Filed 1/14/20 De Armas v. Palazuellos CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

JIMMIE FRANCISCO DE ARMAS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CARMEN PALAZUELOS et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

G056729

(Super. Ct. No. 30-2015-00793339)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gregory H. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.

B&D Law Group, Daniel D. Geoulla, Babak Kheiri and Gabriella S. Baharvar for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Michael Maguire & Associates, Paul Kevin Wood, Kathryn Saldana and Juan C. Delgado for Defendants and Respondents.

* * *

Defendant Carmen Palazuelos was driving out of a shopping center parking lot when she suddenly stopped and backed up, hitting the car behind her driven by plaintiff Jimmie Francisco De Armas. De Armas filed a complaint against Carmen and her husband Mark Palazuelos, alleging motor vehicle property damage, personal injury, and general negligence. The Palazueloses admitted liability but disputed the nature and extent of De Armas’s injuries. A jury found for the Palazueloses, determining Carmen’s negligence was not a substantial factor in causing harm to De Armas and awarded no damages.

De Armas appeals, asserting: (1) the court abused its discretion by allowing the defense’s biomechanical engineer expert, Peter Burkhard, Ph.D., to offer an opinion regarding the medical causation of his injuries; (2) the court erroneously denied his motion for a directed verdict on the issue of whether the accident was a substantial factor in causing harm to him; (3) the court committed judicial misconduct throughout the trial; and (4) the court abused its discretion by striking the testimony of his expert witness Dr. Morris concerning the reasonable costs of his past and future medical expenses. We affirm.

FACTS

In July 2013, Carmen, who was driving her husband’s truck, was about to turn onto a surface street from a shopping center parking lot when she stopped because of the speed of oncoming traffic. The front of the truck was out in the street, so she put the truck in reverse and backed up. She did not see the car driven by De Armas behind her and hit it. Carmen believed the truck was traveling about two miles an hour when it hit the car.

Before impact, De Armas saw the truck’s reverse lights illuminate, and he honked his horn. At the moment of impact, he was looking up at the rearview mirror to see if he had clearance to back up. His head went forward and then back. He did not initially believe he was injured, but felt dizzy later that evening. He tried to sleep but was restless and felt pain in his neck and upper back. His head ached and then he began vomiting.

The next morning, he had sharp pains in his neck and numbness in his arm. He wanted to go to the emergency room but did not because he lacked health insurance. Trying to get assistance with medical treatment, he called Carmen’s insurance company and then called an attorney. He received treatment about a week after the accident from Dr. Mousavi, a chiropractor, who recommended chiropractic treatment on his neck, shoulder, and upper back for 90 days. De Armas attended 30 treatment sessions during this time period and the treatment provided temporary relief from the pain. But the pain and his headaches returned.

De Armas next saw Dr. Arluck, then Dr. Khrisnareddy, and then Dr. Katz. Dr. Arluck ordered an MRI, which showed tears and bulges in the discs in De Armas’s neck. De Armas did physical therapy based on the recommendations of Drs. Arluck and Khrisnareddy, but the treatment provided only temporary relief from the pain. Because the physical therapy was not effective, Dr. Katz recommended De Armas have an epidural injection in his neck. De Armas received four epidural injections, which provided temporary relief from the pain.

About two years after the accident, De Armas saw Dr. Gravori, a neurosurgeon. Dr. Gravori reviewed De Armas’s medical records and ordered another MRI and then a discogram, which is a CT scan performed after dye is injected into the disc to determine if it is leaking. The discogram showed a fracture in one of his cervical discs. Dr. Gravori recommended De Armas have surgery to replace two discs in his neck, but De Armas has not yet had the surgery. Dr. Gravori believed the injury to De Armas’s neck and upper extremities was caused by the accident because he complained of pain shortly after the accident.

Prior to the accident, De Armas had sustained no injuries to his neck or shoulder and had no neck or shoulder pain. Now he constantly has sharp pains in his neck and periodic tingling in his right arm. Before he had infrequent headaches, but after the accident, he has severe headaches every two to three days. He missed time from work because of the accident, and the pain has negatively affected his work and homelife.

