Case Name: Howard v. Toyota Motor Corp., et al.

Case No.: 111CV197027

Defendants Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., Toyota Motor North America, Inc., and Toyota Motor Corporation move for an Order enforcing Toyota’s settlement with Plaintiff Daniel Brodie Howard and Intervening Plaintiff Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., reached at the second mediation hearing on October 30, 2013.  Defendants Margaret Carlene Ruhl, deceased, and the Estate of Margaret Carlene Ruhl, join the Toyota Defendants’ motion and additionally move for an Order enforcing the Ruhl Defendants’ settlement with Plaintiff and Intervening Plaintiff, for an Order that dismisses with prejudice the remaining defendants, and for an Order that Plaintiff complete and transmit to Ruhl’s counsel the release of the Ruhl Defendants within 10 days. The joinder is proper, and is allowed.  Plaintiff opposes on the grounds that the settlement is only between Defendants on the one hand and Plaintiff on the other hand (and not Intervening Plaintiff), and that Ruhl Defendants failed to sign the global settlement.

Defendant Ruhl requests the court to take judicial notice of the petition to approve the settlement of Plaintiff’s compromise settlement, filed on January 25, 2014, and the Stipulation and Order approving the global settlement signed by Judge Aaron Persky on May 5, 2014.  Plaintiff seeks judicial notice of seventeen documents already filed with the Court.  The court may take judicial notice of records filed with the court.  (Evid. Code, § 452(d).)  Therefore, the court grants both requests.

On October 30, 2014, the Toyota Defendants and Plaintiff and Intervening Plaintiff reached a confidential settlement. (Hostetler Decl. Ex. C, ¶ 3.)  On the same date, the Ruhl Defendants reached a settlement with both Plaintiff and Intervening Plaintiff.  (Ibid. ¶ 2.)  The court entered an Order approving the settlement on January 29, 2014.  (Ibid. ¶ 5.)  Intervening Plaintiff moved for an Order modifying the approved settlement because of an ongoing accounting issue between Plaintiff and Intervening Plaintiff.  (Ibid. ¶ 6.)  On April 24 and 25, 2014, the parties executed the joint Stipulation and Order approving the global settlement and compromise of a disputed claim reached at the second mediation hearing, subject only to final resolution of an accounting issue by Plaintiff and Intervening Plaintiff.  (Ibid. ¶ 14.)  Judge Persky signed the proposed settlement on May 5^th, 2014.  (Ibid. Order)  The Order states: “The Plaintiff and Intervening Plaintiff are to supply signed Requests for Dismissals to the Toyota defendants and the Ruhl defendants and comply with the other terms of their respective settlements.”  (Ibid. Order ¶ 3.)

Plaintiff argues that Ruhl did not sign the Toyota settlement agreement, and thus Ruhl cannot enforce the Toyota settlement agreement.  Plaintiff also states that the only document Plaintiff signed in an effort to resolve the Ruhl claim is the Petition to Compromise signed by Plaintiff and approved by Judge Persky.  Plaintiff argues that if the Petition is sufficient to provide this court authority under CCP § 664.6, then the same is true for the $800,000 Hartford settlement that Plaintiff seeks.  Plaintiff also argues that the attempt to make the settlement “global” fails because not all parties signed the Toyota settlement.  Plaintiff also argues that it cannot dismiss the case between Intervening Plaintiff and Defendants because the settlement gives nothing to Intervening Plaintiff which has its own cause of action against Defendants.

Toyota Defendants respond that there is only one lawsuit pending and that there is no case number for the lawsuit between Intervening Plaintiff and Defendants. In addition, Toyota Defendants argue that the failure of the settlement to allocate a certain amount to both Plaintiffs goes against logic because if a certain amount were required for every lien holder, then cases would never settle.

If the parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.  (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6.)  The court must determine whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement.  (Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, p. 1182.)  “A settlement is enforceable under section 664.6 only if the parties agreed to all material settlement terms.” (Ibid.)  “A trial court cannot enforce a settlement under section 664.6 unless the trial court finds the parties expressly consented to the material terms of the settlement.”  (Bowers v. Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 724, p. 732.)

This stipulation regarding the settlement can be enforced.  Even though the Ruhl Defendants did not sign the Toyota agreement, the Ruhl Defendants seek the enforcement of the stipulation and Order signed by Judge Persky, which the Ruhl Defendants did sign. (Hostetler Decl. Ex. C.)  Also, all parties agreed to the stipulation as required by CCP § 664.6.  The Toyota Defendants and Ruhl Defendants had different settlements to which the respective parties to each agreed, and all parties signed the stipulation sent to Judge Persky.  (Ibid.¶¶ 2-3.)  In addition, no legal support was provided for the contention that the settlement requires some allocation to the Intervening Plaintiff, even when the Intervening Plaintiff signed the stipulation, before the case can be dismissed pursuant to CCP § 664.6.

Therefore, the motions are GRANTED.  The “accounting issue” between Plaintiff and Intervening Plaintiff is set for trial on Monday, August 25, 2014, at 8:46 a.m.  Plaintiff and Intervening Plaintiff shall file dismissals of Defendants pursuant to the stipulation and the Order signed by Judge Persky, on or before August 1, 2014.