Lawzilla Additional Information:
Per the Santa Clara records defendant is represented by attorney Alexander Abraham

Note: This was a tentative ruling. We have not been able to confirm if the tentative became a final ruling, or it changed or was withdrawn.

Case name: DEWEY, ET AL. v. DARKO PRECISION, INC.
Case No: 1-12-CV-223216
Date: April 4, 2014
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept.: 13

Plaintiffs Ryan Dewey and Phuong Huynh (“Plaintifs”) seek an order compelling defendant Darko Precision, Inc. (“Defendant”) to provide further responses to special interrogatories (“SI”), Nos. 11 and 21; to provide further responses to requests for production of documents (“RPD”), Nos. 11 and 12; and to produce documents in compliance with its response to RPD, No. 9.

Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice of the declaration of Darko Simunic is GRANTED, as the declaration is a court record that is relevant to this motion. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); Stepan v. Garcia (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 497, 500 [the court may take judicial notice of its own file]; People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 [only relevant matters are subject to judicial notice].)

Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses to SI, Nos. 11 and 21 and RPD Nos. 11 and 12 is GRANTED.

With regard to SI, No. 11 Defendant’s objection that the interrogatory is not full and complete in and of itself on the ground that it references prior interrogatories lacks merit because reference to another interrogatory number does not violate the statutory requirement that interrogatories be full and complete in and of themselves. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.060, subd. (d); Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1290; Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter Group 2012) at 8:979.7, p. 8F-22.)

Defendant’s objection that SI, No. 11 violates the privacy rights of its employees also lacks merit. In evaluating Defendant’s privacy claim, the court applies the framework set forth in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 40. Defendant’s employees do, on the one hand, possess a legally protected interest and reasonable expectation of privacy in their contact information such as their name and home address. (See Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1252; Crab Addison, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2008) 169 Cal. App. 4th 958, 962; Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 370; Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 554, 560–561.) However, the invasion of privacy is not a serious one because Defendant’s employees are similarly situated to Plaintiffs such that they may reasonably be supposed to want their information disclosed to Plaintiffs’ counsel. (See Puerto v. Super. Ct., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p.1252–1253; Crab Addison, Inc. v. Super. Ct., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 963.) Moreover, the disclosure of the names and addresses of potential witnesses is a routine and essential part of pretrial discovery, such that on balance the right of Plaintiffs to discover potential witnesses and relevant facts outweighs the privacy interests of Defendant’s employees in their contact information. (See Puerto v. Super. Ct., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p.1252; People v. Dixon (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 414, 443.)

With regard to SI, No. 21, Defendant’s objection that the interrogatory is not full and complete because it references an exhibit lacks merit as the reference to the exhibit was for the purpose of identifying the document and not to undermine the presumptive numerical limit of 35 interrogatories . (See Code Civ. Proc., 2030.060, subds. (c), (d); Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial, (Rutter Group 2012), at 8:979.5, at p. 8F-22; Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal. App. 4th 1277, 1291; Hogan & Weber, Cal. Civil Discovery, (2d ed. 2005), Interrogatories to a Party, § 5.3, p. 5-6 to 5-7.) Defendant’s objection that SI, No. 21 violates the privacy rights of the machinists who executed declarations also lacks merit for the same reasons outlined with regard to SI, No. 11. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification was granted and the Court found that an ascertainable class exists composed of all machinists employed by Defendant from April 26, 2009 to April 24, 2012, and the 19 machinists who allegedly signed the declarations are potential witnesses.

With regard to RPD, No. 11, Defendant’s objection to the term “releases” and “releasing claims” as vague and ambiguous is overruled as the terms are not so vague or ambiguous as to render the question unintelligible. (See Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.3d 771, 783.)

With regard to RPD, No. 12, Defendant’s objection that the interrogatory is not full and complete by virtue of its reference to an attached exhibit is overruled because there is no requirement that requests for production of documents be full and complete in and of themselves. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.060.) Defendant’s objection that RPD, No. 12 violates the privacy rights of the machinists who executed the declarations is also overruled for the reasons outlined with regard to SI, Nos. 11 and 21.

Because Defendant failed to justify its objections to the discovery at issue, further responses are warranted. Accordingly, Defendant shall serve verified, code-compliant further responses to SI, Nos. 11 and 21 and RPD, Nos. 11 and 12, without objections, within 20 calendar days of the filing of the written order, and also produce all documents in accordance with the further responses to the RPD.

Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendant to produce documents in compliance with its response to RPD No. 9 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs established that Defendant has not yet complied with its agreement to produce payroll records, and Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an order compelling compliance. (See Code of Civ. Proc., § 2031.320, subd. (a); Standon Co., Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 898, 903.) Accordingly, within 20 calendar days of the filing of the written order, Defendant shall provide Plaintiffs with all documents responsive to RPD No. 9 that have not yet been produced.

Plaintiffs’ request for monetary sanctions against Defendant’s counsel is GRANTED in the amount of $2,975. Plaintiffs are the prevailing parties, Defendant did not act with substantial justification, and no circumstances would make the imposition of sanctions unjust. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.330, subd. (d), 2031.310, subd. (h).) Accordingly, within 20 calendar days of the filing of the written order, Defendant’s counsel shall pay $2,975 to counsel for Plaintiffs.

Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiffs is DENIED. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.020.)