Filed 3/9/20 Marriage of Olin CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re Marriage of KELLY and JEFFREY OLIN.

________________________________

KELLY RENE OLIN,

Respondent,

v.

JEFFREY JASON OLIN,

Appellant.

B295416

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. YD058401)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Glenda Veasey, Commissioner. Affirmed.

Jeffrey J. Olin, in pro. per., for Appellant.

No appearance by Respondent.

_________________________

INTRODUCTION

Jeffrey and Kelly (a divorced couple) each requested a domestic violence restraining order against the other. The trial court denied Jeffrey’s request, and granted Kelly’s request, resulting in the issuance of a five-year restraining order against Jeffrey.

Jeffrey, in propria persona, appeals from the restraining order issued against him, arguing the trial court erred. Most of his arguments are legally untenable and/or not supported by the record before us. He also appeals from the denial of his restraining order request against Kelly, arguing the trial court refused to hold a substantive hearing on his request and was “injudiciously hellbent on punishing someone she just doesn’t like,” namely, him.

For reasons explained below, we disagree with Jeffrey and affirm both orders.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Background Information
B.
We rely on the record provided to piece together and summarize the factual and procedural history of this dispute.

Jeffrey and Kelly dissolved their marriage effective June 17, 2011. They have one minor child, Joseph, currently 13 years old.

Kelly filed her first request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Jeffrey on August 6, 2018; one week later, on August 13, 2018, Kelly filed an RFO to modify visitation. We were not provided a copy of Kelly’s first DVRO request and her RFO. Jeffrey alleges in his opening brief: “On the same day [Kelly] waived her first DVRO request, . . . Kelly filed a request to have Jeffrey – who just a week before she had accused of being a child abuser – have increased visitation with their minor child.”

A few days later, on August 17, 2018, Jeffrey filed his first DVRO request against Kelly; again, we were not provided with that pleading.

On August 22, 2018, the trial court dismissed Kelly’s first DVRO request for “lack of prosecution.” On September 4, 2018, the trial court heard argument and denied Jeffrey’s first DVRO request. In denying Jeffrey’s DVRO request, the court said: “I can’t issue a domestic violence restraining order for her contacting the authorities or filing for actions, because that’s protected speech. [¶] To a large extent, you’re saying that you believe that she’s engaged in paternal alienation [or] that sort of thing. You all have a custody and visitation dispute, but it’s not a domestic violence restraining order [dispute]. [¶] You need to file an R.F.O. to deal with the custody and visitation issues.”

The court explained its reasoning to Jeffrey: “[B]ecause you’re saying, for example, that she filed with the child support department, and then the child support department then sent letters to your current and your former employers. Well, I can’t issue a restraining order against her because the child support department sent letters to your employers. I can’t even issue a restraining order for her filing a child support action, even if she was incorrect, wrong, or intentionally wrong in filing it, because she has an absolute right to contact the authorities and file actions.”

Jeffrey argued Kelly’s actions of filing her first DVRO request and initiating a child support action against him were “malicious” and “[s]he did it only to hurt [him].” He argued he had “no recourse for her perjury” and “no recourse for her putting on the record these allegations against me.” He argued Kelly caused him “emotional damage by having this thing served at [his] work” and that she “ruined [his] reputation.”

The court disagreed with Jeffrey and said: “I don’t agree that you can establish that her sole and only motivation in any of the things she’s done is to harass . . . you. [¶] Might harassment be a byproduct or one of the effects? Yes. But that doesn’t make it a domestic violence restraining order.” The court then told Jeffrey: “Sir, . . . if you feel that she has slandered or defamed you in any way, you do have recourse. You can file a defamation or a slander action.”

On October 2, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on Kelly’s RFO to modify custody/visitation. While we neither have a copy of the RFO nor Jeffrey’s filed response to it, the court stated on the record that Kelly requested the “parties have fifty-fifty custody” of minor child Joseph, and Jeffrey filed a response “indicating that he wants no visitation with the minor child and . . . that the child is a clear and present danger to his security and safety.” (Italics added.) The court asked Jeffrey, “Is that still your position, sir?” to which Jeffrey responded, “Absolutely, your honor.” This resulted in the court awarding Kelly sole legal and physical custody of Joseph; further, any contact between Joseph and Jeffrey “shall be by mutual agreement between the father and the minor child.”

C. Kelly’s Second DVRO Request
D.
On October 18, 2018, Kelly filed her second DVRO request against Jeffrey, listing herself and Joseph as persons to be protected.

