Motion for Attorney Fees

Tentative Ruling: Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED. Wells Fargo is awarded $44,114.50 in fees, and $1,278 in costs, for a total award of $45,392.50, against Plaintiff Harold Haney. Moving party is to give notice.

Fees: A trial court “assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney … involved in the presentation of the case.’ ” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321, quoting Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131–1132.) The court tabulates the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work. (Ketchum, supra, at p. 1134; Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) “[T]he lodestar figure may be increased or decreased depending on a variety of factors, including the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 1134.) A reasonable fee is determined in the trial court’s discretion. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084.) The trial court is uniquely suited to determine the value of the services rendered. (In re Marriage of Keech (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 860, 870. )

To determine reasonable attorney fees, the Court considers the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and employed in handling the matter, the attention given, the success of the attorney’s efforts, the intricacies and importance of the litigation, the labor and necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the cause, and the time consumed. ( Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 659 [disapproved on other grounds in Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53].)

The party requesting fees has the initial burden of producing evidence sufficient to support the reasonableness of the billing rates requested. (See Davis v. City of San Diego (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 893, 903.) If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce admissible evidence sufficient to show the rates requested are not reasonable. (See Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 155 [court erred in reducing rates where evidence of reasonableness of rate requested was undisputed]; Davis v. City of San Diego, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 904.)

Here, the hourly rate of $195/hour is reasonable, and for Mr. Fabozzi, at (if not well below) the prevailing community standard for attorneys with comparable experience and skill. The $195/hour rate for the more junior Ms. Weddington is reasonable for her experience. The hourly rate of $100/hr for experienced paralegal services also appears reasonable.

The attorney and paralegal time at issue also appear proper given the motions filed, and the amount of work required for the case. Plaintiff has filed no opposition, and thus appears to concede same. The sum sought in the original motion, in the amount of $36,917.50 thus appears appropriate.

So too does the additional amount sought in the supplemental declaration. This sum was not included in the original notice of motion, nor was any amended notice filed, raising some potential due process concerns. However, as the Supplemental Declaration was served well in advance of the hearing, and no opposition whatsoever has been filed, it appears reasonable to include those sums in the final award.

Costs: The Memo of Costs (“MOC”) was not included with this Motion. It was filed 9-9-13, with only the cover pages and no worksheet, so the Court has no information about just what costs were included (the MOC shows $1,055 for “filing and motion fees” and $55 for “Court-ordered transcripts.”) This is troubling as it does not allow the Court to evaluate the extent to which the claimed costs are proper.

However, initial verification on the MOC is sufficient to establish the reasonable necessity of the costs claimed; supporting documentation must be submitted only if costs have been put in issue by a motion to tax costs. (Wegner, Fairbank, & Epstein, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Trials & Evid. (The Rutter Group 2013), §17:131.1.) Cases also state that if items on a verified cost bill appear to be proper charges, they are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred. (Wegner, supra, citing Oak Grove School Dist. v. City Title Ins. Co. (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 678, 698, and Decoto School Dist. v. M. & S. Tile Co. (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 310, 316–317. ) Therefore, as Wells’ counsel has attested to the cost categories here, and that those costs were “necessarily incurred in this case” (MOC, p. 1), Wells has met its initial burden to show the costs are recoverable. Since no Motion to Tax Costs was filed in response, Plaintiff has done nothing to suggest otherwise.

Accordingly, the Court is inclined to award the entire sum requested in the instant motion. Because there was a small [$10] error in moving party’s math, the Court awards fees and costs in the amounts of $44,114.50 and $1,278, respectively, for a total award of $45,392.50.