After the collision, the only damage to the Palazueloses’ truck was a few scrapes and scratches to the bumper. The car, which belonged to De Armas’s girlfriend, sustained damage to its hood and front bumper, which cost about $2,428 to repair. Its airbags were not deployed.

Peter Burkhard, Ph.D., a biomechanical engineer and an accident reconstructionist, testified as a defense expert. He defined Delta-V as “the change in velocity of a particular vehicle due to contact” and explained it is used by biomechanical engineers and accident reconstructionists to “assess the severity of a collision.” In determining the Delta-V in this case, he reviewed photographs of both vehicles, the repair estimate for the car, and inspected the Palazueloses’ truck. He also used crash data to help correlate the physical damage to the vehicles to a known standard. In his opinion, the Delta-V here was three to five, meaning that the contact would have pushed the car backward at a speed of about three to five miles per hour. He described these forces as very low and similar to hitting a curb at three to four miles per hour or a bumper car ride at an amusement park. Over an objection by De Armas (discussed post), Dr. Burkhard testified that in his opinion, from a biomechanical engineering perspective, he would not expect to see an injury in this case because the forces were so low.

The defense also presented the testimony of Dr. Weinstein, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon with a subspecialty in neck and back surgery and rehabilitation. He had reviewed De Armas’s medical records and examined him. De Armas’s first MRI report indicated he had disc bulges at his C4-5 and C5-6 vertebrae. These were “normal physiologic disc bulges” in Dr. Weinstein’s opinion. In the MRI, De Armas’s spinal cord and nerve roots appeared to be fine and there was nothing impinging on either that would explain his radiating symptoms. The second MRI was higher quality and showed the disc bulges were about two millimeters. These were degenerative changes to the discs, normal for De Armas’s age. Dr. Weinstein did not believe De Armas’s disc bulges were caused by an accident because that theory is not supported by medical literature.

Dr. Weinstein disagreed with Dr. Gravori’s decision to order a discogram in this case and his interpretation of the results. In Dr. Weinstein’s opinion, the discogram did not show a fracture in De Armas’s cervical discs and showed the degeneration was the same in all three discs. Although the discogram showed De Armas had annular tears, they were caused by degeneration and were not the result of trauma. In Dr. Weinstein’s opinion De Armas did not need surgery.

When Dr. Weinstein examined De Armas more than three years after the accident, De Armas complained of constant neck pain that radiates to his mid-back and occasionally to his hands and fingers. However, when De Armas first went to the chiropractor, he did not complain of numbness or radiating pain. Even assuming that De Armas had numbness and tingling in his neck down to his fingers within a week of the accident, Dr. Weinstein opined it would mostly likely be caused by a neck spasm and would have gone away. In his opinion, there was no neurological evidence to explain De Armas’s complaints of ongoing numbness or tingling radiating from his neck to his fingers.

Dr. Weinstein explained he assumes a patient is injured if the patient says so. Assuming De Armas was injured because of the accident, Dr. Weinstein would anticipate he could have suffered a cervical sprain. Most people recover from a cervical sprain in three to four months; they might have some residual stiffness or achiness but the majority of the discomfort would be gone. Dr. Weinstein opined that assuming De Armas was injured, it would have been reasonable for him to receive some chiropractic care, X-rays, physical therapy, an MRI, and be evaluated by an orthopedic surgeon. But the epidural injections, discogram, and surgery were not reasonably medically necessary.

DISCUSSION

De Armas raises four claims on appeal. First, he contends the court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. Burkhard to offer an opinion regarding the medical causation of his claimed injuries, an area outside the witness’s expertise. Second, he argues the court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict as to causation. Third, he asserts the court committed judicial misconduct throughout the proceedings by “repeatedly demean[ing] and disparag[ing] [his] counsel” and belittling his expert witness, Dr. Morris. Last, he argues the court abused its discretion by excluding Dr. Morris’s testimony as to the reasonable costs of his medical care. We reject each in turn.

