Filed 2/14/20 Hubbard v. Taskrabbit, Inc. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

DARYAN HUBBARD,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

TASKRABBIT, INC., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

G057286

(Super. Ct. No. 30-2017-00896666)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Deborah C. Servino, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Office of Ghassan O. Hasan, Ghassan O. Hasan and Ajay P. Sahni for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Manuel Saldana and Nicole Ortiz for Defendant and Respondent Cheryl Holmes.

Dhillon Law Group, Harmeet K. Dhillon, Krista L. Baughman, Michael R. Fleming for Defendant and Respondent TaskRabbit, Inc.

Daryan Hubbard appeals from the trial court’s judgment after its order granting summary judgment in favor of TaskRabbit, Inc. (TaskRabbit) and Cheryl Holmes. The court determined summary judgment was appropriate because Hubbard’s claims were time barred. Hubbard claims the court erred because he was genuinely ignorant of the necessary facts to state his claims against TaskRabbit and he did not unreasonably delay filing a Doe amendment to name Holmes in his complaint. None of his arguments have merit, and we affirm the judgment.

FACTS

TaskRabbit is an online platform that allows people seeking services to find and hire local service providers. Holmes was a “Tasker” on TaskRabbit. In 2015, Nicole Leal (Leal) hired Holmes through TaskRabbit to assist in organizing Leal’s home on January 11, 2015. Hubbard was Leal’s boyfriend at the time, and he also came over to help. Hubbard met Holmes on the day she worked for Leal. Hubbard knew Holmes had been hired by Leal through TaskRabbit. At some point on January 11, 2015, Hubbard claimed he was moving a desk with Leal and Holmes and they pushed the desk into him with excessive speed, causing him severe neck and back injuries.

On January 10, 2017, Hubbard filed his original complaint against Leal and her brother Jeffrey Leal (Jeffrey), but did not name TaskRabbit or Holmes as defendants. Hubbard alleged he was injured while helping Leal and Holmes move a desk on January 11, 2015. He asserted Leal hired “a professional mover” and referred to the person as “Doe 25.” The statute of limitations for personal injury expired on January 11, 2017.

On April 26, 2017, Hubbard amended his complaint to name TaskRabbit as “Doe 1,” but did not name Holmes. On June 22, 2017, Hubbard filed a first amended complaint (FAC), naming TaskRabbit as a defendant. The FAC identified “Cheryl H.,” but did not name her as a defendant.

On December 22, 2017, Hubbard served interrogatories on TaskRabbit requesting the “full name, address and phone number of ‘Cheryl H.’” TaskRabbit responded with the information on February 9, 2018.

On June 19, 2018, Hubbard amended the FAC and named Holmes as “Doe 2.” By the time Holmes was named as a defendant, all parties and witnesses had been deposed in the case.

TaskRabbit moved for summary judgment, asserting Hubbard’s claims were time-barred. Holmes joined in TaskRabbit’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions. It explained, “[t]he record shows [Hubbard] knew, on January 11, 2015, that . . . Leal had used TaskRabbit’s platform to hire an individual to assist her with her tasks that day. Hubbard further understood that Holmes was the individual Leal had connected with through TaskRabbit’s platform. [Citation.] Yet, [Hubbard] did not name TaskRabbit as a defendant in the original [c]omplaint filed on January 10, 2017. Rather, he waited until April 26, 2017, to name TaskRabbit as Doe 1. The undisputed facts demonstrate that TaskRabbit’s identity was known to [Hubbard] at all relevant times. Thus, [Hubbard] cannot avail himself of the relation back provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 474, because [Hubbard] was not ignorant of the true name of TaskRabbit.”

As to Holmes, it was “undisputed that [Hubbard] met Holmes on January

11, 2015. In the original [c]omplaint, [Hubbard] referred to Holmes as DOE 25 ‘a female individual who was hired by Leal as a contractor, employee agent, or otherwise acting on behalf of Leal, . . .’ [Citation.] He identified Holmes as ‘Cheryl H.’ in his FAC filed on June 23, 2017. [Hubbard] was provided with Holmes’ full name and address on

February 9, 2018. He took Holmes’ deposition on June 14, 2018. Finally, he added Holmes as DOE 2 on June 19, 2018. [¶] . . . [Hubbard’s] counsel’s declaration belies a finding that Hubbard’s 15-month delay in filing the DOE 2 amendment was reasonable. As Holmes points out in her reply, ‘counsel provides no details about what efforts he

made other than allegedly “repeatedly requesting” the information from TaskRabbit [after July 24, 2017], without serving any discovery.’ [Citation.] There is no explanation as to why [Hubbard] could not have learned or accessed earlier Holmes’ full name from the TaskRabbit platform, through propounding discovery on Leal, or propounding discovery on TaskRabbit, even before TaskRabbit was added by Doe amendment. [Hubbard] also contends he only had ‘a mere suspicion of wrongdoing by Holmes when he learned of her

identity,’ but it was ‘not until [Hubbard’s] counsel deposed Holmes on June 14, 2018, that [Hubbard] became aware of sufficient facts regarding Holmes’ liability.’ [Citation.] This assertion is unsupported by [Hubbard’s] own pleadings. [Hubbard] has alleged from the start, that his injury was caused by Leal and Holmes’ use of ‘excessive speed and force’ while moving the desk. [Citation.]”

