Case Number: BC521234 Hearing Date: March 13, 2018 Dept: J

Re: Juan Carlos Mendoza v. Dillon Larado Monta Bruno, et al. (BC521234 C/W BC521670)

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SECOND SET OF FORM INTERROGATORIES

Moving Party: Plaintiff Juan Carlos Mendoza

Respondent: No timely opposition filed (due 2/28/18)

POS: Moving OK[1]

Case No. BC521234

Plaintiff Juan Carlos Mendoza (“Mendoza”) alleges he sustained injuries in a 9/28/11 motor vehicle accident at or near the eastbound SR-60 and I-605 freeways. The complaint was filed on 9/12/13. On 1/14/14, plaintiff dismissed Defendant EMO Line Express, Inc. (“EMO”), without prejudice. On 1/27/14, Judge Beaudet related Case Nos. BC521670 and BC521234; on 12/5/14, the foregoing cases were consolidated, per the parties’ stipulation.

On 9/23/16, Mendoza filed his First Amended Complaint, asserting causes of action therein against Defendants Dillon Larado Monta Bruno (“Bruno”), EMO, Eric Desion Owens (“Owens”) and DOES 1-25 for:

1. Motor Vehicle

2. General Negligence

On 5/25/17, this matter was transferred from Department 97 (personal injury hub to this instant department. On 7/19/17, the court granted Cross-Defendants Paccar Inc.’s (erroneously sued and served as Paccar Inc. dba Kenworth Truck Company) (“Paccar”) and Kenworth Truck Company, an unincorporated division of Paccar Inc.’s (erroneously sued as Kenworth Truck Company) (“KTC”) motion for determination of good faith settlement, as well as plaintiff’s motion for joinder of parties as defendants in the lead case.

The Final Status Conference is set for 8/13/18. A jury trial is set for 8/21/18.

Case No. BC521670

Plaintiff in Intervention Preferred Employers Insurance Company (“PEIC”) paid out workers’ compensation benefits to Mendoza for his injuries allegedly sustained in the 9/28/11 motor vehicle accident. On 9/18/13, PEIC filed its complaint, asserting causes of action therein against Defendants Bruno, EMO, Owens, Transport Express, Inc. dba Port Logistics Group (erroneously served and sued as PLG Holdings, Inc.) (“PLG”) and DOES 1-25 for:

1. Motor Vehicle

2. General Negligence

On 10/23/13, PEIC filed an “Amendment to Complaint,” wherein “D&J West, Inc. dba Port Logistics Group” (“D&J West”) was named in lieu of DOE 26.

On 12/18/13, Owens filed his cross-complaint, asserting causes of action therein against Paccar, Inland Kenworth (US) Inc.—The Inland Group, KTC, Tony’s Truck & Lube and Tires, Inc. and ROES 1-25 for:

1. Strict Products Liability

2. Express Warranty

3. Implied Warranty of Merchantability

4. Negligence

5. Equitable Indemnity

6. Contribution

7. Declaratory Relief

On 12/27/13, PEIC dismissed EMO and D&J West, without prejudice.

Plaintiff Juan Carlos Mendoza (“plaintiff”) moves the court, per CCP § 2030.300, for an order compelling Defendant Transport Express, Inc. dba Port Logistics Group (“PLG”) to provide further responses to his Form Interrogatories—General, Set Two (i.e., No. 17.1 [as to Requests for Admissions Nos. 97 and 98]). Plaintiff also seeks an award of $1,935.00 in sanctions against PLG and its attorneys of record.

CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT (“CRC”) RULE 3.1345 NON-COMPLIANCE:

At the outset, the court notes that plaintiff’s separate statement reflects non-compliance with CRC Rule 3.1345(c) (i.e., “[a] separate statement is a separate document filed and served with the discovery motion that provides all the information necessary to understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue. The separate statement must be full and complete so that no person is required to review any other document in order to determine the full request and the full response. Material must not be incorporated into the separate statement by reference. The separate statement must include–for each discovery request (e.g., each interrogatory, request for admission, deposition question, or inspection demand) to which a further response, answer, or production is requested–the following: (1) The text of the request, interrogatory, question, or inspection demand…(5) If the response to a particular discovery request is dependent on the response given to another discovery request, or if the reasons a further response to a particular discovery request is deemed necessary are based on the response to some other discovery request, the other request and the response to it must be set forth…”).