Admission of Dr. Burkhard’s Testimony

De Armas argues the court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. Burkhard, the defense’s biomechanical expert, to render an opinion regarding the medical causation of his claimed injuries. Having reviewed Dr. Burkhard’s testimony, we conclude De Armas’s argument is based on a misconstruction of the record. When asked for his perspective as a biomechanical engineer, Dr. Burkhard testified he would not expect to see an injury in this case. Dr. Burkhard did not render a medical opinion or discuss whether the accident could have caused De Armas’s specific injuries. De Armas has not shown an abuse of the court’s discretion by permitting Dr. Burkhard’s testimony nor has he shown prejudice warranting reversal of the judgment.

Our analysis begins with the proceedings in the trial court. Prior to trial, De Armas moved to prohibit Dr. Burkhard from offering “causation and medical opinion testimony” on the grounds Dr. Burkhard was not a medical doctor and therefore “not qualified to render [a] medical opinion regarding the cause of a specific injury.” (Emphasis omitted.) De Armas also sought to exclude any testimony by Dr. Burkhard concerning whether the accident could have generated the forces necessary to cause his injuries. De Armas argued Dr. Burkhard “should not be permitted to testify that the accident could not have caused [his] injuries” as this testimony is “within the exclusive province of a medical expert.” (Emphasis omitted.) The court took the matter under submission pending Dr. Burkhard’s testimony.

At trial, Dr. Burkhard testified he was a biomechanical engineer and an accident reconstructionist and not a medical doctor. He has an engineering degree from Pennsylvania State University and received his masters and doctorate degrees in bioengineering from the University of California, San Diego. He initially worked in the crash injury group at General Motors’ Research Laboratories, which investigated injuries and how they are “causally related to automobile collisions.” While there, he performed tests involving various types of collisions and investigated the motions and forces on the body in those situations. Since 1989, he has been doing consulting work for attorneys concerning forces on the body in a accidents and works exclusively or almost exclusively for defense attorneys.

In this case, he inspected the Palazueloses’ truck and reviewed photographs of both vehicles involved in the accident, the repair estimate for the car, and De Armas’s deposition. Based on this information and crash data, he calculated “the relative speed between the truck and the [car] at impact was no greater than six to nine miles an hour.” Because the car was stopped at the time of impact, it would have been pushed back at a speed of three to five miles per hour. Dr. Burkhard explained the “forces associated with that type of contact” are “very, very low” and commensurate with other activities like hitting a curb at a speed of three to four miles per hour.

On direct examination, Dr. Burkhard was asked whether “from a biomechanical engineering perspective,” he would anticipate anyone could be injured as a result of the forces in this collision. De Armas’s counsel objected, and during a sidebar, reiterated his argument that Dr. Burkhard was not qualified to render an opinion on this issue because it was in the realm of a medical physician. The court overruled the objection. Dr. Burkhard then testified that in his opinion, he would not expect to see an injury in this case because the forces are so low. He explained his opinion was also based on highway statistics that show the most likely outcome for this type of impact is no injury.

“‘Evidence Code section 801 qualifies a matter as the proper subject for expert testimony if it is “sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.”’” (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 709.) Biomechanics and the amount of force on a body in an accident are areas beyond the general knowledge of jurors such that expert testimony on this subject would have assisted them in their determination of the issues at trial. Thus, the trial court properly admitted expert testimony on these areas. De Armas does not dispute this or that Dr. Burkhard was an expert in biomechanics and accident reconstruction. His contention, however, is that the court abused its discretion by permitting Dr. Burkhard to testify to a subject beyond his expertise. Whether a professional qualifies as an expert on an issue “in a particular case depends on the facts of that case, the questions propounded to the witness” and the witness’s specific qualifications. (People v. Davis (1965) 62 Cal.2d 791, 801; Evid. Code, § 720.)

On appeal, a trial court’s decision to admit expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773.) “‘An abuse of discretion occurs only if the reviewing court, considering the applicable law and all of the relevant circumstances, concludes that the trial court’s decision exceeds the bounds of reason and results in a miscarriage of justice.’” (Orange Catholic Foundation v. Arvizu (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 283, 292.)

