Case Number: 18STCV10058 Hearing Date: January 22, 2020 Dept: 34

SUBJECT: Motion for Summary Judgment

Moving Party: Defendant Clara Seneca

Resp. Party: Plaintiff Gina Minervini

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

BACKGROUND:

Plaintiff Gina Minervini alleges that Defendant Clara Seneca evicted her from her long-term, rent-stabilized home, on the untruthful basis that Defendant Clara Seneca would be moving into and occupying the apartment as her primary residence. Instead of occupying the apartment in good faith, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Clara Seneca resides at another property she owns less than a mile away from the apartment.

Plaintiff Gina Minervini commenced this action on December 27, 2018 against Defendants Clara Seneca, Jeff Hirschfeld, 1128 Euclid Street, LLC, Rachel Sene, and Jay Johnson for (1) violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act; (2) violation of the Santa Monica Rent Control Law, Art. XVIII, Section 1806; (3) common law fraud; and (4) wrongful eviction.

On July 9, 2019, dismissal was entered as to Defendants Jeff Hirschfeld and 1128 Euclid Street, LLC.

On July 10, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel further responses to form interrogatories.

On July 11, 2019, Plaintiff a motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories.

On July 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel further responses to request for production of documents.

On August 6, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for protective order as to Defendant Clara Seneca.

On September 11, 2019, the parties resolved their discovery issues as to the motions to compel to form interrogatories, special interrogatories, request for production of documents during an informal discovery conference with the Court, thus were taken off-calendar.

On September 12, 2019, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to compel inspection of mobile telecommunication devices.

On October 9, 2019, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to compel Verizon Wireless Services, LLC to comply with subpoena for production of business records.

On January 9, 2019, the Court denied Plaintiff’s second motion to compel further responses to request for production of documents and request for sanctions.

Before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, filed on September 5, 2019.

ANALYSIS:

A. Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of Chapter 9 of the Santa Monica Rent Control Board Regulations. (RJN, p. 2:2-4, Ex. A.)

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice. (Evid. Code § 452(b).)

B. Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiff submits 22 objections to evidence Defendant submits to support her motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff’s objections are not in proper form. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354.)

The Court declines to rule on these objections.

C. Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

D. Discussion

Defendant asserts that “the gravamen of all of the causes of action pleaded by the plaintiff in her complaint, is that she was wrongfully evicted from her tenancy at the front house located at 729 9th Street in Santa Monica.” (Motion, p. 4:21-23.) Defendant argues that “this contention has no merit, because defendant Clara Seneca, the owner of the entire property located at 729 9th Street, in Santa Monica, had the legal right under the Santa Monica Rent Control law regain possession of the premises in order to occupy them herself.” (Id. at p. 4:23-26.)

Defendant maintains that she “complied with the Rent Control Law” because “from the time she began the eviction proceeding, [she] intended, in good faith, to move into the front house at 729 9th Street, and did so.” (Id. at p. 7:15-17.) Defendant asserts that “she lived in the front house, as her primary residence for more than a year.” Defendant argues that “there was never any issue of offering a comparable vacant unit to [Plaintiff], because there were no rental units on the property available when [Plaintiff] was evicted” and “in any event, none of the five units in the back of the property was in any way comparable to the front house.” (Id. at p. 8:22-25.) Defendant contends that since she “never failed to occupy the front house, no duty to offer it to [Plaintiff] ever arose.” (Id. at p. 8:25-26.)

Defendant argues that all four causes of action fail because: (1) “since there was no discrimination against [Plaintiff] for any improper purpose, there was no violation of the Unruh Act[;]” (2) “since the Santa Monica Rent Control Law established a right on the part of defendant . . . to evict the plaintiff, there was no violation of this law[;]” (3) “there was no common law fraud, since the representations made by [Defendant] in connection with the eviction proceedings were true and correct[;]” and (4) “there was no violation of Civil Code section 1947.10, because the defendant lived in the front house for more than six months.” (Id. at p. 9:5-12.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that “numerous facts establish that [Defendant] was not acting in good faith when she evicted [Plaintiff], but was attempting to circumvent the Santa Monica Rent Stabilization Ordinance for the purpose of renting to other, younger tenants who would pay market rent and presumably move out sooner.” (Opp., pp. 1:28-2:3.) More importantly, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment must be denied as Defendant “has not even met her initial burden in seeking summary judgment” because “she has not established a right to dismissal of any of the causes of action, much less all of them.” (Id. at p. 2:4-7.)

