Filed 10/18/19 Meder v. County of S.F., Human Resources Agency CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

ELEN MEDER, WALTER MEDER,

Appellants,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, HUMAN RESOURCES AGENCY,

Respondent.

A155185

(City & County of San Francisco

Super. Ct. No. CPF-17-515968)

Elen and Walter Meder, who have appeared in propria persona throughout these proceedings, contend they are entitled to receive social services benefits from the County of San Francisco while they await adjudication of their application for political asylum in the United States. However, they fail to demonstrate that the Department of Human Resources for the City and County of San Francisco (the Department) erred when it concluded the Meders were not eligible for the benefits they sought. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the Meders’ petition for writ of mandate.

OVERVIEW OF COUNTY ADULT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

This appeal arises out of a dispute about eligibility for benefits under the County Adult Assistance Programs of the City and County of San Francisco. (S.F. Admin. Code, art. VII, § 20.7-1, et seq.) These programs, referred to by the parties as CAAP, provide financial assistance and support services to the indigent and dependent poor of the City. (§ 20.7-4.) The Department administers these assistance programs pursuant to policies established by the County Board of Supervisors. (§ 20.7-5.)

The Department has promulgated a “CAAP Eligibility Manual” that addresses, among other things, the application process, eligibility requirements, and fair hearing requirements. This appeal involves section 91-4 of the CAAP Eligibility Manual, which is titled “United States Citizenship & Alienage.” For clarity, we refer to this regulation as section 91-4.

Section 91-4 provides that ‘[i]n order to be eligible to receive CAAP, an applicant must be either a United States citizen or an eligible alien (non-citizen) lawfully admitted to the United States.” Section 91-4 further provides that “[a]n alien has eligible status” if that person is: (1) “Lawfully admitted for permanent residence”; (2) “Permanently residing in the United States under color of law (PRUCOL)”; or (3) a Jay Treaty Native American with “the right to freely travel between the U.S. and Canada.”

Section 91-4 lists fifteen subcategories of applicants who are eligible aliens under criterion (2) listed above because they permanently reside in the United States under color of law. Fourteen of these subcategories describe people who have been granted some form of special status or visa by the federal government. For example, PRUCOL aliens include “[a]liens granted asylum pursuant to Section 208 of the [Immigration and Nationality Act].” The fifteenth subcategory of PRUCOL aliens eligible for CAAP benefits are “[a]ny other aliens permanently living in the United States with knowledge and permission of the USCIS and whose departure that agency does not contemplate enforcing.”

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 3, 2017, the Meders went to the Department to apply for CAAP benefits. They were interviewed and submitted documentation, but their applications were denied “because they failed to meet CAAP immigration requirements for program eligibility.” They requested a hearing, which was held before a CAAP hearing officer on October 12, 2017.

At the October 12 hearing, the Department employee who denied the Meders’ applications testified that when she interviewed them, they reported that they were born in Moscow, and came to the United States seeking asylum from Germany. They both had work permits and had pending applications to the federal government for political asylum, but they had not been granted asylum. After reviewing the CAAP Eligibility Manual and consulting a supervisor, the Department employee determined the Meders were not eligible for aid and denied their applications.

The Meders testified at the hearing that they were seeking asylum due to religious persecution in Germany. They had social security cards, work permits and had applied for California ID cards. They were living with friends and they were not working because, they explained, they were not going to work below their education levels. They had been in the United States since December 2016 and testified they were not receiving support from anyone. They confirmed that their asylum applications were pending. Ms. Meder had been interviewed in connection with her application, but Mr. Meder had not.

On October 16, 2017, the CAAP hearing officer issued a written decision that the initial denial of benefits to the Meders was correct. In her decision, the hearing officer summarized the hearing testimony and reviewed pertinent provisions of section 91-4 before reaching the following conclusion: “The claimants were denied aid because they do not meet eligibility status under citizenship rules for this program. The program allows non-citizen applicants to meet eligibility requirements if they have been granted asylum. These two applicants have not been granted asylum – their applications for asylum are pending. By a preponderance of the evidence, the county’s determination to deny the applications for aid is affirmed. The applicants may reapply for aid when their circumstances change.”

In December 2017, the Meders filed a petition for writ of mandate, which incorporated the CAAP hearing officer’s decision denying them CAAP benefits. The Meders alleged the Department erroneously interpreted “the applicable law” by concluding that they do not meet the CAAP Eligibility Manual’s “definition of [a] ‘documentable alien.’ ” The Department opposed the petition and a hearing was set for July 10, 2018.

At the July 10 hearing, the court wished the Meders the “best of luck” with their asylum applications, but stated that “as I read the rules, until you are successful with those applications, you’re not entitled to the benefits that you’re seeking.” Ms. Meder responded that they did qualify because their evidence established that they were living in the country with the knowledge and permission of the USCIS, and that they were “here permanently in San Francisco until” their asylum cases were decided. According to Meder, “this status” allowed them to reside in San Francisco “under the color of [the] law.” Clarifying that the issue was not whether Meder was in the country lawfully, but whether she was permanently residing in the country, the court stated: “I think you are temporarily residing, pending the ruling on your asylum application.”

