Filed 11/18/19 Wright v. Robinson Oil Corporation CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JOELLE WRIGHT,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

ROBINSON OIL CORPORATION,

Defendant and Respondent.

F077203

(Super. Ct. No. 17CV-02504)

OPINION

THE COURT*

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Brian L. McCabe, Judge.

Sacino, Bertolino and Hallissy and Richard P. Bertolino for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Offices of Thomas J. Burns and Stacey L. Malcolm for Defendant and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

The defendant in this personal injury action was granted a dismissal with prejudice on the ground the complaint was not electronically filed within the two-year statute of limitation prescribed by Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1. The plaintiff appealed and argues the limitations period should be equitably tolled because (1) the original complaint and filing fee were mailed to, and received by, the clerk of court prior to the expiration of the limitations period, (2) the clerk rejected the complaint because it was not electronically filed, (3) plaintiff’s counsel reasonably and in good faith relied on a website retrieved by a Google search that stated electronic filing was permissive rather than mandatory, and (4) defendant was not prejudiced by the delay in filing because the complaint was served 22 days after the expiration of the statute of limitations, well within the 60-day period allowed for service.

We give a broad reading to the elements of California’s equitable tolling doctrine based on the policy considerations underlying that doctrine and conclude tolling of the limitations period is appropriate in the narrow circumstance of this case. First, the undisputed facts establish defendant had timely notice of the lawsuit and, accordingly, allowing this action to proceed would not frustrate the basic purpose of the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act (Gov. Code, § 68600 et seq.) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.110(b), which requires plaintiffs to serve defendants and file proof of service within 60 days of filing the complaint. Second, the fact of timely notice and the short amount of time that elapsed between the clerk’s rejection of the hardcopy of the complaint and the electronic filing of the complaint reasonably support the inference that the defendant was not prejudiced in gathering evidence or taking other action to defend against the lawsuit. Third, the record available at the pleading stage adequately supports the inference that plaintiff’s counsel acted reasonably and in good faith in relying on a website created by the superior court and retrieved as the first result of a Google search. Therefore, equitable tolling of the limitations period has been properly pleaded and the lawsuit is timely despite being electronically filed two years and 10 days after the date of slip and fall incident.

We therefore reverse the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

On July 16, 2015, plaintiff Joelle Wright was legally on property owned and operated by defendant Robinson Oil Corporation in Santa Nella, California. Plaintiff alleges she slipped and fell on spilled oil and suffered serious personal injuries. Plaintiff further alleges that defendant was negligent in maintaining the property and its negligence caused the fall and her injuries.

Filing of the Complaint

After the incident, plaintiff became represented by a law firm. On July 6, 2017, staff from the law firm “googled” the Merced County Superior Court website for information about filing a complaint. The first item retrieved by the Google search was an official website of the Merced County Superior Court entitled “forms and filings” E-filings. The version of Merced County Superior Court Local Rule 2.1 obtained by the Google search stated:

“RULE 2.1: ELECTRONIC FILING [¶] a. Permissive Electronic Filing [¶] After July 1, 2015, parties may file documents electronically in limited, unlimited, and complex civil actions in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6 and California Rules of Court, rules 2.250-2.559. A document that is filed electronically shall have the same legal effect as an original paper document.”

On July 6, 2017, counsel for plaintiff mailed a complaint, summons, civil case coversheet, and a check in the amount of $435 to the Merced County Superior Court with a cover letter and a return, stamped envelope. The clerk of court stamped the cover letter “received” on July 10, 2017, a Monday.

On Thursday, July 13, 2017, the clerk of court returned the documents and check to the law firm. The written notice accompanying the returned documents stated:

“Your document(s) is not in compliance with the Local Rules Superior Court of California, County of Merced, Rule 2.1 and Rules of Court 2.253(b)(4) requiring that documents must be filed electronically. Unless you can demonstrate undue hardship or significant prejudice, the court has mandated e-filing. To e file with the Court, litigants must submit their documents using the court electronic filing service providers. To obtain more information, visit www.mercedcourt.org.”

