Case Name: Helen Theresa Givens v. Roy Anthony Givens, et al.
Case No: 17CV311029

I. Background

Plaintiff Helen Givens (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against her former husband, Roy Givens (“Husband”) and several other defendants for damages associated with domestic violence and financial abuse.

According to the allegations of the third amended complaint (“TAC”), and relevant here, defendant Banner Bank (“Banner”) is a Washington state chartered bank headquartered in Walla Walla, Washington. (TAC, ¶ 17.) Plaintiff and Husband purchased property in Newport, Washington and Banner issued home equity lines of credit (“HELOC”), secured by the property. (Id. at ¶ ¶177, 179, 180.) The loans was sought by Husband, who caused a third person to fraudulently notarize the bank documents. (Id. at ¶ ¶ 179, 181.) The lines of credit exceeded the value of the property, and Plaintiff was unaware of their existence. (Id. at ¶¶ 179, 182.) The terms of the loan were subsequently modified two times in 2013 and 2015, but Plaintiff did not sign the documents. (Id. at ¶¶184, 186.)

Banner sold the loans to Bank of New York, who hired Sellpoint, a mortgage servicer, to foreclose on the loan. (TAC, ¶ 187.) At the time of the foreclosure, Plaintiff was in discussions to modify the loans at issue. (Ibid.)

In December 2014, Plaintiff’s family law attorney discovered the HELOC and contacted Banner alleging that the signature on the application purported to be Plaintiff’s was a forgery. (TAC, ¶¶ 190, 191.) Banner did not respond. (Ibid.) However, Banner reported Plaintiff’s default on the account to the credit reporting agencies. (Id. at ¶ 193.) Though Plaintiff tried to dispute her liability for the HELOC, Banner did not conduct a reasonable investigation and did not instruct the credit reporting agencies to delete the fraudulent account. (Id. at ¶ 196.)

As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff asserts three causes of action against Banner for: (13) Breach of Duty; (14) violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act; and (15) violations of the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act.

Presently before the Court is Banner’s motion to quash the third amended summons.

II. Judicial Notice

In support of its motion to quash, Banner seeks judicial notice of six court records from this action, and three court records from a federal action in case number 3:18-cv-02374.

Judicial notice may be taken of any matter authorized or required by law. (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113, citing Evidence Code §§ 451 & 452.) Any matter judicially noticed must be relevant to a material issue. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2.)

A court may take judicial notice of court records. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) However, the court does not take judicial notice of the truth of the facts as stated, but may take notice that documents “say what they say.” (Hamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1602, 1608, fn. 3.)

As a result, the Court will take judicial notice of the six documents from the present action, which include the original complaint, a proof of service on Husband, Plaintiff’s Case Management Statement filed on January 8, 2018, Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application to file the TAC, the TAC itself and the Third Amended Summons issued in this action on December 18, 2018 as they are all court documents relevant to the material issue of proper service of summons.

Likewise, the Court will take judicial notice of the three documents in the federal case including the Complaint for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the California Civil Code filed in April 2018, a declaration filed by Plaintiff in that action in June 2018, and the Clerk’s Notice of Trial filed in that action. These are also relevant to the material issue of proper service of summons.

Consequently, Banner’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED.

III. Motion to Quash

Banner moves to quash service of summons pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10 subdivision (a)(1) on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction on the basis that it was wrongfully served as a “Doe” defendant.

A. Legal Standard

In a motion to quash summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, though defendant is the moving party, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. (Evangelize China Fellowship, Inc. v. Evangelize China Fellowship, Hong Kong (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 440, 444 (Evangelize).) That burden may be met by declarations, verified complaint or other evidence. (2 Witkin, California Procedure (4th ed. 1996) Jurisdiction, §211, p. 775 – 776.)

B. Noncompliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 474

Code of Civil Procedure section 474 allows a plaintiff who is ignorant of a defendant’s identity to designate the defendant in a complaint by a fictitious name, and then to subsequently amend the pleading to state the defendant’s true name when he or she discovers it. However, the procedure is only available when the plaintiff is actually ignorant of the facts establishing a cause of action against the party to be substituted for a Doe defendant. (McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLC (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 368, 372 (“McClatchy”) citing Optical Surplus, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 776, 783.) Improper service of a defendant under section 474 may be attacked by a motion to quash service of summons. (Id. at 375.) The question is whether the plaintiff knew, or reasonably should have known that he or she had a cause of action against the defendant. (Id. at 372.)

In McClatchy a trust beneficiary sued a law firm partner and “Does 1 through 2” for breach of trust and two years later amended the pleading to name the law firm as a defendant pursuant to section 474. (McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLC, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th 368, 372.) However, with its motion, the law firm produced evidence that the partner had conducted business at the law firm’s offices, and utilizing its stationery in administering the trust, sufficient to show that plaintiff knew or should have known of his cause of action against it.

Here, Plaintiff submits a declaration in opposition to the motion. Banner raises several evidentiary objections, including that the declaration lacks relevance pursuant to Evidence Code section 210. The Court agrees and notes the declaration is devoid of statements regarding Plaintiff’s late discovery of Banner as a defendant in this action. The Court also observes that the declaration conspicuously omits the dates of discovery of the Banner HELOC referenced in the TAC rendering those statements that may tend to prove or disprove a material facts irrelevant. (Pl. Dec in Opp. to Def. MTQ at ¶¶ 6, 13, 16.) It also misstates the date of filing of the action in Plaintiff’s federal case as April 19, 2019, when the actual date of filing was April 18, 2018. (Id. at ¶ 20; Def. RJN, Exhibit 7.) This is particularly concerning given the materiality of dates and timelines required in amending a pleading to add a newly discovered “Doe” defendant. Consequently, the Court sustains Banner’s objection to Plaintiff’s declaration on the ground of relevance.

Attached to her declaration, Plaintiff also submits numerous documents but offers no basis for the Court to consider them beyond a statement that they are “true and correct copies.” These documents are: (1) a confidential financial statement; (2) IRS form regarding innocent spouse finding; (3) a Deed of Trust; (4) a letter from the California Secretary of State regarding participation in the “Safe at Home” program; (5) a customer identification worksheet provided to Banner; (6) medical records (specifically endoscopic pictures); (7) Deed of Trust; (8) Deed of Trust; (9) Equity Line Agreement; (10) a statement labeled “Form 1040”; (11) Schedules “A and B” from tax form 1040; (12) Tax form 1040, 2009; (13) a promissory note; (14) a stock transfer agreement in shares of Pantrol, Inc.; (15) emails related to debt consolidation; (16) a loan history print out; (17) an email from lender regarding amount past due; (18) an unlabeled/unsigned timeline of events; (19) an opinion letter from a forensics expert; (20) an undated letter from Plaintiff’s counsel to Banner Bank; (21) a mortgage statement from Shellpoint; (22) a notice of postponement of Trustees’ sale; (23) a loan history print out from Banner; (24) a TransUnion credit report; (25) a change in terms agreement for a loan; (26) a property tax bill; (27) print out from social media or website; (28) a declaration submitted by Banner in the federal lawsuit; (29) interrogatories propounded in the federal lawsuit; (30) request for documents propounded in the federal lawsuit; (31) report of forensic document examiner and various documents she considered, labeled as “Exhibit Y”; (32) an illegible document on Banner Bank stationery; (33) an illegible “amendment to business loan agreement”; and (34) financial documents produced by Banner in discovery in the federal lawsuit (including appraisal documents, loan applications, financial statements; underwriters’ report, title insurance documents, deed of trust; HELOC application).

Banner objects to the admission of these documents on many grounds, including hearsay, lack of foundation, vague and ambiguous, and relevance. The Court sustains Banner’s objections on the basis of hearsay as a mere prefatory statement that the documents, which were not prepared by the declarant, are “true and correct” does not render them admissible. Furthermore, Plaintiff offers no argument that they are either not hearsay, or that some exception applies. (Evid. Code § 1200 et seq.)

