Filed 12/26/19 Marriage of Janssens CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Shasta)

—-

In re the Marriage of JENNIFER and DAN JANSSENS.

JENNIFER JANSSENS,

Appellant,

v.

DAN JANSSENS,

Respondent.

C085986

(Super. Ct. No. 167923)
Jennifer Janssens (mother) appeals from an order awarding Dan Janssens (father) attorney fees in the amount of $15,000 pursuant to Family Code section 2030. This section provides that the trial court “shall ensure that each party has access to legal representation . . . by ordering, if necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one party . . . to pay to the other party, or to the other party’s attorney, whatever amount is reasonably necessary for attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending the proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding.” (§ 2030, subd. (a)(1).) We review an order for attorney fees under this provision for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Smith (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 529, 532 (Smith).) The burden falls upon appellant to persuade this court such an abuse occurred. (Kevin Q. v. Lauren W. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 633, 644 (Kevin Q.).) We conclude mother has failed to carry this burden and therefore affirm the challenged order.

BACKGROUND

The litigants in this contentious custody dispute, over their son, C., were married for almost five years, between 2005 and 2010.

We begin our summary of the procedural background in July 2014. That month, mother filed a request for modification of custody and visitation and also sought a temporary emergency order suspending all visitation with father until the completion of a criminal investigation into an allegation father sexually abused their son. While mother ultimately acknowledged she made the allegation against father, in her declaration attached to the request to suspend father’s visitation, mother stated she was informed of the allegation by a social worker who told her “an anonymous report had been made” by someone who “suspected child sexual abuse.” Father filed a responsive declaration denying the allegation. The trial court ordered supervised visitation pending an evidentiary hearing regarding custody and visitation.

In November 2014, declarations were filed by mother and father ahead of the scheduled hearing. Father’s declaration stated, among other things, that mother made the sexual abuse allegation after he informed her he would be asking the trial court to grant him an equal custody arrangement. Father also stated the investigations into the alleged sexual abuse had been completed by both the Shasta County Sheriff’s Department and Child and Family Services (CFS). According to father, the sheriff’s department’s investigation was closed due to a determination “the reporting party was ‘not credible’ [and] that ‘the allegations seem to be motivated by child custody.’ ” Father further stated he was informed the CFS investigation was closed without a finding of sexual abuse. Documents filed under seal with this court confirm the sheriff’s department investigation was closed as “unfounded” after the investigating officer interviewed C., mother, and father, who also submitted to a computer voice stress analyzer examination. Thereafter, the CFS investigation was closed as “inconclusive.”

Mother stated in her declaration that her relationship with father was marred by domestic violence. She then provided an account of C. initially disclosing the alleged sexual abuse to her in November 2013, followed by a few “casual references” to it between then and June 2014, culminating in her informing law enforcement authorities about the alleged abuse. CFS then visited her home, but according to mother, the visit was not prompted by her report to law enforcement authorities and the social worker who made the visit had no knowledge of that report. After mother informed the social worker of her concerns regarding the alleged abuse, he advised her to take steps in court to prevent father from having contact with their son or “CFS would have no choice but to take [C.]” from both parents. Mother claimed C. made additional disclosures of abuse to her following this visit, which she passed along to CFS. Mother also followed the social worker’s advice in seeking an emergency order. We note mother’s declaration further stated C. repeated his disclosure of sexual abuse to, among other people, a marriage and family therapist recommended by the social worker.

After these declarations were filed, the trial court appointed a child custody recommending counselor (CCRC) to weigh in on the issue of custody. After reviewing the declarations and other documents, including a declaration from the marriage and family therapist noted above, the CCRC’s report recommended joint legal and physical custody and explained “that barring any legitimate and documented reasons, the Court encourages that the minor child have access to both of his parents on a continuous and frequent basis.” The report also advised the court that it “may consider” ordering both a psychosexual evaluation for father and a psychological evaluation for mother.

