Case Name: Deborah O’Connell v. Insphere Insurance Solutions, Inc., et al.
Case No.: 2012-1-CV-232891

Currently before the Court is plaintiff Deborah O’Connell’s (“O’Connell”) motion to strike defendants Insphere Insurance Solutions, Inc. and Health Markets, Inc.’s (collectively, the “Insphere Defendants”) motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of the fourth, fifth, sixth, and fourteenth causes of action in Plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint (“FAC”).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On June 18, 2014, O’Connell filed the operative FAC, asserting 15 causes of action against defendant Ron Almaraz and the Insphere Defendants for: (1) violation of Labor Code sections 98.6 and 1102.5; (2) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (3); defamation; (4) fraud; (5) false promise; (6) conversion; (7) intentional interference with prospective economic relations; (8) violation of Labor Code section 201; (9) violation of Labor Code sections 227 and 227.3; (10) violation of Labor Code section 226; (11) violation of Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512; (12) violation of Labor Code sections 510 and 1194; (13) violation of Labor Code section 2802; (14) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200; and (15) violation of Labor Code sections 2698 and 2699.

On November 18, 2015, the Insphere Defendants filed their initial motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of each cause of action in the FAC. On February 26, 2016, the motion was granted in part and denied in part. The motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of the fourth, fifth, sixth and fourteenth causes of action was denied. The motion was otherwise granted.

On April 27, 2016, the Insphere Defendants filed their second motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of each of the remaining causes of action in the FAC.

On May 6, 2016, O’Connell filed the instant motion to strike the second motion for summary judgment. The Insphere Defendants filed their opposition on May 24, 2016. On May 31, 2016, O’Connell filed her reply brief.

II. Discussion

O’Connell moves to strike the second motion for summary judgment on the ground that the Insphere Defendants fail to demonstrate that the second motion is based on new facts or new law. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2) [stating that “a party may not move for summary judgment based on issues asserted in a prior motion for summary adjudication and denied by the court, unless that party establishes to the satisfaction of the court, newly discovered facts or circumstances or a change of law supporting the issues reasserted in the summary judgment motion”].)

Preliminarily, the Court must determine if it has the requisite statutory or non-statutory authority to strike the Insphere Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (See Los Angeles County v. Industrial Acc. Commission (1926) 76 Cal.App. 639, 642 [stating that general jurisdiction courts have the power to make effective only those orders they are expressly authorized to enter.)

O’Connell asserts that the Court may strike this motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 435 and 436. This argument is not well-taken. As O’Connell acknowledges in her motion, these sections permit a litigant “to challenge the legal sufficiency of a pleading.” (Mem. Ps & As., p. 2:15-16; see also Code Civ. Proc., §§ 435, subd. (b)(1), 436.) By definition, the term “pleading” specifically refers to demurrers, answers, complaints, or cross-complaints. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435 subd. (a)(2).) Since a motion for summary judgment does not constitute a pleading, sections 435 and 436 do not provide the Court with statutory authority to grant the motion.

Next, O’Connell claims that the Court possesses the inherent authority to strike a procedurally defective motion for summary judgment. In this respect, she relies on several cases providing that a court has the inherent authority to strike a defective separate statement of undisputed material facts filed in connection with a motion for summary judgment. (See Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 95, 106; Security Pacific Nat. Bank v. Bradley (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 89, 93; Collins v. Hertz Corp. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 64, 67; Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 263.) However, none of these cases stand for the proposition that a party may bring, and a trial court may grant, a motion to strike a motion for summary judgment in its entirety. Instead, in each case, the Court of Appeal contemplated the striking of the separate statement in the context of the trial court’s ruling on the motion for summary judgment. (Reeves, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 106 [stating that “trial courts have the inherent power to strike proposed ‘undisputed facts’ that fail to comply with the statutory requirements” and “[i]f such an order leaves the required separate statement insufficient to support the motion, the court is justified in denying the motion on that basis”]; Security Pacific Nat. Bank, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 93 [providing that Code Civ. Proc., § 437c “unquestionably gives the trial court discretion to grant a motion for summary judgment when the opposing party fails to file a separate responsive statement”]; Collins, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 67 [indicating that a court may “grant summary judgment after striking portions of an opposing party’s separate statement, because that party failed to comply with the requirements for the separate statement…”]; Nazir, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 263 [finding that the grant of a motion for summary judgment on the basis of an improper separate statement would have been an abuse of discretion].) As such, O’Connell fails to establish that these cases demonstrate that the Court has the inherent authority to grant a standalone motion to strike the Insphere Defendants’ second motion for summary judgment.

In sum, O’Connell fails to identify a statutory or nonstatutory basis for the instant motion. Accordingly, the motion to strike the second motion for summary judgment is DENIED.