In any event, to the extent that any of the documents are not submitted for the truth of the matter asserted, the court sustains the objection on the ground of relevance as to each of the documents. None is specifically directed at Plaintiff’s late discovery of Banner having possible liability in this action. In fact, to the extent they are considered by the Court at all, the Court observes that numerous of the documents, dating back into the early 2000’s, name Banner as Plaintiff and Husband’s mortgage lender, including on the original deed of trust, tending to disprove her ignorance of its relationship to her family and possible claims against it.

Therefore, the Court relies on statements in the verified TAC as well as matters of which it takes judicial notice. The preponderance of this evidence shows that while Plaintiff complied with section 474 by designating “Doe” defendants in her original complaint, her amendment to the pleading in December 2018 adding Banner as a named defendant is not compliant. In fact, the TAC itself defeats any claim that Plaintiff did not know Banner’s name and needed to initially designate it as a “Doe” defendant. As alleged, “It was not until December 2014, that [P]laintiff’s family law attorney discovered that [P]laintiff’s ex-husband had obtained the HELOC.” (TAC, ¶ 190.) It if further alleged that “On January 26, 2015, [P]laintiff’s family law attorney sent Banner Bank a letter informing it that… ex-husband had obtained the HELOC without her knowledge.” (Id. at ¶ 191.) Therefore, when the original complaint was filed in May of 2017, as her facts assert, Plaintiff was aware of the loans obtained by Husband from Banner and had been for two years.

The facts also allege that in January and March of 2018, Plaintiff sent dispute letters to the credit reporting agencies, informing them that the “Banner Bank HELOC account was opened fraudulently…” (TAC, ¶ 194.) Furthermore, the Court takes judicial notice of the complaint filed in federal court on April 19, 2018, wherein Plaintiff has sued Banner for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the California Civil Code. (Def. RJN, Exhibit 7.) Even assuming that Plaintiff was not aware of Banner’s name at the time she filed the original complaint in the present action, the evidence shows that she became aware of Banner, and her claims against them at least in January of 2018 and no later than April 2018. Therefore, her amendment was not compliant with section 474 in that she did not amend the pleading “when she discovered” Banner’s true name as she waited up to eleven months to amend accordingly.

Thus, the preponderance of the evidence shows that Plaintiff knew or should have known of possible liability by Banner in 2017 when she originally filed her complaint in this action. To the extent she did not, she knew or should have known many months before she amended her pleading to add Banner. Consequently, her amendment does not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 474.

Consequently, Banner Bank’s motion to quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is GRANTED.

The Court will prepare the order.

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Case Name: Helen Theresa Givens v. Roy Anthony Givens, et al.
Case No: 17CV311029

IV. Background

Plaintiff Helen Givens (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against her former husband, Roy Givens (“Husband”) and several other defendants for damages associated with domestic violence and financial abuse.

According to the allegations of the third amended complaint (“TAC”), and relevant here, First Interstate Bancsystem, Inc. (“Interstate”) is a financial holding company based in Billings, Montana. (TAC, ¶ 15.) It is the successor in interest by merger to Inland Northwest Bank (“Inland”), whose principal place of business is in Spokane, Washington. (Ibid) Plaintiff was a customer of Inland. (Id. at ¶ 138.)

Following Plaintiff and Husband’s divorce, Inland issued a debit card, used by Husband’s new wife, wrongfully giving her access to funds that were Plaintiff’s. (Id. at ¶ 139.) In so doing, Inland distributed Plaintiff’s income and funds from the sale of Solaris Power Cells, Inc. (“Solaris”) to an unauthorized person. (TAC, ¶ ¶ 140, 141, 142.) As a result, Plaintiff sustained losses of the funds from the sale of Solaris, and from income from Solaris. (TAC, ¶ 145.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff brings causes of action for breach of “fiduciary and contractual duties” against Inland through its successor, Interstate.