She described an incident of abuse on October 2, 2018, when Jeffrey posted the following Yelp review about Kelly on her employer’s Yelp page: “I am surprised that they don’t have a policy against property managers, like Kelly Olin, engaging in sexual relationships with tenants, like Steve Silver of State of the Art Audio Visual. I’ll bet she’s nicer to tenants she’s doing, but I am simply surprised that her employers don’t have a problem with the conflict of interest that creates. Maybe they are just glad that she’s finally being nice to a tenant.” Kelly explained Jeffrey posted the Yelp review immediately after their October 2, 2018 court appearance on the RFO, where he was “escorted out of the courtroom . . . due to hostile behavior, yelling, anger, and unwillingness to cooperate with instructions given to him by Commissioner Veasey.”

She described the “most recent abuse” as occurring on October 18, 2018, when Jeffrey sent a “[h]arassing email” to her and her employer, “threatening to print defamatory/libelous statements about [her] and distribute them to [her] employer’s clients.” A copy of Jeffrey’s email was attached to her DVRO request; in the email, Jeffrey states:

1) “I am astounded – with all of the reviews about your employer being negative, and all of them being about YOU – that you still have a job.” (Boldface and underscoring omitted.)
2)
3) “Your disgusting attacks against my job because of your blatant jealousy of my new position are all the more obnoxious after your intentional alienation of my son and I, your perjurious attack against me, and the utter failure of commissioner Glenda ‘[w]ho gives a shit about the Truth so long as I get to brag about interrupting people’ Veasey to respect the Law and my rights.”
4)
5) “As soon as it is convenient for me to file . . . , I intend to sue you for your tortious acts against me. Glenda ‘Useless Braggart’ Veasey may not prosecute your perjury, but I fully intend to. I will sue you for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. I will sue you for Abuse of Process for your maliciously filed [DVRO] request. I will sue you for Defamation. If you complain to the Bar, I will have more causes of action – and you don’t think they aren’t used to bitchy bitter ex-wives bitching?”
6)
7) “I thought: maybe she wouldn’t want her boss to know that she was screwing a tenant and has been doing so since at least April.”
8)
9) “If [Commissioner] Glenda thinks you have a right to express lies about me, maybe even she (though it is doubtful) will realize that I have a First Amendment Right to publish the Truth.”
10)
Kelly also alleged that between the hours of 10:30 p.m. on September 29, 2018 and 7:30 a.m. on September 30, 2018, Jeffrey trespassed onto her property and “dumped” all of their minor child Joseph’s personal belongings in front of her garage door, in direct view of Joseph’s bedroom window. She attached to her DVRO request a photo of the items as they were left in front of her garage door.

Kelly asked the court to make the following orders:

1) That Jeffrey cannot “[h]arass, attack, strike, threaten, assault . . . , hit, follow, stalk, . . . disturb the peace” of Kelly and Joseph.
2)
3) That Jeffrey cannot “[c]ontact [Kelly or Joseph], either directly or indirectly, in any way”; and
4)
5) That Jeffrey shall stay at least 100 yards away from Kelly and her home, place of work, and vehicle, and from Joseph and the school he attends.
6)
The trial court granted a temporary DVRO against Jeffrey (effective until the hearing date), ordering him to stay “at least 100 yards away” from Kelly and her home/car/place of work, and from Joseph and the school he attends.

E. Jeffrey’s Second DVRO Request
F.
On October 22, 2018, Jeffrey filed his second DVRO request against Kelly. He alleged:

1) Kelly “hates me. She totally despises me with every ounce of her being. She has reason to, because she has injured me worse tha[n] I ever could have thought possible. She caused my 12-year-old son to cheat on me with another father in secret (which is why it was ‘cheating’) for three months. When I responded by serving ex parte notice . . . to request . . . him evaluated by a therapist for parental alienation, [Kelly] began a malicious, and perjurious prolonged assault against my job and my livelihood.” (Emphasis in original.)
2)
3) “The current problems began . . . when I found that my son had been cheating on me for at least three months. It was then that my son . . . revealed that he’d been secretly building a relationship with this other man since late April. He told me that his mother had told him to keep all knowledge of the man’s existence from me and that my son had willingly done so.” (Emphasis in original.)
4)
5) “I was being cuckholded as a father and none of them thought that there was anything wrong with doing that to me.” (Boldface and underscoring omitted.)
6)
7) After notifying Kelly of his intent to appear in court on ex parte basis on August 7 “to request that the Court have our son evaluated for Parental Alienation”, Kelly “began a campaign of retaliation against me for having given the ex parte notice. [¶] She had already demolished my fatherhood. She decided to demolish my job and the shreds of my life that were left.” (Boldface, italics and underscoring omitted.)
8)
9) Kelly “began her assault immediately after I gave her the [ex parte] notice . . . by filing a complaint with the L.A. County Dept. of Child Support Services, complaining that I was a Deadbeat Dad – which was a malicious lie. This resulted in my current employer . . . being instructed by the County to report on my income, as though I was a Deadbeat Dad.”
10)
11) Kelly “committed felony perjury” by filing a DVRO request and “chose to intentionally harm” him by having it served at his “2-month-old job.”
12)
13) “Commissioner Veasey completely ignored the clear evidence of the felony perjury and said [Kelly] had a First Amendment Right to file her malicious complaint with the County . . . . Commissioner Veasey clearly makes her decisions in camera, and the hearing is simply a rubber-stamp – in mockery of Due Process.”
14)
Jeffrey alleged Kelly “attacked [his] job again” on October 17, 2018 when she sent a cease and desist letter to him at his new place of employment, demanding that he cease his harassment of her. He argues: “If she wanted to achieve her desired result, she would have sent it to my home or via email. Instead, she sent the letter to my job in order to shame me and cause me further pain – to pour salt in the gaping wound that is what is left of my life.”

