Jaspal Deol vs. Sacramento Municipal Utilities Department
Nature of Proceeding:
Filed By:
Motion to Compel Form Interrogatories
Telfer, Jill P.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatory 17.1 is denied.

Plaintiff alleges claims under the FEHA arising out of his 29 year employment with SMUD. SMUD contends plaintiff’s claims are barred by a release. SMUD contends that it sought Plaintiff’s voluntary separation after it received complaints from subordinates about his style of leadership and concluded he could no longer be an effective manager at SMUD. Plaintiff signed the release as part of the voluntary separation agreement . Plaintiff contends that he was coerced into signing the release because he did not want a false Investigation Report to become public.

The Request for Admissions served by Plaintiff seek the private, personnel information of SMUD employees (or former employees) who are not parties to this lawsuit. Those former employees are Alice Perez and Deirdre Perkins-Moore. The Court has previously ruled that plaintiff did not make a sufficient showing to obtain information concerning former employee Alice Perez when it denied plaintiff’s request to produce the investigation into Perez’ conduct. The Court has denied the motion to compel further responses to Requests for Admissions. Therefore, the Court denies the motion to compel further responses to the related Special Interrogatory 17.1.

The personnel information sought by Plaintiff is in a constitutionally protected zone of privacy set forth under Article I , Section 1 of California’s Constitution. (Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 526, 528-529; El Dorado Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 342.) The constitutional right of privacy is not absolute; it may be abridged when, but only when, there is a compelling and opposing state interest. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1.

When compelled disclosure intrudes on constitutionally protected areas, it cannot be justified solely on the ground that it may lead to relevant information. And even when discovery of private information is found directly relevant to the issues of ongoing litigation, it will not be automatically allowed; there must then be a “careful balancing” of the compelling public need for discovery against the fundamental right of privacy. Board of Trustees, supra, at p. 525. Thus, the standard applicable to general discovery, i.e. that items only need be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is inapplicable to the discovery of items protected by the right of privacy. As to items protected by right to privacy, the threshold requirement is that such items must be directly relevant to the issue in the case. (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844; Tylo v. Superior Court (1997) 55Cal.App.4th 1379.)

The information that Deol seeks concerning Perez, Mercado, and Perkins- Moore has nothing to do with the events in this case and plaintiff has made no showing to show direct relevance to his claims of discrimination and rescission involving his severance agreement. It bears repeating that relevancy in right of privacy cases is governed by a more stringent standard of “direct relevance,” apparently to prevent a searching for only tangentially pertinent sensitive information. Britt, supra, at pp. 860-861 & fn. 4; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide, Civil Procedure Before Trial (1987) § 8:320, p. 8C-50

Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the information he sought is relevant and admissible as “me too” evidence. Determining whether a case presents “me too” evidence must be based on an individualized factual assessment and include consideration of how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiffs circumstances and theory of the case. Generally, “me too” evidence is evidence tending to demonstrate an employer’s hostility towards a certain group. (Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children’s Foundation of Los Angeles and Ventura Counties (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 740, 765.) Deol has failed to offer any description of what certain group he claims was subject to demonstrated hostility.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.