34-2016-00190824

Jose J. Mejia vs. Roussos Construction, Inc.

Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Filed By: Hawkins, Bryan L.

Defendant Mathew Hawkins’ (Hawkins) motion for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, for an order striking the private attorney general (PAGA) claim for civil

penalties is DENIED.

The court notes other Defendants’ joinder in the motion.

Hawkins’ request for judicial notice of this court’s order denying class certification in this case is DENIED as irrelevant.

This is a wage-and-hour employment case. The plaintiffs are Jose J. Mejia, Miguel Osuna and Oscar J. Almazan-Martinez (collectively “Plaintiffs”). In the operative third amended complaint (TAC), Plaintiffs allege that they worked as floor installers and were misclassified as independent contractors. Plaintiffs allege that Hawkins is liable as one of several joint employers.

Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action is for civil penalties under the PAGA provisions in Labor Code §§ 2698 et seq. Under those sections, an aggrieved employee may seek civil penalties on behalf of other current and former employees. Plaintiffs’ prayer in the TAC contains a claim for PAGA penalties as well. Hawkins now moves for judgment on the pleadings as to the eight cause of action only. In the alternative, he moves to strike the PAGA claim in the prayer.

Trial is set to commence on 1/29/18.

The alternative motion to strike is DENIED as untimely. To the extent the court is empowered to entertain a motion to strike long after the defendant’s responsive pleading is due, the court declines to do so here.

The motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED as well. Citing solely federal cases, Hawkins argues the eighth cause of action is defective because any assessment of civil penalties would render a trial “unmanageable.” He argues Plaintiffs would be required to prove that individual installers were misclassified, that each installer had an employment relationship with each defendant, and that each defendant violated each installer’s rights. Hawkins notes that this court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, and he analogizes Plaintiffs’ PAGA claims to class claims subject to class-certification criteria. In his reply, Hawkins further argues that courts have dismissed unfair competition claims due to unmanageability as well.

Plaintiffs’ PAGA cause of action is predicated on Labor Code violations, not unfair competition. Hawkins’ cases do not establish judicial authority to dismiss such a PAGA cause of action on a theory of unmanageability.

Similarly, class certification criteria do not apply to PAGA claims under the Labor Code. (See Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 975.) Hawkins does not cite any California case in which a PAGA claim was dismissed on grounds of unmanageability. Absent precedent that the court possesses that specific authority, the motion is denied.