Case Name: Griselda Mejia, et al. v. Sunding Brothers, LLC, et al.
Case No.: 2014-1-CV-267444

Currently before the Court is the demurrer of defendants Sunding Brothers, LLC and Jay Huang (collectively, “Defendants”) to the second amended complaint (“SAC”) of Griselda Mejia (“Griselda”) and Brayin David Mejia (“Brayin”), a minor by and through his guardian ad litem, Marisol Mejia (“Marisol”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”).

On September 18, 2015, Plaintiffs filed the operative SAC against Defendants, alleging thirteen causes of action for: (1) tortious breach of the implied warranty of habitability; (2) contractual breach of the implied warranty of habitability; (3) breach of contract; (4) breach of quiet enjoyment; (5) private nuisance; (6) premises liability; (7) retaliation in violation of Civil Code section 1942.5; (8) negligence; (9) constructive eviction; (10) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200; (11) retaliatory eviction; (12) violation of Civil Code sections 51, 51.5, and 52 (the “Unruh Act”); and (13) violation of Government Code section 12955 (the “FEHA”).

As relevant here, the SAC alleges the following: In 2010, Plaintiffs entered into a written agreement with Defendants to rent a second-floor apartment at 218 Selwyn Dr. #3, Milpitas, CA. (SAC, ¶ 7.) At that time, Brayin, Griselda’s son, suffered from Huntington’s disease. (SAC, ¶ 18.) Due to Brayin’s disability, Griselda was forced to carry him up and down the stairs to access their apartment. (SAC, ¶ 18.) On June 30, 2013, Plaintiffs requested that Defendants reasonably accommodate Brayin’s disability by permitting them to occupy a vacant downstairs unit. (SAC, ¶ 18.) Defendants unreasonably denied this request, forcing Griselda to continue to carry Brayin up and down the stairs. (SAC, ¶ 18.) Brayin passed away on May 10, 2015. (SAC, ¶ 20.)

On December 1, 2015, Defendants filed the instant demurrer to the SAC on the grounds of uncertainty, lack of jurisdiction, lack of legal capacity to sue, and failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (a), (b), (e) and (f).)

A. Uncertainty

Defendants demur to the SAC on the ground of uncertainty because it does not “reflect proper tense and use of pronouns.” (Mems. Ps & As., p. 6:15.)

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a [pleading] is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) As such, a demurrer will only be sustained on this ground where the pleading is so incomprehensible that the opposing party cannot reasonably respond. (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ imprecise use of verb tense and pronouns does not render the SAC so incomprehensible that Defendants cannot reasonably respond, and any remaining ambiguities may be clarified in discovery. Accordingly, the demurrer on the ground of uncertainty is OVERRULED.

B. Lack of Jurisdiction

Defendants demur to each cause of action in the SAC asserted by Brayin on the ground that the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (a).) Specifically, they argue that the Court cannot render a judgment until Brayin’s personal representative or successor-in-interest is substituted into the action. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 377.30 [stating that “[a] cause of action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence an action or proceedings passes to the decedent’s successor in interest…”], 377.31 [permitting decedent’s successor in interest or personal representative to be substituted into the proceeding].) As a general matter, it is improper to render judgment for or against a decedent prior to the substitution of that party’s personal representative or successor-in-interest. (Sacks v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 950, 957; Pham v. Wagner Litho Machinery Co. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 966, 972–973.) However, the failure to do so is considered a technical error that does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to proceed and enter judgment upon a decedent’s death. (Sacks, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 959; Kern v. Kern (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 325, 328 [stating that the court is prevented from entering judgment only if the failure to comply with Code Civ. Proc., § 377.31 causes prejudice].) Accordingly, Defendants fail to demonstrate that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this action, and therefore the demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.

C. Lack of Legal Capacity

Defendants demur to each cause of action in the SAC on the ground that Marisol, Brayin’s guardian ad litem, lacks the capacity to sue on Brayin’s behalf. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (b).) In particular, they assert that Marisol fails to allege that she has the right to continue the action as Brayin’s successor in interest or personal representative. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 377.30-377.31.) This argument is not well taken.

“There is a difference between the capacity to sue, which is the right to come into court, and the standing to sue, which is the right to relief in court. Incapacity is merely a legal disability, such as infancy or insanity, which deprives a party of the right to come into court. The right to relief, on the other hand, goes to the existence of a cause of action.” (Color-Vue, Inc. v. Abrams (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1604, internal citations omitted; see also Klopstock v. Sup. Ct. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 13, 17-18 [stating that “a demurrer for lack of capacity to sue raises only the question of whether the plaintiff is free from general disabilities, such as infancy or insanity, or if he sues in a representative capacity, that he actually possesses the character in which he sues”].)

