Filed 10/16/19 McGrath v. The Judges Retirement System CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

DUFF McGRATH, as Trustee, etc., et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

THE JUDGES RETIREMENT
SYSTEM,

Defendant and Respondent.

G057354

(Super. Ct. No. 30-2018-01005879)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Glenn R. Salter, Judge. Affirmed.

Paul G. Mast for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

California Public Employees’ Retirement System, Matthew G. Jacobs and John L. Shipley for Defendant and Respondent.

* * *

INTRODUCTION

The California Judges Retirement Law (Gov. Code, §§ 75000-75111) sets forth a series of combinations of age and service markers; if a judge retires having reached these markers, he or she immediately becomes entitled to receive full retirement benefits. (§ 75025.) If a judge retires before reaching these markers, he or she may take a deferred retirement, in which the benefits will not start until the section 75025 markers are reached, at which time the retirement benefits will be a percentage of the full retirement benefit. (§ 75033.5.)

Plaintiffs and Appellants in this case are the representatives of two former judges, now deceased, who retired before they reached the age and service markers under section 75025, and therefore opted for deferred retirement under section 75033.5. They claim that the Judges Retirement Law provides for one more retirement option—retiring before the age and service markers are met, and receiving the full retirement benefit when the section 75025 markers are met. They further claim the Judges Retirement System (JRS) failed to advise them of this option, and therefore seek as damages the difference between the amount they actually received in retirement benefits, and the amount they believe they should have received.

Following an administrative hearing, JRS denied Appellants’ claims. The trial court denied their petition for a writ of administrative mandamus. We affirm. The plain meaning of the statutes gave the former judges two options for their retirement benefits, and JRS fully and fairly advised them of those options. JRS did not violate any fiduciary duties by failing to advise the former judges about a retirement option that did not exist.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Judge Betty Lou Lamoreaux served as a judge on the Orange County Municipal and Superior Courts for a total of 14 years and 13 days. She was 65 years of age when she retired. In response to Judge Lamoreaux’s requests before she retired, JRS informed her that the first date she could retire under section 75025 was September 18, 1991, if she continued to serve as a judge through that date; at that point her retirement pay would be 65 percent of a sitting judge’s salary. JRS also informed Judge Lamoreaux that she could elect a deferred retirement under section 75033.5, retire on December 31, 1988, and receive 49.8313 percent of a sitting judge’s salary.

On August 1, 1989, Judge Lamoreaux submitted an application for retirement under section 75033.5, effective September 30, 1989. In the application she affirmed that her retirement payments would start September 18, 1991, at 52.6336 percent of a sitting judge’s salary.

Judge Harry A. Ackley served as a Yolo County Superior Court judge for a total of 14 years, 10 months, and 7 days. He was 66 years old on his retirement date. In response to Judge Ackley’s requests regarding his service credit and retirement options, JRS advised him that March 1, 1992 would be the first day he was eligible to retire under section 75025 if he continued to serve as a judge through that date. JRS also advised him that he could elect deferred retirement under section 75033.5 and provided his approximate retirement allowance.

On November 9, 1990, Judge Ackley signed an application for retirement, electing to retire effective January 7, 1991, pursuant to section 75033.5. JRS received Judge Ackley’s Notice of Retirement indicating his intent to concurrently retire with JRS and the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), and confirmed he would receive 55.6969 percent of a sitting judge’s salary beginning on March 1, 1992, the age at which he would have been eligible to retire under section 75025. Judge Ackley died April 10, 2013. His widow, Gloria Ackley, became entitled to 50 percent of the benefits Judge Ackley was entitled to receive.

Judge Lamoreaux, through her conservator, Sally Cicerone, and Gloria Ackley (collectively Appellants) submitted separate claims to JRS seeking damages for past benefits. Appellants’ primary argument was that Judge Lamoreaux and Judge Ackley were entitled to retire under section 75025 despite the fact they did not meet the age and service markers on their effective retirement dates. Appellants claimed that Judge Lamoreaux and Judge Ackley were entitled to retire under section 75025 if they met the age and service markers after the effective retirement date, and that JRS failed to inform them of this option. Appellants sought the difference in retirement benefits they believed they should have received under section 75025 (65 percent), and what they actually received under section 75033.5 (Judge Lamoreaux was receiving 52.6336 percent; Judge Ackley had been receiving 55.6969 percent).

JRS issued separate determinations denying Appellants’ claims. Appellants appealed JRS’s determinations. A consolidated administrative hearing took place before an administrative law judge (ALJ) with the Office of Administrative Hearings.

The ALJ issued a proposed decision denying the appeals. The ALJ found that “[n]either the plain meaning, legislative history, nor principles of statutory construction of sections 75025 and 75033.5 supports [Appellants’] argument that Judges Lamoreaux and Ackley should have been allowed a deferred retirement under section 75025, and the corresponding greater benefits.” The ALJ also found that JRS gave the judges correct advice about their retirement options when they made preretirement inquiries, and that this was the basis of the judges’ decisions to retire. The CalPERS Board of Administration adopted the proposed decision at its meeting on June 20, 2018.