He requested the court order Kelly not to “[h]arass, attack, strike, threaten” Jeffrey, not to contact him in any way, and to stay “at least 100 yards away” from him, his home, his vehicle, and his place of work. He also requested the court order Kelly to participate in a 52-week batterer intervention program.

The court did not issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) to protect Jeffrey until the hearing date, because the facts as stated “do not show reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.”

G. Jeffrey’s Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration and his Response to Kelly’s Second DVRO Request
H.
On October 29, 2018, Jeffrey filed an ex parte application asking the court to reconsider its decision to grant Kelly a TRO protecting her from Jeffrey until the hearing on the DVRO request. He also requested the court reconsider its decision to deny his peremptory challenge against Commissioner Veasey. In his request, he states: “I never engaged in any behavior towards [Kelly] during either hearing. You and your bailiffs would not have allowed it. Your bailiffs would have reported any bad behavior . . . and it would have been recorded in the Court record. You know these statements are perjury, but you granted her DVRO anyway, demonstrating your bias against me and demonstrating that the DVRO of a liar should never have been granted.” The court denied Jeffrey’s ex parte requests.

On November 8, 2018, Jeffrey filed his response to Kelly’s second DVRO request. He denied having stalked Kelly on the evening of September 29, 2018; he explained his son Joseph “no longer has a home” with Jeffrey, so it made “no sense for [him] to have [Joseph’s] property” at his house, leading him to package Joseph’s clothes, linens, toys, and leave them in front of Kelly’s garage door. Jeffrey alleged Kelly was the one doing the stalking: “If me dropping off my son’s property at a time when I would not encounter her is stalking, what is her parking her white Dodge Minivan directly in front of my apartment building at dinnertime?”

Jeffrey alleged Kelly “committed perjury when she filed her [first] DVRO request as retaliation for [Jeffrey’s] Ex Parte Notice.” He alleged Kelly further committed perjury by stating he was “escorted out of the courtroom by the bailiff . . . due to hostile behavior, yelling, anger”—which Jeffrey denied ever happened: “So, bailiffs are nothing more than bouncers tossing ruffians to the curb? I have never been escorted out of a courtroom.”

Additionally, Jeffrey objected to assertions and statements in Kelly’s DVRO request and attachments on the ground the request misstated the evidence, and the attachments were inadmissible hearsay, not authenticated, irrelevant and prejudicial.

I. Trial Court Proceedings and Rulings
J.
The hearings on Kelly’s and Jeffrey’s respective second DVRO requests took place on November 9 and 30, 2018.

The court asked Jeffrey whether he prepared and sent the October 18 email to Kelly. Jeffrey admitted having done so. The court then asked Jeffrey whether he posted the Yelp review about Kelly on her employer’s page. He confirmed he had. He also admitted to having left Joseph’s materials outside Kelly’s garage door on the evening of September 29, 2018. The court then told Jeffrey, “I’m asking th[e]se questions because you filed an objection to the emails that you acknowledge that you sent. [¶] So you’re objecting to your own communications to her?” Jeffrey responded that “[t]hey’re hearsay. Whether there’s an exception or not—they’re hearsay.” The court told Jeffrey that “[t]hey’re statements against interest,” to which Jeffrey replied, “But unless you were giving her legal advice, she wouldn’t know that.” The court disagreed: “I haven’t given her any legal advice. I asked you, ‘did you send these emails,’ and you acknowledged that you sent them.” The court also explained Jeffrey’s “posting those comments does have relevance to her request for a restraining order against you.”