Plaintiff argues that “although Defendant seeks judgment in her favor on the entire Complaint, she sets forth only six ‘undisputed material facts’ in her separate statement.” (Id. at p. 6:23-24.) Plaintiff asserts that “the sixth ‘undisputed material fact’ . . . that [Defendant] occupied the front house as her primary residence from approximately November 20, 2017 until December 31, 2018 . . . is . . . hotly disputed.” (Id. at p. 7:10-12 [citing Defendant’s UMF No. 6].) However, Plaintiff argues that “even if [she] did not dispute this fact, the Court could not grant summary judgment in favor of Ms. Seneca because the fact that Ms. Seneca ostensibly occupied the front house as her primary residence from November 20, 2017 until December 31, 2018 does not address the elements of Plaintiff’s first cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act or Plaintiff’s third cause of action for fraud.

Plaintiff argues that “Defendant’s motion does not even superficially address the substance of Ms. Minervini’s Unruh Act claim, merely making the conclusory statement that ‘[s]ince there was no discrimination against Ms. Minervini for any improper purpose, there was no violation of the Unruh Act.’” (Id. at p. 8:13-16 [citing Motion, p. 9:6-7). Plaintiff maintains that “this is a false premise, and this conclusory statement does not entitle Defendant to judgment in her favor on that theory of liability.” (Id. at p. 8:16-17.) Instead, Plaintiff argues that “the crux of the claim is that [Plaintiff]’s eviction by [Defendant] was a sham in order to remove an older, disabled tenant paying below-market rent by virtue of her long tenancy, in order to rent to rent to younger tenants who would pay market rent and presumably move out sooner.” (Id. at p. 8:18-21.)

The Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code section 51, subdivision (b) provides:

“All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).)

In Plaintiff’s first cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Plaintiff alleges that “a substantial motivating reason for Defendants’ conduct was their perception of Ms. Minervini’s age, disability or status as a long-term rent-stabilized tenant who was unlikely to move because of her age, disability, and low rent.” (Complaint, ¶ 27.)

Although in her moving papers, Defendant asserts that “since there was no discrimination against [Plaintiff] for any improper purpose, there was no violation of the Unruh Act,” Defendant has not provided any evidence to support that there was no discrimination against Plaintiff. Instead, Defendant only states that she denies that her eviction of Plaintiff was wrongful. (UMF No. 2 [citing Answer, ¶ 1; Weatherup Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. B].)

Defendant has not demonstrated that there exist no triable issues as to Plaintiff’s cause of action for the violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, thus Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Since Defendant has not met her initial burden to show that there are no triable issues of material fact, the burden does not shift to Plaintiff. Although not necessary for the Court’s analysis, the Court notes that, Plaintiff has presented evidence that there are triable issue of material fact as to all of Plaintiff’s causes of action.

Plaintiff provides evidence that “at the time of her eviction, [she] was paying a low rent for her apartment in relation to other units at the property” and “on June 27, 2017, the rent for [Plaintiff]’s two-bedroom apartment was $2,566.00 per month, which was only slightly higher than the rent for the other, smaller, one-bedroom apartments: Unit A ($2,294.00), Unit B ($2,215.00), Unit C ($2,290.00).” (Plaintiff’s UMF No. 17 [citing Belisle Decl. at ¶ 4, Ex. C (Ex. 6 to Seneca Depo.)] Plaintiff also provides evidence that Defendant “ultimately re-rented the apartment for substantially more than [Plaintiff] was paying.” (Id. at No. 20.) In November 2018, the subsequent tenants, Ms. Kent and Mr. Rowland, entered into a lease agreement to rent the apartment for $5,450.00 per month. (Id. at No. 20 [citing Belisle Decl. at ¶¶ 10 9, Ex. H (Kent Depo.) at 17:21-18:17, 49:5-50:14, Ex. I (Ex.7 to Kent Depo. at pp. 5-8].) On January 19th or 20th, 2019, two weeks after Defendant was personally served with the instant lawsuit, Defendant had Ms. Kent and Mr. Rowland sign a new lease agreement for $2,666.00 per month. (Id. at No. 20 [citing Belisle Decl. at ¶ 9, Ex. H (Kent Depo.) at 19:1-20:7, 37:4-25, 47:11-17, 78:3-5; See Belisle Decl. at ¶¶ 10, 19 , Ex. I (Ex. 5 to Kent Depo.); Ex. R].) Defendant had Ms. Kent and Mr. Rowland backdate the January lease to say that it was signed in December 2018. (Id. at No. 20 [citing Belisle Decl. at ¶ 9, Ex. H (Kent Depo.) at 39:5-40:19].)

Defendant has not met her burden to show that no triable issues exist as to any material fact and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.