Joseph Casarez v. Target Corp. CASE NO. 113CV240620
DATE: 18 April 2014 TIME: 9:00 LINE NUMBER: 12
This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 19 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose. Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 19 at 408.808.6856 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM Thursday 17 April 2014. Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel.

On 18 April 2014, the motion of defendants Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics USA, Inc. and Target Corporation and Target Westgate and FR Westgate Mall, LLC (hereinafter collectively “Defendants”) for an order to compel the mental examination of plaintiff Joseph Casarez (“Plaintiff”) was argued and submitted. Plaintiff filed a formal opposition to this motion.

All parties are reminded that all papers must comply with Rule of Court 3.1110(f).

I. Background

This action arises from alleged personal injuries sustained by Plaintiff while visiting a Target shopping center on 4 April 2011. Plaintiff alleges that the elevator doors at Defendants premises malfunctioned and he was hit in the spine by one door causing him to fall forward and catch himself on the oncoming door.

Discovery Dispute

On 23 January 2014, Plaintiff submitted to a physical examination with Defendants’ Orthopedic Surgeon, Dr. Thomas G. Sampson. After performing the examination Dr. Sampson opined that the subject elevator incident constituted a non-injury and was no more than a compression injury or at worst, a mild contusion not requiring treatments. Dr. Sampson’s report states that Plaintiff complained of injuries to his shoulder and back when Plaintiff was forced to pry the elevator door open with his arms. (See Declaration of Maria A Starn, Exh. A.) Dr. Sampson recommended further psychiatric examination to help understand the root of Plaintiff’s ongoing somatization of his complaints.

Plaintiff has not made a “claim for mental or emotional distress over and above that usually associated with the physical injuries being claimed in this case.” Defendants have placed Plaintiff’s mental condition in contention based on the findings of Dr. Sampson’s Independent Medical Exam (“IME).

After exchanging meet and confer emails, counsels for Defendants and Plaintiff failed to agree on a stipulation for the independent mental examination of Plaintiff.

II. Discussion

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2032.320(a), the Court “shall grant a motion for a physical or mental examination under Section 2032.310 only for good cause shown. Section 2032.310 requires a party to obtain the leave of court if that party desires to obtain discovery by a physical or mental examination. The motion must specify the time, place, manner, conditions, scope, and nature of the examination, as well as the identity and the specialty, of the person who will perform the examination. Code of Civil Procedure § 2032.310(b).

However, Code of Civil Procedure § 2032.310(b) states, “[i]f a party stipulates as provided in subdivision (c), the court shall not order a mental examination of a person for whose personal injuries a recovery is being sought except on a showing of exceptional circumstances.”

A. Good Cause Shown.
B.
Good cause is shown by the production of specific facts, which justify the requested discovery and upon showing that the discovery is relevant to the subject matter of the action or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Vinson v. Superior Court, 43 Cal.3d 833, 840-841.

Here Defendant’s expert physician Dr. Sampson, does not believe that the ongoing somatization of Plaintiff’s complaints, comport with Plaintiff’s present physiological condition. Dr. Sampson notes that Plaintiff’s observed affect and confabulations, indicate that the root of Plaintiff’s ongoing somatization of his complaints may have a psychological explanation requiring a mental examination. (See Declaration of Maria A. Starn Exh. A.)

The Court finds that Defendants have shown good cause necessitating the need for the request mental examination, under Code of Civil Procedure § 2032.320(a). However, it is the interpretation of this Court that the “exceptional circumstances” provision described in subsection (b) supersedes the “good cause” requirement found in subsection (a), once Plaintiff has made the required stipulations.

C. Exceptional Circumstances Requiring a Mental Examination When There Are No Claims for Mental or Emotional Distress.
D.
Neither party has argued to the Court’s satisfaction of what would constitute exceptional circumstances requiring a mental examination when Plaintiff has made the required stipulations pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2032.320(c).

Defendants rely on Shapira v. Superior Court, (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1249, 1252-1254, to stand for the proposition that where there are conflicting medical opinions as to whether Plaintiff’s disabilities are of organic or psychological origin, Defendants are entitled to a psychological examination.

However, Shapira merely sought to interpret the Code of Civil Procedure as to whether Defendants would be entitled to a second mental examination, where other mental examinations are contradictory and inconclusive. The Shapira court found that the number of mental examinations did not matter so long as Defendant showed there existed good cause to require an additional examination under the Code of Civil Procedure. The standard applied was still the good cause standard as opposed to the “exceptional circumstances” provision found in Code of Civil Procedure § 2032.020(b).

Both parties rely on Vinson v. Superior Court, (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, where the court required a showing of good cause in order to balance Plaintiff’s privacy interests in his medical records and Defendant’s rights to discover relevant facts.

When the Court examines the statute under principles of statutory construction: ” ‘[O]ur fundamental task is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute. … We begin with the language of the statute, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. … The language must be construed “in the context of the statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme, and we give ‘significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.’ ” … In other words, ” ‘we do not construe statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute “with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.” …’ ” … If the statutory terms are ambiguous, we may examine extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. … In such circumstances, we choose the construction that comports most closely with the Legislature’s apparent intent, endeavoring to promote rather than defeat the statute’s general purpose, and avoiding a construction that would lead to absurd consequences.” (Boy Scouts of America National Foundation v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 428, 443, citations omitted.)

Here the legislature chose to use the words “exceptional circumstances” and made these words applicable only in the situation where Plaintiff has conceded certain claims of damages relating to mental and emotional distress.

Thus where a Plaintiff has conceded such claims of mental and emotional distress, the courts must provide extra care in protecting the privacy interests of the Plaintiff. Dr. Sampson’s conclusions on Plaintiff’s current physiological state is admissible evidence that tends to show, that Plaintiff did not suffer physical injuries rising to a claim for damages. The Court does not believe that the necessity of a mental examination to corroborate such a finding, rises to the level of “exceptional circumstances” as described in subsection (b), at the cost of Plaintiff’s rights to privacy.

Accordingly, Defendants motion is DENIED, Defendants have failed to show that exceptional circumstances exists requiring Plaintiff to submit to a mental examination.

That having been said, nothing in this order is intended to preclude Dr. Sampson from testifying about any perceived confabulation by Plaintiff. Additionally, Defendants may renew this motion should Plaintiff indeed claim more than “garden-variety” emotional distress.