Case Name:   Fox, et al. v. Stanford Hospital & Clinics, et al.

Case No.:       1-13-CV-257953

Currently before the Court is the demurrer of defendant the Stanford Hospital & Clinics (“SHC”) to the complaint of plaintiffs Caroline M. Fox and Kiran Ramchandran (“Plaintiffs”).

The demurrer is SUSTAINED with 10 days’ leave to amend as to Mr. Ramchandran’s claims.  SHC correctly argues that Mr. Ramchandran fails to plead facts establishing that he was married to Ms. Fox at the time of her injury as required to support a claim for loss of consortium.  (See Vanhooser v. Super. Ct. (Hennessy Industries, Inc.) (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 921, 927 [a valid and lawful marriage between the plaintiff and the person injured at the time of the injury is an element of a claim for loss of consortium].)  Nor does he plead any facts indicating that SHC owed him a direct duty with respect to the packaging and shipment of Ms. Fox’s oocytes.  However, Plaintiffs are permitted leave to amend in light of the parties’ apparent stipulation to this outcome and given that it is not entirely clear that Mr. Ramchandran cannot state a claim against SHC, whether for loss of consortium or for negligence arising from his own participation in the medical process at issue.  (See City of Stockton v. Super. Ct. (Civic Partners Stockton, LLC) (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 747 [leave to amend is routinely granted when the plaintiff has not had an opportunity to amend the complaint in response to a demurrer].)

The demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to Ms. Fox’s claim for general negligence.

SHC argues that Ms. Fox’s first cause of action for general negligence fails to state a claim because Ms. Fox also alleges a second claim for medical negligence, and a breach of duty based upon a single set of facts can give rise only to one claim or the other.  SHC argues that “the crux” of Ms. Fox’s allegations pertains to a claim for medical negligence, given that packaging and shipping oocytes is related to the medical care and treatment provided to Ms. Fox and is a task that SHC is licensed to perform as a health care provider, bringing Ms. Fox’s claims under the ambit of the Medical Injury and Compensation Reform Act (“MICRA”).  Plaintiffs argue that, here, it is not yet clear whether ordinary or professional negligence is at issue, and Plaintiffs are entitled to assert alternate theories of liability at the pleading stage.

Both SHC and Plaintiffs mischaracterize the issue here as whether Ms. Fox states a claim for “ordinary” or merely “professional” negligence.  Under Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992 (hereinafter, “Flowers”), only one standard of care applies to the single set of facts at issue here (the packaging and shipment of oocytes that forms the basis for both of Plaintiffs’ claims), and only one claim for negligence arises from these allegations.  (See Flowers, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 997-998 [professionals subject to the same duty of ordinary prudence as others; “With respect to professionals, their specialized education and training do not serve to impose an increased duty of care but rather are considered additional ‘circumstances’ relevant to an overall assessment of what constitutes ‘ordinary prudence’ in a particular situation. … Since the standard of care remains constant in terms of ‘ordinary prudence,’ it is clear that denominating a cause of action as one for ‘professional negligence’ does not transmute its underlying character.”].)  While the characterization of Ms. Fox’s claim as one for “ordinary” or “professional” negligence would be relevant to determining whether certain statutory provisions—such as statutes of limitations or various provisions of MICRA—apply, here, the issue is simply whether Ms. Fox’s cause of action states a claim for negligence, and any distinction between “ordinary” and “professional” negligence is irrelevant for this purpose.  (See Flowers, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 998-999.)  SHC does not challenge the conclusion that Ms. Fox states at least one claim for negligence, given that it demurs to the claim for professional negligence only as asserted by Mr. Ramchandran, and the details of precisely how SHC breached the standard of care need not be alleged in order for Ms. Fox’s claim to survive demurrer.  (See Landeros v. Flood (1976) 17 Cal.3d 399, 408-410 [medical malpractice may be pleaded in general terms, and what treatments the standard of care requires is ordinarily a question of fact].)

Nevertheless, a demurrer should be sustained where the same facts are alleged in support of two different causes of action, resulting in “duplicative pleading which adds nothing to the complaint by way of fact or theory.”  (Award Metals, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (Hernandez) (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1135.)  Consequently, SHC’s demurrer is sustained without leave to amend on the ground that Ms. Fox’s first claim is duplicative of her second claim.  The Court notes that it is immaterial how the surviving claim is labeled, and the Court’s ruling is not a determination of whether Ms. Fox’s claim is for “professional” negligence as defined by any particular statute such as MICRA.

The Court will prepare the order.  The parties are reminded of the case management conference also scheduled for April 22, 2014 at 1:30 P.M.