Case Name: Emma Martinez-Morris v. City of Sunnyvale, et al.
Case No.: 2016-CV-294878

Motion for Summary Judgment to the Second Amended Complaint by Defendants City of Sunnyvale and Dzahn Le

Factual and Procedural Background

This case involves an incident of assault and battery and alleged false arrest. According to the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), plaintiff Emma Martinez-Morris (“Plaintiff”) is a 48 year old single mother living at her mother’s home in Sunnyvale, California. (See SAC at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff’s mother died on March 21, 2015. (Ibid.) Prior to her death, Plaintiff’s mother had arranged for defendant Matthew Fletcher (“Fletcher”) to perform some household maintenance in exchange for room and board. (Ibid.) Plaintiff discovered that Fletcher had taken her daughter’s cell phone and was selling some of her late mother’s possessions on Craigslist. (Ibid.) When Plaintiff confronted Fletcher, he attacked her. (Ibid.) Plaintiff had her 10 year old daughter contact 911. (Ibid.) When the Sunnyvale Public Safety Officers arrived, they interviewed everyone and falsely arrested the Plaintiff, allowing Fletcher to remain in the house thus allowing him to steal additional items. (Ibid.)

Following the attack, Plaintiff was injured and taken to Valley Medical Center where she was diagnosed with a concussion. (See SAC at ¶ 7.) After Plaintiff was arrested she was incarcerated in the Santa Clara County Women’s facility. (Ibid.) Upon her release from the facility, Plaintiff and her daughter had nowhere to live as Fletcher continued to occupy the home and steal more possessions from the residence. (Ibid.) Fletcher was ultimately removed from the home by an unlawful detainer action. (Ibid.) Due to the actions of the Sunnyvale Public Safety Department and the County, Plaintiff has suffered economic damages as well as emotional distress. (Ibid.)

On August 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed the operative SAC setting forth the following causes of action: (1) false arrest [against defendants City of Sunnyvale (“City”) and Officer Dzahn Le (“Officer Le”) (collectively, “Defendants”)]; (2) negligence [against Defendants]; (3) assault and battery [against Fletcher]; (4) grand theft [against Fletcher]; (5) identity theft [against Fletcher]; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress [against Defendants]; and (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress [against Fletcher].

On September 2, 2016, Defendants filed their Answer to the SAC alleging various affirmative defenses.

Motion for Summary Judgment

Currently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment to the SAC. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.) In the alternative, Defendants seek an order for summary adjudication with respect to the first, second, and sixth causes of action. Plaintiff filed written opposition to the motion. Defendants filed reply papers and objections to evidence. No trial date has been set.

Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections

In reply, Defendants filed objections to Plaintiff’s evidence submitted in opposition to the motion. The Court SUSTAINS Objection Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6. The Court declines to rule on the remaining objections which are not material in resolving issues raised by the motion for summary judgment. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q) [in granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion].)

Legal Standard

“Summary judgment is properly granted when no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit by showing that one or more of its elements cannot be established or that there is a complete defense. Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff ‘to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.’ ‘There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.’” (Madden v. Summit View, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1272 [internal citations omitted].)

Similarly, “[a] party may seek summary adjudication on whether a cause of action, affirmative defense, or punitive damages claim has merit or whether a defendant owed a duty to a plaintiff. A motion for summary adjudication…shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.” (California Bank & Trust v. Lawlor (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 625, 630 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].)

First Cause of Action: False Arrest

The first cause of action is a claim for false arrest. Penal Code section 847, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part:
“There shall be no civil liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall arise against, any peace officer or … law enforcement officer …, acting within the scope of his or her authority, for false arrest or false imprisonment arising out of any arrest under any of the following circumstances: (1) The arrest was lawful, or the peace officer, at the time of the arrest, had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful.”

(Pen. Code, § 847, subd. (b)(1).)

“Reasonable cause to arrest exists when the facts known to the arresting officer would lead a reasonable person to have a strong suspicion of the arrestee’s guilt.” (Levin v. United Airlines (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1018.) This is an objective standard. (Ibid.) “ ‘Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable (or reasonable) cause Fourth Amendment analysis.’ [Citation.] Probable cause is measured by an objective standard based on the information known to the arresting officer, rather than a subjective standard that would take into account the arresting officer’s actual motivations or beliefs. [Citation.] The arresting officer’s actual motivations or beliefs should play no role in the court’s determination of probable cause. [Citation.]” (Gillan v. City of San Marino (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1045.)

