2012-00129957-CO-PO

Joseph Ramos vs. Timothy Dickson

Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Summary Judgment

Filed By: Gessford, Marc C.

Defendant Timothy Dickson’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections nos. 1, 6-8, 12-15 are SUSTAINED, the remainder
are OVERRULED.

Plaintiff Joseph Ramos’ First Amended Complaint alleges two causes of action against
st nd
defendant Dickson: the 1 for Negligence and 2 for Negligence Per Se. The FAC
alleges that on or about December 20, 2009, plaintiff was skiing on Rainbow Ridge, a
novice trail and beginner run at the Homewood Ski Resort, when defendant Timothy
Dickson was snowboarding, and impacted plaintiff and caused plaintiff to be thrown
down the mountain, sustaining personal injuries and damages.

Defendant Timothy Dickson moves for summary judgment on the grounds that under
the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, he owed no duty to plaintiff under a
general negligence theory or negligence per se.

Whether or not a defendant owes a duty to plaintiff is a legal question to be decided by
the court. (Staten v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1628, 1632-1633.)
Summary judgment is appropriate where the defendant demonstrates that primary
assumption of risk is applicable. (Id.)

In cases involving “primary assumption of the risk” — where, by virtue of the nature of

the activity and the parties’ relationship to the activity, the defendant owes no legal
duty to protect the plaintiff from the particular risk of harm that caused the injury–the
doctrine continues to operate as a complete bar to the plaintiff’s recovery. Knight v.
Jewett (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 296, 314-315.

it is improper to hold a sports participant liable to a coparticipant for ordinary careless
conduct committed during the sport–for example, for an injury resulting from a
carelessly thrown ball or bat during a baseball game–and that liability properly may be
imposed on a participant only when he or she intentionally injures another player or
engages in reckless conduct that is totally outside the range of the ordinary activity
involved in the sport. Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 296, 318. Applied in the sports
setting, this doctrine provides that voluntary participants in a sports activity have no
duty to protect one another from risks inherent in that particular activity. (Knight , supra
, at pp. 316-317.) “[T]he nature of a defendant’s duty in the sports context depends
heavily on the nature of the sport itself.” (Id.)

Snow skiing has been held to involve inherent risks. Each person who participates in
the sport of skiing accepts the dangers that are inherent in that sport insofar as the
dangers are obvious and necessary. Those “ordinary” dangers include, but are not
limited to, injuries which can result from variations in terrain; surface or subsurface
snow or ice conditions; bare spots; rocks, trees and other forms of natural growth or
debris; collisions with ski lift towers and their components, with other skiers, or with
properly marked or plainly visible snow-making or snow-grooming equipment. Connelly
v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area (1995) 39 Cal. App. 4th 8, 12.

The facts in Mastro v. Petrick (2001) 93 Cal. App. 4th 83, 90 are similar to those of this
action. There, the court held that “given the nature of the activity of snowboarding
(descending a snow-covered mountain), and the relationship of Mastro to that activity
(descending the same snow-covered mountain on skis), under Knight it is clear Petrick
owed no legal duty to protect Mastro from the particular risk of harm that caused
Mastro’s injuries (i.e., that a snowboarder may be negligent or careless).” In Mastro,
the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the basis
that that under the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk a snowboarder owes no
duty of care to a skier on the same slope. Id.

In opposition, as in Cheong v. Antablin (1997) 16 Cal. 4th 1063, 1069, Plaintiff argues
that Skier Responsibility Code, enacted as a Placer County Ordinance, imposes a
higher duty on defendant than Knight establishes. (Placer Code, § 9.28.010, et seq.
formerly 12.130, et seq.) The court in Cheong disagreed. Although Knight was a
development of the common law of torts and the Legislature may, if it chooses, modify
the common law by statute, whether a local ordinance such as the Placer Code can
modify Knight is less clear. That question does not need to be decided because we
conclude that the ordinance does not modify the Knight standard even if we assume it
could. Id.

The Placer Code provides in part: “Any individual or group of individuals who engage
in the sport of skiing of any type, . . . shall assume and accept the inherent risks of
such activities insofar as the risks are reasonably obvious, foreseeable or necessary to
the activities.” (Placer Code, § 9.28.030 former 12.132.) “Inherent risks of skiing” are
defined to expressly include “collision with other skiers”. (Placer Code, § 9.28.020,
former 12.131(a).)

This Court does not find the defendant’s failure to recognize the difference between
blue or green runs leads to the inference that he acted recklessly outside the range or
recreational skiing (or snowboarding) and cannot create a disputed issue of material
fact as to whether the plaintiff agreed to be bound by the primary assumption of the
risk doctrine assuming the inherent risks of skiing which expressly includes collision
with other skiers or snowboarders.

The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

The prevailing party is directed to prepare a formal order complying with C.C.P. §437c
(g) and C.R.C. Rule 3.1312.