Filed 8/22/18 Marriage of Sadat CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re the Marriage of SAMIA and RAHMAT SADAT.

SAMIA SADAT,

Respondent,

v.

RAHMAT SADAT,

Appellant.

E067259

(Super.Ct.No. SWD1500183)

O P I N I O N

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Michael J. Rushton, Judge. Affirmed.

Rahmat Sadat, in pro. per., for Appellant.

Law Office of Richard G. Prantil and Richard G. Prantil for Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant, Rahmat Sadat, and respondent, Samia Sadat, married in 2002 and separated in 2014. In January 2015, Samia filed a petition to dissolve the marriage. After a trial in 2016, the court entered a judgment of dissolution dividing the parties’ assets and debts. It also found Rahmat breached his fiduciary duties to Samia. Rahmat challenges a number of the court’s findings and rulings on appeal, but he has failed to provide a record of the evidence at trial. We must therefore affirm the judgment.

II. THE STATEMENTS OF DECISION

The bench trial in this case occurred in two phases. The court heard two days of evidence in April 2016 on one issue—an alleged loan from Adam Khan to Rahmat. The court issued a statement of decision on this issue in June 2016. Then, in August 2016, the court heard two days of evidence on remaining issues, including the characterization and division of real property, Rahmat’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty, the characterization of Samia’s student loans, spousal support, child support, and attorney fees and costs. The court filed a separate statement of decision on these issues, and later, a judgment incorporating both statements of decision.

The scant record on appeal contains no reporter’s transcript or documentary evidence that the court may have considered at trial. The record consists of little more than the judgment, the statements of decision, and the register of actions in the trial court. We summarize relevant portions of the statements of decision in the remainder of this part.

A. The Alleged Khan Loan

In 2010, Khan allegedly agreed to loan Rahmat $250,000. The two men purportedly entered into this loan agreement in Afghanistan. Rahmat and Khan (as a claimant in this action) requested that the court permit Rahmat to repay the loan from the assets of the community—specifically, from the sale of two homes that were part of the marital estate. The court found that Rahmat and Khan had not proven the existence of the alleged loan and the community did not, therefore, owe Khan any debt. The statement of decision extensively explained why it found Rahmat, Khan, and their evidence lacking in credibility and the circumstances surrounding the alleged debt “cloak[ed]” in “suspicion.”

B. The Characterization of the Parties’ Two Homes

The court found the parties purchased two homes during the marriage. They used community property funds to buy the homes—Rahmat’s income during marriage, which he earned as an interpreter contracted to the United States government. Samia executed deeds of trust conveying both homes to Rahmat as his sole and separate property. She received no compensation for forfeiting her interest in the homes. “[S]he did it because [Rahmat] told her to do it,” and he told her “she was not losing anything.” Rahmat offered no proof that she understood she was giving up her community property interest in the homes. Her reliance on these statements, combined with fear, motivated her to execute the deeds. The court found her credible when she “testified to a marriage filled with actual physical violence and pervasive psychological abuse at the hands of” Rahmat. She had previously secured a domestic violence restraining order against him, protecting her and their child.

The court rejected Rahmat’s claim that these two homes constituted his separate property and concluded they were community property. “[I]n transactions between themselves, spouses are subject to the general rules governing fiduciary relationships.” (Fam. Code, § 721, subd. (b).) When one spouse secures an advantage over the other in an interspousal transaction, a statutory presumption of undue influence arises, and the courts will set aside the transaction unless the advantaged spouse establishes the disadvantaged spouse acted freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the facts and a complete understanding of the consequences of the transaction. (Lintz v. Lintz (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1353.) The court held Rahmat had failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence and set aside the deeds granting him the homes as his sole and separate property.

C. Rahmat’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty and the Award of Attorney Fees and Costs to Samia

After Samia filed her petition for dissolution, Rahmat transferred an interest in the parties’ two homes to Khan, without prior approval of the court or notice to Samia. Before he did so, the two homes “had come up time and again in court,” and the characterization of the homes as separate or community property “was clearly an issue looming before the court.” Moreover, Samia had filed a request for order (RFO) seeking to sell the homes, and the parties had stipulated to a hearing date for the RFO. Rahmat executed the quitclaim deeds in favor of Khan knowing of the hearing date on the RFO, and at the hearing, he failed to advise the court of the quitclaim deeds.

The court held Rahmat’s actions constituted a breach of his fiduciary duties to Samia. It awarded her 50 percent of the two properties plus all her attorney fees and costs, the remedy provided by Family Code section 1101, subdivision (g). The court also justified the award of Samia’s attorney fees and costs as sanctions, pursuant to Family Code section 271. The court found Rahmat’s nondisclosure or fabrication of the Khan loan, plus his breach of fiduciary duty in conveying an interest in the homes to Khan, “dramatically prolonged and complicated th[is] litigation.” This justified sanctions of $68,373.20, i.e., all of Samia’s attorney fees and costs to date.

D. Samia’s Student Loans

The court held Samia was solely responsible for repaying her student loans in the amount of $11,000. It ordered Samia’s attorney to hold a portion of her separate property award sufficient to repay the loans in the attorney’s client trust account. When the parties provided the attorney with the necessary documentation to pay off the loans, the attorney would remit the funds to the lender.

 

III. DISCUSSION

Rahmat contends the court erred when it: (1) found he did not prove the existence of the Khan loan; (2) characterized the parties’ two homes as community property; (3) found he breached his fiduciary duties to Samia; (4) awarded Samia her attorney fees and costs; and (5) granted Samia a permanent restraining order against him and added the parties’ child to the restraining order. As to almost all these claims, he argues the court erroneously relied on Samia’s evidence as opposed to his evidence, or it excluded important evidence. Further, he asserts the court was biased against him, and the court interpreters were ineffective. Finally, he argues that, although the court ordered Samia to repay her student loans, she has yet to repay them.

We presume the judgment is correct and the record contains evidence to sustain every factual finding. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133; Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1658.) The appellant has the burden of demonstrating otherwise. (Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc., supra, at p. 1658.) To carry this burden, the appellant must provide an adequate record to evaluate his or her contentions. (Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 132.) If the appellant does not provide an adequate record, we must reject his or her arguments. (Ibid.; Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574-575.) In fact, “[w]here no reporter’s transcript has been provided and no error is apparent on the face of the existing appellate record, the judgment must be conclusively presumed correct as to all evidentiary matters. . . . The effect of this rule is that an appellant who attacks a judgment but supplies no reporter’s transcript will be precluded from raising an argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence.” (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992.)

Here, we must reject Rahmat’s arguments because he has failed to provide an adequate record. He elected to proceed without a reporter’s transcript setting forth the evidence at trial, or some other alternative, such as a settled statement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137.) We thus have no way to evaluate whether sufficient evidence supported the court’s findings, and we presume its findings and judgment were correct. The same goes for his charges of bias and ineffective interpreters. We have no way to evaluate these claims without a record of the trial and presume the court was impartial and the interpreters effective. Additionally, the mere fact that the court ruled in Samia’s favor does not show bias. The court had a duty to decide this dispute and, as the fact finder, it was entitled to credit her evidence over Rahmat’s evidence. (In re Marriage of Balcof (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1531.) Lastly, Rahmat’s charge that Samia has not repaid her student loans does not raise a trial court error for our review. If she has not complied with the court’s order to repay her loans, Rahmat should address that grievance to the trial court in the first instance, not this court.

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Samia shall recover her costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS

J.

We concur:

MILLER

Acting P. J.

SLOUGH

J.