Presently before the Court is Interstate’s motion to quash the third amended summons.

V. Judicial Notice

In support of its motion to quash, Interstate seeks judicial notice of six court records from this action, and three court records from a federal action in case number 3:18-cv-02374.

Judicial notice may be taken of any matter authorized or required by law. (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113, citing Evidence Code §§ 451 & 452.) Any matter judicially noticed must be relevant to a material issue. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2.)

A court may take judicial notice of court records. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) However, the court does not take judicial notice of the truth of the facts as stated, but may take notice that documents “say what they say.” (Hamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1602, 1608, fn. 3.)

As a result, the Court will take judicial notice of the six documents from the present action, which include the original complaint, a proof of service on Husband, Plaintiff’s Case Management Statement filed on January 8, 2018, Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application to file the TAC, the TAC itself and the Third Amended Summons issued in this action on December 18, 2018 as they are all court documents relevant to the material issue of proper service of summons.

Interstate also seeks judicial notice of the three documents in the federal case including the Complaint for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the California Civil Code filed in April 2018, a declaration filed by Plaintiff in that action in June 2018, and the Clerk’s Notice of Trial filed in that action. However, only the declaration is cited by Interstate in its arguments, as it includes a statement by Plaintiff that she considers Washington her home state. The other two documents are not cited by Interstate and therefore are not relevant, so the Court will not take judicial notice of them.

Consequently, Interstate’s request for judicial notice is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.

VI. Motion to Quash

Interstate moves to quash service of summons pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10 subdivision (a)(1) on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction on the basis that it was wrongfully served as a “Doe” defendant, and on the basis that it lacks sufficient minimum contacts in California.

A. Legal Standard

In a motion to quash summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, though defendant is the moving party, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. (Evangelize China Fellowship, Inc. v. Evangelize China Fellowship, Hong Kong (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 440, 444 (Evangelize).) That burden may be met by declarations, verified complaint or other evidence. (2 Witkin, California Procedure (4th ed. 1996) Jurisdiction, §211, p. 775 – 776.)

B. Evidentiary Objections

Interstate objects to Plaintiff’s evidence on various grounds.

Plaintiff’s evidence consists of the TAC, a declaration by Plaintiff , and exhibits attached to the declaration.

Interstate raises numerous evidentiary objections to Plaintiff’s declaration including hearsay, lack of personal knowledge, lack of foundation and the secondary evidence/best evidence rule. The Court sustains the objection on the ground of hearsay and lack of personal knowledge to all but the following relevant statements , as they are facts known to Plaintiff, and statements to which she can personally attest: (1) “I found out through a subpoena responded to in November of 2017 that a debit master card… was taken out in about January of 2016 at INB Bank;” (2) “the addresses on the banking statements were no (sic) known to me;” (3) “Emily Brooks Marion Krolic was unknown to me;” (4) “I found out about the bank deposits, alterations to the account, identity theft, debit card and stolen money when attorneys representing me subpoenaed the bank for records;” (5) “I have lived in Washington in the 2000s;” (6) “I moved with my now ex-husband Roy Givens to the Palm Springs/Riverside County area;” (7) “Roy Givens and I were living in the Palm Springs area from 2011 through 2014;” (8) “I have been living in the San Francisco Bay Area since 2014.”

Attached to her declaration, Plaintiff also submits numerous documents. These include: (1) undated and unsigned documents submitted in conjunction with an identity theft claim with the IRS in 2017; (2) results of a Lexis-Nexis search; (3) bank statements; (4) invoices documenting use of a credit card; (5) a bill from a veterinary clinic; (6) a document hand labeled “Roy Givens Wedding Package;”(7) a real estate license; (8) photocopies of checks drawn on Plaintiff and Husband’s checking account at Interstate; (9) an email exchange between Husband and River Bank; (10) personal financial statement submitted to River Bank; (11) financial statement submitted to Banner Bank; (12) bank statements from Interstate; (13) a letter from the California Secretary of State regarding Plaintiff’s participation in the Safe at Home program; and (14) medical records (specifically an endoscopic scan); and (15) a report of debit card transactions.