Here, De Armas argues Dr. Burkhard’s testimony that he would not expect to see an injury in this case constituted a medical opinion and was therefore improper opinion testimony because “[m]edical causation can only be determined by expert medical testimony.” (Emphasis omitted.) We disagree with De Armas’s characterization of Dr. Burkhard’s testimony. The record shows Dr. Burkhard did not render a medical opinion as to the causation of De Armas’s injuries. Dr. Burkhard began his testimony by discussing his education and experience in biomechanics and explaining that any analysis he provided regarding injuries was from a biomechanical engineering perspective based on forces, motions, and test data. He readily admitted he was not a medical professional and that it was not his job to diagnose as that was the responsibility of a medical provider. In explaining why he would not expect to see an injury in this case, he cited force analysis, crash tests, and highway statistics, not medical literature. It was clear to the jury that Dr. Burkhard’s opinion was based on his expertise as a biomechanical engineer.

Contrary to De Armas’s assertion, the jury would not have believed Dr. Burkhard was rendering a medical opinion as to the causation of his claimed injuries. The contested issue at trial was whether this accident was a substantial factor in causing De Armas’s alleged injuries—bulges and tears in his cervical discs. Dr. Burkhard’s testimony did not address whether the collision could produce these specific injuries. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by permitting Dr. Burkhard’s testimony.

De Armas argues the court erred by admitting Dr. Burkhard’s testimony, yet he makes no effort to demonstrate prejudice flowing from the court’s alleged error. Even if he had made an effort, we would conclude the admission of Dr. Burkhard’s expert testimony did not result in a miscarriage of justice. “[A] miscarriage of justice should be declared only when the reviewing court, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, is of the opinion that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Huffman v. Interstate Brands Corp. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 679, 692.) It is not reasonably probable the jury would have found Carmen’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing De Armas’s injuries, even if Dr. Burkhard’s opinion testimony had been excluded. The evidence showed Carmen was traveling at a slow rate of speed when she backed into De Armas’s car. The jury was able to view photographs of the vehicles and see the minimal damage to both. The jury also heard Dr. Weinstein’s testimony that the bulges and annular tears in De Armas’s cervical discs were the result of degeneration and not trauma. Even without Dr. Burkhard’s testimony, the jury would have reasonably concluded the minor impact did not cause De Armas’s injuries. Thus, any error by the court in admitting Dr. Burkhard’s expert testimony was harmless.

Denial of De Armas’s Motion for a Directed Verdict

After the defense rested, De Armas filed a written motion for a partial directed verdict on the issue of whether the accident was a substantial factor in causing his harm. The motion was made on the grounds Carmen had stipulated she was at fault for the accident and Dr. Weinstein, the defense’s expert, had testified to his opinion that the accident caused injury to De Armas and that certain medical care he received was reasonable and necessary. The court denied the motion, indicating whether Carmen’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing De Armas’s harm was a question for the jury. The jury was provided a special verdict form which asked, “Was Defendant Carmen Palazuelos’ negligence a substantial factor in causing harm to Plaintiff Jimmie Francisco De Armas.” The jury checked, “No” on the verdict form, and the decision was unanimous.

On appeal, De Armas contends the testimony of Dr. Weinstein and Dr. Gravori “conclusively established” that the collision caused his neck injuries, and therefore, the court erroneously denied his motion for a directed verdict on the issue of causation. We disagree.

“[A] motion for a directed verdict is in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence.” (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 629 (Howard).) A court cannot grant a motion for a directed verdict if “there is any substantial conflict in the evidence.” (Ibid.) It can only be granted “when, disregarding conflicting evidence, giving the evidence of the party against whom the motion is directed all the value to which it is legally entitled, and indulging every legitimate inference from such evidence in favor of that party, the court nonetheless determines there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support the claim or defense of the party opposing the motion, or a verdict in favor of that party.” (Id. at pp. 629-630.) Thus, the court must deny the motion if the nonmoving party has presented evidence that would be sufficient to support a verdict in its favor. (Id. at p. 630.)