“Where the facts are not in conflict, the issue of probable cause is a question of law. [Citations.] The existence of probable cause depends upon facts known by the arresting officer at the time of the arrest. [Citations.] ‘Probable cause for an arrest is shown if a man of ordinary caution or prudence would be led to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused. [Citations.] Probable cause may exist even though there may be some room for doubt. [Citations.] … The test in such a case is not whether the evidence upon which the officer made the arrest is sufficient to convict but only whether the prisoner should stand trial.’ [Citation.]” (Hamilton v. City of San Diego (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 838, 844 (Hamilton).)

The existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a civil action for false arrest or false imprisonment. (See Hamilton, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at pp. 843-844; White v. Martin (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 641, 643.) If the officer is immune from liability for false arrest, then the public entity is also immune. (Gov. Code, § 815.2.) Where there is undisputed evidence of probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest, a trial court may grant summary judgment to a cause of action for false arrest. (See Salazar v. Upland Police Dept. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 934, 947-948.)

In determining the issues that a motion for summary judgment must address, courts look to the pleadings. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues and to frame the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding. (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 267, 381.) In the first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Le arrested her without probable cause despite the fact that evidence was available showing she had been the victim of an aggravated battery. (SAC at ¶ 9.) Plaintiff attempts to hold the City liable for false arrest as a result of the actions committed by its employee, Officer Le, in the course and scope of his employment. (Id. at ¶ 13; Gov’t Code, § 815.2.)

On summary judgment, Defendants argue that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff following her physical altercation with Fletcher. In support, Defendants rely upon the Declaration by Officer Le, a Lieutenant with the Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety and the arresting officer on the scene. (See Declaration of Officer Le at ¶ 1.) On June 26, 2015, Officer Le responded to a call for service regarding a domestic violence incident at the home of Plaintiff’s mother in Sunnyvale. (Id. at ¶ 2.) He was accompanied by Officers Strom, Eckford and Griffith along with Lieutenant Giguiere at the residence. (Ibid.) As the residence was located within a beat assigned to Officer Le, he took the lead in conducting the investigation. (Ibid.)

In the course of the investigation, Officer Le determined that Plaintiff and Fletcher had been in a romantic relationship and were living in the Sunnyvale residence together. (See Defendants’ Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts at Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, and 36; Declaration of Officer Le at ¶ 5.) On that basis, Officer Le identified this case as one involving domestic abuse and thus Penal Code section 13701 is applicable. That section requires every law enforcement agency in the state to develop, adopt, and implement policies and standards for officers’ responses to domestic violence. (Pen. Code, § 13701, subd. (a).) “These policies shall reflect that domestic violence is alleged criminal conduct.” (Ibid.) In addition, subdivision (b) of this section provides in pertinent part:

“These policies shall discourage, when appropriate, but not prohibit, dual arrests. Peace officers shall make reasonable efforts to identify the dominant aggressor in any incident. The dominant aggressor is the person determined to be the most significant, rather than the first, aggressor. In identifying the dominant aggressor, an officer shall consider the intent of the law to protect victims of domestic violence from continuing abuse, the threats creating fear of physical injury, the history of domestic violence between the persons involved, and whether either person acted in self-defense.”

(Pen. Code, § 13701, subd. (b).)

Similarly, Chapter 4 of the Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety Police Services Procedures sets forth the City’s policies and procedures for handling domestic violence situations at the time of the incident. (See Defendants’ Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts at No. 56.) Under Section 4.2.04(F) of the Procedures Manual, officers are required to identify the dominant aggressor in the incident. (Ibid.) The dominant aggressor is the person determined to be the most significant, rather than the first aggressor. (Ibid.) In identifying the dominant aggressor, officers shall consider the following: (1) the intent of the law to protect victims from continuing abuse; (2) the threats creating the fear of physical injury; (3) the history of domestic violence between the persons involved; and (4) whether either person involved acted in self-defense. (Ibid.)

In determining who the dominant aggressor was, Officer Le considered the factors set forth in the Procedures Manual and Penal Code section 13701. (See Defendants’ Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts at No. 57; Declaration of Officer Le at ¶ 5.) For example, prior to the incident, neither Plaintiff nor Fletcher reported a history of domestic violence between them. (Id. at No. 58; Declaration of Officer Le at ¶ 10.) It should also be noted that, prior to the incident, Officer Le had received training in handling domestic violence situations while attending the police academy at least every other year for the 12 years before the incident. (Id. at No. 55; Declaration of Officer Le at ¶ 3.) Following his investigation, Officer Le concluded that Plaintiff was the dominant aggressor:

“Based upon the following, it was determined that Plaintiff was the dominant aggressor: (1) Fletcher reported Plaintiff hit him above his right eyebrow with a guitar; (2) Plaintiff admitted that she swung the guitar at Fletcher; (3) Fletcher had physical injuries above his right eyebrow consistent with being hit by an object; (4) Plaintiff did not have any physical injuries, despite her claim that Fletcher hit her full force in the back of the head multiple times; and (5) Plaintiff did not request any medical attention prior to her arrest.”
(Id. at No. 65; Declaration of Officer Le at ¶ 11.)

