the Lakehaven property on January 5th at 7:44 a.m. (Declaration of Jason M. Burke in Support of Opposition to Motion to Quash (“Burke Decl.”), ¶ 5.) Burke rang the doorbell and waited several minutes for a reply but no one answered the door. (Id.) On January 7th, at 7:30 p.m., Burke again attempted to effectuate personal service on Defendant at the Lakehaven address but no one answered the door. (Id., ¶ 6.) During his third visit on January 9th at 2:31 p.m., an Asian male, later identified as Tyler Chi (“Chi”), answered the door. (Id., ¶¶ 7-8.) Burke asked Chi if Defendant was home and he responded that she was not but confirmed that both he and Defendant lived at the property. (Id., ¶ 8.) Burke proceeded to hand Chi copies of the summons and complaint, which he identified to him as such, and explained that the documents were for Defendant. (Id., ¶ 9.) The following day, Burke executed a proof of service memorializing his efforts to serve Defendant. (Id., ¶ 10.)

Plaintiff explains that, as per the contents of Burke’s declaration, it made several attempts to personally serve Defendant at the Lakehaven address and after failing to successfully do so, utilized substitute service instead. Substitute service is a secondary method of service on a defendant in lieu of person delivery and is permitted under Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20, subdivision (b), which provides that if a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered, service may be perfected by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s dwelling house, usual place of abode, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, with a person of at least eighteen years of age. Where such a manner of service is made and challenged, it is critical that a connection be shown between the address at which substitute service is effectuated and the party alleged to be served. (Zirbes v. Stratton (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1407, 1416-1417.) Plaintiff maintains that it has demonstrated reasonable diligence on its part by having made several attempts to personally serve Defendant at the Lakehaven property and that is properly resorted to statutorily compliant substitute service when personal service could not be made.

In an effort to rebut the presumption of proper service afforded to Plaintiff based on the filing of the proof of service, Plaintiff submits her own declaration and that of Tyler Chi in support of her contention that she has not been physically present in the U.S. since June 2018, that she is domiciled in China, and that she does not know Chi and has never met him. (Declaration of Guanfeng Jiang in Support of Motion to Quash (Defendant’s Decl.”), ¶¶ 3-5.) In his own declaration, Chi explains that he has been a tenant of the Lakehaven property since early January 2019, and has lived there with two roommates, Jody and Rufei, whom he does not know very well. (Declaration of Tyler Chi in Support of Motion to Quash (“Chi Declaration”), ¶¶ 2-3.) He explains that he does not know Defendant, has never met her, and she has not been a resident of the Lakehaven property since he moved in. (Id., ¶¶ 4-5.) According to Chi, he initially did not realize Burke was a process server when he knocked on the door and he assumed he was delivering a package for one of his roommates. (Id., ¶¶ 6-7.) At that time, he had only lived in the residence for a few days and had not yet met his roommates. (Id.) He explains that as both of his roommates are Asian, he incorrectly assumed when Burke was at the door that Defendant was one of them and thus wrongly told Burke that Defendant resided at the Lakehaven property. (Id., ¶¶ 8-9.) He continues that by the time he realized the documents left with him were a court summons, Burke had already left. (Id., ¶ 11.) He looked through the papers and tried to call the Court to inform them of his mistake of identifying 767 Lakehaven as Defendant’s residence to the process service. (Id., ¶ 12.) Upon contacting the Court, Chi was advised to get in touch with a particular Court employee and explain what happened. (Id.) He did so, sending an email explaining he did not know who Defendant was and did not want to have “the responsibility of passing on such serious documents.” (Id., Exhibit A.) Later that day, Chi was informed by the individuals that he signed his lease with, Steve and Fei Liu, that Defendant was the mother-in-law of the owner of the residence, Jimmy Ding. (Id., ¶ 13.) Those individuals then instructed him to leave the papers left with him by Burke in the garage for Jimmy Ding to pick up. (Id., ¶ 14.) Chi did not see the papers after that point in time.

By supplying declarations attesting to the foregoing information, Defendants have sufficiently rebutted the presumption of proper service. (See Rancho Santa Fe Pharmacy, Inc. v. Seyfert (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 875, 882 [when the opposing party produces evidence casting doubt on the truth of the presumed fact, the other party is no longer aided by that presumption and “the presumption disappears, leaving it to the party in whose favor it initially worked to prove the fact in question”].) Defendant has sworn under penalty of perjury that the Lakehaven property is not her dwelling, with her not having been there since June 2018. (Defendant’s Decl., ¶ 4.) Her son-in-law and the owner of the home, Zhimin Ding, echoes the foregoing statements in his own declaration. (Declaration of Zhimin Dang in Support of Motion to Quash, ¶¶ 5, 7.) Problematically for Plaintiff, it has failed to offer anything which establishes that at the time service was attempted at the Lakehaven property, it was Defendant’s “dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20, subd. (b).) In its opposition, Plaintiff proclaims that Defendant provided 767 Lakehaven as her mailing address in her personal injury matter and as her mailing address for treatment, but proffers no evidence which establishes as much. The mere fact that a Notice of Lien was mailed to Defendant at that address by Plaintiff on October 11, 2018, as reflected in materials provided to the Court, does not, without more, establish that the Lakehaven property was a valid place to effectuate service on Defendant. (See Avila Decl., ¶ 6, Exhibit A.)

In sum, the Court finds that that proper service was not effectuated on Defendant. While it may be true that Defendant stayed at the Lakehaven property at some point in time, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that it was a place where substitute service could properly be effectuated on Defendant in August 2018. Consequently, Defendant’s motion to quash is GRANTED.