The trial court went on to detail how Holmes was prejudiced by Hubbard’s

unreasonable delay. “Not only was [Hubbard’s] delay unreasonable, his delay has

caused Holmes specific prejudice. Holmes was added by DOE amendment after key depositions had already occurred, including the depositions of [Hubbard] and Leal. Before Holmes had even appeared, the court granted a good faith determination of a settlement between [Leal] and Jeffrey . . . and [Hubbard]. Moreover, trial is scheduled for February 19, 2019, less than two months away. When this court continued the trial date from September 24, 2018 to its current date of February 19, 2019, it issued a minute order expressly stating that ‘[t]he [c]ourt does not anticipate any further continuances, except for good cause.’ . . . . While affording Holmes a fair opportunity to prepare a defense constitutes ‘good cause,’ the only reason another trial continuance would be necessary is because [Hubbard] unreasonably delayed in naming Holmes as a DOE defendant.”

DISCUSSION

Hubbard contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because it erroneously ruled Hubbard’s claims against TaskRabbit were untimely and he unreasonably delayed naming Holmes as a Doe defendant. We find no error and affirm the judgment.

I. Standard of Review

We review the trial court’s summary judgment order de novo. (Canales v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1262, 1268.) “[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. That is because of the general principle that a party who seeks a court’s action in his favor bears the burden of persuasion thereon. [Citation.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. . . . [¶] . . . [T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he [or she] carries [the] burden of production, he [or she] causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his [or her] own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. . . . A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question. [Citation.]” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850-851, fns. omitted.) A defendant “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.’ [Citation.]” (Johnson v. ArvinMeritor, Inc. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 234, 239-240.) Expiration of the applicable statute of limitations is a complete defense. (Cucuzza v. City of Santa Clara (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1037.)

II. Summary Judgment as to TaskRabbit

Hubbard asserted claims of negligence against TaskRabbit. The relevant statute of limitations for negligence resulting in personal injury is two years. (§ 335.1.) “‘When a plaintiff has cause to sue based on knowledge or suspicion of negligence the statute starts to run as to all potential defendants.’ [Citation.]” (Knowles v. Superior Court (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1290, 1299-1300.)

The parties agree as to the timeline of events and statute of limitations. The incident giving rise to Hubbard’s claims occurred on January 11, 2015. The pertinent statute of limitations expired on January 11, 2017. Hubbard filed a Doe amendment naming TaskRabbit as a Doe 1 on April 26, 2017, three months after the statute of limitations had run, and filed a first amended complaint on June 23, 2017, nearly five months after the statute of limitations had run. The trial court determined Hubbard’s substitution of TaskRabbit as Doe 1 did not relate back to the original complaint. We agree.

Section 474 provides in pertinent part: “When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint, or the affidavit if the action is commenced by affidavit, and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly.” When a defendant is properly named by a fictitious name, amending the operative pleading to state the defendant’s true name relates back to the filing of the original complaint. (McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 368, 371.) “[T]his procedure is only available when the plaintiff is actually ignorant of the facts establishing a cause of action against the party to be substituted for a Doe defendant.” (Id. at pp. 371-372.) Section 474 requirements are mandatory, failure to comply “prevent[s] the amendment from relating back.” (Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1144.)

Section 474 and case law interpreting it are clear, an amended complaint will not relate back to an earlier-filed Doe complaint where the defendant shows the plaintiff knew of the defendant’s identity and connection to the stated claims at the time of the initial filing. (See, e.g., Opitcal Surplus, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 776, 783-784.) Hubbard asserts this case is akin to the facts of Breceda v. Gamsby (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 167 (Breceda). It is not.

In Breceda, plaintiff was injured when a stack of lumber fell on him while operating a forklift. (Breceda, supra, 267 Cal.App.2d at p. 168.) Only after a deposition was taken, however, did plaintiff learn defendant had ordered the removal of a protective guard designed to protect the operator of the forklift. (Id. at p. 169.) Under those facts, the appellate court allowed relation back because there was “no evidence of any facts known to plaintiff or his attorneys before [the filing of the initial complaint], from which they might justifiably have inferred” defendant engaged in misconduct by ordering the removal of the protective guard. (Id. at p. 178.)

