Case Name: Jane Doe v. Milpitas Cab, et al.
Case No.: 1-12-CV-237479
This action arises from the rape of plaintiff Jane Doe (“Plaintiff”) by a taxi driver, Amanpreet Singh Bath (“Bath”) in January 2012. On May 30, 2014, Plaintiff filed her second amended complaint (“SAC”) against Bath and his alleged employers: Milpitas Cab, Milpitas Cab, Co., Milpitas Cab, LLC, City Cab, City Cab, Co., Shri Nabh Kamam Raja Sabibiji, Inc., and Raja Sahibji, Inc.[1] (collectively with the exception of Milpitas Cab, LLC, the “Milpitas/City Cab Defendants”); the alleged owners, shareholders, and managers of the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants and Milpitas Cab LLC, Lakhbir Pooni and Balhar Singh (collectively, the “Owner Defendants”); and an alleged employee and manager at the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants and Milpitas Cab LLC, Varinder Singh (“Varinder”).
The SAC asserts a cause of action for negligence against the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants, Milpitas Cab LLC, the Owner Defendants, and Varinder (the first cause of action) and a cause of action for alter ego liability against the Owner Defendants (the sixth cause of action), in addition to various claims against Bath.
Currently before the Court are the separate demurrers of the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants, the Owner Defendants, and Varinder.
The Milpitas/City Cab Defendants’ Demurrer
The Milpitas/City Cab Defendants demur to the first cause of action on the grounds that it fails to state a claim (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e)) and is uncertain and ambiguous (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f)).
As an initial matter, uncertainty is a disfavored ground for demurrer and is typically sustained only where the pleading is so unintelligible that the responding party cannot reasonably respond. (See Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616 [“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.”].) Here, as the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants recognize, Plaintiff clearly alleges that the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants were negligent in hiring Bath and entrusting him to operate a taxi cab. (SAC, ¶¶ 33-35; Mot., p. 4.)
Accordingly, the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants’ demurrer based on uncertainty is OVERRULED.
The Milpitas/City Cab Defendants contend that the first cause of action fails to state a claim against them because it alleges insufficient facts to support the conclusions that they owed Plaintiff a duty, breached that duty, and proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries. However, as acknowledged by the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants, a taxi operator is a common carrier with an affirmative duty to protect its passengers from harm. (Ingham v. Luxor Cab Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1050-1051; see Mot., p. 7.) This includes a duty to protect passengers from sexual assaults by the carrier’s employees. (Berger v. Southern Pacific Co. (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 1, 8 [common carrier owes passengers a duty to prevent sexual assaults by its employee].) Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants breached this duty by hiring Bath and allowing him to operate a taxi cab despite the San Jose Police Department’s prior investigation of Bath for raping another passenger. (SAC, ¶¶ 33-35.) While the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants point out that Plaintiff does not allege that they actually knew of this prior incident, they cite no authority for the proposition that actual knowledge of a prior incident is required to state a claim for negligent hiring or supervision, and the law is to the contrary. (See Deutsch v. Masonic Homes of California, Inc. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 748, 783-784 [“the ‘actual notice’ or ‘specific warning’ instruction offered by appellant was not a correct statement of the law of the tort of negligent hiring or supervision, and was properly refused by the trial court”].) Finally, it is clear that the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants’ employment of Bath as a taxi driver was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries given that Plaintiff was raped while a passenger in Bath’s taxi.
The Milpitas/City Cab Defendants’ demurrer based on failure to state a claim is consequently OVERRULED.
Varinder’s Demurrer
Varinder demurs to the first cause of action on the grounds that it fails to state a claim (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e)) and is uncertain and ambiguous (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f)).
