2012-00131228-CU-PA

David Schoonover vs. Cameron Taylor Elford

Nature of Proceeding:      Motion for Summary Adjudication

Filed By:   Smith, Robert B.

Defendant Lisa J. Pashenee (“Defendant”) Motion for Summary Adjudication is
DENIED.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted.  In taking judicial notice of these
documents, the court accepts the fact of their existence, not the truth of their contents.

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(See Professional Engineers v. Dep’t of Transp. (1997) 15 Cal.4   543, 590 [judicial
notice of findings of fact does not mean that those findings of fact are true]; Steed v.
Department of Consumer Affairs (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 112, 120-121.)

This is an automobile personal injury and loss of consortium action between David
Schoonover (“Schoonover”) and Thuy Bich Van (“Van”) [“Plaintiffs”], and Defendant
and her son, Cameron Elford (“Elford”).

On July 22, 2012, Elford was involved in an automobile accident with Schoonover.
(UMF 1.)  At the time of the accident, Elford was a minor and was driving a vehicle
owned by his mother, Defendant.  (UMF 10, 12.)    Before the accident, Elford and his
friend were consuming beers purchased by Aaron Koper (“Koper”) at Koper’s
residence.  (UMF 9.)  After leaving Koper’s residence, Elford and his friend went to
Ann Marie Armas’ (“Armas”) residence, where Elford consumed three more beers.
(Deposition of Cameron Elford [98:16-25].)  After the accident, Elford was charged with
driving at an unsafe speed and driving under the influence of alcohol.  (UMF 8.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant negligently entrusted Elford with her vehicle.
Defendant refutes Plaintiffs’ claims and contends that she played no role in the
accident.  This motion follows.

Defendant moves for summary adjudication on the second cause of action relating to
general negligence – negligent entrustment.  Defendant moves for summary
adjudication on the grounds that Plaintiffs have no evidence showing that Defendant
had actual or constructive knowledge of Elford’s incompetence or unfitness to drive.

CCP §437c(f)(1) provides that the court may grant a motion for summary adjudication
“if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit.”  Defendant bears the
burden of producing evidence establishing the nonexistence of any triable issue of
material fact.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. , 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  After Defendant  meets her initial burden, the burden shift to Plaintiffs to produce evidence
demonstrating the existence of a triable issue.  (Id.)

In order to show negligent entrustment, “the lending owner must know, or from facts
known to [her] should know, that the entrustee driver was intoxicated, incompetent, or
reckless.”  (Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 65; see, e.g., Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co v. Abdullah (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 81, 91.)  However, negligent entrustment
is “properly resolved by application of general principles of negligence.”  (Hartford,
supra, 94 Cal.App.3d at 91-92.)  The most important general principle is whether the
lending owner, upon entrusting the vehicle, exercised ordinary care or skill. (Id.; see
also, Allen v. Toledo (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 415, 421.)H

Here, Defendant proffers evidence that she had no knowledge that Elford was ever
involved in an accident prior to the July 22nd incident, or that Elford ever received a
citation relating to the operation of a motor vehicle.  (UMF 21, 27.)  Further, Defendant
argues that her duty was limited-preventing an incompetent driver from operating her
vehicle.  Defendant argues that because she had no knowledge of her son’s
incompetence, she satisfied her duty.

Defendant has satisfied her initial burden to demonstrate that no triable issue of
material fact exists.  The burden now shifts to Plaintiffs to demonstrate a triable issue
of material fact.

In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant knew or should have known that Elford
was incompetent or unfit to drive her vehicle.  Plaintiffs proffer as evidence two
separate vehicle citations made against Elford.  For one citation, on October 2011,
Elford was cited for possession of tobacco and alcohol, where a bottle of alcohol was
found in the front passenger seat of Defendant’s vehicle.  (Guenard Decl., Exh. 2,
p.31.)  For the other citation, on April 2012, Elford was cited for possession of
marijuana.  (Guenard Decl., Exh. 2, p. 39.)  During both citations, Elford was found
sitting in the driver’s seat of Defendant’s vehicle.  (Guenard Decl., Exh.1, p.19; Exh. 2,
p. 41.)  After both citations, Defendant appeared at the scene, spoke to the police, and
drove Elford and Defendant’s vehicle home.  (Guenard Decl., Exh.1, p.11-12; Exh. 2,
p. 40.)  Here, the question of whether Defendant knew or should have known that
Elford was unfit to drive her vehicle is a question for the jury.  Accordingly, the court
finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of material fact.

Moreover, the court is not convinced that Defendant’s duty is limited only to preventing
an incompetent driver.  Defendant’s reliance on Lindstrom is misplaced.  (Lindstrom v.
Hertz (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 644, 650.)  In Lindstrom, the court granted Hertz’s motion
for summary adjudication on the negligent entrustment cause of action.  (Id.)  There,
Hertz had “no knowledge of any circumstances that would put it on notice that [the
entrustee] was an incompetent driver.”  (Id.)  Furthermore, the court found that “Hertz
had no duty to interrogate the driver before renting a car to him.”  (Id.)

Unlike in Lindstrom, Defendant is not a third-party who lacks a prior relationship with
the entrustee, her son.   Indeed, as noted above, there is a triable issue of material fact               as to whether Defendant knew or should have known circumstances that would put her
on notice that her son was an incompetent driver.

The Court is also not convinced that Koper’s alleged provision of alcohol to Elford was
an intervening/superseding event that terminates Defendant’s liability.  Defendant
concedes that foreseeablity is a question of fact for the jury, but argues that Koper’s
criminal conduct in purchasing alcohol for Elford, a minor, was not reasonably
foreseeable.  Here, however, Plaintiffs have proffered evidence that Defendant knew
that Elford had previously possessed alcohol and marijuana.  Whether Elford’s
consumption of alcohol was forseeable is a question of fact for the jury and Plaintiffs
have demonstrated a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendant knew or
should have known of that Elford was unfit to drive her vehicle.

Accordingly, the motion for summary adjudication for the cause of action relating to
general negligence – negligent entrustment is DENIED.

The minute order is effective immediately.  No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule
3.1312 or further notice is required.