In December 2014, after receiving the CCRC’s report, mother filed a request for a child custody evaluation pursuant to section 3118. Father opposed the request and filed a request for attorney fees pursuant to section 2030, arguing that due to his unemployment he did not possess the financial ability to finance the litigation at the level pursued by mother. Father urged the court to look not only to mother’s income, but to her “access to funds” available to finance the litigation. Thereafter, mother filed a declaration stating she was also unemployed, had no income of her own, was receiving public assistance due to a disability, and applied for disability payments but they had not yet been approved. With respect to litigation costs, mother declared: “My parents have loaned me the money to litigate this matter as they are also very concerned about the well-being of their grandchild. However, they have made it clear that it is a loan that needs to be repaid as soon as I am able. They have also expressed that the funds available are not infinite as it is coming from [her father’s] retirement funds.”

In April 2015, after an intervening request from mother to discontinue father’s supervised visitation altogether, or in the alternative, remove the visitation supervisor, the trial court ordered mother to pay $15,000 in attorney fees. While this is not the attorney fee order challenged in this appeal, we set forth its contents in some detail because mother’s disregard of this order played a role in the subsequent order she challenges herein.

In granting father’s request for attorney fees, the trial court observed that despite mother’s personal financial situation, “she has hired two competent counsel[,] . . . has hired an investigator (or two) and has also retained an expert as a special consultant to review the visitation situation. Her attorney at one time estimated the trial would take approximately 15 days. Her attorney has also requested at least two days of trial this week to address the request for order . . . to modify the temporary visitation schedule and to remove a supervisor.” After noting mother was financing the litigation with a “loan” from her parents, the trial court ruled: “It’s clear to this court that the mother is going to aggressively prosecute this issue pertaining to allegations of sexual abuse by the father. The fact that she requested two days of hearings on a temporary order as well as requesting a . . . section 3118 evaluation indicates to this Court that when it comes time for the trial on the . . . permanent order pertaining to custody and visitation, that the matter may take several days. She cannot hide behind the fact that she has no money when it’s clear to this Court that she has the financial capabilities or sources to finance the father right out of his parental rights. This being a Court of equity, it is only fair that the father be provided some assistance with regard to attorney fees. The Court does find that there is a disparity in access to funds and the father needs assistance to pay attorney fees given his unemployment status. The Court will order that the mother pay $15,000 in fees to the father’s attorney and that this be paid forthwith.” The trial court further ordered mother to pay the cost of the section 3118 evaluation, but that the payment of attorney fees shall “take precedence over the payment of the evaluation.”

In January 2016, father filed a request for modification of custody and visitation. Father argued notwithstanding the fact that the sheriff’s department and CFS investigations into the alleged sexual abuse “found no evidence that any crime had taken place[,] . . . 18 months later, [father] must still pay for a professional supervisor to attend and report on each visit with no opportunity to be a parent to his child.” Father asked the court to vacate the order for a section 3118 evaluation, noting mother’s attorney had stated mother did not have the resources to pay father’s attorney the $15,000 ordered by the court the previous April. As mentioned, payment of that amount was required before mother could pay for the section 3118 evaluation. Father also requested the court “vacate the temporary orders for custody and move forward with the case using the evidence presented, including the [CCRC’s report recommending joint legal and physical custody].”

Mother filed a responsive declaration in which she took issue with the sheriff’s department’s handling of the investigation into her allegation of abuse, recounted C.’s behavioral issues, again attributed these issues to his visits with father, and also noted the visitation supervisor had withdrawn as supervisor due to C.’s behavioral problems during recent visits. Mother asked the court to deny father’s request to vacate the order for a section 3118 evaluation and instead vacate the requirement that she pay the ordered attorney fees prior to paying for that evaluation.

The trial court temporarily suspended the order for mother to pay attorney fees and ordered her to pay for the section 3118 evaluation. Thereafter, Blake D. Carmichael, Ph.D., was appointed by the court to conduct the evaluation. He submitted his report in December 2016. This report was filed under seal and we need not set forth its contents in this opinion, except to note Dr. Carmichael could not determine whether or not the alleged sexual abuse occurred and ultimately recommended mother retain custody of C., with a plan for resumption of supervised visitation with father.

In April 2017, mother filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order based on allegations father violated the trial court’s order for supervised visitation by approaching C. while he was playing outside and telling him “it was [mother’s] fault [father] and [C.] hadn’t been able to see one another.” Father denied the allegations.

