Case Name: Jose Simon Garcia v. Tobias Scott Whipple, et al.
Case No.: 17-CV-305518

I. Background and Discovery Dispute

Plaintiff Jose Simon Garcia (“Garcia”) alleges defendant Tobias Scott Whipple (“Whipple”) touched him inappropriately in the room they shared as patients at a hospital operated by defendant Stanford Health Care (“Stanford”). Garcia asserts causes of action against Whipple and Stanford for: (1) assault (against Whipple); (2) battery (against Whipple); (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (against Whipple); (4) negligence (against Whipple); (5) negligence (against Stanford); and (6) premises liability (against Stanford).

In June 2017, Stanford served Garcia with requests for production of documents, set one (“RPD”) and special interrogatories, set one (“SI”). (Hutchins Decl., Ex. B.) Overall, the RPD and SI seek documents and information showing Garcia’s medical history and whether he received other forms of compensation — such as workers’ compensation, Social Security, Medicare, and Medi-Cal benefits — for his injuries, which Stanford asserts were preexisting. (Hutchins Decl., Ex. B.)

Several months later, Garcia served Stanford with unverified responses to the RPD and SI; Garcia objected to some of the requests and provided substantive responses to others. (Hutchins Decl., Ex. D.) Stanford and Garcia corresponded about his failure to verify his responses and purported deficiencies in his objections and substantive responses to the RPD and SI. (Hutchins Decl., Exs. E-I.) Garcia served Stanford with amended, unverified responses to the RPD and SI in September 2017. (Hutchins Decl., Ex. J.) The parties continued to meet and confer because Stanford asserted the amended responses to these requests remained inadequate. (Hutchins Decl., Exs. L-O.)

Although the parties appeared to be making progress in the resolution of their discovery dispute, in December 2017, Garcia stated he would not reconsider his objections to the SI and did not respond to follow-up correspondence about documents responsive to the RPD. (Hutchins Decl., ¶ 18.) Consequently, Stanford filed the instant motions to compel further responses to RPD No. 7 and SI Nos. 41-42, 50-58, 61-70, 100, and 103. Stanford requests an award of monetary sanctions in connection with each motion.

II. Preliminary Procedural Matters

Stanford filed a meet and confer declaration along with each motion as required by Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300 and 2031.310. After reviewing the declarations and the attached correspondence, the Court is concerned about the quality and sufficiency of Garcia’s contributions to the meet and confer process.

The Judges of the Santa Clara County Superior Court have adopted by standing order the Santa Clara County Bar Association’s Code of Professionalism, and expect attorneys to comport themselves in accordance with the guidelines of professionalism set forth therein. In accordance with section 9, and as consistent with the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court expects attorneys to “conduct discovery in a manner designed to ensure the timely, efficient, cost-effective, and just resolution of a dispute” and “promptly and completely comply with all discovery requirements of the Civil Discovery Act.” (SCCBA Code of Prof., § 9; see also Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2017.010-2017.020, 2019.020-2019.030.)

This expectation extends to the parties’ meet and confer efforts, which must be diligent and in good faith. (SCCBA Code of Prof., §§ 9-10; Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.) For example, the responding party cannot simply reiterate his or her objection in response to the propounding party’s invitation to the negotiation table; rather, the parties “must present to each other the merits of their respective positions with the same candor, specificity, and support during informal negotiations as during the briefing of discovery motions.” (Townsend v. Super. Ct. (1998) 51 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1436.)

Here, Garcia’s conduct fell short of what the Court expects. His belated responses and verifications, provided only after multiple follow-up requests by Stanford, demonstrate a lack of diligence and promptness. Furthermore, Garcia’s mere restatement of objections in meet and confer letters sent to Stanford was not sufficient.

The Court expects all parties and their counsel to comport with its expectations going forward. Because the deficiencies identified above are attributable to Garcia, the Court will consider the merits of Stanford’s motions.

III. Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPD

The demanding party may move to compel the responding party to provide a further response to an inspection demand if an objection lacks merit or is too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a)(3).) “The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) The moving party’s “burden is met simply by [making] a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (Glenfed Development Corp. v. Super. Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) For purposes of discovery, information is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Super. Ct. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.) If the demanding party establishes good cause, the responding party must, then, justify his or her objections. (Kirkland v. Super. Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)

Here, Stanford moves to compel Garcia to provide a further response to RPD No. 7, which seeks: “Any and all writings identifying any other lawsuits and/or workers’ compensation claims that have been filed or made on behalf of you, whether before or after this case was filed.” (Hutchins Decl., Ex. B at p. 3.) Garcia objected to RPD No. 7 on the grounds of relevance, privacy, undue burden and oppression, and vagueness and ambiguity. (Hutchins Decl., Ex. J at p. 5.) Garcia opposes the motion and focuses solely on his right to privacy.