Interstate objects to the admission of these documents on various grounds, including hearsay, lack of foundation, vague and ambiguous, and relevance. The Court sustains Interstate’s objection on the basis of hearsay. Plaintiff offers a mere prefatory statement in her declaration that the attached documents are “true and correct” but this alone does not render them admissible. Plaintiff does not argue that they are either not hearsay, or that some exception applies. (Evid. Code § 1200 et seq.) Furthermore, Plaintiff offers no other basis for the Court to consider them, such as through a request for judicial notice.

Consequently, Interstate’s objection to the documentary evidence is sustained.

C. Noncompliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 474

Code of Civil Procedure section 474 allows a plaintiff who is ignorant of a defendant’s identity to designate the defendant in a complaint by a fictitious name, and then to subsequently amend the pleading to state the defendant’s true name when he or she discovers it. However, the procedure is only available when the plaintiff is actually ignorant of the facts establishing a cause of action against the party to be substituted for a Doe defendant. (McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLC (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 368, 372 (“McClatchy”) citing Optical Surplus, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 776, 783.) Improper service of a defendant under section 474 may be attacked by a motion to quash service of summons. (Id. at 375.) The question is whether the plaintiff knew, or reasonably should have known that he or she had a cause of action against the defendant. (Id. at 372.)

In McClatchy a trust beneficiary sued a law firm partner and “Does 1 through 2” for breach of trust and two years later amended the pleading to name the law firm as a defendant pursuant to section 474. (McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLC, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th 368, 372.) However, with its motion, the law firm produced evidence that the partner had conducted business at the law firm’s offices, and utilizing its stationery in administering the trust, sufficient to show that plaintiff knew or should have known of his cause of action against it. Therefore, the McClatchy court found that the plaintiff had not complied with section 474.

Here, while Plaintiff’s initial complaint properly names “Doe” defendants, the preponderance of Plaintiff’s own evidence shows that she knew or should have known of Interstate and its connection to her family’s finances a year before she amended the complaint. Plaintiff alleges that she “was a customer of Inland Northwest Bank.” (TAC, ¶ 138.) Likewise, her declaration states that she “found out through a subpoena… in November of 2017 that a debit master card… was taken out in about January of 2016 at INB Bank” using her identity and utilized by someone whose name she did not recognize. (Dec. of T. Givens, ¶ 3, emphasis added.) The TAC also alleges that she “became aware of the fraud and forgery” during her dissolution of marriage proceedings through documents received November 17, 2016.” (TAC, ¶ 55.) Her declaration buttresses this assertion by stating “I found out about the… identity theft, debit card and stolen money when attorneys representing me subpoenaed the bank for records” in apparent reference to the attorneys representing her in the dissolution proceedings. (Dec. of T. Givens, ¶ 12.)

Despite this earlier knowledge, the complaint in the present action was not amended until over a year later, on December 4, 2018, to add Interstate as a “Doe” defendant. Therefore, she did not add Interstate’s name “when she discovered it.” For this reason alone, Plaintiff’s amendment does not comply with section 474.

Furthermore, Interstate has produced evidence to show Plaintiff’s knowledge of her family’s association with Interstate well before even the original complaint was filed. It submits the declaration of Chad Burchard, its Market President, who is familiar with the checking account and bank transactions at issue here and reviewed its records prepared and maintained in the regular course of business. (INB Dec. of Chad Burchard, ¶¶ 1, 2, 10.) His declaration states that Plaintiff and Husband opened their account in 2004. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Interstate mailed statements each months, and the statements were also available online. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 8.) The declaration also states that deposits from Solaris were made in 2014 and appeared on the statements. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Finally, the declaration attests to a fraud report made on the account in May of 2016, which led to both debit cards being cancelled. (Id. at ¶ 9.)