Appellants then filed a verified petition for a writ of mandate on July 16, 2018. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) Following briefing and a hearing, the trial court issued a minute order denying the petition.

The trial court found that JRS had correctly determined that neither Judge Lamoreaux nor Judge Ackley met the age and service markers under section 75025 when they retired. The court found that, because they were not eligible to retire under the provisions of section 75025, JRS had fulfilled its fiduciary duty to them.

The trial court also found that even if Judge Lamoreaux and Judge Ackley were eligible for deferred retirement under section 75025, JRS had fulfilled its duty under Hittle v. Santa Barbara County Employees Retirement Assn. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 374 (Hittle) to fully inform its members of their retirement options.

Appellants’ motion for reconsideration was denied. Judgment was entered, and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

“Administrative mandamus is the form of judicial review used to challenge an agency’s adjudicatory decision, i.e., a decision by an agency regarding private rights or interests, when a hearing is required by law to be given before the agency issues that decision.” (1 Cal. Administrative Mandamus (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. 2016) Nature of Proceeding, § 1.1, p. 2.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 lays out the procedure for judicial review by administrative writ of mandamus of final administrative decisions. (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 810.) “The inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) The substantial evidence standard of review applies in an appeal from an administrative mandate proceeding. (Fukuda v. City of Angels, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 810.) “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, resolving all conflicts in the evidence and drawing all inferences in support of the judgment.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 225.)

The Judges Retirement Law provides for retirement allowances for California state court judges. Section 75025 sets forth the age and service markers to receive a full retirement allowance of 65 percent of a sitting judge’s salary:

“Every judge who has the age and service qualifications specified in one of the following subdivisions, and who is not ineligible for retirement under Section 75026, shall be retired for service upon filing notice of retirement with the Judges’ Retirement System, specifying the date upon which his or her retirement is to become effective:

“(a) Age 70 or older, with an aggregate of 10 years of service as a judge within the 15 years immediately preceding the effective date of retirement.

“(b) Age 69, with an aggregate of 12 years of service as a judge within the 16 years immediately preceding the effective date of retirement.

“(c) Age 68, with an aggregate of 14 years of service as a judge within the 18 years immediately preceding the effective date of retirement.

“(d) Age 67, with an aggregate of 16 years of service as a judge within the 20 years immediately preceding the effective date of retirement.

“(e) Age 66, with an aggregate of 18 years of service as a judge within the 22 years immediately preceding the effective date of retirement.

“(f) Age 65, with an aggregate of 20 years of service as a judge within the 24 years immediately preceding the effective date of retirement.

“(g) Age 70 or older, with an aggregate of 20 years of service as a judge, the last five years of which has been served immediately preceding the effective date of retirement.

“(h) Age 60, with an aggregate of 20 years of service as a judge.

“Upon the effective date of the retirement of any judge, the judicial office from which he or she has retired shall become vacant, and a successor shall thereupon be appointed to fill the vacancy.” (§ 75025; see § 75076, subd. (a) [“A judge who qualifies . . . to receive the benefits accorded by this article shall receive a retirement allowance equal to 65 percent of the salary payable, at the time payment of the allowance falls due, to the judge holding the judicial office to which he or she was last elected or appointed”].)

Section 75033.5 provides for deferred retirement. In this situation, the judge can retire before he or she meets the age and service markers set forth in any of the subdivisions of section 75025, but will not begin to receive retirement benefits until actually reaching those markers. In many cases, the monetary benefits of deferred retirement will be less than if the judge retired under section 75025. Section 75033.5 reads, in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, any judge with at least five years of service, may retire, and upon his or her application therefor to the Judges’ Retirement System after reaching the age which would have permitted him or her to retire for age and length of service under Section 75025 had he or she remained continuously in service as a judge up to that age, receive a retirement allowance based upon the judicial service as a judge of a court of record, with which he or she is credited, in the same manner as other judges, except as otherwise provided by this section the retirement allowance is an annual amount equal to 3.75 percent of the compensation payable, at the time payments of the allowance fall due, to the judge holding the office which the retired judge last held prior to his or her discontinuance of his or her service as judge, multiplied by the number of years and fractions of years of service with which the retired judge is entitled to be credited at the time of his or her retirement, not to exceed 20 years.” (Ibid.)

In a matter involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task is to discern the Legislature’s intent in order to give effect to the law’s purpose. (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141; Fluor Corp. v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1175, 1198.) We first examine the words of the statute, giving them their ordinary, usual, and commonsense meanings. (People v. Gonzalez, supra, at p. 1141; Fluor Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 1198.) We consider the language of the entire statute and related statutes and harmonize the terms whenever possible. (People v. Gonzalez, supra, at p. 1141.) If the statutory language is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls. (Fluor Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 1198.) If the statutory language is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, then extrinsic aids, such as the statutory purpose, its legislative history, and public policy may be considered to determine the legislative intent. (Ibid.)