On Tuesday, July 18, 2017, the law firm received the notice dated July 13, 2017, along with the returned documents and check.

On Wednesday, July 26, 2017, the law firm electronically filed a civil case coversheet, summons, and personal injury complaint. The complaint alleged causes of action against defendant for general negligence and premises liability. On August 1, 2017, the superior court issued a notice of case management conference stating (1) a conference had been scheduled for January 8, 2018, and (2) plaintiff was required to serve the notice of the case management conference together with the complaint.

On Monday, August 7, 2017, a registered process server personally served defendant’s agent for service with a copy of the summons, complaint, and notice of case management conference. On August 10, 2017, the process server signed a proof of service on Judicial Council form POS-010, and this proof of service was filed in the superior court on August 21, 2017.

Demurrer

In October 2017, defendant filed a demurrer asserting the statute of limitations had expired and, as a result, plaintiff could not state a viable cause of action. Defendant argued the personal injury action was subject to the two-year statute of limitations contained in section 335.1 and, as shown on the face of the complaint, the injury occurred on July 16, 2015, and the complaint was not filed until July 26, 2017, 10 days after the statute of limitations expired. Defendant supported its demurrer with a request for judicial notice of a copy of (1) a printout of a webpage from the Merced County Superior Court’s website with links and instructions regarding e-filing civil documents and (2) the Merced County Superior Court Local Rules of Court that became effective July 1, 2017. This version of the local rules stated:

“RULE 2.1: ELECTRONIC FILING IN CIVIL CASES

“A. Mandatory Electronic Filing [¶] Beginning February 1, 2016, parties must file documents electronically in limited, unlimited, and complex civil actions in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6 and California Rules of Court, rules 2.250–2.559, unless parties are excused from doing so by the Court. Self-represented parties are exempt from mandatory electronic filing and service requirements. A document that is filed electronically shall have the same legal effect as an original paper document. [¶] … [¶]

“C. Effective Filing Dates [¶] No document transmitted electronically is deemed filed unless it is accepted for filing by the clerk.…”

Plaintiff filed an opposition to the demurrer, defendant filed a reply, and the superior court posted a tentative ruling. During the hearing on the demurrer, the court stated “there might be facts that Plaintiff can allege that may toll the statute.” As a result, the court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend within 30 days. The written order prepared by defense counsel was signed and filed on November 22, 1017.

First Amended Complaint

In December, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint that included allegations about the law firm (1) relying on the Google search, (2) mailing the complaint and check to the clerk of court, (3) receiving the complaint and check back from the clerk, and (4) electronically filing the complaint.

In January 2018, defendant filed a demurrer to the first amended complaint, again asserting the lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations. Defendant argued plaintiff’s original attempt to file the complaint by mail violated the Local Rules and, therefore, did not toll the statute of limitations. Defendant supported its demurer by repeating its request for judicial notice of the official court webpage and the local rules.

Plaintiff’s opposition argued the clerk should have filed the complaint instead of rejecting it and causing plaintiff to miss the two-year statute of limitations. The opposition asserted the Merced County Superior Court website visited by the law firm’s staff was an official website and the website stated e-filing was permissive, not mandatory.

Defendant’s reply argued no case law or statute supported plaintiff’s position that the time to file the complaint should have been tolled. Defendant warned that treating the complaint as timely “would open the flood gates of late filings in many cases and would blur the lines of when a statute of limitations may run.”