In June 2017, mother again sought to stop supervised visitation altogether, and to remove the new visitation supervisor. This time, mother claimed C. attempted suicide on three occasions, “each time reiterating that he doesn’t want to see his father,” and after the third such attempt, he was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric facility pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. Father denied his supervised visitation with C. was causing any behavioral problems. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court temporarily granted father joint legal and full physical custody of C. and ordered mother’s visitation to be supervised in the same manner as previously ordered for father’s visitation. The trial court, Judge Gregory S. Gaul, then indicated the remaining matters would have to be heard by a different judge due to Judge Gaul’s scheduled retirement. In order to facilitate the transfer of the case, Judge Gaul declared a mistrial as to all pending matters.

Three days later, the parties appeared before Judge Gary G. Gibson for purposes of rescheduling a hearing on the pending matters. Father’s counsel asked the trial court to condition setting such a hearing on mother’s payment of the $15,000 in attorney fees previously ordered by the court. Counsel also indicated father would be seeking additional attorney fees. The trial court agreed, noting mother’s January 2017 income and expense declaration indicated her parents had paid $194,000 in legal fees related to the case. Judge Gibson, who was the same judge who granted the previous attorney fee request, stated on the record: “[Mother] has access to funds, and that’s the way she’s been able to fund this case. And she basically is funding dad’s parental rights out the door. And that’s why I granted the first request for attorney’s fees. So I’m not willing to set this until attorney’s fees are paid.”

The following month, father filed the promised attorney fee motion, seeking over $100,000 in attorney fees, and submitted an income and expense declaration of his own. Mother opposed the motion, repeating her assertion that “the costs related to the case have been paid as loans owed back to my parents.” Mother added: “The funds have always been a loan. They continue to be strictly a loan as they are able to afford it and I continue to be responsible for paying it back once I complete my degree and am able to earn a sustainable income.” Mother then chronicled her inability to “earn a living . . . due to a disability,” let alone pay the attorney fees previously ordered, noting she “live[s] on government assistance (welfare) and HUD housing assistance and [her] tuition at Simpson University has been paid by academic scholarships and grants.”

In September 2017, the trial court ordered mother to pay an additional $15,000 in attorney fees. After noting the April 2015 attorney fee order had not been paid, and instead mother continued to pay her own litigation expenses, over $290,000 by the time of the hearing on this attorney fee motion, the trial court explained: “Now that the . . . section 3118 evaluation has been completed, the parties need a hearing. Once again, it is estimated that it will take 15 days. The mother is continuing to aggressively prosecute this matter and is outspending the father in an effort to take his parental rights.” We recite the remainder of the trial court’s ruling in its entirety:

“The Court has considered . . . section 2030 which provides the Court shall make findings on whether an award of attorney fees and costs under that section is appropriate and whether there is a disparity in ‘access to funds’ to retain counsel. While the mother claims she does not have the ability to pay the father’s fees, she certainly has access to funds in order to finance him right out of the lawsuit and his parental rights. This is not fair. This is a Court of equity and the Court must have the ability to exercise discretion to achieve fairness and equity [citation].

“The respondent requested fees in the amount of $109,500.00. This is based upon the estimate given by the mother’s counsel that trial will take about 15 days. During the argument, [mother’s] counsel indicated that it may not take as long, but there is certainly an indication that the trial will be long. The mother has incurred $300,000.00 in fees while she’s unemployed so money is not a consideration in her effort to take the child from the father. The father’s income and expense declaration of July 5, 2017, reflects that he has paid $15,000.00 in fees to date and that he still owes $10,000.00. It is anticipated that he is going to need much more than that for a 15 day trial or even a 10-day trial.

“The Court will find that there is a significant disparity in access to funds in the mother’s favor. Although the father is now employed and averages about $3,500.00 a month in income, it’s evident he will need assistance to pay the attorney fees for a 15 day trial or even a 10 day trial. The Court will award the father an additional $15,000.00 in fees without prejudice to the Court reassessing his need for fees depending upon the length of the hearing.

“The Court is not inclined to set a hearing until the Court sees that the mother is taking this Court seriously. She only pays when it is to her advantage such as to obtain a [section] 3118 evaluation. She paid over $150,000.00 in additional fees since the Court ordered her to pay the father $15,000.00 in fees. She has not paid any of the father’s fees but has paid her own fees. This is not right.”

