On 28 February 2014, the motion of Plaintiffs Cynthia Nomikos (“Nomikos”), Robert A. Spanner (“Spanner”), and Trial & Technology Law Group (“Law Group”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) to compel further responses to requests for admissions (“RFA”), form interrogatories (“FI”), special interrogatories (“SI”), and requests for production of documents (“RPD”) and for monetary sanctions was argued and submitted. Defendant Union Bank, N.A. (“Defendant”) filed a formal opposition to the motion and requests monetary sanctions.
Statement of Facts
This is an action for fraud. In the operative complaint, Plaintiffs allege the following: Spanner and Nomikos are married, and Spanner is a principal of the Law Group. Plaintiffs had several lines of credit and a home loan with Defendant. In 2009, Defendant created the Mortgage Assistance Program (“MAP”), ostensibly to allow customers to refinance their mortgages for the customers’ benefit. Defendant in fact used MAP to identify customers at risk of defaulting on their mortgages, fraudulently obtain evidence of their adverse financial circumstances, and take action against those customers in order to reduce its non-performing loan exposure.
After Nomikos applied for the MAP, Defendant closed Plaintiffs’ lines of credit and demanded immediate or accelerated payment of any outstanding balances. Defendant’s actions caused Plaintiffs significant financial harm. Plaintiffs initiated this action in 2012, and on 6 November 2013, filed the second amended complaint, asserting causes of action for fraud, unfair business practices, false advertising, fraudulent conversion, tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Discovery Dispute
On or about 2 October 2013, Plaintiffs served the RFA, FI, SI, and RPD on Defendant. The parties’ counsel agreed that responses to the discovery requests were due on 11 November 2013.
Defendant served objection-only responses to the RFA, FI, SI, and RPD on 11 November 2013, but also produced some documents responsive to the RPD on that date. Defendant produced additional responsive documents on 15 November 2013.
Defendant served supplemental responses to the RFA, FI, SI, and RPD on 21 November 2013. Plaintiffs deemed the supplemental responses to be deficient.
Spanner—acting as counsel for Plaintiffs—sent several meet and confer letters to Defendant’s counsel in November and December 2013, outlining the purported deficiencies in Defendant’s responses to the RFA, FI, and RPD.
On 27 December 2013, Defendant produced audio files responsive to the RPD.
The parties’ counsel’s meet and confer negotiations reached an impasse as to the propriety of Defendant’s objections and substantive responses to RFA Nos. 1-2 and 4-8, RPD Nos. 1-12 and 15-17, and FI Nos. 1.1, 2.1, 2.5, and 17.1.
Plaintiffs filed this motion to compel further responses to RFA Nos. 1-2 and 4-8, RPD Nos. 1-12 and 15-17, FI Nos. 1.1, 2.1, 2.5, and 17.1, and the SI on 21 January 2014.
Defendant supplemented its response to FI No. 17.1 on 14 February 2014.
Defendant filed opposing papers on 14 February 2014.
On 24 February 2014, Plaintiffs filed their reply.
Discussion
Plaintiffs move to compel further responses to RFA Nos. 1-2 and 4-8, RPD Nos. 1-12 and 15-17, FI Nos. 1.1, 2.1, 2.5, and 17.1, and the SI, and also request an award of monetary sanctions.
Defendant argues that the Court should deny this motion for lack of meet of confer efforts, opposes the motion on its merits, and requests an award of monetary sanctions.
I. Meet and Confer
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ counsel did not meet and confer regarding the RFA, FI, SI, and RPD.
A motion to compel further responses to interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and requests for admission shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration “showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code of Civ. Proc. [“CCP”], §§ 2016.040, 2030.300, subd. (b), 2031.310, subd. (b)(2), and 2033.290, subd. (b).) A reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution requires that the parties present the merits of their respective positions with candor, specificity, and support. (Townsend v. Super. Ct. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435, 1439.)
Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel presented the merits of his position regarding the RFA, RPD, and FI with candor, specificity, and support. However, he did not present any arguments regarding Defendant’s responses to the SI. Therefore, the meet and confer efforts were adequate as to the RFA, RPD, and FI, but not as to the SI.
Thus, to the extent Defendant contends the Court should not deliberate the merits of the motion to compel further responses to the SI for lack of meet and confer efforts, its argument is well-taken. However, the argument is unavailing with respect to the RFA, RPD, and FI.
To the extent Plaintiffs seek an order compelling Defendant to provide further responses to the SI, the motion is accordingly DENIED.
II. RFA and FI
Plaintiffs seeks further responses to FI Nos. 1.1, 2.1, 2.5, and 17.1, and RFA Nos. 1-2 and 4-8.
The RFA and FI requests at issue seek basic information about Defendant, information concerning Plaintiffs’ loans and MAP application, the MAP in general, and the identities of witnesses.
Defendant responded to each the discovery requests at issue with objections, and substantively responded to FI Nos. 1.1, 2.1, 2.5, and 17.1, and RFA Nos. 1-2, 4, and 7.
Plaintiffs argue that an order compelling Defendant to provide further responses to FI Nos. 1.1, 2.1, 2.5, and 17.1, and RFA Nos. 1-2 and 4-8 is warranted because Defendant’s objections lack merit and its substantive responses are incomplete and/or evasive.
Defendant contends that no further responses to the RFA and FI are warranted because its objections have merit and its substantive responses are complete and straightforward.
After Plaintiffs filed this motion, Defendant served a supplemental response to FI No. 17.1. In a situation where a discovery response is served after a motion to compel is filed, the court has substantial discretion to decide how to rule on the motion, including the discretion to deny the motion as moot. (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pac. Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 409.) Here, the Court exercises its discretion to deny the motion relative to FI No. 17.1 as moot.
A. Legal Standard
If a party demanding a response to an interrogatory or request for admission deems an answer to a particular interrogatory or request for admission as incomplete or evasive, or an objection in the response to be without merit or too general, that party may move for an order compelling further response. (CCP, §§ 2030.300, 2033.290.) The objecting party bears the burden of explaining and justifying the objection. (Coy v. Super. Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221 [“Coy”].)
B. Defendant’s Objections
Defendant objected to all the RFA and FI requests at issue on the ground of “premature.”
Interrogatories and requests for admission may be propounded any time more than 10 days after service of summons on, or appearance by, the responding party. (CCP, §§ 2030.020, subd. (b), 2033.020, subd. (b).) Since Defendant appeared in this action in 2012, and the discovery requests were propounded in October 2013, the FI and RFA are not premature. The “premature” objection is accordingly overruled.
Defendant also asserted objections on the grounds of vagueness and ambiguity (RFA Nos. 1-2 and 4-8), overbreadth (RFA Nos. 1-2, 4, and 6-8), “calls for a legal conclusion” (RFA Nos. 4 and 6-8 ), “assumes facts not in evidence” (RFA Nos. 1-2, 4, and 6-8), confidentiality (FI No. 1.1 and RFA Nos. 1-2 and 4-8), relevance (FI Nos. 2.1 and 2.5, and RFA Nos. 1-2 and 4-8), third party privacy (RFA Nos. 1-2 and 8), unspecified privileges (FI No. 1.1), and the attorney-client and attorney work product privileges (FI No. 1.1. RFA Nos. 1-2 and 4-7).
Objections to discovery requests on the grounds of “calls for a legal conclusion,” “assumes facts,” and confidentiality are improper. (See West Pico Furniture Co. v. Super. Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 416-417, 421 [“assumes facts” and “legal conclusion” are not grounds for objections to discovery requests]; Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 12, 23 [confidentiality objections are generally improper].) As such, these objections are overruled.
Since the ground for the general privilege objection is not set forth clearly in the response, the unspecified privilege objection is overruled. (See CCP, § 2030.240, subd. (b).)
Defendant does not proffer arguments to justify its attorney-client privilege and attorney work product privilege objections. As such, those objections are overruled. (See Coy, supra, at pp. 220-221.)