Before the hearing on the demurrer, the superior court posted a tentative ruling stating the demurrer would be sustained without leave to amend because the complaint clearly alleged the injury claims accrued on July 16, 2015, and the original complaint was filed more than two years later on July 26, 2017. The tentative ruling also stated:

“Plaintiff’s effort to file her complaint by mail did not comply with Local Rule 2.1 and plaintiff does not allege she sought a waiver from the electronic filing requirement under rule 2.253(b)(4) of the California Rules of Court. Plaintiff has not provided any legal authority supporting the tolling of the applicable statute of limitations because an internet search performed by plaintiff’s attorney’s office returned a result linking to an obsolete copy of the court’s Local Rules dated two years earlier. [¶] Since no amendment appears possible to cure the defect, the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend.”

On February 8, 2018, the superior court heard argument on the demurrer. During argument, counsel for plaintiff rhetorically asked, “why was it that when we Googled Merced County Superior Court, the first item popping up is the two-year-old website? That was the information provided to us. And as far as I know, it had not changed for at least two months after the original filing. [¶] I know, as of yesterday, you finally scrubbed that site, but the county allowed that to remain online.” The superior court responded, “Counsel, [the] Court does not control what goes on with Google. We have nothing to do with that. The Court has its own website. And what is on that website is what the Court ….” After an interruption and subsequent admonition of counsel, the court stated:

“[T]he Court does not control all the information out on the website. We don’t ‘scrub’ anything. We don’t have control over that. Google and all the other search engines control what’s on their websites. We however do have a website. Merced County Superior Court has had one for years. And if you’d gone to the Merced County Superior Court website, you would have found the current rules online. Whether or not there were old rules somewhere else on some search engine is irrelevant, and something that the Court does not control, doesn’t even attempt to control.”

The court asked counsel how he could get around the fact that the law firm did not go to the Merced County Superior Court website to pull up its current rules. Counsel replied, “We have a screen shot of the Merced County Superior Court website. That was attached as an exhibit, Your Honor. We went to the Merced County website.” At the end of the hearing, the court stated is would adopt its tentative.

On February 22, 2018, the superior court signed and filed an order submitted by counsel for defendant. The order stated the demurrer to plaintiff’s first amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend. It also stated the first amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A. Statutes of Limitations

1. Operation and Purpose

The term statute of limitations is applied to an act that prescribes the period beyond which a plaintiff may not bring a cause of action. (Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 903, 911.) Several policies underly statutes of limitation, including (1) giving defendants reasonable repose, which protects parties from defending stale claims, and (2) stimulating plaintiffs to pursue their claims diligently. (Ibid.) In addition, a statute of limitations promotes judicial efficiency, conserves judicial resources, increases the accuracy of judgments by promoting the resolution of disputes while the record is fresh, and aids the entry of final judgments within a reasonable time. (Day v. McDonough (2006) 547 U.S. 198, 205–206.) The foregoing considerations sometimes conflict with the policy favoring the disposition of cases on the merits rather than procedural grounds. (Rubenstein, supra, at p. 911.) In basic terms, the law of limitations of actions “is the product of interplay between two competing sets of policies: those supporting the extinguishment of untimely claims and those encouraging the resolution of all claims, whether timely or untimely, on their substantive merits.” (Ochoa & Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of the Statutes of Limitation (1997) 28 Pacific L.J. 453, 454–455.)

Conceptually, the statute of limitations applied in a civil case is “not jurisdictional.” (People v. Williams (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 436, 457.) Rather, the statute of limitations “merely serves a procedural function and constitutes an affirmative defense that is [forfeited] unless pleaded and proved.” (Id. at pp. 457–458.) The United States Supreme Court takes the same view—a statute of limitations defense is not jurisdictional. (Day v. McDonough, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 205.) Because a civil statute of limitations is not jurisdictional, it is subject to judicially created exceptions.

2. Accrual and Commencement of an Action

Generally, the limitations period “runs from the moment a claim accrues.” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191 (Aryeh).) California follows the “‘last element’” accrual rule, which holds that the statute of limitations runs from the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action. (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court has described the essential elements for statute of limitations purposes as “‘wrongdoing, harm, and causation.’” (Ibid.) Ordinarily, a cause of action for a personal injury accrues on the date of the injury. (Ward v. Westinghouse Canada, Inc. (9th Cir. 1994) 32 F.3d 1405, 1407.)

