Filed 5/29/20 Reid v. Givens-Morgan CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

DEBRA ANN REID,

Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant,

v.

PATRICIA GIVENS-MORGAN, as Special Administrator, etc.,

Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent.

B299274

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC654817)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Elizabeth Allen White, Judge. Affirmed.

Debra Ann Reid, in pro. per., for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant.

Lola M. McAlpin-Grant for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent.

_________________________________

Debra Ann Reid appeals from a judgment following a court trial. We affirm.

Reid lives in a house in Gardena (the Property) that her stepfather, respondent Gerald Barnes, purchased in 1996 using a loan insured by the Veteran’s Administration (VA). Reid claims that Barnes took legal title to the Property with the understanding that Reid would be the beneficial owner, and that Reid was therefore the beneficiary of a resulting trust in the Property. However, Reid’s resulting trust claim was decided against her in a prior opinion by Division Seven of this appellate district following a trial in which Reid unsuccessfully asserted similar claims against Barnes. (See Reid v. Barnes (Nov. 15, 2016, B261810) [nonpub. opn.] (Reid I).) The trial court here correctly concluded that the result of that case is res judicata.

The trial court also ruled in Barnes’s favor on his cause of action for quiet title. Reid raises various fact-based objections to that ruling. Because Reid did not provide a reporter’s transcript or a settled statement on appeal, we cannot review those objections and must presume that the trial court correctly decided the issues against her.

Reid also raises a number of other challenges to the proceedings below, including a charge of bias against the trial judge. We conclude that those challenges are baseless, and we therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

1. Reid’s Prior Lawsuit

Reid sued Barnes and his wife, Ethel Barnes (Reid’s mother), in 2012 (the 2012 Lawsuit). Reid alleged in that case that she had an oral agreement with Barnes that Barnes would acquire title to the Property, but that Reid would be the “ ‘true owner.’ ” Pursuant to this agreement, Reid was to make all the payments on the loan for the Property and was responsible for all expenses. The parties allegedly agreed that Barnes would later transfer title to Reid upon her request.

Reid’s complaint in the 2012 Lawsuit included causes of action for breach of oral contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, unjust enrichment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and requests for a constructive trust and an equitable lien. The claims were tried before Judge Robert Hess in 2014.

Following trial, Judge Hess issued a statement of decision rejecting each of Reid’s claims. Judge Hess found that there was in fact an understanding between Reid and the Barneses that the Barneses would purchase the Property “for the use of Ms. Reid and her children.” However, a condition of the agreement was that Reid “was expected to make the payments on the home loan, and pay taxes, insurance and maintenance.” If she did so, the Barneses agreed that, “at some unspecified time,” they would transfer the Property to her “on condition that the Barnes[es] would be formally taken off the home loan.”

Reid did not comply with these conditions. Reid did not always pay the loan payment in full or on time, forcing the Barneses to pay the shortfall. Judge Hess found that Reid did not carry her burden to prove a breach of oral contract or a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because “she did not prove that she made all required payments, nor did she demonstrate compliance with the requirement that the Barnes[es] be released from further obligation on the VA loan.” Reid also failed to prove her other claims because she failed to show that the Barneses: (1) owed her a fiduciary duty; (2) made any promise without the intent to perform; and (3) engaged in extreme or outrageous conduct, or intended to cause emotional distress. Judge Hess also found that Reid failed to prove the predicate facts necessary for her unjust enrichment and constructive trust claims.

Reid appealed. On appeal, Reid argued that the evidence did not support the trial court’s ruling. (Reid I, supra, B261810.) Reid also argued that the evidence showed she was the beneficiary of a resulting trust in the Property because the trial court found that she had paid the closing costs for the purchase of the Property and had made many of the mortgage payments. Although Reid made this resulting trust argument for the first time on appeal, the appellate court considered it on the merits. (Reid I, supra, B261810.)