We find the statutes at issue to be clear and unambiguous in their meaning. Section 75025 sets forth a list of combinations of age and service markers that will entitle a retiring judge to receive a full retirement allowance of 65 percent of a sitting judge’s salary. If the judge has not reached a combination of the age and service markers, section 75033.5 allows him or her to retire on a date of his or her choice, with two caveats: (1) the judge will not receive the retirement allowance until he or she reaches one of the age and service markers set forth in section 75025, and (2) the judge will not receive the full retirement benefit, but rather a percentage of that benefit, as determined by a formula within the statute. Together, these two statutes provide for retirement benefits to all sitting judges appointed or elected before November 9, 1994, whether they retire before or after reaching the age and service markers of section 75025.

Because the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we need not consider the purpose and legislative history of the statutes. Even if we did consider those extrinsic aids, we would interpret the statutes in the same way. The purpose of Senate Bill No. 217, which added section 75033.5 to the Government Code, was “to provide alternative deferred retirement for Judges.” The Assembly committee analysis provided: “SB 217 would add an alternative deferred retirement provision to the law. The alternative would provide that a judge leaving office at any time, with at least five years of service and under age 70, would be eligible for a deferred retirement.” The Legislative Analyst’s summary of the legislation and the enrolled bill memorandum to the governor provided the same analysis of Senate Bill No. 217.

The legislative history shows that, before the enactment of section 75033.5, the assumption was the state of the law did not permit a judge to defer his or her retirement benefits if he or she left office before reaching the age and service markers of section 75025. Section 75033.5 was intended to fill that gap. We reject the Appellants’ contention that the lack of direct citation to section 75025 in the legislative history for Senate Bill No. 217 means that statute had no connection to the legislation.

Despite the clear language of the statutes and the legislative history of section 75033.5, Appellants contend that they had a right to defer receiving the full 65 percent retirement benefit under sections 75025 and 75076 without meeting the age and service requirements of section 75025 at the time they retired. Appellants argue that if section 75025 did not permit a judge to retire and defer his or her benefits under section 75025, each subdivision of that statute would read “a judge who serves until age __.” The relevant language of the statute actually reads as follows: “Every judge who has the age and service qualifications specified in one of the following subdivisions . . . shall be retired for service upon filing notice of retirement with the Judges’ Retirement System, specifying the date upon which his or her retirement is to become effective . . . . Upon the effective date of the retirement of any judge, the judicial office from which he or she has retired shall become vacant, and a successor shall thereupon be appointed to fill the vacancy.” (§ 75025, italics added.) The language of this statute makes clear the effective date of retirement under section 75025 is both the date on which the judge has met the age and service requirements, and the date on which the judge leaves his or her judicial office. Appellants’ argument would necessarily give the term “effective date of retirement” two different meanings within the same statute.

Appellants contend that the “effective date of retirement” is the date on which a judge begins to receive retirement benefits. The clear language of section 75025 defeats this argument. That statute provides, in relevant part: “Upon the effective date of the retirement of any judge, the judicial office from which he or she has retired shall become vacant, and a successor shall thereupon be appointed to fill the vacancy.” (§ 75025.) If the effective date of the retirement was the date on which the judge began receiving retirement benefits, the judicial office would not become vacant until that date. In construing statutes, we must avoid absurd or unworkable results. (Smith v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 83.) Further, the fact that section 75033.5 specifically addresses deferred retirement benefits prevents this court from reading into section 75025 a separate deferred retirement benefit provision.

Appellants also point to the difference in language between subdivision (g) and the other subdivisions of section 75025. Subdivision (g) provides that a judge may retire at: “Age 70 or older, with an aggregate of 20 years of service as a judge, the last five years of which has been served immediately preceding the effective date of retirement.” In comparison, subdivision (a) provides that a judge may retire at “Age 70 or older, with an aggregate of 10 years of service as a judge within the 15 years immediately preceding the effective date of retirement.” As noted ante, the effective date of retirement means both the date on which the right to benefits begins, and the date on which the judicial office is vacated. The difference in the phrasing of these two subdivisions of section 75025 does not create a right to defer receipt of full retirement benefits under this statute.

Appellants argue the JRS violated the rule of Hittle, supra, 39 Cal.3d 374, by failing to advise them about their right to defer full retirement benefits under section 75025. As explained in detail ante, there was no such right. JRS had no duty to advise Appellants about retirements benefits that did not exist. Further, as the trial court found, JRS fully complied with the rule of Hittle, in which the court held that the trustee of a pension plan may fulfill its fiduciary duty to a terminating employee by “fully and fairly describ[ing] the plan and its various options and procedures.” (Hittle, supra, at p. 394.) The appellate record amply supports the trial court’s factual finding. JRS provided both Judge Lamoreaux and Judge Ackley detailed information on what their benefits would be if they retired pursuant to section 75025 or to section 75033.5.

 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent to recover costs on appeal.

FYBEL, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IKOLA, J.

THOMPSON, J.