Pursuant to section 312, an action must be “commenced within the periods prescribed in this title, after the cause of action shall have accrued.” The period prescribed for personal injury actions is two years. (§ 335.1.) The meaning of the word “commenced” is addressed in section 350, which states: “An action is commenced … when the complaint is filed.” (See § 411.10 [“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court”].) In turn, the meaning of “filing” is addressed in California Rules of Court, rule 1.20: “Unless otherwise provided, a document is deemed filed on the date it is received by the court clerk.” (Italics added.) Accordingly, “ ‘[i]n ordinary statutory usage a proceeding is commenced by the filing of a petition or complaint….’ ” (In re M.C. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 784, 805.) “The action is ‘commenced’ upon plaintiff’s filing the original complaint against defendant. [Citation.]” (Bank of America v. Superior Court (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1000, 1010.)

The foregoing general rules identify when a statute of limitations begins to run and the acts that must be completed to prevent the lawsuit from being time-barred by the statute of limitations. These general rules are subject to modifications and equitable exceptions that alter the initial accrual of a cause of action, the subsequent running of the limitations period, or both. (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192.) These exceptions and modifications include the discovery rule, equitable tolling, equitable estoppel, the continuing violation doctrine, the theory of continuous accrual, waiver, and forfeiture. (Aryeh, supra, at p. 1192; Prudential, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 689 [defendant may waive—i.e., intentionally relinquish—the right to rely on the statute of limitations]; Ard v. County of Contra Costa (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 339, 348 [judgment of dismissal reversed, plaintiff granted leave to amend to allege equitable estoppel].)

3. Equitable Tolling

Equitable tolling has been described in a variety of ways. The California Supreme Court stated, “application of the doctrine of equitable tolling requires [1] timely notice, … [2] lack of prejudice, to the defendant, and [3] reasonable and good faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff.” (Addison v. State of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313, 319 (Addison) [filing of federal lawsuit tolled statute of limitations for second action filed in state court].) In San Pablo Bay Pipeline Co., LLC v. Public Utilities Com. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 295, this court stated: “The three elements of equitable tolling are (1) timely notice of the claim to the defendant, (2) lack of prejudice to the defendant, and (3) reasonable and good faith conduct by the claimant.” (Id. at p. 316.)

In Collier v. City of Pasadena (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 917 (Collier), the Second District stated the three core elements of equitable tolling “are: (1) timely notice to the defendant in filing the first claim; (2) lack of prejudice to defendant in gathering evidence to defend against the second claim; and, (3) good faith and reasonable conduct by the plaintiff in filing the second claim.” (Id. at p. 924.) The court noted “[i]t is not altogether clear whether the Supreme Court would insist on all three prerequisites.” (Id. at p. 924, fn. 5.) The court stated equitable tolling is based on the rationale that “a plaintiff should not be barred by a statute of limitations unless the defendant would be unfairly prejudiced if the plaintiff were allowed to proceed.” (Id. at p. 923.) The court stated this policy rationale suggested equitable tolling might occur where only the second prerequisite (i.e., lack of prejudice to the defendant) was satisfied. (Id. at p. 924, fn. 5.)

Generally, whether the elements for equitable tolling have been satisfied presents questions of fact. (Hopkins v. Kedzierski (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 736, 745 [equitable tolling presents questions of fact]; cf. Santos v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1065, 1076 [the existence of the factual elements of equitable estoppel may be decided as a matter of law “when the undisputed evidence is susceptible of only one reasonable inference”].) These questions of fact involving the elements of equitable tolling are not presented to the jury. Rather, the trial court is the proper trier of fact to decide whether a limitations period has been equitably tolled. (Hopkins, supra, at pp. 745–746.)