In its opinion in Reid I, Division Seven affirmed Judge Hess’s ruling, except for one portion of the judgment that awarded the Barneses $39,800 on their cross-complaint. (Reid I, supra, B261810.) The court rejected Reid’s evidentiary arguments, which were undermined by her failure to provide a reporter’s transcript on appeal. (Ibid.) The court also rejected Reid’s resulting trust argument. The court noted that the trial court had not found that Reid had paid any specific amount of money in closing costs and concluded that Reid had therefore failed to prove “the precise amount of consideration” that she furnished toward the purchase price. (Ibid., citing Lloyds Bank California v. Wells Fargo Bank (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1038, 1044.)

2. Barnes’s Unlawful Detainer Action

Following the unsuccessful 2012 Lawsuit, Barnes brought an unlawful detainer action (the UD Action) to evict Reid and her family from the Property. The trial court in that action ruled that Judge Hess’s statement of decision in the 2012 Lawsuit “established that . . . Barnes was the owner of the [Property],” and that this finding “constituted collateral estoppel on this issue.” However, the court also found that there was no landlord-tenant relationship that could support an unlawful detainer action. The court concluded that although the parties had an oral agreement that Barnes would acquire title to the Property and Reid would make the loan payments, that agreement did not create a landlord-tenant relationship. The court therefore entered judgment against Barnes.

3. The Current Lawsuit

Following the UD Action, Reid filed this lawsuit. Her operative first amended complaint (Complaint) alleged causes of action for a resulting trust, unjust enrichment, and an equitable lien.

Barnes cross-complained to quiet title in the Property. His first amended cross-complaint (Cross-complaint) also asserted claims for ejectment and for injunctive relief to remove Reid, Mitchell, and Hendrickson from the Property. After filing the Cross-complaint, Barnes also filed another unlawful detainer action, which the court treated as a related case.

Reid demurred to the Cross-complaint. The trial court sustained her demurrer with respect to Barnes’s claims for ejectment and injunctive relief. With respect to the ejectment claim, the court found that the prior ruling in the UD Action established that Barnes did “not have a superior right of possession as against Reid.” The court noted that “[t]here is no indication that the unlawful detainer judgment was appealed, and thus it is final for purposes of res judicata.” With respect to the claim for injunctive relief, the court noted that injunctive relief is a remedy rather than a cause of action.

Reid’s claims and Barnes’s cross-claim to quiet title were tried to the court on October 12, 2018. Following trial, the court issued a statement of decision, rejecting Reid’s ownership claim on the ground of res judicata. The court observed that, although Reid’s causes of action were different from those she asserted in the 2012 Lawsuit, “the allegations are the same, namely that Barnes was to transfer title to Reid if she paid all expenses related to the [P]roperty.” The court noted that Judge Hess “soundly rejected” those allegations in the 2012 Lawsuit, and his decision was affirmed on appeal. The trial court also specifically quoted the portion of Division Seven’s opinion in Reid I that considered and rejected Reid’s resulting trust claim.

The trial court also ruled in Barnes’s favor on his quiet title claim. The court took judicial notice of the deed granting Barnes and Ethel title to the Property and an exhibit establishing Ethel’s death. Based on these exhibits, the court found that “Barnes has established that he is the true owner of the [P]roperty.” The court noted that Barnes had dismissed the related unlawful detainer case and that “accordingly it is no longer in issue.”

Finally, the court observed that “[t]he parties do not dispute that Reid has continued paying the monthly mortgage of $1,478 for the [P]roperty since the entry of judgment in [the 2012 Lawsuit] on July 26, 2015. . . . Accordingly, [Reid] has established that she is entitled to $1,478 x 39 months or $57,642.” The court noted that it had “issued a tentative decision from the bench awarding Reid a resulting trust on the [P]roperty . . . in the amount of $56,888.52. The court now determines that that was mathematically inaccurate and that the true amount should be $57,642.00.”