After further discussion, the court again wished luck to the Meders but informed them it was denying the petition because the hearing officer’s determination that the Meders were ineligible for CAAP benefits was not wrong.

DISCUSSION

Generally, we review the decision whether to grant a writ of administrative mandamus to determine whether there was “a prejudicial abuse of discretion in the administrative agency’s decision.” (Cobb v. San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 345, 350; Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) However, to the extent the appeal raises pure questions of law, our standard of review is de novo. (T & A Drolapas & Sons, LP v. San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 646, 651.)

The Meders contend, as they did below, that they are eligible for CAAP benefits under section 91-4 of the CAAP Eligibility Manual because they are permanently residing in the United States under color of law. However, as the trial court attempted to explain, the Meders misunderstand the “permanently residing” requirement. The undisputed evidence shows that when the Meders submitted their applications, they had permission to reside in the country while their applications for asylum were being decided. Thus, they were not permanently residing here under color of law. However, as the lower court also explained, if the Meders are granted asylum, their status will become permanent within the meaning of section 91-4 and they may reapply from CAAP benefits then.

The Meders contend there is no substantial evidence to support the finding of the trial court and CAAP hearing officer that they are temporarily residing in the United States under the color of law. However, their own testimony and documentation constitutes substantial evidence that they have permission to remain in this county only until their asylum applications are decided. This evidence of the Meders’ temporary right to reside in San Francisco is not only substantial, it is undisputed.

The Meders argue their PRUCOL status is shown by evidence that the State of California has paid them Medi-Cal benefits since February 2017 and “CAPI benefits” since November 2017. The Meders make this claim for the first time in their Appellant’s Reply Brief, which is not proper. (Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1542.) Furthermore, we find no evidence in the appellate record that the Meders receive these state benefits or why such benefits were (allegedly) granted. In this regard, we note that the Meders did not designate the Administrative Record as part of the record on appeal. However, according to the CAAP hearing officer’s December 2017 order, the Meders testified only that they had applied for Medi-Cal, that they missed the deadline to apply for “RCA benefits,” and that they had no other support. Thus, there is no basis for concluding that the Meders demonstrated to the Department that they qualified for social welfare services under California law.

The Meders argue their “current relationship with the U.S. government” is permanent as that term is defined in the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), which states: “The term ‘permanent’ means a relationship of continuing or lasting nature, as distinguished from temporary, but a relationship may be permanent even though it is one that may be dissolved eventually at the instance either of the United States or of the individual, in accordance with law.” (8 U.S.C., § 1101(a)(31).)

It is important to understand that eligibility for CAAP benefits is not governed by the INA. In any event, when the USCIS confirmed receipt of the Meders’ applications for asylum it informed them: “You may remain in the U.S. until your asylum application is decided.” The Department could have concluded reasonably that this permission was not continuing or of a lasting nature but simply allowed the Meders to remain in the country temporarily while their applications were considered.

The Meders cite Holley v. Lavine (2d Cir. 1977) 553 F.2d 845, which involved very different facts. In that federal action, a woman who was unlawfully in the country but had six children who were all citizens challenged a ruling terminating her aid for dependent child (AFDC) benefits. The termination was authorized by New York state law, but because federal law governs the payment of AFDC benefits, the issue was whether plaintiff was permanently residing in the United States under color of law. (See 45 C.F.R. § 233.50.) The appellate court concluded that the plaintiff satisfied this requirement because, after she had fully disclosed her situation to the Department of Justice, an INS officer issued a formal letter notifying the social services agency “that ‘deportation proceedings have not been instituted . . . for humanitarian reasons’ ” and that the “ ‘Service does not contemplate enforcing [the parent’s] departure from the United States at this time.’ ” (Holley, at p. 849.) Concluding that this evidence established that the plaintiff was eligible for AFDC benefits, the Holley court reasoned that, in matters cognate to the INA, plaintiff was permanently residing in the country when her residence “was assured at least until all her children had grown to full age, and might be extended thereafter indefinitely dependent upon conditions then existing.” (Id. at p. 851.)

In contrast to the Holley plaintiff, the Meders did not receive individualized assurance that they may remain in this country for an indefinite period of time. To the contrary, like all individuals whose applications for asylum are received by the government, they were considered by the Department to be temporarily residing in this country while their applications were under review.

We find nothing unreasonable about the Department’s interpretation of the eligibility criteria set forth in the CAAP Eligibility Manual. Certainly in light of the deference due where an agency interprets its own regulations (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 812, 840), we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying the Meders’ petition for writ of mandate.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

 

_________________________

TUCHER, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

POLLAK, P. J.

_________________________

STREETER, J.

Meder v. County of San Francisco, Human Resources Agency (A155185)

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