B. Demurrers and Standard of Review

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a pleading. (Restore Hetch Hetchy v. City and County of San Francisco (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 865, 871; § 430.10, subd. (e).) Under section 430.30, subdivision (a), when “any ground for objection to a complaint … appears on the face thereof, … the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading.” The statute of limitations is a “ground for objection to a complaint” for purposes of this provision and, therefore, may be raised in a demurrer. (Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 493.) Generally, an order sustaining a demurrer on statute of limitations grounds is subject to de novo review on appeal. (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42 (Committee for Green Foothills).)

Courts considering a demurrer treat it as admitting the truth of all material facts alleged in the complaint and give the plaintiff the benefit of facts that may be inferred reasonably from the expressly alleged facts. (Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403; see Committee for Green Foothills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 42 [complaint given a reasonable interpretation]; § 452 [pleadings given liberal, yet reasonable, construction].) When a demurrer is based on the statute of limitations, it is well settled that the untimeliness of the lawsuit must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint and matters judicially noticed before the demurrer will be sustained. (Committee for Green Foothills, supra, at p. 42; Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, supra, at p. 1403 [allegations in complaint showing claim might be barred are not enough].)

II. APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE TOLLING DOCTRINE

A. Timely Notice

In Aryeh, the Supreme Court stated equitable tolling “may suspend or extend the statute of limitations when … the statute of limitations’ notice function has been served.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192.) Defendants are notified a lawsuit has been filed against them by service of the complaint and summons. As a result, the timeliness of notice of the lawsuit (as opposed to filing a lawsuit) is defined by (1) the statute of limitations that prescribes the time allowed for commencing the action and (2) the rules of law that state how long the plaintiff has to serve process on the defendant. In personal injury actions, the statute of limitations is two years. (§ 335.1.) Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.110(b), the plaintiff must serve all named defendants and file proof of service within 60 days of filing the complaint. When these two time periods are combined, they establish, as a general rule, that the maximum period for giving a defendant timely notice of a personal injury lawsuit is two years and 60 days after the accrual of the claim.

For purposes of this case, if the complaint was deemed filed on July 10, 2017, when the clerk of court received the paper complaint and filing fee in the mail, then the 60-day period for service would have expired on September 8, 2017. The proof of service shows the complaint and summons was personally served on defendant’s agent for service of process on Monday, August 7, 2017, which was 32 days before the period for timely service would have expired based on the first attempt to file the complaint. Consequently, we conclude defendant received timely notice of the complaint and, therefore, “the statute of limitations’ notice function” was fulfilled. (See Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192.) In addition, the policies underlying the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act, which are implemented in part by deadline for service set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.110(b), would not be compromised by tolling of the statute of limitations in this case because defendant received timely notification of plaintiff’s lawsuit.

B. Lack of Prejudice to Defendant

Generally, the passage of time prior to the commencement of litigation may result in prejudice to a defendant if (1) the defendant has changed position in reliance on the expectation that the claim would not be asserted or (2) the defendant’s ability to gather evidence to defend against the claim has been impaired. (See Collier, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at p. 924 [an element of equitable estoppel is “lack of prejudice to defendant in gathering evidence to defend against the second claim”].) The concern for gathering evidence is tied to the main purpose of statutes of limitation—namely, “to prevent the assertion of stale claims by plaintiffs who have failed to file their action until evidence is no longer fresh and witnesses are no longer available.” (Addison, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 317; see Barrington v. A.H. Robins Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 146, 152 [evidence may be “lost or destroyed” and witnesses may “become unavailable or their memories dim”].)

