Sandoval v. KC Feed and Cubes 15CVP-0078

Hearing: Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

Date: March 27, 2018

This dispute, concerning Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants David and Allison Sandoval’s failure to pay a $595.50 bill for livestock feed sold to them by Defendant/Cross-Complainant Cecil Martinez, has generated litigation between the Parties since March 2015. Plaintiffs’ underlying lawsuit alleged violations of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act based upon abusive tactics, harassment, and foul language used by Mr. Martinez his attempts to collect the debt on behalf of his dba, KC Feed.

Mr. Martinez and KC Feed1 filed a cross-complaint against the Sandovals to collect the amount owed. Shortly thereafter, the Sandovals dismissed the underlying compliant, leading CrossComplainants to amend their cross-complaint to include causes of action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process, and adding the Sandovals’ attorneys2 as cross-defendants. Cross-Defendants’ special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.163 (known as the anti-SLAPP statute) followed.

On February 9, 2017, this Court, the Honorable Donald G. Umhofer (Ret.) presiding, granted Cross-Defendants’ special motion to strike. On April 4, 2017, the Court granted CrossDefendants’ motion for attorney fees incurred in bringing the special motion to strike.

Cross-Complainants appealed the Court’s ruling granting the special motion to strike. On January 16, 2018, Division Six of the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the Court’s ruling and awarded Cross-Defendants costs and reasonable attorney fees “in an amount to be determined by the trial court” pursuant to section 425.16(c)(1). (Sandoval, et al. v. Martinez, et al. (Jan. 16, 2018, 2d. Civil No. B282053) [nonpub. opn.].) With the instant motion, CrossDefendants seek $24,456.00 in fees incurred in responding to Cross-Complainants’ appeal.

Cross-Complainants oppose the instant motion with three arguments. First, Cross-Complainants contend Mr. Martinez’s financial situation prevents him from paying Cross-Defendants’ attorney fees. (Opp., p. 2, ll. 9-15.) Second, Cross-Complainants contend Cross-Defendants’ fees should be reduced, insinuating that the Appellate Court at least partially found in “favor” of CrossComplainants. (Opp., p. 2, ll. 16-23.) Third, Cross-Complainants contend Cross-Defendants’ fees should be reduced due to duplicative, incomplete, ambiguous, and irrelevant billing. (Opp., pp. 2-3, passim.)

1 As used herein, “Cross-Complainants” refers to Mr. Martinez and KC Feed. 2 The additional cross-defendants are Kazerouni Law Group, APC; Hyde & Swiggart; and Matthew M. Loker. As used herein, “Cross-Defendants” refers to the moving parties, who are the Sandovals; Kazerouni Law Group, APC; Hyde & Swiggart; and Mr. Loker. 3 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.
As to Cross-Complainants’ first argument, there is no exception to an award of attorney fees under section 425.16 based on a party’s claimed inability to pay. Because Cross-Defendants prevailed on appeal, they are entitled to recover their appellate attorney fees. (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 489.) “A statute authorizing an attorney fee award at the trial court level includes appellate attorney fees unless the statute specifically provides otherwise…[A] prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike a SLAPP suit ‘shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.’ The statute does not preclude recovery of appellate attorney fees by a prevailing defendant-respondent; hence they are recoverable.” (Evans v. Unkow (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1499-1500, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(c).)

Cross-Complainants’ second argument lacks support. Cross-Complainants claim that they “prevailed on the majority of the elements required to bring a Malicious Prosecution case, in the appeal [sic].” (Opp., p. 2, ll. 17-19.) Although somewhat unclear, Cross-Complainants apparently claim that because the Appellate Court agreed with this Court’s findings with respect to the anti-SLAPP motion – for example, that Cross-Defendants’ complained-of acts were not subject to the Rosenthal Act – they therefore “prevailed” on at least a portion of the appeal. This is inaccurate. The Appellate Court affirmed this Court’s ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety and did not reverse any portion of the ruling. Moreover, Cross-Defendants appealed no portion of this Court’s ruling on their anti-SLAPP motion. If they had appealed the ruling, and if that appeal was unsuccessful even in part, Cross-Complainants are correct that perhaps a portion of Cross-Defendants’ sought-after fee award would be reduced. (See Jackson v. Yarbray (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 75, 82 [only those fees and costs incurred in connection with the successful portion of the anti-SLAPP motion may be recovered]; Mann v. Quality Old Time Service Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 345 [lack of success on other claims is relevant to the amount of, but not the right to, recoverable fees].) But that is not the scenario before the Court. CrossComplainants are the only parties who appealed the anti-SLAPP ruling. Because the Appellate Court affirmed the ruling in its entirety, Cross-Defendants are entitled to all reasonable fees incurred with responding to Cross-Complainants’ appeal.

Finally, Cross-Complainants argue that certain of Cross-Defendants’ claimed fees should be reduced, claiming the fees are for billing that is (among other things) “irrelevant to this motion4” (Opp., p. 5, ll. 13-15), and that Cross-Defendants’ counsel’s billing records are “filled with incomplete and ambiguous information.” (Opp., p. 4, ll-17-19.) The Court has reviewed CrossDefendants’ counsel’s billing records and finds them sufficiently itemized to allow this Court to determine “whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2014) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.) Counsel’s billing records are succinct with respect to the tasks described and appear reasonable with respect to the amount of time allotted to each task. The claimed hours and fee of $400 per hour are reasonable and have in fact been upheld by this Court in earlier fee proceedings in this matter.

Accordingly, Cross-Defendants David Sandoval; Allison Sandoval; Kazerouni Law Group, APC; Hydge & Swiggart; and Matthew Loker’s request for attorney fees and costs in the amount of $24,256.00 is granted. 4 Of course, it is not just the fees that Cross-Defendants’ counsel will incur with the instant motion, but all reasonable fees counsel incurred with respect to Cross-Complainants’ appeal that are recoverable.