Jeffrey argued Kelly’s cease and desist letter to Jeffrey at his workplace was “full of outright lies” and “defamatory.” The court disagreed: “Sir, I don’t see a lie in her cease and desist letter; I read it, and it is a proper cease and desist letter.” As Jeffrey continued to disagree with the court, the court reminded Jeffrey of another option available to him: “I told you before, if you think she has defamed you – and by the way, this is a letter to you. If you think she’s guilty of some sort of defamation or slander, you can file a defamation o[r] slander action.”

The court next asked Jeffrey about his allegation that Kelly contacted Child Support Services and referred to him as a “deadbeat dad.” The court asked, “What information do you have that she has ever referred to you – to them or anyone else – as a deadbeat dad? [¶] The only person who keeps raising that term is you.” Jeffrey responded with a question of his own: “What do you call a father who doesn’t pay his child support?” The court explained that “anyone who has a child in a family law action can open a case with Child Support Services” and that “anyone who does so is not automatically . . . a deadbeat dad or any other derogatory term.” Jeffrey then called “this entire hearing . . . pointless.”

The court responded: “I don’t agree with your view of the law. I think you make several legal and factual misstatements in your paperwork. Your legal position – for example, you say that you’re angry with her, because you say that she has caused your 12-year-old child to cheat on you, because she has a gentleman in her life. [¶] And I don’t know what the relationship between the gentleman in her life and your son is, but a child can’t cheat on you. To state – as an attorney, to state that ‘she has caused my 12-year-old child to cheat on me,’ and then to send letters and e mail messages – page-and-a-half-long letters and e-mail messages, not only to her, but to the 12-year-old child, calling him a lying, deceitful – and telling the court that having contact with your 12-year-old child is a danger to you and your job, and therefore, you want no contact with your child ever again . . . .”

The court and Jeffrey engaged in a back-and-forth dialogue; the record reflects multiple instances where the bailiff had to remind Jeffrey: “Don’t interrupt the judge” three separate times; “Lower your voice”; “Calm down.”

The court overruled Jeffrey’s objections to the documents attached to Kelly’s second DVRO request, took judicial notice of the prior restraining order pleadings and responses filed by both sides, and found issuance of Kelly’s requested restraining order against Jeffrey both “necessary and appropriate.” The DVRO was effective for five years.

The court then denied Jeffrey’s requested DVRO against Kelly.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Issuing the DVRO Against Jeffrey.
B.
Under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.), a court is authorized to issue a protective order enjoining a party from engaging in specific acts of harassment or abuse against a cohabitant or former cohabitant. (Fam. Code, §§ 6211, subd. (b), 6218, 6322, 6340, subd. (a)(1).) The court’s issuance of a restraining order under the DVPA is a discretionary matter. (Fam. Code, § 6300, subd. (a).) “ ‘A trial court’s exercise of discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless, as a matter of law, an abuse of discretion is shown—i.e.,—where, considering all the relevant circumstances, the court has “exceeded the bounds of reason” or it can “fairly be said” that no judge would reasonably make the same order under the same circumstances.’ ” (In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 480, italics omitted.) “So long as the court exercised its discretion along legal lines, its decision will not be reversed on appeal if there is substantial evidence to support it.” (Ibid.) We resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of Kelly, the prevailing party, and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences in favor of upholding the trial court’s findings. (In re Marriage of Bonds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1, 31.)

Jeffrey argues it was an abuse of discretion for the court to grant the five-year DVRO against him “in light of the facts.” He contends he “was justified” in sending his October 18, 2018 email to Kelly because she “would not stop harassing and embarrassing him at his new job” (referring to Kelly having sent her cease and desist letter to him at his place of employment via certified mail). He further argues although “he’d felt an urge to retaliate against [Kelly] . . . by distributing flyers with all the negative Yelp reviews about Kelly,” he decided not to “follow[] through with this inclination and instead would be filing a lawsuit against Kelly.” He contends his Yelp review is “not vulgar” because he used no profanity or graphic language in the post. Finally, he alleges the trial court abused its discretion in granting Kelly’s requested DVRO because Commissioner Veasey had “personal knowledge as a percipient witness to the fact that multiple allegations made by Kelly [in her DVRO request] were perjurious fabrications” (referring to Kelly’s allegations about Jeffrey for being “escorted out of the courtroom by the [b]ailiff . . . due to hostile behavior, yelling, anger, and unwillingness to cooperate” during the September 4 and October 2, 2018 hearings).

