Edmund Prehoden, Jr. v. Sandbar, et al.
Case No: 18CV04185
Hearing Date: Tue Aug 20, 2019 9:30

Nature of Proceedings: Motion Strike

Motion to Strike Portions of First Amended Complaint

ATTORNEYS:

Derek J. Wilson for Plaintiff Edmund Prehoden, Jr.

Vanessa H. Hubert for Defendants Old Town Hospitality, Inc. dba Sandbar Restaurant and Aron Ashland; Marjorie E. Motooka for Defendant Teak Warehouse.

RULING: Defendant Teak Warehouse’s motion to strike portions of plaintiff’s first amended complaint is denied.

BACKGROUND:

This is an action for personal injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff when the chair he was sitting in at the Sandbar Restaurant, 514 State Street, Santa Barbara, California, broke, causing him to fall and hit his head. Defendants Old Town Hospitality, Inc. and Aron Ashland are the owners of the Sandbar Restaurant. Defendant Teak Warehouse, Inc. is the manufacturer of the chair that failed. Plaintiff alleges that there had been a series of chair failures at the restaurant prior to his injury, all involving the same chair manufacturer, and that the failures continued to occur as defendants squabbled about who should be responsible for repairing or replacing the chairs. On July 9, 2019, plaintiff filed his first amended complaint for (1) general negligence, (2) premises liability, and (3) products liability. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against defendants pursuant to Civil Code Section 3294.

By this motion, defendant Teak Warehouse, Inc. (“Teak”) asks the Court to strike the claim for punitive damages. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

ANALYSIS:

Code of Civil Procedure Section 435, subdivision (b)(1), provides that “[a]ny party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.” The grounds for a motion to strike are set forth in Code of Civil Procedure Section 436, which provides:

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper:

“(a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.

(b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”

For purposes of a motion to strike, “irrelevant” matter includes a “demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” Code Civ. Proc. §431.10, subds. (b)(3), (c).

In the present case, Teak moves to strike the punitive damages allegations in the FAC on the ground that the complaint is devoid of any facts that would support a claim for such damages. Under Civil Code Section 3294, subdivision (a), punitive damages are recoverable only where it is shown that the defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. Fraud is not alleged in the FAC. “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. Civ. Code §3294, subd. (c)(1). “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. Civ. Code §3294, subd. (c)(2).

A claim for punitive damages cannot be pled generally. Rather, where malice is alleged, specific factual allegations of an intent to harm or despicable conduct are required. As the California Supreme Court held in College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725:

“By adding the word ‘willful’ to the ‘conscious-disregard’ prong of malice, the Legislature has arguably conformed the literal words of the statute to existing case law formulations. [Citation.] However, the statute’s reference to ‘despicable’ conduct seems to represent a new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards. Used in its ordinary sense, the adjective ‘despicable’ is a powerful term that refers to circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’ [Citation.] As amended to include this word, the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.”

Teak contends that the FAC alleges no facts evincing malice on its part. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff alleges that Teak acted with a willful and conscious disregard for the safety of others by failing to repair or recall furniture that it knew was breaking with regularity at the Sandbar Restaurant. Specifically, plaintiff alleges:

“This case is a textbook example of companies showing a conscious indifference and disregard for the probable harm to others. Sandbar, Teak, and Sharkeez acted with a conscious disregard of the safety of others by failing to repair or replace the newly purchased chairs that were breaking, despite knowing that faulty furniture could cause harm to patrons (through common sense, numerous prior patrons falling out of the chairs as they broke, and the danger being admitted in emails amongst these parties). Further, Teak acted with conscious disregard for the safety of others by failing to change the design of their furniture or recall the furniture it knew was breaking with regularity at Sandbar even after it was made aware that the furniture was breaking. Sandbar had a higher-end Bianca chair with much thicker legs but never mentioned this chair as a substitute. Each of these entities acted recklessly to preserve profit – either from keeping hazardous seats in use or for refusing to replace unfit furniture that would destroy all profit made from a large furniture sale – at the expense of safety for patrons of a busy restaurant. These actions are offensive to a reasonable person.” (FAC, Exemplary Damages Attachment, ¶Ex-2, p. 7.)

Thus, plaintiff has alleged acts on the part of defendant demonstrating a reckless indifference to, or a conscious disregard of, the health and safety of others. Such conduct is more reprehensible than simple negligence and is sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages.

Based on the foregoing, Teak’s motion to strike the punitive damages allegations in the FAC will be denied.