The trial court thereafter entered an order directing mother to pay father $30,000 in attorney fees, i.e., the still-outstanding $15,000 from the April 2015 order plus the additional $15,000. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I

Appealability

Mother’s notice of appeal states this appeal is from the “Order on Attorney’s Fees, dated Sept. 6, 2017.” That date, however, is the date of the trial court’s ruling on the fee motion. The order awarding the challenged attorney fees was entered five days later.

An order awarding attorney fees under section 2030 is appealable “where nothing remains for judicial determination except the issue of compliance or noncompliance with its terms.” (In re Marriage of Weiss (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 106, 119 (Weiss); In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1311.) A ruling on the fee motion, however, is not appealable. Nevertheless, in accordance with our duty to liberally construe a notice of appeal in favor of its sufficiency, we may construe mother’s notice of appeal as applying to the attorney fee order, rather than the ruling on the motion, as long as father was not misled or prejudiced. (See, e.g., Red Mountain, LLC v. Fallbrook Public Utility Dist. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 333, 344; Walker v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15, 20.) We perceive no prejudice in doing so. Nor would father have been misled, particularly since the notice of appeal states mother is appealing from the attorney fee order, albeit with the erroneous date attached.

Whether nothing remains for judicial determination except the issue of compliance or noncompliance with the order is another matter. The ruling states: “The Court will award the father an additional $15,000.00 in fees without prejudice to the Court reassessing his need for fees depending upon the length of the hearing.” This language indicates the total amount of attorney fees to be awarded has not been finally resolved. However, as mentioned, the attorney fee order challenged in this appeal directs mother to immediately pay a total of $30,000 in attorney fees, including both $15,000 amounts. Moreover, the attached ruling states the trial court is “not inclined to set a hearing [on the remaining matters in the case] until the Court sees that the mother is taking this Court seriously.” Viewed together, we conclude the trial court intended the additional award of $15,000 in attorney fees to be a final determination of father’s entitlement to that sum of money, subject only to the possibility of an additional fee award should the length of the hearing warrant further fees. Indeed, the suggested “reassessing” of father’s “need for fees depending on the length of the hearing” would necessarily occur after that hearing, and there would be no such hearing should mother not take the trial court “seriously” and comply with the attorney fee order.

In short, we conclude the attorney fee order challenged in this appeal is final and appealable as “an interlocutory order collateral to the main issue, dispositive of the rights of the parties in relation to the collateral matter, and directing payment of money.” (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368.)

II

Statutory Overview and Standard of Review

Section 2030 provides that the trial court “shall ensure that each party has access to legal representation . . . by ordering, if necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one party . . . to pay to the other party, or to the other party’s attorney, whatever amount is reasonably necessary for attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending the proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding.” (§ 2030, subd. (a)(1).)

“In determining the necessity of making such an award, the trial court must determine what award would be ‘just and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the respective parties.’ (§ 2032, subd. (a).) The factors to be considered in determining the relative circumstances of the parties include, to the extent relevant, those used for determining spousal support, enumerated in section 4320, including the catchall ‘[a]ny other factors the court determines are just and equitable.’ (§ 4320, subd. (n); see § 2032, subd. (b).)” (Smith, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 533.)

A trial court has wide discretion in awarding attorney fees under section 2030. Our review of an order awarding such fees is for an abuse of that discretion. (In re Marriage of Sorge (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 626, 662.) “Applying the abuse of discretion standard, we consider de novo any questions of law raised on appeal, but will uphold any findings of fact supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] The trial court’s order ‘will be overturned only if, considering all the evidence viewed most favorably in support of its order, no judge could reasonably make the order made.’ [Citation.]” (Smith, supra, at p. 532.)

III

Analysis

Mother brings a multitude of challenges to the attorney fee order. We first assess the validity of the order under the standard articulated above. Concluding there was no abuse of discretion, we then address mother’s remaining arguments, to the extent we deem appropriate.

Smith, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th 529 is instructive. There, the trial court ordered the appellant to pay attorney fees under section 2030 where she engaged in overzealous litigation with “ ‘no concern about the level of her attorney fees because her father . . . was committed to paying those fees and costs whatever the amount.’ ” (Id. at p. 532.) The trial court found the payments to be “ ‘a loan against [her] inheritance’ ” and that her father did not expect to be repaid during his lifetime. (Ibid.) Unlike the appellant, the respondents in the matter, the appellant’s former husband and his current wife, were unable to finance the litigation at the same level and were relying on credit cards in order to do so. (Ibid.)