As with her claim against the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants, Plaintiff’s claim against Varinder is based on his allegedly negligent hiring and supervision of Bath in his capacity as the manager for the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants. (See SAC, ¶¶ 24 and 33-35.) As an initial matter, while Varinder asserts that he was not and is not a manager, the Court must accept this allegation on demurrer. Varinder contends that Plaintiff nevertheless fails to state a claim against him as an individual given his employment by the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants. However, agents generally remain liable for their own torts committed during their agency regardless of whether their principals are also liable (see Bayuk v. Edson (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 309, 320 [affirming judgment against agent architect for negligent supervision of construction project;if a tortious act has been committed by an agent acting under authority of his principal, the fact that the principal thus becomes liable does not necessarily exonerate the agent from liability]), so this argument is unpersuasive. The remainder of Varinder’s demurrer is substantively identical to the demurrer of the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants, and lacks merit for the reasons discussed above.
Varinder’s demurrer based on uncertainty and failure to state a claim is consequently OVERRULED.
The Owner Defendants’ Demurrer
The Owner Defendants demur to the first and sixth causes of action on the grounds that they fail to state a claim (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e)) and are ambiguous and uncertain (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f)).
As with the other defendants, Plaintiff’s first cause of action against the Owner Defendants is based on their allegedly negligent hiring and supervision of Bath. Plaintiff alleges that the Owner Defendants, like Varinder, managed the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants and Bath. (See SAC, ¶¶ 22, 23, and 33-35.) As discussed above, these allegations are adequate to state a claim for negligence and are not uncertain.
The Owner Defendants’ demurrer to the first cause of action based on uncertainty and failure to state a claim is thus OVERRULED.
Plaintiff also clearly asserts a claim for alter ego liability against the Owner Defendants. (See SAC, ¶¶ 57-60, Mot., p. 6 [recognizing that the sixth cause of action asserts a claim for alter ego liability].) In support of this claim, Plaintiff alleges that the Owner Defendants own 100% of the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants between the two of them, there is a unity of interest and ownership between the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants and the Owner Defendants, and the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants are mere shells through which the Owner Defendants conduct their taxi cab business as they had conducted it prior to incorporating the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants. (SAC, ¶¶ 58 and 59.) Plaintiff further alleges that inequity would result from respecting the separate existence of the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants because it would permit an abuse of the corporate privilege. (SAC, ¶ 60.) These allegations, while somewhat bare, are adequate to survive demurrer. (See Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 799, 811 [“in order to prevail on an alter-ego theory, the plaintiff must show that (1) there is such a unity of interest that the separate personalities of the corporations no longer exist; and (2) inequitable results will follow if the corporate separateness is respected,” considering a “long list” of non-exhaustive factors], internal citations and quotations omitted; Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 235-236 [allegations of ultimate facts supporting alter ego liability—such as “that a unity of interest and ownership existed between” an individual and a corporation, the corporation “was a mere shell and conduit for” the individual’s affairs, and “recognizing the separate existence of [the corporation] would promote injustice”—adequate to state a claim]; see also Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 418 [pleading only one or two factors supporting alter ego liability—specifically, that an individual owned all the stock in a corporation and disregarded corporate formalities—may be adequate to satisfy the first element of alter ego liability; suggesting that an allegation that “the corporation was a mere sham or shell” may satisfy the second element].)
Accordingly, the Owner Defendants’ demurrer to the sixth cause of action based on uncertainty and failure to state a claim is OVERRULED.
[1] The Milpitas/City Cab Defendants assert that Milpitas Cab, Milpitas Cab, Co., City Cab, and City Cab, Co. are fictitious business names for Raja Sahibji, Inc. They state that Shri Nabh Kamam Raja Sabibiji, Inc. “is incorrect as the corporate entity name under which the above fictitious business names are associated” and there is no record of this entity on the California Secretary of State web site; however, this entity is nevertheless identified as a party to the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants’ demurrer. The Milpitas/City Cab Defendants further state that, according to the Secretary of State web site, Milpitas Cab, LLC is a forfeited limited liability company. Milpitas Cab, LLC is not identified as a party to the Milpitas/City Cab Defendants’ demurrer.

Link to this page