Here, unlike Breceda, the facts show a reasonable person should have inferred TaskRabbit, as the platform Leal used to employ Holmes, might have liability for Holmes’ conduct. There were no surprise revelations during discovery. Hubbard knew Leal used TaskRabbit to hire Holmes to help with the moving tasks that allegedly gave rise to his injury. Hubbard was well aware of TaskRabbit’s identity and connection to the case not only at the time he filed the original complaint, but at the time of the alleged injury.

The fact that Hubbard apparently did not realize he could have pursued an action against TaskRabbit did not make him ignorant of TaskRabbit’s identity. Hubbard asserts in order to deprive him of the benefits of the relation back doctrine, the court must find he had “knowledge of TaskRabbit’s hiring and training practices, its supervision of its employees, or its misrepresentations about Holmes’ fitness to provide moving services.” Not so. (See, e.g., Dover v. Sadowinski (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 113, 117-118 [“Plaintiff seems to be asserting that, in order to be required to name a person whom he knows to be involved as a defendant, the plaintiff must be aware of each and every detail concerning that person’s involvement. We do not agree with such a standard. . . . The evidence is clear that the claimed lack of knowledge is not real, but is in fact feigned.”].)

Hubbard knew TaskRabbit’s identity and connection to the case at the time of filing the initial complaint. We find no error.

III. Summary Judgment as to Holmes

Hubbard insinuates TaskRabbit concealed or prevented him from obtaining Holmes’ identity, “it was not until February 9, 2018, that TaskRabbit finally disclosed the identity of Holmes.” The record belies this claim. A plaintiff’s ignorance of the defendant’s name must be genuine and in good faith.

A review of the timeline in this case is helpful. The date of the alleged injury was January 11, 2015. Hubbard filed his initial complaint on January 10, 2017. The initial complaint contained no explanation as to why Hubbard did not name TaskRabbit or Holmes, even though their identities were known to him at the time of the alleged injury. Hubbard named TaskRabbit as a Doe defendant on April 26, 2017, but not Holmes. On December 22, 2017, nearly eight months after TaskRabbit was named in the case, Hubbard served an interrogatory on TaskRabbit for Holmes’s full name. On February 9, 2018, Hubbard received TaskRabbit’s responses to the interrogatory, containing Holmes’ full name, but still did not name Holmes as a defendant. Hubbard took Holmes’ deposition four months later on June 14, 2018. He finally named Holmes as a Doe defendant on June 19, 2018—nearly three and one-half years after his alleged injury, 17 months after he filed his initial complaint, and just seven months before trial.

Hubbard contends the trial court’s reliance on A.N. v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1058 (A.N.), was in error. We disagree. A.N. involved a two-year delay in filing and serving Doe amendments. (Id. at pp. 1066-1067.) The supporting declaration from plaintiff’s counsel contained “no express statement explaining the dates upon which A.N.’s counsel learned the names of the Doe [d]efendants, nor do we see any explanation of whether and why the identities could not have been learned before [the late filing].” (Id. at p. 1068.) The A.N. court held, “a defendant named in an action by a Doe amendment under section 474 may challenge the amendment by way of an evidence-based motion, which argues that the plaintiff ‘unreasonably delayed’ his or her filing of the challenged amendment.” (Id. at p. 1067.) “[U]nreasonable delay . . . includes a prejudice element, which requires a showing by the defendant that he or she would suffer prejudice from plaintiff’s delay in filing the Doe amendment.” (Ibid.)

As was the situation in A.N., Hubbard may not feign ignorance as to Holmes’ identity in order to attempt to relate back to his original complaint. Hubbard admits he met Holmes on the day of the alleged injury. It was unreasonable not to obtain her information immediately upon being injured. However, even assuming he was not bound to learn her identity on the day of the incident, Hubbard provides no explanation as to why he could not obtain Holmes’ information soon after filing the initial complaint. Common sense dictates Hubbard could have attempted to ascertain Holmes’ full name and information through the TaskRabbit platform, propounding discovery on Leal, or subpoenaing TaskRabbit.

Furthermore, it is clear Hubbard’s unreasonable delay in naming Holmes’ caused her actual prejudice. Before naming Holmes, the case was litigated for over a year and one-half. All of the key witnesses were deposed and written discovery completed. Hubbard asserts Holmes is not prejudiced by being forced to litigate this case on a short timeline, but we disagree. Holmes would be required to retake depositions, conduct discovery, and prepare for trial on a shortened timeline. Hubbard’s unreasonable delay in naming Holmes in the underlying action caused Holmes actual prejudice. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Holmes.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. TaskRabbit and Holmes shall recover their costs on appeal.

O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, J.

IKOLA, J.