Stanford argues there is good cause for the discovery sought by RPD No. 7 because workers’ compensation documentation may substantiate its defense theory that Garcia’s injuries materialized after a workplace accident in 2014 and thus existed prior to his hospitalization in 2015. The Court is persuaded that “documents reflecting proof of damages[,] specifically, workers’ compensation documents from Plaintiff’s ongoing claim beginning in February 2014” are relevant. (Sep. Stat. at p. 2:20-22.) With that said, RPD No. 7 encompasses much more. Stanford does not attempt to justify all of the discovery sought by RPD No. 7, which also includes “[a]ny and all writings identifying any other lawsuits” without limitation. (Hutchins Decl., Ex. B at p. 3.) Although it appears Stanford perhaps meant to request documents identifying workers’ compensation claims and workers’ compensation lawsuits, the request as drafted is much broader. It is not otherwise obvious to the Court how documents identifying any other lawsuits, without limitation, are relevant or helpful. Thus, the Court finds Stanford establishes good cause for only a portion of the discovery sought by RPD No. 7.

Under these particular circumstances, in lieu of simply denying the motion, the Court will consider whether a further response is warranted to a narrower request that encompasses the discovery for which Stanford establishes good cause. (See Williams v. Super. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 540.) The Court thus considers whether a further response is warranted to RPD No. 7 when narrowed to: “Any and all writings identifying any [ ] workers’ compensation claims [or workers’ compensation lawsuits] that have been filed or made on behalf of [Garcia], whether before or after this case was filed.”

Turning to Garcia’s response to RPD No. 7, he objected on several grounds and did not provide any substantive response. Garcia only attempts to justify his privacy objection, and so his remaining undefended objections are overruled. (See Kirkland, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 98.)

“In Hill, [the California Supreme Court] established a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 552, citing Hill v. Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.) “The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 552.) “The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.” (Ibid.) “A court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Ibid.)

To be clear, the California Supreme Court has rejected the “de facto starting assumption that such an egregious invasion is involved in every request for discovery of private information.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 557.) It has directed courts to “instead place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and the seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interests the opposing party identifies, as Hill requires.” (Ibid.) A compelling need for the discovery is not always required. (Ibid.) “What suffices to justify an invasion will. . . vary according to the context.” (Ibid.)

Garcia treats RPD No. 7 as though it is a request for medical records and argues it thus intrudes on his right to privacy. But RPD No. 7 does not, on its face, seek medical records. Thus, Garcia’s argument is not persuasive. Despite the inadequacy and inaccuracy of Garcia’s presentation, the Court is concerned that documents within the scope of the request contain private information. Documents “identifying” workers’ compensation claims and lawsuits may include documents in Garcia’s personnel file, documents containing financial information, and documents that, although not medical records, contain medical information. Personnel, financial, and medical information is traditionally protected by the right to privacy. (See Alch v. Super. Ct. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426-39; Britt v. Super. Ct. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 861-62; Valley Bank of Nevada v. Super. Ct. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 656-57.) Accordingly, RPD No. 7 implicates Garcia’s right to privacy.

Nevertheless, Stanford demonstrates the workers’ compensation documents are relevant to its defense theory in this lawsuit and may prove or disprove some of the essential elements of Garcia’s negligence claims. Thus, Stanford establishes the discovery sought by RPD No. 7, as narrowed by the Court, is sufficiently and directly relevant to overcome Garcia’s privacy objection. Garcia’s privacy objection is therefore overruled and a further response to RPD No. 7 as narrowed by the Court is warranted.

In conclusion, Stanford’s motion to compel a further response is GRANTED with respect to RPD No. 7, which is modified as follows: “Any and all writings identifying any [ ] workers’ compensation claims [or workers’ compensation lawsuits] that have been filed or made on behalf of [Garcia], whether before or after this case was filed.” Garcia must provide a verified, further response to this request, without objections, within 10 calendar days of this order and, thereafter, produce documents in accordance with his response. The Court expects Garcia to provide a code-compliant response. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2031.220, 2031.230, 2031.250.)