Here, defendant’s receipt of timely notice and the short amount of time that elapsed between the July 16, 2017, expiration of the two-year limitation period and the electronic filing of the complaint on July 26, 2017, strongly support the inference that the defendant was not prejudiced in gathering evidence or taking other action to defend against the lawsuit. The only argument about prejudice in defendant’s respondent’s brief asserts: “[Defendant] has now had to incur time and expense to deal with two demurrer hearings along with this appeal. Thus, reversing the ruling … granting the second demurrer and dismissing the action would be prejudicial as to [Defendant].” This argument is not supported with a citation to authority holding this type of litigation expense demonstrates the kind of prejudice required to preclude the application of equitable tolling. While the relevant prejudice may be broader than the description of the second element provided in Collier, which refers to gathering evidence, we conclude the relevant prejudice must be caused by the delay permitted by the equitable tolling of the limitation period. Thus, the relevant prejudice cannot be established by the expense incurred in litigating the statute of limitations issue and whether equitable tolling applies. Based on the facts alleged in the first amended complaint, the exhibits attached to the pleading, and the matters subject to judicial notice, we conclude there is only one reasonable inference that can be drawn at this stage of the litigation. Specifically, the delay permitted by equitable tolling did not cause defendant any prejudice in gathering evidence or in otherwise presenting a defense to this lawsuit. (Cf. Santos v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 17 Cal.App.5th 1065, 1076 [a factual element of equitable estoppel may be decided as a matter of law “when the undisputed evidence is susceptible of only one reasonable inference.”].)

C. Conduct of Plaintiff and the Law Firm

The “application of the doctrine of equitable tolling requires … reasonable and good faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff.” (Addison, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 319; San Pablo Bay Pipeline Co., LLC v. Public Utilities Com., supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 316 [“reasonable and good faith conduct by the claimant”].)

1. Subjective Good Faith

Defendant’s demurrer and supporting papers do not contend plaintiff and the law firm lacked good faith or acted in bad faith. Thus, the good faith of plaintiff or the law firm is not a contested issue in this appeal. Nonetheless, we address whether plaintiff has pleaded facts sufficient to establish the good faith component of the equitable tolling doctrine.

The California Supreme Court has recognized the term “good faith” can refer to (1) a subjective state of mind equated with honesty and sincerity, (2) an objective standard requiring a reasonable basis, or (3) a standard that requires both a subjective and an objective component to be met. (Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1113, 1120.) As used in the third element of California’s equitable tolling doctrine, we conclude “good faith” is a subjective standard and the component requiring “reasonable” conduct imposes an objective standard. Accordingly, the inquiry into good faith “is a subjective one that focuses on the actual state of mind” of plaintiff and her representatives. (Id. at p. 1128.) This “subjective good faith standard is satisfied by a state of mind denoting honesty of purpose and freedom from intention to mislead or defraud.” (POET, LLC v. State Air Resources Bd. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 52, 99.)

Here, the first amended complaint did not specifically allege plaintiff and her representatives acted in good faith, acted with honesty, or acted without any intention of misleading or defrauding defendant. We conclude the absence of a specific allegation as to state of mind is not a defect that requires the filing of a second amended complaint. This court has recognized that an analysis of “[t]he existence of good faith involves a factual inquiry into the party’s subjective state of mind, a fact that rarely is susceptible to direct proof.” (People v. Accredited Surety Casualty Co. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 548, 560, fn. 9.) Consequently, the court must “examin[e] the circumstances that existed at the time of the action in question and draw[]inferences from those circumstances about the party’s state of mind.” (Ibid.)

Our review of the facts alleged in the first amended complaint, the exhibits attached to the pleading, and the matters subject to judicial notice leads us to conclude there is only one reasonable inference that can be drawn at this stage of the litigation with respect to the state of mind of plaintiff and the law firm. Specifically, plaintiff and the firm acted in good faith in connection with filing the complaint with the superior court. Stated from another perspective, there is no reasonable basis for inferring the firm mailed a paper complaint to the superior court due to dishonesty or an intent to mislead or defraud defendant or the superior court. Therefore, the conduct described provides and adequate basis for inferring plaintiff and the law firm acted in good faith and, thus, satisfied the good faith component of the equitable tolling doctrine.