Here, Defendants argue that Marisol lacks standing to sue because she is not the real party in interest, namely, Brayin’s personal representative or successor in interest. However, this is a ground for a general demurrer, not a demurrer based on lack of capacity. (See Color-Vue, Inc., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1604, fn. 4 [stating that a plaintiff lacks standing to sue if he or she is not a real party in interest].) Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to each cause of action on the ground of lack of capacity is OVERRULED.

D. Failure to State Sufficient Facts

Defendants demur to the twelfth and thirteenth causes of action for violation of the Unruh Act and FEHA as to Griselda on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

1. Twelfth Cause of Action for Violation of the Unruh Act

Defendants contend that Griselda lacks standing to bring a cause of action for violation of the Unruh Act because she does not allege that she was a direct victim of discrimination. (See Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b) [stating that the elements of a cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act are: (1) the defendant was a business establishment; (2) which intentionally denied the plaintiff full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services; (3) based upon the plaintiff’s sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, marital status, or sexual orientation].)

In opposition, Griselda argues that she may bring a cause of action for violation of the Unruh Act based on Defendants’ denial of full and equal accommodations to her son, Brayin. This argument lacks merit. “[A] cause of action under the Unruh Act is of an individual nature” and protects only direct victims of housing discrimination. (Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Housing v. Westwood Investors (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1377, 1383; see also Surrey v. TrueBeginnings (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 414, 419 [stating that “cases interpreting the Unruh Act have consistently held that an individual plaintiff has standing to bring claims thereunder only if he or she has been the victim of the defendant’s discriminatory act”].) Given that Griselda does not allege that she was the direct victim of Defendants’ discriminatory acts, she fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for violation of the Unruh Act. Since she provides no indication in her opposing papers, nor is it readily apparent how the foregoing deficiency can be remedied by amendment, the demurrer to the twelfth cause of action as to Griselda is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [stating that the burden is on the plaintiff to establish he or she can amend the pleading and how such an amendment changes the legal effect of pleading].)

2. Thirteenth Cause of Action for Violation of the FEHA

Defendants first claim that Griselda lacks standing to bring a cause of action for violation of the FEHA because she does not allege that she was discriminated against due to a disability. In opposition, Griselda asserts that she may maintain a cause of action for violation of the FEHA because she was injured as a result of Defendants’ discrimination directed at Brayin. Griselda’s argument is well-taken. The FEHA authorizes the filing of a suit by “[a]n aggrieved person” to seek relief for a discriminatory housing practice. (Gov. Code, § 12989.1) An aggrieved person is defined as “any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice or believes that the person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur.” (Gov. Code., § 12927, subd. (g).) Courts have interpreted this broad statutory language as permitting an action for violation of the FEHA by a party suffering injury as a result of a discriminatory housing practice directed towards another. (Sisemore v. Master Financial, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1426 [finding that a non-profit housing organization could allege a cause of action for violation of the FEHA based on the diversion of its resources to investigate the defendant’s discriminatory conduct]; see also Urban Habitat Program v. City of Pleasanton (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1561, 1581 [same].) Here, the SAC states that Defendants’ failure to reasonably accommodate Brayin’s disability caused Griselda injury as she was forced to carry him up and down the stairs. (SAC, ¶ 18.) Accordingly, Griselda sufficiently alleges that she is an aggrieved person under Government Code section 12989.1 and, therefore, has standing to assert a FEHA claim.

Next, Defendants assert that the thirteenth cause of action fails because Griselda does not allege specific facts in support of this cause of action. This argument lacks merit because a plaintiff is not required to plead a cause of action for violation of the FEHA with specificity. (See Alch v. Sup. Ct. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 339, 382 [stating that “the plaintiff is required only to set forth the essential facts of his case with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action” under the FEHA].) Here, the SAC states that Plaintiffs asked Defendants on June 30, 2013 to occupy a vacant ground floor apartment to accommodate Brayin’s disability, Defendants summarily denied the request, and Griselda was injured as a result. (SAC, ¶ 18.) Therefore, Griselda alleges sufficient facts to acquaint defendants of the nature, source, and extent of her cause of action.

In light of the foregoing, the demurrer to the thirteenth cause of action on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts is OVERRULED.