Therefore, the evidence shows that even beyond Plaintiff’s one year delay in amending the complaint, she was on notice of Interstate’s connection to her family’s finances, and its name was known to her since 2004. She knew or should have known of the transactions on the account through Interstate’s online portal, or as a named owner of the account she could have otherwise accessed the information. She knew or should have known that the jointly owned proceeds from the Solaris sale were deposited in 2014 into her account at Interstate. Finally, the debit card fraud she alleges was known to Interstate in 2016, and it cancelled the debit cards associated with the account, information to which she had access and knew or should have known about. Since the original complaint was filed in May 2017, the evidence shows that Plaintiff knew or should have known of Interstate’s possible liability for financial fraud before this, and her reliance on section 474 is unavailing.

Consequently, the amendment to the complaint to add Interstate as a previously unknown “Doe” defendant is not compliant with Code of Civil Procedure section 474. Therefore, the motion to quash service of summons will be granted.

D. Lack of Sufficient Minimum Contacts

Interstate also brings its motion on the basis that it does not have sufficient minimum contacts for a California court to assert jurisdiction over it.

When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts to support that defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the state. (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 449 (Vons).) The burden then shifts to defendant to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Ibid.)

A defendant may be subject to the general jurisdiction of the forum if its contacts are “substantial, continuous and systematic.” (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th 434, 445.) Where no such substantial contacts are found, a defendant may still be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the forum if it has purposefully availed itself of forum benefits and the “controversy is related to or arises out of a defendant’s contacts with the forum.” (Id. at 446, citations omitted.)

In the Vons case, specific jurisdiction was found, sufficient to deny a motion to quash service of summons, over meat suppliers whose place of business was Washington. The Vons court relied on the defendant’s own behavior in entering into contracts with California businesses to supply meat. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th 434, 451.) Since the cause of action was one based on allegations that the meat was contaminated and sickened California consumers, there was a nexus between the business contracts and the tort claims sufficient to find defendant availed itself of the forum. (Id. at 456.)

Here, Plaintiff fails to meet the initial burden of demonstrating that Interstate availed itself of forum benefits through its activities in California. In fact, her evidence tends to show the contrary. Specifically, it shows that that Plaintiff was a Washington resident at the time she and Husband opened the account with Inland. (Dec. of T. Givens, ¶ 15.) She and Husband subsequently moved to the “Palm Springs/Riverside County area.” (Ibid.) She also states that she has been “living in the San Francisco Bay Area since 2014.” (Ibid.) Also, by Plaintiff’s own allegations, Interstate “is a financial holding company based in Billings, Montana” and it is a successor in interest to Inland Northwest Bank, whose “principal place of business at 421 W. Riverside Avenue, Spokane, WA…” (TAC, ¶ 15.)

Therefore, the evidence is that while residing in Washington State, Plaintiff opened an account with a bank whose principal place of business is Washington State, and that bank was subsequently sold to a holding company whose principal place of business is Montana. Plaintiff and Husband moved to California, and apparently kept the account open. However, there is no evidence that a contract was entered for business with Plaintiff and Husband once they moved to California, or that it was Interstate that availed itself of the forum by seeking out business relationships here. In fact, unlike in the Vons case, the record is devoid of evidence of voluntary business activity in which Interstate engaged to show sufficient minimum contacts.

Furthermore, there is no nexus between the wrongful conduct alleged and Interstate’s behavior in the forum. Plaintiff alleges, for example, that Interstate wrongfully “distributed funds from the sale of Solaris Power Cells Inc.” (TAC, ¶ 141.) However, she also alleges that Solaris is a “Nevada Corporation” (TAC, ¶ 10.) and as previously mentioned that the bank was either a Washington or Montana corporation. Thus, there are no facts to support an inference that any wrongful conduct was related to Interstate’s own choice to conduct business in California.

Therefore, Plaintiff has not met her burden to show that Interstate has sufficient minimum contacts with the state to confer either general or specific jurisdiction over it.

Consequently, Interstate’s motion to quash the third amended summons is GRANTED.

The Court will prepare the order.