With respect to the vagueness and ambiguity objection to RFA Nos. 1-2 and 4-8, such an objection will only be sustained if the requests are unintelligible. (See Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783.) Here, the discovery requests are intelligible, and thus, the vagueness and ambiguity objection is overruled.
Defendant asserted a relevance objection in response to FI Nos. 2.1 and 2.5, and relevance and overbreadth objections in response to RFA Nos. 1-2 and 4-8. FI Nos. 2.1 and 2.5 seek Defendant’s current and former name(s) and address(es), and the identity and location of a party to the action is relevant and discoverable. (See CCP, § 2017.010 [providing that the identity and location of any witness to a relevant matter is discoverable].) Turning to the relevance and overbreadth objections to the RFA requests, Defendant argues that the discovery sought by the RFA is overbroad because it encompasses irrelevant information. For discovery purposes, information is “relevant to the subject matter” if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Super. Ct. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.) RFA Nos. 1-2 and 6-8 seek information regarding the MAP and Defendant’s use of information obtained by customers who apply for the MAP. This information would reasonably assist Plaintiffs in evaluating their fraud and unfair business practices claims because they allege that Defendant used MAP as a means to fraudulently obtain its borrowers’ adverse financial information to identify borrowers at risk of defaulting on their loans. RFA Nos. 4-5 seek information about Plaintiffs’ MAP application, lines of credit, and Defendant’s adverse actions against them. Such information is relevant to Plaintiffs’ claim for tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealings because it would help them evaluate their allegation that Defendant used information obtained from Plaintiffs’ MAP application in order to justify closing their lines of credit, rather than to help them refinance their mortgage. Thus, the relevance and overbreadth objections are overruled.
Defendant objected to RFA Nos. 1-2 and 8 on the ground of third party privacy. A person has a privacy interest in his or her financial information. (See Sacramento Cnty. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Super. Ct. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 440, 468; see also Valley Bank of Nevada v. Super. Ct. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 656.) However, the discovery sought by the RFA does not encompass third parties’ records. Rather, it asks Defendant to either admit or deny statements regarding its MAP program in general. Therefore, the third party privacy objection is overruled.
In sum, all of Defendant’s objections to the FI and RFA requests at issue are overruled.
C. Defendant’s Substantive Responses
Plaintiffs argue further responses to the FI and RFA requests at issue are warranted because Defendant’s substantive responses are incomplete and/or evasive.
1. Responses to the FI
Responses to interrogatories must be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits. (CCP, § 2030.210.) A substantive response to an interrogatory must either provide the information sought by the interrogatory, or make a statement of an inability to comply. (CCP, § 2030.210, subd. (a).)
Defendant only substantively responded to FI Nos. 1.1, 2.1, and 2.5, and RFA Nos. 1-2, 4-5, and 7. Since Defendant did not substantively respond to RFA Nos. 6 and 8, further responses are warranted.
FI No. 1.1 asks for he name and contact information of anyone who helped Defendant prepare its responses to the FI. Defendant substantively responded by stating its counsel’s name and contact information. Plaintiffs argue a further response is necessary because Defendant’ counsel simply typed the responses and did not assist in the formulation of the answer. This argument is not well-taken. The substantive response provides the information sought by the interrogatory. The fact that the objections to this interrogatory are overruled is immaterial to the sufficiency of the response. As such, a further response to FI No. 1.1 is not warranted.
FI No. 2.1 asks for Defendant’s name, past name(s), and the dates it used each name. FI No. 2.5 asks for Defendants’ present address, its address(es) for the past five years, and the dates it resided at each address. Defendant substantively responded by stating its current name and address, but does not indicate whether it ever used any past names or addresses, or the dates when it used its current name and address or any other name and address. These responses are incomplete because they do not provide all of the information sought by the requests. Therefore, further responses to FI Nos. 2.1 and 2.5 are warranted.
