Case Name:   Elaine Holland v. Artloan Financial Services, LLC, et al.

 

Case No.:       1-09-CV-151296

 

Motion by Plaintiff Elaine Holland to Compel Defendant Steven McVay to Provide Further Responses to Requests for Admission and an Initial or, in the Alternative, Further Response to Form Interrogatory, and for an Award of Monetary Sanctions

 

Plaintiff filed this motion to compel McVay to provide further responses to requests for admission, set two (“RFA”), Nos. 23-26, 32-34, and 37-40, and an initial or, in the alternative, a further response to form interrogatories, set one (“FI”), No. 17.1, and for an award of monetary sanctions.

 

Meet and Confer

 

McVay argues that Plaintiff failed to adequately meet and confer prior to filing the motion.  Plaintiff’s counsel sent McVay a detailed meet and confer letter on April 29, 2014, to which McVay did not respond.  Under these circumstances, Plaintiff’s meet and confer efforts were adequate.  (See Townsend v. Super. Ct. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435, 1439; see also Obregon v. Super. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.)

 

Motion as to the RFA

 

Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to RFA Nos. 23-26, 32-34, and 37-40 is GRANTED.  Accordingly, within twenty days of notice, McVay shall serve verified code-compliant further responses to RFA Nos. 23-26, 32-34, and 37-40, without objections.

 

McVay’s undefended objections are overruled. (See Coy v. Super. Ct., supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 220-221.)  McVay’s objections to RFA No. 34 on the grounds of ambiguity and calls for a legal conclusion are overruled because the request is not so ambiguous as to make it unintelligible and “legal conclusion” is not a ground for objection to discovery requests. (See West Pico Furniture Co. v. Super. Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 416-417, 421; see also Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783.)  McVay’s objections to RFA Nos. 37-40 on the grounds of vagueness and ambiguity are overruled because the requests are not unintelligible.  (See Deyo v. Kilbourne, supra, at p. 783.)

 

Mc.Vay’s responses to RFA Nos. 23-26 and 32-33 are incomplete because they do not state that a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the particular request has been made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable McVay to admit the matter.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220, subd. (c).)

 

McVay’s responses to RFA Nos. 34 and 37-40 are evasive and incomplete because McVay has sufficient knowledge to state if he was licensed to solicit loans at the time that Plaintiff made her loan to Artloan or if he conducted investigations prior to discussing a loan to Artloan with Plaintiff.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220, subd. (c).)

 

Since McVay’s objections are overruled and his responses are incomplete and/or evasive, further responses are warranted to RFA Nos. Nos. 23-26, 32-34, and 37-40.

 

Motion as to Form Interrogatory No. 17.1

 

While McVay’s response is deficient, his answer stating “Yes” constitutes a response.  Thus, the motion as to FI No. 17.1 is not a motion to compel an initial response under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290.

 

Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to FI No. 17.1 is GRANTED.  A further response is warranted because McVay’s response did not include responsive information about RFA Nos. 18-22, 27-31, and 36, which he expressly denied. Additionally, if McVay provides further substantive responses denying RFA Nos. 34 and 37-40, he must provide a response to FI No. 17.1 for those RFAs as well.

 

Plaintiff’s Request for Monetary Sanctions

 

Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300(d) and 2033.290(d) require that the court “shall” impose a monetary sanction against a party who unsuccessfully opposes a discovery motion unless the party acted “with substantial justification or [ ] other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” “Substantial justification” is generally defined as being justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person, or stated another way, that it has a reasonable basis both in law and fact. The burden for proving “substantial justification” is on the losing party claiming that it acted with “substantial justification.”  Doe v. U.S. Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4^th 1424, 1434-1435.

 

Here, McVay has not met his burden to show that he acted with substantial justification. The arguments that there was no adequate meet and confer when McVay did not respond at all to a letter; that he did not respond adequately because he cannot speak for Artloan; or that the Artloan bankruptcy trustee has information, do not approach substantial justification.  There is no record evidence of other circumstances making an award of sanctions unjust.  Therefore, McVay is ordered to pay Plaintiff within twenty days of notice, the sum of $1,490 as and for attorney’s fees.