IV. Motion to Compel Further Responses to SI

The demanding party may move to compel the responding party to provide a further response to an interrogatory if an answer is evasive or incomplete or an objection is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).) “While the party propounding interrogatories may have the burden of filing a motion to compel if it finds the answers it receives unsatisfactory, the burden of justifying any objection and failure to respond remains at all times with the party resisting an interrogatory.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 541.)

Stanford moves to compel Garcia to provide further responses to SI Nos. 41-42, 50-58, and 61-70, to which he provided objection-only responses, as well as to SI Nos. 100 and 103, which he answered without waiving his objections. SI Nos. 41 and 42 ask Garcia to identify the physicians and hospitals he visited during the last ten years. SI Nos. 50-58 and 61-70 seek information about whether Garcia qualified for or received Medicare, Social Security, or other collateral source benefits. SI Nos. 100 and 103 are contention interrogatories. The Court addresses each group of SI in turn.

A. SI Nos. 41-42

Garcia objected to SI Nos. 41 and 42, which seek a list of the physicians and hospitals he visited on the grounds of relevance, privacy, and because it “is overbroad, vague, ambiguous, and calculated to harass [him].” (Hutchins Decl., Ex. J.) Garcia bears the burden of justifying his objections in opposition to the motion. (Coy v. Super. Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-21.) He only attempts to justify his objections on the ground of privacy. Accordingly, his remaining undefended objections to RPD Nos. 41 and 42 are overruled.

With respect to Garcia’s privacy objections, the Court employs the same balancing test articulated above in the discussion of RPD No. 7. (See Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 552.) SI Nos. 41 and 42 seek Garcia’s medical history, which is protected by the right to privacy. (Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 844.) Even so, Garcia’s medical history is directly relevant to this case because it may prove or disprove his claim that Stanford caused his injuries. To be sure, Garcia alleges Stanford caused injuries to “his health, strength, and activity, sustaining injury to his body and shock and injury to his nervous system and person, all of which injuries have caused, and continue to cause, [him] great mental, physical, and nervous pain and suffering.” (Compl., ¶ 49.) Given the breadth of injuries alleged in the complaint, Garcia’s medical history, inclusive of treatment for physical and mental ailments, is directly relevant. Garcia does not provide any explanation or authority to support a contrary conclusion. Accordingly, Garcia’s privacy objections to SI Nos. 41 and 42 are overruled and further responses to these requests are warranted.

B. SI Nos. 50-58 and 61-70

Garcia objected to SI Nos. 50-58 and 61-70 on the grounds of relevance and privacy, and to a subset of these requests, on the additional grounds of undue burden and oppression. In opposition to the motion, Garcia only attempts to justify his privacy objections. Consequently, his remaining undefended objections are overruled.

Turning to Garcia’s privacy objections, he simply states Stanford has not established direct relevance. But Garcia must first demonstrate SI Nos. 50-58 and 61-70 seek private information before the burden shifts to Stanford to demonstrate the relevance of the discovery sought. (See Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 552.) Garcia does not identify what sphere of privacy these requests intrude upon or cite any authority demonstrating they seek protected information. Thus, Garcia does not carry his initial burden.

To be sure, SI Nos. 50-54, 61-65, 67, and 69-70 ask whether Garcia has been eligible for, applied for, or received Medicare, Social Security, and Medi-Cal benefits before, as a result of, or after his hospitalization at Stanford; these requests elicit only a yes or no response. SI No. 55 asks for the dates of Garcia’s Medicare enrollment, if he was in fact enrolled. Similar to these requests about government benefits, SI Nos. 56-58 ask for the collateral source payments Garcia received (if any). Finally, SI Nos. 66 and 68 ask for Garcia’s Medicare claim number and Social Security number. Although the benefits that are the subject of these requests relate to medical care, these requests do not actually require Garcia to disclose his medical history or information about his health. Thus, to the extent Garcia’s position is that the requests seek medical information like SI Nos. 41 and 42, his position lacks merit.
In summary, Garcia does not establish SI Nos. 50-58 and 61-70 seek private information. Even if he did, Stanford demonstrates the information sought is sufficiently relevant to overcome Garcia’s privacy objections. This information may help prove or disprove whether Garcia suffered injuries, whether Stanford caused those injuries, and whether Garcia incurred the amount of damages claimed. Consequently, the discovery sought is highly relevant and essential to the resolution of this lawsuit.