2. Responses to the RFA
Responses to requests for admission must be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits. (CCP, § 2033.220.) A response to a request for admission must admit so much of the matter as is true, either as expressed in the request or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party, or deny so much of the matter that is untrue. (CCP, § 2033.220, subd. (b)(1)-(2).) A denial, however, must be unequivocal. (See American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern Calif. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 247, 268.) If the responding party lacks sufficient information to admit or deny the truth of the matter, it must so state in the response. (CCP, § 2033.220, at subd. (b)(3)-(4).)
Defendant only substantively responded RFA Nos. 1-2, 4-5, and 7. Since Defendant did not substantively respond to RFA Nos. 6 and 8 and all of its objections are overruled, further responses to RFA Nos. 6 and 8 are warranted.
RFA No. 1 asks Defendant to admit that it did not provide mortgage relief pursuant to the MAP to any person who disclosed financial hardship on their MAP application. Defendant responded by denying the request, and stating that it “provided loan modifications to qualification residential loan customers.”
RFA No. 2 asks Defendant to admit that it had a customary practice to terminate its customers’ bank accounts and/or accelerate their repayment schedules upon learning of the customers’ financial hardship. Defendant denied the truth of the matter, and further stated that Plaintiffs’ line of credit was frozen pursuant to their note and deed of trust after they advised Defendant of their “precarious financial condition.”
RFA No. 4 asks Defendant to admit that Plaintiffs qualified for a loan modification. Defendant denied the truth of the matter, and further stated that one of Plaintiffs’ loan modifications was denied in January 2012.
Defendant’s responses to RFA Nos. 1-2 and 4 are not straightforward and the denials are equivocal because the statements stated after the denial suggest that rather than denying the truth of the statement set forth in the requests, Defendant denied the truth of a different statement. For example, RFA No. 4 asks for Defendant to admit that Plaintiffs qualified for a loan modification, but Defendant responded as though the request asked Defendant to admit that it approved Plaintiffs’ application for a loan modification. As such, further responses to RFA Nos. 1-2 and 4 are warranted.
RFA No. 5 asks Defendant to admit that it conducted only a drive-by appraisal of Plaintiffs’ home. RFA No. 7 asks for Defendant to admit that it was its policy to conduct appraisals for loan modifications by evaluating comparable properties in the same geographic area. Defendant responded to these requests with denials, but further stated that it is “not a licensed real estate appraiser,” and then admitted that it appraised Plaintiffs’ property. These responses are not straightforward. The denials are apparently qualified on a fact that is immaterial to the matter in the request (i.e. whether Defendant is a licensed real estate appraiser). Moreover, the responses include the word “admits,” which makes the denials equivocal. Therefore, further responses to RFA Nos. 5 and 7 are warranted.
D. Conclusion
Since Defendant served a supplemental response to FI No. 17.1 after Plaintiffs filed this motion to compel, the motion with respect to FI No. 17.1 is moot.
All of Defendant’s objections to FI Nos. 1.1, 2.1, and 2.5, and RFA Nos. 1-2 and 4-8 are overruled.
Defendant’s substantive response to FI No. 1.1 is code-compliant, but Defendant did not provide code-compliant responses to FI Nos. 2.1 and 2.5, and RFA Nos. 1-2 and 4-8.
Plaintiffs’ motion to compel, to the extent they seek further responses to the FI and RFA, is therefore GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED to the extent Plaintiffs seek an order compelling further responses to FI Nos. 2.1 and 2.5, and RFA Nos. 1-2 and 4-8. The motion is DENIED to the extent Plaintiffs seek an order compelling further responses to FI Nos. 1.1 and 17.1.
III. RPD
Plaintiffs seek an order compelling Defendant to provide further responses and production of documents responsive to RPD Nos. 1-12 and 15-17.