Consistent with this ruling, the trial court entered judgment on Reid’s Complaint “in favor of Plaintiff DEBRA ANN REID in the sum of $57,642.00 and against Defendant GERALD BARNES.” The judgment did not award Reid any ownership interest in the Property. The trial court entered a separate judgment on Barnes’s Cross-complaint quieting title to the Property in Barnes’s favor. The court further ordered that “any lis pendens filed against Cross-Complainant’s property by Cross-Defendant be expunged.”

DISCUSSION

1. Reid’s Claim to an Ownership Interest in the Property Is Precluded Under the Doctrine of Res Judicata

The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects. First, it precludes parties (or persons in privity with parties) from relitigating a cause of action that has been finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under this aspect of the doctrine, a “valid final judgment on the merits in favor of a defendant serves as a complete bar to further litigation on the same cause of action.” (Slater v. Blackwood (1975) 15 Cal.3d 791, 795 (Slater); see Code Civ. Proc., § 1908, subd. (a)(2).) Second, any issue necessarily decided in prior litigation is conclusively determined as to the parties (or their privies) in a subsequent lawsuit on a different cause of action. This second aspect of the doctrine is often termed collateral estoppel. (Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601, 604.)

The doctrine of res judicata is “based upon the sound public policy of limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair trial on an issue from again drawing it into controversy.” (Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn. (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 811.) The doctrine “also serves to protect persons from being twice vexed for the same cause.” (Ibid.) The doctrine applies even if the prior judgment was “erroneous or unfair.” (McGaffey v. Sudowitz (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 215, 217 (McGaffey).)

In her opening brief in this appeal, Reid explains that she filed her Complaint in this case “to show that the precise amount of consideration she furnished for the purchase of the [Property] established a ‘resulting trust,’ ” so that she could “gain full ownership rights” to the Property. She acknowledged that her motivation in doing so was the holding by Division Seven in Reid I rejecting her resulting trust claim. In essence, she has conceded that she filed this lawsuit to have another opportunity to litigate claims that she had already lost. Such an attempt to relitigate claims is precisely what the doctrine of res judicata is intended to preclude.

All the elements of the first aspect of res judicata are present here. In the 2012 Lawsuit, Reid asserted causes of action claiming a right to ownership of the Property. Judgment was entered against Reid, and the judgment is final.

Reid’s Complaint in this action asserts the same “primary right” to an ownership interest in the Property. (See Slater, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 795 [for purposes of res judicata, “the invasion of one primary right gives rise to a single cause of action”].) Moreover, although she did not plead a claim for a resulting trust in the 2012 Lawsuit, she was permitted to argue that specific claim on appeal. Reid is therefore precluded from asserting the same claim in this action.

Reid argues that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply if there are “changed conditions and new facts.” She claims that, as a result of the UD Action following the 2012 Lawsuit, she acquired new evidence concerning the actual amount that she paid in closing costs for the Property.

Reid misunderstands the exception that she cites. The exception can apply when there are “ ‘changed conditions and new facts which were not in existence at the time the action was filed upon which the prior judgment is based.’ ” (Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 210, 227, italics added, quoting McGaffey, supra, 189 Cal.App.2d at pp. 217–218.) This is another way of stating that “res judicata ‘is not a bar to claims that arise after the initial complaint is filed.’ ” (Conservation League, at p. 227, quoting Allied Fire Protection v. Diede Construction, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 150, 155.)

Reid’s ownership claim did not arise after the 2012 Lawsuit. All the facts on which she relied in this case occurred before she filed the 2012 Lawsuit. Her failure to obtain particular evidence supporting those claims until after the lawsuit was completed does not preclude the application of res judicata. (See Evans v. Celotex Corp. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 741, 748 [“An exception to collateral estoppel cannot be grounded on the alleged discovery of more persuasive evidence. Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation”].)