Although plaintiff’s separate statement sets forth the text of both Requests for Admissions Nos. 97 and 98 and PLG’s respective responses to same, it does not set forth the text of Form Interrogatory—General, Set No. Two, No. 17.1 or PLG’s response to same. Plaintiff’s counsel is admonished.

Notwithstanding the above deficiency, the court elects to otherwise consider the motion.

“The party to whom interrogatories have been propounded shall respond in writing under oath separately to each interrogatory by any of the following: (1) An answer containing the information sought to be discovered. (2) An exercise of the party’s option to produce writings. (3) An objection to the particular interrogatory.” CCP § 2030.210(a). “Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.” CCP § 2030.220(a).

“On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete. (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate. (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” CCP § 2030.300(a). “A motion under subdivision (a) shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” CCP § 2030.300(b). “Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories.” CCP § 2030.300(b).

On 8/16/17, plaintiff mail-served his Form Interrogatories, Set No. Two, on PLG. (Richardson Decl., ¶ 6, Exhibit “1”). On 10/11/17, PLG mail-served its responses thereto. (Id., ¶ 7, Exhibit “2”). On 11/8/17, plaintiff’s counsel Gail Richardson (“Richardson”) sent a meet and confer letter to PLG’s counsel, wherein she requested that counsel let her know by 11/13/17 whether or not PLG would provide further responses. (Id., ¶ 8, Exhibit “3”).

On 11/17/17, Richardson sent a second meet and confer letter, advising, in relevant part, as follows:

“As we have agreed, your further responses are due on Monday November 20, 2017… Pursuant to the 5th Amended General Order of the Los Angeles Superior Court, parties are required to engage in a an [sic] informal discovery conference prior to a hearing on a motion to compel further discovery responses. Given the deadlines for motions to compel, parties generally enter into an agreement to continue the time for filing any motions to compel to a time certain after the informal discovery conference. That eliminates the need to file a motion to compel if the parties are able to resolve their disputes informally at the conference. However, if the parties cannot come to an agreement, a motion to compel may be filed prior to the conference.

My proposal is that we agree that any necessary motions to compel would need to be filed no more than thirty (30) days following any informal discovery conferences. If there are additional responses, those responses would serve to reset the forty-five (45) day period. I would appreciate your professional courtesy in agreeing to this. Otherwise, I will request sanctions if I placed [sic] into the position of filing a motion to compel to preserve my client’s rights.

I left you a message yesterday regarding this issue, and if we cannot come to an agreement today, I will move forward with a motion to compel.” (Id., ¶ 9, Exhibit “4”).

On 11/20/17, PLG’s counsel Nicholas Koumoulis (“Koumoulis”) emailed Richardson, advised that PLG would be “standing on [its] prior objections/responses” and requested that Richardson propose some IDC dates.(Id., ¶ 10, Exhibit “5”). Richardson attests that she was unable to set an Informal Discovery Conference Date with this department (Id., ¶ 9); instead, on 12/1/17, plaintiff filed his “Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s Second Set of Form Interrogatories, Request for Admissions and Special Interrogatories,” which the court ordered off-calendar on 1/10/18 due to plaintiff’s non-compliance with Court Reservation System guidelines and failure to pay separate filing fees.

The court determines that this motion is untimely, inasmuch as the filing deadline for any motion to compel further responses was 11/30/17. Plaintiff’s earlier motion was filed 12/1/17. Again, PLG mail-served its responses on 10/11/17. There is no indication in the record above reflecting that PLG at any time agreed to an extension of time within which to file a motion to compel past the statutory period of 45 days.

“Delaying the motion beyond the 45-day time limit waives the right to compel a further response to the interrogatories. [CCP § 2030.300(c); see Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (Halpem) (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d681, 685—court lacks jurisdiction to order further answers after 45 days].” Weil & Brown, et al., CAL. PRAC. GUIDE: CIV. PRO. BEFORE TRIAL (The Rutter Group 2017) ¶ 8:1146 (emphasis theirs).

The motion, then, is denied.

[1] This motion was originally set for hearing on 4/11/18. It was reset for 3/13/18, via plaintiff’s 1/24/18 ex parte application. The court ordered plaintiff to give notice on 1/24/18. On 1/25/18, plaintiff filed his “Proof of Service of Notice of the Court’s Ruling on Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application to Hear Motion to Compel Further Responses or, in the Alternative, for Order Shortening Time to Hear Motion to Compel Further Responses.”