The RPD seeks Defendant’s internal documents concerning the MAP (RPD Nos. 1 and 15), documents reflecting Defendant’s efforts to identify borrowers at risk of default (RPD Nos. 2 and 17), Defendant’s advertisements and publicly available information about the MAP (RPD Nos. 3-4), documents showing the identity and basic contact information for customers who applied for the MAP (RPD Nos. 5-7), Defendant’s financial statements (RPD No. 8), communications between Plaintiffs and Defendant (RPD Nos. 9-10), documents reflecting the identity of Defendant’s managers and the management hierarchy from 2008 to the present (RPD No. 12), and customer complaints about the MAP (RPD No. 16).
Defendant objected to each RPD request at issue, and substantively responded to RPD Nos. 3-4, 8-12, and 17.
Plaintiffs argue an order compelling further responses to these requests is warranted because they have good cause for the discovery sought, the objections lack merit, and the substantive responses are incomplete and/or evasive.
Defendant contends such an order is not warranted because Plaintiffs lack good cause for the discovery sought, its objections have merit, and its responses are complete and straightforward.
A. Legal Standard
A party propounding a request for production may move for an order compelling a further response if it deems that a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete or an objection in the response is without merit or too general. (CCP, § 2031.310, subds. (a)(1) and (3).) The motion must set forth “specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Id., at subd. (b)(1); Kirkland v. Super. Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) If good cause is shown, the burden shifts to the responding party to justify any objections. (Kirkland v. Super. Ct., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 98.)
B. Good Cause Requirement
Good cause is established simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance. (Kirkland v. Super. Ct., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 98.)
As a general matter, discovery is relevant if it is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790.) Documents pertaining to the MAP, Defendant’s efforts to identify borrowers at risk of defaulting on their loans, how the MAP was advertised to the public, and customer complaints from 2008 to the present (RPD Nos. 1-4 and 15-16) are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence concerning Defendant’s allegedly unlawful motives for offering the MAP. Similarly, communications between Plaintiffs and Defendant (RPD Nos. 9-10) are either likely admissible or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence concerning Defendant’s use of information obtained from Plaintiffs’ MAP application. Thus, the discovery sought by RPD Nos. 1-4, 9-10, and 15-16 is relevant to this action.
In addition to information itself, the names and contact information of persons with knowledge of a relevant matter are discoverable. (CCP, § 2017.010.) Therefore, documents that identify borrowers who applied for the MAP program and Defendant’s managers (RPD Nos. 5-7 and 12) from 2008 to the present are relevant because such documents will disclose the identities and locations of potential witnesses to the MAP. As such, the discovery sought by RPD Nos. 5-7 and 12 is relevant to this case.
Lastly, any information that assists a party in evaluating its case is relevant. (See Gonzalez v. Super. Ct., supra, 33 Cal.App.4th, at p. 1546.) Defendant’s financial information from 2007 to 2010 (RPD No. 8) will help Plaintiffs evaluate their case because they allege that Defendant fraudulently misrepresented the MAP for its own pecuniary gain (i.e. to reduce its number of risky loans) around the time when the home mortgage market crashed in 2007. Therefore, the discovery sought by RPD No. 8 is relevant to this action.
Therefore, Plaintiffs have good cause for the discovery sought.
C. Defendant’s Objections
Defendant objected to all of the RPD requests at issue on the grounds of “premature,” vagueness and ambiguity, overbreadth, and relevance. Defendant also asserted objections in response to some of the RPD requests at issue on the grounds of “assumes facts not in evidence” (RPD Nos. 1-4, 7, 10, and 15) confidential or proprietary business information (RPD Nos. 1-10, 12, and 15-17), compound (RPD Nos. 9 and 12), duplicity and harassment (RPD No. 17), third party financial privacy (RPD Nos. 1-2, 5-7, and 16-17), and accessibility (RPD No. 8).
Since Defendant does not seek to justify its duplicity objection to RPD No. 17, or its attorney-client privilege and attorney work product privilege objections to any of the RPD requests, those objections are overruled. (See Kirkland, supra, at p. 98.)