Garcia’s assertion that this information is irrelevant based on the collateral source rule is wholly without merit. “Under the collateral source rule, plaintiffs in personal injury actions can still recover full damages even though they already have received compensation for their injuries from such ‘collateral sources’ as medical insurance.” (Arambula v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1009.) “The collateral source rule operates both as a substantive rule of damages and as a rule of evidence.” (Id. at p. 1015.) “As a rule of evidence, it precludes the introduction of evidence of the plaintiff being compensated by a collateral source unless there is a ‘persuasive showing’ that such evidence is of ‘substantial probative value’ for purposes other than reducing damages.” (Ibid.) Significantly, “[a]dmissibility is not the test” for whether information is relevant or discoverable. (Gonzalez, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1546, original italics.) Thus, whether information is admissible pursuant to the collateral source rule has no bearing on whether the information is discoverable in the first instance.

Furthermore, “Civil Code section 3333.1 modifies the collateral source rule in medical negligence cases.” (Canister v. Emergency Ambulance Service (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 388, 408.) “In an action for personal injury against a health care provider based upon professional negligence, the defendant may elect to introduce evidence of any amount payable as a benefit to the plaintiff as a result of the personal injury from collateral sources such as health insurance, disability insurance or workers’ compensation.” (Ibid.; see also Cuevas v. Contra Costa County (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 163, 181.) Thus, Garcia’s assertion that the collateral source rule clearly and categorically renders inadmissible the information sought is incorrect.

Stanford demonstrates the discovery sought is sufficiently relevant to overcome Garcia’s privacy objections, and Garcia’s argument does not support a contrary conclusion. Consequently, Garcia’s privacy objections to SI Nos. 50-58 and 61-70 are overruled and further responses to these requests are warranted.

C. SI Nos. 100 and 103

SI Nos. 100 and 103 are contention interrogatories. SI No. 100 asks for facts that support Garcia’s contention that his injuries cause and will continue to cause him mental, physical, and nervous pain and suffering. SI No. 103 asks for the facts that support Garcia’s contention that his injuries will result in permanent disability.

Although Garcia objected and provided a substantive response to these requests, he does not attempt to justify his objections. Consequently, Garcia’s objections to SI Nos. 100 and 103 are overruled. (See Williams, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 541-42.) The Court thus considers whether Garcia’s substantive responses to these SI are code-compliant.

Each answer in response to an interrogatory must be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subds. (a)-(b); Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783-84 [“Answers must be complete and responsive.”]) If a responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to any interrogatory, it must state as much, but is still obligated to make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiring of other sources, except for information that is equally available to the propounding party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (c).)

In response to SI Nos. 100 and 103, Garcia stated that he continues, and will likely continue, to experience pain, suffering, and inconvenience. In other words, Garcia simply restated the allegations that are the bases for these interrogatories. Garcia’s responses are evasive and are tantamount to no response at all because he did not identify the facts that support his contentions. (See, e.g., Burke v. Super. Ct. (1969) 71 Cal.2d 276, 284-85.) Thus, Garcia’s answers to SI Nos. 100 and 103 are not code-compliant and he must provide further responses to these requests.

D. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Stanford’s motion to compel Garcia to provide further responses to SI Nos. 41-42, 50-58, 61-70, 100, and 103 is GRANTED. Garcia must provide verified, further responses to these requests, without objections, within 10 calendar days of this order. To assuage any concerns, the Court orders Stanford, its attorneys, and agents to refrain from disseminating private information to any non-party except for use in the present litigation.

V. Requests for Monetary Sanctions

Stanford requests an award of monetary sanctions against Garcia and his counsel in connection with each motion.

“[T]he court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).) A court is required to do the same in connection with a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (d).)

Garcia unsuccessfully opposed Stanford’s motions, and so it is entitled to awards of monetary sanctions unless Garcia was substantially justified or other circumstances would make the imposition of sanctions unjust. But the Court does not find Garcia was substantially justified or that other circumstances justify denying Stanford’s requests because Garcia did not adequately participate in the meet and confer process or provide accurate and sufficient arguments and legal analysis to justify his objections and responses. Accordingly, Stanford is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions against Garcia and his counsel.

Stanford requests the attorney’s fees and costs it incurred in preparing each motion, which amount to $867.00 and $922.50 for a total of $1,789.50. These amounts reflect, respectively, 4.2 and 4.5 hours of attorney time spent preparing each motion at a rate of $185.00 per hour as well as the cost of filing each motion, which the Court finds to be reasonable. Thus, Stanford is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,789.50.

In conclusion, Stanford’s requests for monetary sanctions against Garcia and his counsel are GRANTED. Garcia’s counsel shall pay Stanford’s counsel $1,789.50 within 10 calendar days of this order.