Case Number: EC061404    Hearing Date: August 01, 2014    Dept: A

Stepanian v Best Buy Bail Bondsh

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

Calendar: 6
Case No: EC061404
Date: 8/1/14

MP: Cross-Defendants, Gevork Stepanian, Sona Stepanian, and John Akopian
RP: Cross-Complainant, Best Buy Bail Bonds, Inc.

RELIEF REQUESTED:
Order awarding attorney’s fees of $31,372.50.

DISCUSSION:
This case arises from the claims of the Plaintiffs, Gevork Stepanian, Sona Stepanian, and John Akopian, that they have made a full satisfaction of a judgment that the Defendant had against the Plaintiffs and that the Defendant has refused to file a full satisfaction or to release the judgment. The Plaintiffs seek to quiet title on their property to remove the $44,616 abstract of judgment and a declaration of rights and duties to the property.
The Defendant, Best Buy Bail Bonds, Inc., then filed a Cross-Complaint to seek the attorney’s fees that it has incurred to defend itself against the Complaint under theories of fraud and breach of contract.

Trial is set for March 23, 2015.

This hearing concerns the motion for attorney’s fees filed by the Cross-Defendants, who request the award of attorney’s fees under CCP section 425.16 because they prevailed on their motion to strike the Cross-Complaint. The Court granted the Cross-Defendants’ motion to strike the Cross-Complaint on April 11, 2014 because the Cross-Complaint arose from the Cross-Defendants’ act of filing the pending Complaint.
CCP section 425.16 permits the Court to strike causes of action that are brought against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech. In addition, CCP section 425.16(c) permits the Court to award a prevailing defendant the fees and costs which will adequately compensate the defendant for the expenses of responding to the lawsuit. Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer, & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 785. The SLAPP statute reflects the Legislature’s “strong preference for awarding attorney fees to successful defendants.” Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 338. Further, the provision is broadly construed so as to effectuate the legislative purpose of reimbursing the prevailing defendant for expenses incurred in extracting herself from a baseless lawsuit. Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal. App. 4th 443, 448.
However, a necessary predicate for obtaining fees is the existence of an attorney-client relationship. Taheri Law Group v. Evans (2008) 160 Cal. App. 4th 482, 494-495.
A party, whether or not he or she is an attorney, who is not represented by counsel and who litigates an anti-SLAPP motion on his own behalf may not recover attorney fees under the CCP section 425.16. Id.

A Court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved in the presentation of the case. Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 553, 579-580. Reasonable hourly compensation does not include inefficient or duplicative efforts, aka “padding”. Id.
Further, the Court can then adjust the amount if the Court determines that the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the lodestar figure. Id. The Court makes this determination based on the following factors:

1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
2) the skill displayed in presenting them;
3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; and
4) the contingent nature of the fee award.

The trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his or her court and this judgment will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong. Id.

The Cross-Defendants supported the request for $31,372.50 in attorney’s fees with facts in the declaration of John Akopian. An initial issue is that this request includes attorneys’ fees for a self-represented attorney, John Akopian. As noted above, Mr. Akopian cannot recover attorney’s fees under CCP section 425.16 because he is representing himself. Mr. Akopian made no effort to segregate his fees and claims that they are “so intertwined” as to make it impracticable to separate his time. It would be difficult to ascertain the time spent regarding Mr. Akopian because the same analysis applied to all the Cross-Defendants, i.e., they all sought to strike the Cross-Complaint on the ground that it was based on their protected act of filing the Complaint.
However, the amount sought is an not reasonable and represents an excessive amount to recover for the simple issues raised in this anti-SLAPP motion.
Mr. Akopian states that the fees are sought for work done on the special motion to strike under CCP section 425.16. In paragraph 22, Mr. Akopian provides a summary to demonstrate that his firm spent 83.5 hours, including 14 hours to draft the pending motion for attorney’s fees, on the anti-SLAPP motion. Further, Mr. Akopian states that the hourly rate is $250 per hour.
The amount of time to spend on the anti-SLAPP motion is excessive because the issue involved in the anti-SLAPP proceeding was simple, i.e., the Cross-Complaint was subject to the anti-SLAPP statute because it sought damages for the Cross-Defendant’s protected act of filing the Complaint. It did not require any extraordinary or lengthy research or briefing because CCP section 425.16 expressly states that a protected act includes filing a written document in a judicial proceeding, i.e., a Complaint. A more reasonable amount of time to spend researching, drafting, and appearing on a straightforward anti-SLAPP issue is 30 hours.
Further, it is excessive to spend 14 hours drafting a motion for attorney’s fees because it is a straightforward motion that requires citing to the code section and then to the billing records. A more reasonable amount of time to spend on the pending motion for attorney’s fees is 5 hours.
Finally, the Cross-Defendants request that the Court apply a multiplier of 1.5 to their amount of attorney’s fees. As cited above, the Court may apply a multiplier to a request for attorney’s fees after considering the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, the skill displayed in presenting them, the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and the contingent nature of the fee award. There are no grounds to find that the motion included any novel or complex issues. Instead, it was a simple motion that involved a straightforward application of the express language of the statute. There was no unusual display of skill. The issue was resolved by a simple motion, which did not consume such an extraordinary amount of time that the attorneys could not work on other cases. Accordingly, the Court will deny the request to multiply the Cross-Defendants’ attorney’s fees by 1.5.

Therefore, the Court will award attorney’s fees of $8,810 (35 hours at $250 per hour + $60 filing fee).

RULING:
GRANT motion for attorney’s fees and award $8,810 to the Cross-Defendants under CCP section 425.16 for prevailing on their motion to strike the Cross-Complaint.