An appellate argument that the court erred by denying a motion for a directed verdict is “functionally equivalent to” a contention that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. (Howard, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 630.) “Only if there was no substantial evidence in support of the verdict could it have been error for the trial court earlier to have denied [the] motion for directed verdict.” (Ibid.) On appeal, we examine whether the judgment is supported by substantial evidence. (Ibid.) “Under that standard, we must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of the judgment.” (Ibid.) “As a general rule, therefore, we will look only at the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the successful party, and disregard the contrary showing.” (Id. at p. 631.) Here, we conclude the jury’s verdict was supported by substantial evidence, and therefore, the court properly denied De Armas’s motion for a partial directed verdict.

Because the Palazueloses did not concede causation, De Armas had to present competent testimony showing it was more likely than not that his injuries resulted from Carmen’s negligence. (Bowman v. Wyatt (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 286, 312.) De Armas argues Dr. Weinstein, the defense medical expert, conceded he was injured as a result of the accident and that some of his medical treatment was reasonable and necessary. In making this argument, De Armas ignores large portions of Dr. Weinstein’s testimony. Dr. Weinstein explained he assumed a patient was injured if the patient said so, and in this case, he assumed De Armas was injured because he said he was injured. But Dr. Weinstein also discussed “objective” indicators, like the MRI, that showed no traumatic injury to De Armas’s neck. In Dr. Weinstein’s opinion, the MRIs and discogram showed that De Armas’s disc bulges and annular tears were degenerative changes, consistent with his age, and not the result of trauma, like an accident. He also indicated he saw nothing in the MRIs to explain De Armas’s complaints of radiating pain as there was nothing impinging on his spinal cord or nerve roots. The jury could reject Dr. Weinstein’s assumption that De Armas was injured as a result of the accident, which was based only on De Armas’s statements, because the other evidence did not support this assumption. (Howard, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 633 [if the jury finds that a fact upon which the expert’s opinion is based has been disproved, “the jury is required to consider that in evaluating the expert testimony”].)

There is substantial evidence showing the accident was not a substantial factor in causing De Armas’s injuries. The jury could have reasonably concluded De Armas suffered no injury from the collision based on the circumstances surrounding it: the slow rate of speed at which it occurred, the minor damage to his car, and the minimal forces involved as explained by Dr. Burkhard. Thus, the court properly denied the motion for a directed verdict on causation.

Judicial Misconduct

De Armas contends the court engaged in judicial misconduct throughout the trial. He asserts the court repeatedly demeaned and disparaged his counsel and belittled his crucial expert witness, thus “giving the impression that the Court was aligned with” the Palazueloses. We conclude De Armas forfeited this contention by failing to raise it below, and even assuming it is preserved for review, it lacks merit.

As De Armas recognizes in his briefing, there is a general rule that a party forfeits a claim of judicial misconduct by failing to object to the conduct and seek relief in the trial court. (People v. Sturm (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1218, 1237; See Gimbel v. Laramie (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 77, 85-86; see also Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1218 [appellate claim of judicial bias forfeited because party did not object to judge’s “alleged improprieties” or seek correction below].) There is an exception to this general rule where “‘an objection and an admonition could not cure the prejudice caused by’ such misconduct, or when objecting would be futile.” (Sturm, at p. 1237.) Here, De Armas did not object in the trial court or seek relief by moving for a mistrial or a new trial on the grounds of judicial misconduct. On appeal, he does not try to convince us that an objection and request for relief would have been futile. Thus, his complaint of judicial misconduct is forfeited on appeal.