Reid also argues that the trial court in this case actually found the existence of a resulting trust, and therefore erred in awarding only the reimbursement of mortgage payments “instead of awarding Reid ownership rights to the [Property].” The record does not support Reid’s argument. Although the trial court’s statement of decision referred to its prior tentative decision awarding a “resulting trust” in the amount of Reid’s loan payments following the entry of judgment in the 2012 Lawsuit, the court apparently misused that term. A resulting trust is a remedy imposed when the purchase price of property is paid by one person and title is taken in the name of another. (Martin v. Kehl (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 228, 238.) In such a case, “ ‘it is the natural presumption . . . that it was their intention that the ostensible purchaser should acquire and hold the property for the one with whose means it was acquired.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Lezinsky v. Mason Malt W. D. Co. (1921) 185 Cal. 240, 251.)

The trial court here clearly did not intend to award such a beneficial interest in the Property to Reid. The court specifically found that Reid’s ownership claim was precluded by res judicata, and also specifically found that Barnes “is the true owner of the [P]roperty.” In doing so, the court quoted the portion of the decision in Reid I rejecting Reid’s resulting trust claim. The trial court obviously intended only to reimburse Reid for the loan payments that she had made following the judgment in the 2012 Lawsuit. Consistent with that intent, the final judgment ordered only the payment of a fixed sum to Reid.

Moreover, even if the trial court had found a resulting trust, that finding would have been erroneous. For the reasons discussed above, the decision of Division Seven in Reid I established as a matter of law that Reid’s resulting trust claim was barred under the doctrine of res judicata.

2. Reid’s Fact-based Arguments Are Not Supported by the Record

Reid has not provided a reporter’s transcript or a settled statement on appeal. As Division Seven explained in Reid I, the absence of a reporter’s transcript or a settled statement providing a record of what occurred during trial is fatal to an appeal when no error appears on the face of the available record. (See Reid I, supra, B261810.) That is because an appealed judgment is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to show error. (Randall v. Mousseau (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 929, 935.) “Where no reporter’s transcript has been provided and no error is apparent on the face of the existing appellate record, the judgment must be conclusively presumed correct as to all evidentiary matters. To put it another way, it is presumed that the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error.” (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992.)

Reid makes several arguments that we must reject as a result of this rule. First, Reid argues that Barnes did not actually verify his Cross-complaint as required by section 761.020. Reid claims that a report by a handwriting expert shows that the signature on the verification accompanying the Cross-complaint is not actually Barnes’s.

As the trial court noted in overruling Reid’s demurrer on this ground, whether the Cross-complaint contained Barnes’s genuine signature “is an evidentiary matter.” In the absence of a record of the trial, we must presume that the trial court correctly resolved that evidentiary issue against Reid.

Second, Reid argues that Barnes’s quiet title cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. She claims that her improvements to the property in 2002 put Barnes on notice that she was an adverse possessor and that Barnes was therefore required to bring suit asserting his title to the Property within five years. (See § 321.)

Reid also made this argument in her demurrer to Barnes’s Cross-complaint. In rejecting the argument, the trial court correctly ruled that whether Reid was an adverse possessor and, if so, when her possession became adverse were issues of fact.

Reid claimed that she initially lived in the Property with Barnes’s permission pursuant to the parties’ agreement that Barnes would obtain title and hold it for Reid’s benefit. Where initial use of property is permissive, there cannot be an adverse possession without clear notice to the owner of the adverse nature of subsequent possession. (Southern Pacific Co. v. San Francisco (1964) 62 Cal.2d 50, 56.) Whether such notice has been given is an issue of fact. (Ibid.) In the absence of a reporter’s transcript, we must presume that the trial court correctly found against Reid on that factual issue.

Third, Reid argues that the trial court erred in dismissing Barnes’s unlawful detainer claim at trial without prejudice. Section 581, subdivision (e) requires that a plaintiff’s request for dismissal after the commencement of trial must be granted with prejudice unless all affected parties either consent to dismissal without prejudice or the court finds good cause for dismissal without prejudice. Here, the absence of a trial record precludes any review of whether Reid preserved her objection to dismissal without prejudice or whether the trial court found good cause for such a dismissal. We therefore reject the argument.

