Case Name: Doe v. Evergreen Elementary School Dist., et al.
Case No.: 1-13-CV-254671

Defendant Evergreen School District (“Defendant”) demurs to the first amended complaint (“FAC”) filed by plaintiff Jane Doe (“Plaintiff”).

This action arises out of a sexual assault perpetrated on Plaintiff by her teacher while she was a student at one of Defendant’s schools. On March 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed the first amended complaint (“FAC”) asserting claims for (1) Sexual Abuse of a Minor, (2) Negligence of Employees/Breach of Mandatory Duty, (3) Negligent Hiring, et al., (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and (5) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.

On March 25, 2013, Defendant filed the instant demurrer to the first cause of action on the ground of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s first cause of action is deficiently pleaded because the FAC does not contain any new allegations that allege whether its conduct was intentional or negligent, as it asserts the Court’s prior order on Defendant’s demurrer to the original complaint required. However, the Court’s order did no such thing. In the order, the Court merely reiterated, but did not endorse, Defendant’s assertion that the first cause of action was uncertain because it did not disclose whether the alleged conduct was intentional or negligent. Consequently, Defendant’s argument is without merit.

Defendant next asserts, as it did previously, that “sexual abuse of a minor” is not recognized as a valid cause of action. However, this assertion is plainly contradicted by Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, which held that a civil cause of action for sexual abuse against a child can be maintained by a plaintiff against her perpetrator. In reaching the foregoing conclusion, the court in Angie M. reasoned that the Penal Code prohibited the acts alleged by the plaintiff; the plaintiff was clearly a member of the class intended to be protected those criminal statutes, and thus was entitled to bring a civil action for violations of them. Here, Plaintiff has identified the statutory bases for her claim, alleging violations of Penal Code sections 288, 288a and 647.6 and 11165.1, and she is clearly a member of the class intended to be protected by these statutes.

Defendant insists that Angie M. is distinguishable because it involved a sexual abuse claim against the abusing defendant and not the alleged abuser’s employer. However, this argument fails to recognize, as the Court noted in its prior order, that a principle may be liable when it ratifies an unauthorized tort committed by its employee. (See Murillo v. Rite Stuff Foods, Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 852; see also Baptist v. Robinson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 151, 169 [as an alternate theory to respondeat superior, an employer may be liable for an employee’s act where the employer either authorized the tortious act or subsequently ratified an originally unauthorized tort].) “Whether an employer has ratified an employee’s conduct is generally a factual question.” (C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1110.) Here, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts showing that Defendant ratified Craig Chandler’s sexual misconduct towards Plaintiff. (See FAC at ¶¶ 12, 20 and 26.) Therefore, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim for sexual abuse of a minor.

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to the first cause of action on the grounds of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is OVERRULED.