In addition, after Defendant served its initial responses, Defendant asserted an additional duplicity objection to RPD No. 15, and in its opposition, it asserts an objection to RPD No. 8 on the ground that Plaintiffs seek evidence of its financial condition for the purpose of assessing punitive damages. Since these objections were not raised in the initial responses, they have been waived. (See CCP, § 2031.300, subd. (a).)
1. Premature, Vague and Ambiguous, Relevance, and Overbreadth Objections
Defendant objected to each of the RPD requests at issue on the grounds of “premature,” vagueness and ambiguity, relevance, and overbreadth.
Requests for production may be propounded anytime more than 10 days after service of summons on, or appearance by, the responding party. (CCP, § 2031.020, subd. (b).) Defendant appeared in this action in 2012, and the RPD was propounded in October 2013. As such, the RPD is not premature, and that objection is overruled.
A vague and ambiguous objection will only be sustained if the discovery request is unintelligible. (See Deyo v. Kilbourne, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d, at p. 783.) Since the requests are intelligible, the vagueness and ambiguity objection is overruled.
As discussed in detail above, the discovery sought by the RPD is relevant to this action. Since the overbreadth objection is part and parcel of the relevance objection (i.e. the requests are overbroad because they encompass relevant and irrelevant information), both objections are overruled.
2. Assumes Facts, Confidentiality, and Compound Objections
Defendant objected on the ground of “assumes facts not in evidence” to RPD Nos. 1-4, 7, 10, and 15, and on the ground of confidential or proprietary information in response to RPD Nos. 1-10, 12, and 15-17. “Assumes facts” and confidentiality are not proper grounds for objections to requests for production. (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Super. Ct., supra, 56 Cal.2d, at pp. 416-417, 421; Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Super. Ct., supra, 263 Cal.App.2d, at p. 23.) Thus, those objections are overruled.
Defendant objected on the ground of compound to RPD Nos. 9 and 12. A compound objection is not a proper objection to assert in response to a request for production because the propounding party is not limited on the number of requests for production it may propound. (Compare CCP, §§ 2030.030, subd.(a)(1) and 2030.060, subd. (f) [compound special interrogatories are impermissible if they effectively violate the limit on 35 special interrogatories], with CCP, § 2030.010 et seq. [no limitation on number of requests for production, no prohibition on compound requests].) The compound objection is therefore overruled.
3. Third Parties’ Financial Privacy Objection
Defendant asserted a third party privacy objection in response to RPD Nos. 1-2, 5-7, and 16-17.
A person has a privacy interest in his or her financial information. (E.g. Sacramento Cnty. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Super. Ct., supra, 195 Cal.App.4th, at p. 468.) RPD Nos. 1-2 and 17 do not encompass third parties’ financial information because those requests seek documents concerning Defendant’s internal policies, but RPD Nos. 5-7 and 16 might encompass third parties’ private financial information because they seek documents concerning individual customers who applied for MAP. Given that MAP was a program allegedly marketed to borrowers in difficult financial situations, individual customers’ MAP applications necessarily include at least general financial information (e.g., that the customers were having trouble paying their mortgages). As such, RPD Nos. 5-7 and 16 implicate the privacy rights of third parties.
Defendant insists that, since documents responsive to these requests might implicate third parties’ private financial information, Plaintiffs must show that the documents are directly relevant to this case, and that the RPD is the least intrusive means to obtain them. This argument is not well-taken.
The right to privacy is not absolute (Valley Bank, supra, 15 Cal.3d, at p. 656), and Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution only “protects the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy against a serious invasion.” (Puerto v. Super. Ct. (Wild Oats) (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249-1250 [“Puerto”], quoting Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 370 [“Pioneer”].) Where something less than a serious invasion of a legitimate privacy interest would occur, the court must balance the privacy interest at stake against competing interests, such as “the interest of the requesting party, fairness to the litigants,” and the “consequences of granting or restricting access to the information.” (Id., at p. 1251, citing Pioneer, supra, at pp. 370–371.)