Based on the foregoing, Officer Le arrested Plaintiff for violation of Penal Code section 273.5 and explained to her why she was being arrested. (Declaration of Officer Le at ¶ 11.) Given this evidence, the Court finds that Officer Le acted reasonably and had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff which constitutes a complete defense to the first cause of action.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues there was no probable cause to support the arrest because: (1) Officer Le never interviewed Plaintiff or Fletcher to get their version of the events surrounding the incident; (2) none of the officers on the scene checked Fletcher’s criminal record; and (3) Officer Le should have been aware of the recent history between Plaintiff and Fletcher, particularly with respect to the theft complaint she lodged against Fletcher. (See OPP at p. 6.)

It is true that Officer Le did not personally interview either Plaintiff or Fletcher regarding events surrounding the incident. The undisputed evidence shows however that Officer Eckford interviewed Plaintiff and later told Officer Le what Plaintiff had reported about the incident. (See Defendants’ Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts at No. 44; Officer Le Depo at p. 66:16-21.) In particular, Officer Eckford told Officer Le that, according to Plaintiff, she and Fletcher were involved in an argument, that she tripped over a guitar, and that Fletcher hit her several times in the back of the head. (Ibid.) Plaintiff does not dispute this account and thus Officer Le was aware of her version of the incident as part of his investigation. Similarly, Officer Strom interviewed Fletcher and told Officer Le what he reported about the incident. (Id. at No. 35; Officer Le Depo at p. 66:3-15.) Therefore, the Court finds that Officer Le was aware of both Plaintiff and Fletcher’s accounts of the events surrounding the incident.

In addition, the arguments raised in opposition appear to suggest that the investigation conducted by Officer Le was inadequate. Plaintiff does not cite any legal authority in opposition to support any of these arguments. In fact, at least one case provides that an officer does not have a duty to conduct additional investigation if probable cause has been already been established. In Hamilton, the appellate court held that police officers were immune from civil liability for failing to further investigate after probable cause had already been established. (See Hamilton, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at pp. 844-845.) In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that an officer “had an obligation to investigate … charges before he ‘booked’ [the plaintiffs] and sent them to jail.” (Id. at p. 845.) The plaintiffs also asserted that the officer should have “verif[ied] their version of events.” (Id. at p. 847.) The appellate court held that, once “probable cause to arrest had been established,” there is no duty for police officers to “conduct some additional investigation before incarcerating a suspect.” (Id. at p. 845.)

Similarly, Plaintiff argues that Officer Le should have personally interviewed her and Fletcher, checked Fletcher’s criminal history, and been aware of the history between Plaintiff and Fletcher. Hamilton however points out that any liability for false arrest must be based on something more than mere nonfeasance. (Hamilton, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at pp. 846-847.) Instead, there must be some affirmative misconduct on the part of the officer. (Id. at p. 847.) A lack of diligence is not affirmative misconduct which gives rise to liability. (Ibid.) Plaintiff has not shown any affirmative misconduct on the part of Officer Le to raise any triable issue of fact. Rather, as stated above, Officer Le has submitted evidence demonstrating that he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for a violation of Penal Code section 273.5. Having done so, the first cause action is subject to a ruling in favor of summary adjudication.

Second Cause of Action: Negligence

The second cause of action is a claim for negligence. “In order to establish liability on a negligence theory, a plaintiff must prove duty, breach, causation, and damages.” (Conroy v. Regents of University of Cal. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1250.)
With respect to negligence, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Le had a duty to properly investigate the entire situation. (SAC at ¶ 20.) Officer Le allegedly breached his duty by failing to investigate the assault and aggravated battery committed by Fletcher on the Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 18, 20, 23.) Plaintiff attempts to hold the City liable for negligence as a result of the actions committed by its employee, Officer Le, in the course and scope of his employment. (Id. at ¶ 22; Gov’t Code, § 815.2.)

Here, the moving parties persuasively argue that Officer Le is immune from liability under Government Code section 820.2 which provides:
“Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.”
(Gov’t Code, § 820.2.)