3. Reid’s Remaining Arguments Present No Ground for Reversal

Reid presents a number of other complaints concerning the proceedings below. To the extent that we can discern arguments for reversal based upon those complaints, we reject them.

Reid argues that the trial judge was biased. Reid filed a motion to disqualify on that basis, which the trial court ordered stricken on July 17, 2018. A petition for a writ of mandate is the exclusive method to seek reversal on statutory grounds of a judicial disqualification ruling. (§ 170.3, subd. (d); People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 1000.) Reid failed to file a timely writ petition challenging the trial court’s July 17, 2018 order, and has therefore forfeited any bias claim that does not amount to a due process violation. (Freeman, at p. 1000.)

Reid has not identified any bias by the trial court, much less bias rising to the level of a violation of due process. Reid complains about the trial court’s rulings and the conduct of opposing counsel that the trial court allegedly permitted, but none of those complaints is sufficient to show bias. (See People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112 [“a trial court’s numerous rulings against a party—even where erroneous—do not establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are subject to review”].)

Reid also complains that Barnes did not record a notice of pendency of his quiet title action as required by section 761.010, subdivision (b). Even if true, Reid does not identify how that failure caused her any prejudice. The purpose of this statutory lis pendens requirement is to give persons “who may obtain an interest in the property notice that the state of title as of the date of the complaint (or an earlier date set forth in the complaint) is at issue, and will be adjudicated. Should such a person nonetheless obtain an interest, with such constructive knowledge, that person’s interest will be taken subject to the quiet title judgment.” (Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. McGurk (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 201, 214.) Reid is a party and is named in the judgment, and therefore is clearly bound by the judgment. (§ 764.030, subd. (a).)

Reid also presents various arguments on behalf of the other defendants named in Barnes’s Cross-complaint, Mitchell and Hendrickson, including that the trial court erred in entering a default against them without an evidentiary hearing and that Hendrickson lacked capacity to assist in his defense. Those defendants did not file a notice of appeal, and we therefore may not consider Reid’s arguments on their behalf. (Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1128 [appellants “may not assert error that injuriously affected only nonappealing coparties”].)

Finally, Reid argues that Barnes’s Cross-complaint failed to plead the source of the money used to acquire the Property. Reid has not cited to any authority imposing such a pleading requirement. She cites section 761.020, subdivision (b), but that section simply requires that a quiet title plaintiff plead “[t]he title . . . as to which a determination under this chapter is sought and the basis of the title.” Barnes’s Cross-complaint alleged that he acquired title on the basis of the grant deed recorded after the purchase of the Property. Barnes included a copy of the deed as an exhibit to the Cross-complaint. Reid’s argument therefore identifies no error.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Barnes is entitled to his costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

HOFFSTADT, J.

Parties and Attorneys
Reid v. Givens-Morgan
Division 2
Case Number B299274
Party Attorney

Debra Ann Reid : Plaintiff and Appellant
2923 West 134th Place
Gardena, CA 90249 Pro Per

Gerald Barnes : Defendant and Respondent
Lola Marie McAlpin-Grant
8055 West Manchester Avenue, Suite 525
Playa Del Rey, CA 90293

Gary Hendrickson, Jr. : Cross-defendant
MaryEtta Christina Marks
Law Offices of M.C. Marks
6709 La Tijera Boulevard
#541
Los Angeles, CA 90045-2017

Malcolm Mitchell : Cross-defendant
MaryEtta Christina Marks
Law Offices of M.C. Marks
6709 La Tijera Boulevard
#541
Los Angeles, CA 90045-2017

Patricia Givens-Morgan : Defendant and Respondent
Lola Marie McAlpin-Grant
8055 West Manchester Avenue, Suite 525
Playa Del Rey, CA 90293