Case Number: BC533642    Hearing Date: September 12, 2014    Dept: 34

Moving Party: Plaintiff Dmitry Shychko (“plaintiff”)

Resp. Party: Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“defendant”)

Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to requests for production and for sanctions is DENIED.

Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice of Exhs. 1 and 2 are DENIED AS MOOT; judicial notice is not required of pleadings that are part of the case file.

Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice of Exh. 3-11 are DENIED. The rulings of other courts regarding discovery in other actions (which did not involve either party to this action) are not relevant. (See Aguila Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 569 [a court may decline to take judicial notice of irrelevant items]; Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 901, fn.3 [same].) Moreover, the Court notes that several of the attached records are from other courts, and plaintiff fails to provide certified copies of such. (See Super. Ct. L.A. County, Local Rules, rule 3.8(b).)

PRELIMINARY COMMENTS:

The Court does not understand why counsel did not avail themselves of the court’s offer to informally resolve this discovery dispute in lieu of filing a formal motion to compel – a process that would have taken 15 minutes, instead of the 15 hours that plaintiff counsel claims to have spent preparing this motion. (See Dept. 34 Orders, ¶ III, available at http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/courtroominformation/ui/resultpopup.aspx?value=LAM/34.)

BACKGROUND:

Plaintiff commenced this action on 1/21/14 against defendant for violations of the Song-Beverly Act and Magnuson-Moss Act. The action pertains to defects in a vehicle manufactured by defendant and purchased by plaintiff.

ANALYSIS:

Plaintiff seeks to compel defendant to provide further responses to request for production numbers 9, 18, 25, 26, 35, and 36.

In the opposition, defendant asserts that supplemental responses have been served as to some of the discovery at issue in this motion. However, defendant provides no evidence to support this assertion, other than defense counsel’s conclusory assertion that the facts stated in the opposition memorandum are true. (See Chon Decl., ¶ 2.) Without so much as a proof of service or a copy of the purported supplemental responses, the Court cannot determine that supplemental responses have been served or whether they adequately address the issues raised by plaintiff in the moving papers.

Request number 9 seeks documents relating to defendant’s rules, policies, and procedures since 2004 concerning the issuance of refunds or replacement vehicles in California under the Song-Beverly Act. Request number 18 seeks documents issued by defendant since 2004 relating to policies, procedures, and instructions that employees should follow in responding to customer requests for refunds or replacement vehicles. Defendant responded with objections and, as to request number 9, the substantive response that defendant operates under the Song-Beverly Act, defendant consults with outside counsel to assess claims under the Act, and documents are equally available to plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that the documents are relevant to determine defendant’s criteria for determining whether a vehicle is a “lemon” which is subject to buyback or replacement, and to prove civil penalties. However, plaintiff fails to explain why it is necessary to obtain documents from 2004. Plaintiff alleges that he purchased his vehicle in 2010. (See Compl., ¶ 7.) It is unclear why defendant’s policies and procedures from 2004 are relevant to plaintiff’s claims in and after 2010.

Further, these requests that require production of “all documents which evidence, describe, refer, or relate. . . ” presumably entail tens of thousands – if not hundreds of thousands – of documents.

Defendant’s objection that these requests are overbroad and burdensome is well taken.

Requests number 25 and 26 seek documents relating to technical service bulletins and recalls issued for vehicles of the same year, make, and model of the subject vehicle. Defendant responded with objections and the substantive responses that it would comply with the request and produce all non-privileged documents to which no objection has been made. Plaintiff argues that these documents are relevant to determining whether there was a wide-spread problem with the vehicle and whether the repairs were effective. However, plaintiff fails to explain why all technical service bulletins and recalls are necessary, as opposed to only those pertaining to the specific defect(s) about which plaintiff complains. Plaintiff relies on Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138 to support its requests. Aside from the fact that Donlen did not involve a discovery dispute, the court in that action noted that the “other vehicle” evidence was limited to the specific defective component of the vehicles. (See id. at p. 154.) Plaintiff’s requests are not so limited; instead, plaintiff appears to seek documents pertaining to all technical service bulletins and all recalls, even if such documents did not pertain to the actual alleged defect in plaintiff’s vehicle. Therefore, defendant’s objection that these requests are overly broad is well taken.

As for request numbers 35 and 36, defendant appears to be correct that these requests were not addressed in plaintiff’s meet and confer letter. (See Swanson Decl., Exh. C; Chon Decl., Exh. F.) A meet and confer declaration must “state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040 [emphasis added].) Because plaintiff made no effort to informally resolve the dispute as to these requests, defendant is not required to provide further responses. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(2).)

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to requests for production is DENIED.