In addressing Government Code section 820.2, the appellate court in Ortega v. Sacramento County Dept. of Health and Human Services (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 713, cited by Defendants, provides:

“The Legislature has chosen to immunize government employees from liability for discretionary acts ‘whether or not such discretion be abused.’ The Legislature has determined that government could not function if its employees were subject to liability for their discretionary acts, even where the discretion is exercised badly. Such a rule necessarily causes individual hardship in those cases where discretion is exercised badly and the result is serious injury. But this is a policy calculation the Legislature has made. It is not the proper role of this court to countermand it.”

(Id. at p. 716.)

Furthermore, “[a] decision to arrest, or to take some protective action less drastic than arrest, is an exercise of discretion for which a peace officer may not be held liable in tort.” (McCarthy v. Frost (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 872, 875.) Plaintiff effectively concedes this argument as she fails to address it in opposition. Even if there was no immunity, there would still be no cause of action for negligence as Officer Le had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for the reasons stated above. Thus, Officer Le had no duty to further investigate the matter once probable cause had been established. (See Hamilton, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at pp. 844-845.) Therefore, the second cause action is subject to a ruling in favor of summary judgment.

Sixth Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The sixth cause of action is a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. “The elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) the defendant engages in extreme and outrageous conduct with the intent to cause, or with reckless disregard for the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffers extreme or severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s extreme or severe emotional distress.” (Ragland v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 204.)

“Extreme and outrageous conduct is that which goes beyond all possible bounds of decency so as to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. [Citation.] Insults, indignities, annoyances, petty oppressions or other trivialities will not suffice. The conduct must be such that it would cause an average member of the community to immediately react in outrage. [Citation.]” (Gomon v. TRW, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1172.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants acted in a manner to cause or that likely could cause her to suffer severe emotional distress by: (1) falsely arresting the Plaintiff; (2) falsely incarcerating/detaining the Plaintiff; (3) allowing Fletcher to remain in the Plaintiff’s residence and continue to steal Plaintiff’s personal property and that of the estate; and (4) forcing the Plaintiff and her daughter to become homeless. (SAC at ¶ 38.) Plaintiff attempts to hold the City liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress as a result of the actions committed by its employee, Officer Le, in the course and scope of his employment. (Id. at ¶ 39; Gov’t Code, § 815.2.)
As a preliminary matter, the emotional distress claim is deficient as Plaintiff fails to specifically identify any extreme or outrageous acts by Defendants. (See American Airlines, Inc. v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 1110, 1117 [“A defendant’s motion for summary judgment necessarily includes a test of the sufficiency of the complaint.”].) Plaintiff presumably considers the conduct alleged in paragraph 38 of the SAC to constitute extreme and outrageous behavior to support her emotional distress claim. To the extent that the claim is based on Plaintiff’s arrest, such conduct, having been supported by probable cause for reasons stated above, would not be extreme or outrageous. Even if there was a showing of outrageous conduct, Defendants persuasively argue that Plaintiff has no evidence indicating that she suffered emotional distress as a result of the incident. (See Defendants’ Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts at Nos. 233-234.) This evidence, which is undisputed by the Plaintiff, demonstrates that: (1) Plaintiff did not seek or receive treatment for emotional distress following the incident; and (2) Plaintiff is not making any claims against Defendants for any physical injuries related to the incident. (Ibid.) The opposition points out that emotional distress is a natural consequence of the actions taken by Defendants in this case. (See OPP at p. 9.) This argument however is not supported by any admissible evidence and thus fails to raise any triable issue of fact to defeat the motion. (See Uhrich v. State Farms Fire & Cas. Co. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 598, 616 [“A party cannot defeat summary judgment by the expedient of averring he or she has evidence to support a cause of action; instead, such evidence must be presented in opposition to summary judgment.”]; see also Whitmire v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1093 [The mere possibility of exposure to asbestos does not create a triable issue of fact].)

Based on the foregoing, Defendants have satisfied their burden on summary judgment and there are no triable issues of material fact. Therefore, a ruling in favor of summary judgment is warranted.

Conclusion

The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. To the extent that Defendants are seeking fees and costs under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1038 and 1021.7, the Court will consider such request by way of a separate motion. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1038, subd. (a) [stating that a determination is made “upon motion of the defendant”]; see also Kobzoff v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Med. Ctr. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 851, 856 [defendant must make motion for defense costs alleging that plaintiff did not bring or maintain the proceeding in “good faith” and with “reasonable cause”].)

After Defendants have served notice of entry of the order signed by the Court, Defendants shall submit a proposed judgment either approved as to form, or with proof of compliance with Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

The Court will prepare the Order.