RPD Nos. 5-7 seek only the identities and basic contact information for third parties who applied for the MAP. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant used MAP as a pretext to fraudulently obtain adverse financial information about its customers, and thus, they have a strong interest in obtaining the identities and contact information of witnesses who applied for the MAP. Since the discovery sought seeks only the customers’ identities and basic contact information, their privacy interests are minimal and do not preclude disclosure of the discovery sought. (See Puerto, supra, at pp. 1249-1250, citing CCP, § 2017.010.)
RPD No. 16 asks for customers’ complaints about the MAP, and do not necessarily reflect the customers’ financial information. Assuming that documents responsive to RPD No. 16 do contain third parties’ private financial information, Plaintiff nevertheless has a strong interest in discovering customer complaints about the MAP in order to gather evidence pertaining to their fraud and unfair business practices claims. Moreover, while third parties’ financial information may be disclosed to some degree in their complaints, redacting their financial information would assuage privacy concerns while allowing Plaintiffs to obtain discovery. (See Valley Bank, supra, 15 Cal.3d, at p. 658.)
As such, the privacy objection is overruled, but to the extent any responsive documents reflect third parties’ private financial information, Defendant shall redact the private financial information.
4. Accessibility Objection
Defendant objected to RPD No. 8 on the ground that the discovery sought is equally available to Plaintiff in the public domain. Defendant cites CCP section 2031.310, subdivision (g) in support of its position that it does not need to produce electronically stored information (“ESI”) available to the public on the internet because to require it to do so would somehow inconvenience or burden it.
A court may limit discovery of ESI if it “is possible to obtain the information from another source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive,” or if the demanding party “has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought.” (CCP, § 2031.310, subd. (g)(1) and (3).)
Here, contrary to Defendant’s assertion, it would be more burdensome for Plaintiffs to obtain the discovery sought from the public domain than it would be for Defendant to produce the discovery sought because Plaintiffs are not as knowledgeable of Defendant’s financial information as Defendant is. The websites that Defendant identified in its response contain dozens of hyperlinks to thousands of pages of financial reports. It would be time-consuming and costly for Plaintiffs to review all those documents in an effort to determine which of the thousands of pages are responsive to RPD No. 8. In addition, although the documents are available online, no facts suggest that Plaintiffs have had ample opportunity through discovery in this case to obtain them.
Therefore, Defendant’s objection on the ground that the discovery sought is equally available to Plaintiff lacks merit and is overruled.
D. Defendant’s Substantive Responses
Plaintiffs argue further responses to the RPD requests at issue are warranted because Defendant’s substantive responses are incomplete and/or evasive.
A substantive response to a request for production of documents must address each item or category of items separately with a statement of compliance or a statement of an inability to comply. (CCP, § 2031.210, subd. (a).)
Defendant did not substantively respond to RPD Nos. 1-2, 5-7, and 15-16. Thus, further responses to RPD Nos. 1-2, 5-7, and 15-16 are warranted.
RPD Nos. 3-4 ask for documents pertaining to Defendant’s brochures and publicly available information for the MAP from 2008 to the present. Defendant responded that it would produce responsive documents from the period of 2011 to 2012. This response is incomplete because it does not respond to the extent the requests seek documents dated from 2008 through 2010 and from 2013 to the present. Therefore, further responses to RPD Nos. 3-4 are warranted.
RPD No. 8 asks for Defendant’s financial statements from 2007 through 2010. It responded by listing types of financial statements, stating that those documents are publicly available on its website, and providing the hyperlink to its website. This response is incomplete because it is neither a statement of compliance, nor a statement of an inability to comply. As set forth in detail above, Defendant is required to substantively respond to this request, and simply providing the hyperlink to thousands of pages of documents is not a code-compliant response. In addition, Defendant is required to produce documents either as they are kept in the ordinary course of business, or organized and labeled to correspond with the categories in the demand. (See CCP, § 2031.280, subd. (a).) The websites referenced in Defendant’s response list hyperlinks to reports prepared for the website, not internal financial documents as they are kept in the ordinary course of business. Thus, a further response to RPD No. 8 is warranted.