2. Objective Reasonableness

The mistake made by the law firm was believing that electronic filing was permissive rather than mandatory. This mistake was made because the firm relied on an out-of-date version of the Merced County Superior Court’s official website. The out-of-date website was accessed because it was the first item listed in the results of a Google search. Consequently, the question of whether the conduct of the law firm was reasonable depends on whether it was objectively reasonable to rely on the first item retrieved by a Google search for the superior court’s website.

Defendant contends plaintiff’s representatives did not act reasonably because they did not visit the then-current website of the Merced County Superior Court. This argument raises the more specific question of how an objectively reasonable person would find a superior court’s current website when using the Internet. We have located, and the parties have cited, no decision of a California appellate court addressing how an objectively reasonable person identifies the current website of a superior court or other entity.

We conclude the application of the reasonableness standard presents a question of fact that cannot be resolved against plaintiff at the pleading stage. Based on the record before us, it was objectively reasonable for plaintiff’s representatives to use an Internet search engine such as Google to find a website on the Internet. The facts in the record do not suggest, and defendant has not argued, (1) an alternate method for finding the website exists and (2) that alternate method rendered the use of the search engine objectively unreasonable.

The next step in law firm’s reasoning process is the decision to rely on the website retrieved by the Google search. In evaluating the reasonableness of that decision, we reviewed the photocopy of the website attached as Exhibit B to the first amended complaint. We identified nothing in that exhibit suggesting that the website was out-of-date. Instead, it appears to be a website actually created and posted on the Internet by the superior court. In addition, nothing in the copy of the version of the Merced County Superior Court Local Rules accessed through that website and attached to the first amended complaint as Exhibit A suggests that version of the local rules was out-of-date. As a result, an objectively reasonable person would not have suspected the information provided by the website and its links was stale.

Consequently, we conclude the allegations in the first amended complaint and the contents of the attached documents adequately show the law firm acted reasonably in relying on (1) the first item retrieved by the Google search for the Merced County Superior Court’s filing requirements and (2) that website’s link to the local rules. Therefore, plaintiff has pleaded facts sufficient to establish the reasonableness component of the equitable tolling doctrine.

D. Length of Tolling

The appropriate length of the tolling resulting from the law firm’s mistaken belief that electronic was permissive is the amount of time the law firm held that belief. In other words, this incorrect belief and the acts and omissions resulting from the belief constitutes the tolling event. (See Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363, 370.) Accordingly, the limitations period was equitably tolled on July 6, 2017, when the firm conducted the Internet search and then mailed the complaint and check for the filing fee to the superior court. That belief continued until the firm received the rejected complaint back from the clerk of court on July 18, 2017. The written notice included with the returned documents informed the representatives of the superior court’s local rule that made electronic filing of the complaint mandatory. Thus, the limitations period was tolled for 12 days.

When the 12-day tolling period is tacked onto the two-year limitations period, which expired on July 16, 2017, the deadline for filing the action becomes July 28, 2017. The calculation of the new deadline can be performed another way that produces the same result. This alternate calculation asks how many days were left on the limitations period when the tolling began. To determine that number, one compares the date of July 6, 2017, to the two-year anniversary of the injury, which was July 16, 2017. The result of this comparison is 10 days. Next, the 10 days of unexpired time is added to the date the running of the statute recommenced (i.e., July 18, 2017). This calculation also yields a deadline of July 28, 2017.

Plaintiff’s complaint was electronically filed on July 26, 2017—two days before the July 28, 2017, deadline resulting from the application of the two-year limitations period and the equitable tolling period to the facts of this case. Consequently, the complaint was timely filed.

DISPOSITION

The February 22, 2018, order dismissing the first amended complaint with prejudice is reversed. On remand, the superior court is directed to vacate the order and issue a new order overruling the demurrer. Plaintiff shall recover her costs on appeal.