The Court of Appeal held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the payments from the appellant’s father to her attorneys in determining the parties’ relative circumstances under sections 2030 and 2032. (Smith, supra, at pp. 533-534.) The court explained: “In analogous family law contexts, courts have held that ‘where a party receives recurring gifts of money, the trial court has discretion to consider that money as income . . . .’ [Citation.] Even if characterized as a loan, an advance against a party’s share of an expected inheritance is properly treated as a gift. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 534.) The court further concluded that “to exclude those funds from consideration would vitiate one of the primary purposes of section 2030 and section 2032, to prevent one party from being able to ‘litigate[ ] [the opposing party] out of the case,’ by taking advantage of their disparate financial circumstances. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) The court determined “the trial court appropriately looked to the economic reality of the situation, rather than the labels [the appellant] prefer[red] to apply,” and “reasonably determined . . . it would be neither just nor equitable” to treat “money ‘borrowed’ against an expected inheritance, with no expectation of any substantial repayment during the parent’s lifetime, . . . as the equivalent of money borrowed from a credit card company, for purposes of determining the relative economic circumstances of parties for purposes of section 2030 . . . .” (Id. at pp. 534-535.)

Similarly, in Kevin Q., supra, 195 Cal.App.4th 633, the trial court denied a request for attorney fees under section 2030 where the requesting party, the appellant, had no income from employment but received substantial sums of money from her father. (Id. at p. 637.) The Court of Appeal held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in treating these payments as income for purposes of determining the appellant’s ability to pay her own attorney fees. (Id. at p. 647.) Rejecting the argument that “her father made loans to her, not gifts,” the court relied on In re Marriage of Alter (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 718 (Alter), a case in which a former husband seeking to reduce his child support obligation claimed regular monthly payments from his mother were loans rather than gifts and produced promissory notes to support the claim. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s determination the payments were gifts, noting “that no evidence showed the former husband ‘ever repaid any of the money.’ ” (Kevin Q., supra, at p. 646.) The Alter court “concluded ‘that nothing in the law prohibits considering gifts to be income for purposes of child support so long as the gifts bear a reasonable relationship to the traditional meaning of income as a recurrent monetary benefit[]’ ” and “found it ‘irrelevant that there is no legal obligation on the part of the donor to continue making the gifts or that the flow of cash does not appear on the income tax return.’ ” (Ibid.) As in Alter, the Kevin Q. court concluded, “substantial evidence supports the [trial] court’s factual finding that the regular, recurrent monetary infusions made by [the appellant’s] father to her over a lengthy period of time, which relieved her of the need to work outside the home, constituted support (and, impliedly, monetary gifts) to her.” (Ibid.)

Here, as in Smith, the trial court considered the payments from mother’s parents to her attorneys in determining the parties’ relative circumstances under sections 2030 and 2032. This was not an abuse of discretion. Nor does mother dispute the fact that her parents so funded the litigation. And as in Kevin Q., we also reject mother’s assertion these payments were not gifts, but rather loans. The record is more than sufficient to support the trial court’s implied finding the payments were regular and recurrent. Nor is there any evidence in the record supporting a conclusion mother’s parents have any expectation of being repaid for these “loans” during their lifetimes. As in Smith, “to exclude those funds from consideration would vitiate one of the primary purposes of section 2030 and section 2032, to prevent one party from being able to ‘litigate[] [the opposing party] out of the case.’ ” (Smith, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 534.)

Nevertheless, relying primarily on In re Marriage of Schulze (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 519 (Schulze), mother argues there is nothing in the record to support a conclusion she will be able to pay the $15,000 attorney fee award “except the notion that her parents’ previous generosity could be taken for granted.” Schulze is distinguishable. There, the trial court ordered the appellant, a noncustodial parent, to pay his former spouse’s attorney fees, in the amount of $7,500, “forthwith.” (Id. at p. 532.) Noting the amount of the award was “unassailable” in light of the parties’ respective financial circumstances, the Court of Appeal reversed the portion of the order requiring that sum be paid immediately, explaining that neither party had any savings or liquid assets and the trial court erred in presuming the appellant would be able to obtain the $7,500 from his parents, who had previously loaned him $8,000 to pay his own attorney fees. The court stated: “Charity, once extended, is still not an entitlement. Parents are not obligated to pay the costs of their children’s divorces. Nothing showed that [the appellant] had, or was reasonably likely to have, the ‘ability to pay’ the $7,500 forthwith except the notion that [his] parents’ generosity could be taken for granted.” (Ibid., italics added.) Here, however, unlike the “single, relatively small, one-time loan” at issue in Schulze, the sums paid to fund mother’s litigation of this matter amounted to “recurrent, regular gifts totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars . . . . Alter establishes that such recurrent, regular gifts may be treated as income in the discretion of the trial court.” (Smith, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 535.)