Nevertheless, his claim of judicial misconduct also fails on its merits. “A ‘trial court commits misconduct if it persistently makes discourteous and disparaging remarks to [plaintiff’s] counsel so as to discredit [plaintiff’s case] or create the impression that it is allying itself with the [defense].’” (People v. Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1233.) De Armas asserts there were “over sixteen (16) occasions in which the Court either objected sua sponte or otherwise intervened to disallow a question asked by [his] counsel in the absence of an objection by [Palazueloses’ counsel].” We reviewed each of the 16 instances De Armas cited in his opening brief and none were as he described. In several of the instances cited by De Armas, the court did interject during counsel’s cross-examination of Dr. Weinstein, a defense expert witness, to remind counsel to let the witness complete his answer before counsel asked his next question. We find nothing improper with this. During the excitement of cross-examination, an attorney may accidently “step on” a witness’s answer by starting to ask his or her next question before the witness has completed his or her answer. A reminder by the court to counsel to await the end of the witness’s answer before asking the next question is appropriate. Otherwise, the jurors and court reporter are left struggling to understand two people talking at once. A couple of the other instances De Armas complains about occurred outside the presence of the jury and could not have discredited his counsel before the jurors or conveyed to them an alliance with the defense.

De Armas highlights five statements by the court, in which he asserts the court criticized his counsel and conveyed to the jury that the court did not take his theory seriously: “(1) ‘ask a relevant question . . . I don’t need a speaking objection. Just do what I say.’ [citation]; (2) ‘next question, please’ [citation]; (3) ‘get it together’ [citation]; (4) ‘anything further[?]’ [citation]; (5) ‘Let’s move this on.’” We disagree with his characterization of the court’s comments. Again, we have reviewed the court’s comments in context. These statements by the court reflect the court’s efforts to exercise reasonable control over the proceedings and to keep the presentation of evidence moving forward. (Evid. Code, § 765, subd. (a); Code of Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(3); People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 78 [“court has both the duty and the discretion to control the conduct of the trial”].)

Focusing on another one of the 16 instances, De Armas contends the court interrupted his counsel’s cross-examination of a defense expert by asking, “[W]hy do you want to waste time?” and that this “distracted” his counsel from impeaching the witness. The court did not overstep its bounds by suggesting to counsel that he not waste time. In this incident, De Armas’s counsel was seeking to refresh the witness’s recollection as to the exact date of a different trial in which he had testified, and the court suggested counsel represent the date to the witness rather than have the witness review the transcript to see if it refreshed his recollection. When counsel persisted that he wanted to refresh the witness’s recollection, the court permitted counsel to show the witness the transcript. We see no misconduct. Nor does it seem the court’s comments obstructed counsel’s efforts to impeach the witness. Even if this indicated a strained relationship between the court and De Armas’s counsel, it is not evidence of judicial misconduct. (Cf. Roitz v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 716, 724 [“strained relations between a judge and an attorney for a party” are not evidence of judicial bias or prejudice].)

We also reject De Armas’s contention that the court committed judicial misconduct with its comments to and about his expert witness Dr. Morris. The court’s description of Dr. Morris as a “paper gatherer,” which De Armas calls “demeaning,” occurred outside the presence of the jury and could not have been prejudicial to De Armas’s case. Moreover, this comment occurred as the court was explaining its ruling to strike Dr. Morris’s testimony and did not constitute misconduct. (Cf. Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1218 [statements by a judge explaining his or her reasons for ruling against a party is not evidence of judicial bias].) De Armas cannot show any comments by the court during Dr. Morris’s testimony were prejudicial as the court struck Dr. Morris’s testimony in its entirety.

We have reviewed the entire record, including the judicial comments about which De Armas complains, and the record does not support his claim of judicial misconduct.

Striking of Dr. Morris’s Testimony

During the trial, De Armas attempted to qualify Dr. Morris as an expert to testify to the reasonable costs of his past and future medical services alleged to be related to the accident. After permitting Dr. Morris to testify, the court found Dr. Morris did not have expertise as to the reasonableness of De Armas’s medical bills and granted the defense’s motion to strike Dr. Morris’s testimony. On appeal, De Armas contends the court abused its discretion by excluding Dr. Morris’s expert testimony. De Armas, however, cannot establish the alleged evidentiary error was prejudicial. The jury found Carmen’s negligence was not a substantial factor in causing De Armas’s injuries and never reached the issue of his damages. As we have concluded that verdict was supported by substantial evidence, ante, we need not address De Armas’s contention that the court erred by striking Dr. Morris’s testimony concerning his damages.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal.

IKOLA, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

THOMPSON, J.