RPD Nos. 9-10 seek the production of communications between Plaintiffs and Defendant from 2008 to the present. RPD No. 11 seeks contracts that Plaintiffs entered into with Defendant between 2008 to the present. RPD No. 12 asks for Defendant’s organizational chart from 2008 to the present. Defendant responded to RPD Nos. 9-12 by stating it will produce all relevant and non-privileged responsive documents in its possession custody, or control. These responses are evasive because Defendant states it will only produce relevant documents, but as discussed in detail above, all documents responsive to RPD Nos. 9-12 are relevant, and Defendant’s relevance and overbreadth objections are overruled. As such, further responses to RPD Nos. 9-12 are warranted.
RPD No. 17 asks for Defendant’s internal documents that reflect how Defendant attempted to predict or identify which customers were most likely to default on their loans. Defendant responded by stating it would produce relevant, non-privileged documents concerning Plaintiffs’ default(s) on their loan(s). This response is evasive because it does not state that Defendant will produce documents responsive to the request, i.e. documents reflecting Defendant’s methods used to predict or identify borrowers at risk of defaulting on their loans. Therefore, a further response to RPD No. 17 is warranted.
In sum, further responses to all of the RPD requests at issue are warranted.
E. Conclusion
Defendant’s objections to the RPD requests at issue are overruled or waived, and its substantive responses are not code-compliant.
Plaintiffs’ motion, to the extent they seek to compel further responses to RPD Nos. 1-12 and 15-17, is therefore GRANTED.
IV. Requests for Monetary Sanctions
Code of Civil Procedure, § 2023.040 states:
“A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought. The notice of motion shall be supported by a memorandum of points and authorities, and accompanied by a declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought.”
See also Rule of Court 2.30(c): “Sanctions must not be imposed under this rule except on noticed motion by the party seeking sanctions or on the court’s own motion after the court has provided notice and an opportunity to be heard. A party’s motion for sanctions must (1) state the applicable rule that has been violated, (2) describe the specific conduct that is alleged to have violated the rule, and (3) identify the attorney, law firm, party, witness, or other person against whom sanctions are sought. The court on its own motion may issue an order to show cause that must (1) state the applicable rule that has been violated, (2) describe the specific conduct that appears to have violated the rule, and (3) direct the attorney, law firm, party, witness, or other person to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed against them for violation of the rule.” Thus
A. Plaintiffs’ Request
Plaintiffs request an award of monetary sanctions, but do not specify against whom they seeks to impose the sanction. The request is not code-compliant, and an award of monetary sanctions is unwarranted. Plaintiffs’ request for an award of monetary sanctions is accordingly DENIED.
B. Defendant’s Request
Defendant also requests an award of monetary sanctions, but does not specify against whom it seeks to impose the sanction. Thus, Defendant is not entitled to an award of monetary sanctions. Therefore, Defendant’s request for an award of monetary sanctions is DENIED.
Conclusion
Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses to the FI, SI, RFA, and RPD is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
The motion is GRANTED to the extent Plaintiffs seek further responses to FI Nos. 2.1 and 2.5, RFA Nos. 1-2 and 4-8, and RPD Nos. 1-12 and 15-17. Accordingly, within 20 days of the date of the filing of this Order, Defendant shall serve verified code-compliant further responses to FI Nos. 2.1 and 2.5, RFA Nos. 1-2 and 4-8, and RPD Nos. 1-12 and 15-17, without objection, and produce documents in conformity with its responses to RPD Nos. 1-12 and 15-17. To the extent any documents responsive to RPD Nos. 5-7 and 16 encompass the private financial information of third parties, Defendant shall redact the private financial information.

The motion is DENIED to the extent Plaintiffs seek further responses to the SI and FI Nos. 1.1 and 17.1.
Plaintiffs’ request for an award of monetary sanctions is DENIED.
Defendant’s request for an award of monetary sanctions is DENIED.