Before turning to mother’s remaining arguments, we first note the foregoing analysis is sufficient to dispose of this appeal. “An opinion is not . . . a brief in reply to the counsel against whose views we decide. It is merely a statement of conclusions, and of the principal reasons which have led us to them.” (Holmes v. Rogers (1859) 13 Cal. 191, 202.) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the challenged attorney fee order for the reasons already expressed and decline to address each specific argument advanced by mother in her briefing on appeal. Our restraint in this regard is particularly appropriate in this case, where mother’s access to funds to litigate the matter, including this appeal and previous writs filed with this court, far exceeds father’s access to such funds. Presumably, this is why father failed to file a respondent’s brief in this appeal. Without his input on the multitude of purported issues raised in mother’s briefing, including arguments accusing father of using improper litigation tactics to control and abuse mother, we decline to address issues we deem unnecessary to affirm the challenged order.

With those limitations on our willingness to indulge mother’s arguments in mind, we do address mother’s principal argument in this appeal. She asserts the attorney fee order violates section 3020’s declaration that “the health, safety, and welfare of children shall be the court’s primary concern in determining the best interests of children when making any orders regarding the physical or legal custody or visitation of children” (§ 3020, subd. (a)), and also violates her and C.’s constitutional rights to access the courts. This is so, she argues, because the order requires the payment of attorney fees prior to scheduling a hearing on the restraining order and custody matters still pending before the court. We are not persuaded.

First, the attorney fee order is not an order “regarding the physical or legal custody or visitation of children” within the meaning of section 3020. It is an order “ensur[ing] that each party has access to legal representation . . . to preserve each party’s rights” in the custody matter before the court. (§ 2030, subd. (a)(1).) We cannot conclude an order requiring an equitable playing field before the matter continues conflicts with the requirement that courts resolve custody disputes according to the best interest of the child. Second, while mother likens the trial court’s statement of disinclination to set a hearing until fees are paid to an injunction preventing her from accessing the courts, we view the trial court’s statement as an appropriate exercise of its inherent power to control its calendar to ensure the pending matters are fairly and equitably litigated with both sides having access to legal representation. (See, e.g., Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808, 852 [“ ‘a court has both the inherent authority and responsibility to fairly and efficiently administer all of the judicial proceedings that are pending before it . . .’ ”]; Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 267 [“courts have inherent authority to control their own calendars and dockets”].)

The final argument we deem appropriate to address is mother’s assertion, “the record does not show consideration of any number of the relevant factors of [section] 4320 bearing on this case,” setting forth five such factors she finds favorable to her position that the trial court “apparently failed to consider.” However, while “the record must reflect that the trial court considered the factors set forth in sections 2030 and 2032” (In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1056), including “to the extent relevant, the circumstances of the respective parties described in Section 4320” (§ 2032, subd. (b)), mother cites this court to no authority requiring the trial court to state on the record, or include in its ruling on the matter, a discussion of each factor the aggrieved party finds favorable. Nor can we conclude from the failure to discuss each factor that the trial court did not consider them. “From our review of the record, we are satisfied that the trial court analyzed these issues thoroughly.” (In re Marriage of Cryer, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1056.)

There was no abuse of discretion; nor did the trial court violate section 3020 or mother’s constitutional rights in ordering her to pay attorney fees pursuant to section 2030 prior to the matter going forward.

DISPOSITION

The September 11, 2017 order awarding attorney fees under Family Code section 2030 is affirmed. Respondent Dan Janssens is entitled to costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

/s/

HOCH, J.

We concur:

/s/

ROBIE, Acting P. J.

/s/

MURRAY, J.