We find none of these arguments meritorious. We have reviewed Kelly’s allegations regarding Jeffrey’s behavior in her second DVRO request, the October 2, 2018 Yelp review Jeffrey posted about Kelly on her employer’s Yelp page (i.e., “I’ll bet she’s nicer to tenants she’s doing”), and his October 18, 2018 email to Kelly and her employer, where he threatened to sue Kelly for a myriad of torts and for “more causes of action” should she complain about Jeffrey to the California State Bar (i.e., “you don’t think they aren’t used to bitchy bitter ex-wives bitching?”). Although Jeffrey may view his own behavior as “not vulgar”, we believe contacting his ex-spouse’s employer via email in the manner he did (“maybe she wouldn’t want her boss to know that she was screwing a tenant and has been doing so since at least April”) and leaving reviews about his ex-spouse on her employer’s Yelp page in the manner he did (“I’ll bet she’s nicer to tenants she’s doing”) amounts to abuse, harassment, and intentional disturbing of Kelly’s peace, warranting the DVRO against him.

We further agree with the trial court’s decision to issue the DVRO for a period of five years; it is noteworthy Jeffrey maintains to this day he “was justified” in sending the October 18, 2018 email to Kelly and her employer.

Jeffrey next argues Commissioner Veasey acted as “Kelly’s trial-by-combat Champion, taking command of Kelly’s case” and was “both trier of fact and prosecutor at the hearing.” We find nothing based on our review of the record to support Jeffrey’s stated position. To Jeffrey, Commissioner Veasey’s decision to overrule his hearsay objection to his own emails and Yelp review (both of which he admitted drafting) and her explanation of the ruling (“they’re statements against interest”) showed Commissioner Veasey acted as Kelly’s “pro bono counsel.” We are unaware of any legal principle that prevents a trial court from analyzing the merits of a hearsay objection, where the opposing party is not independently aware of an applicable exception to the hearsay rule.

Jeffrey also argues Commissioner Veasey had “personal knowledge” of Kelly’s “perjurious fabrications” in her second DVRO request where Kelly alleged Jeffrey exhibited “hostile behavior, yelling, anger, and unwillingness to cooperate with instructions given to him by Commissioner Veasey,” resulting in him being “escorted out of the courtroom.” The reporter’s transcript does not show whether or not Jeffrey was escorted out of the courtroom by a bailiff; it does, however, show that during the October 2, 2018 hearing, Jeffrey repeatedly interrupted Commissioner Veasey, accused her of “misstating the facts,” and told her she takes “glory in” interrupting him, at which point the bailiff contacted the “office” and reported a “code one.” The record also establishes that during another hearing, the bailiff had to remind Jeffrey multiple times not to interrupt the judge, to lower his voice, and to calm down. We find Jeffrey’s behavior during the trial court proceedings did amount to “hostile behavior, yelling, anger, and unwillingness to cooperate” with Commissioner Veasey, as alleged in Kelly’s second DVRO request. Whether or how Jeffrey was escorted out of prior proceedings does not vitiate the hostile and uncooperative behavior he exhibited to the court.

“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) “ ‘All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 (Denham), italics added.) It is the appellant’s burden on appeal to produce a record “ ‘which overcomes the presumption of validity favoring [the] judgment.’ ” (Webman v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 592, 595.) Failure to provide an adequate record requires that the issue be resolved against the appellant. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295; see Oliveira v. Kiesler (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1362.) If it was so important to impeach Kelly on the issue of whether he was formally escorted out of the courtroom, Jeffrey had the option of subpoenaing the bailiff to testify at the hearing. Not having done so, it was for the trial court to weigh the evidence before it and consider witness credibility, issues routinely resolved by the trier of fact. (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 182.) We believe the evidence elicited at the proceedings of November 9 and 30, 2019 supports the restraining order issued against Jeffrey.

Finally, Jeffrey argues the court “added new allegations” against Jeffrey when it took judicial notice of prior DVRO request filings by the parties. However, judicial notice may be taken of records of any court of this state (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)), and prior pleadings filed by the parties in this case constitute court records. More importantly, because the clerk’s transcript Jeffrey provided us did not include a copy of the first DVRO filings by Kelly and by Jeffrey, respectively, we are unable to determine what the trial court took judicial notice of, other than the fact that the pleadings were filed. Nor are we able to decide whether the court abused its discretion in denying Jeffrey’s request for a continuance of the hearing after the court took judicial notice of the prior DVRO requests. Failure, again, to provide an adequate record results in the issue being resolved against appellant.

On this record, we cannot say the court abused its discretion. There was substantial evidence that Jeffrey’s past acts constituted threatening and harassing behavior toward Kelly.

C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Jeffrey’s DVRO Request Against Kelly.
D.
Jeffrey contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his DVRO request. More specifically, he argues he made “a prima facie showing of the necessity of a DVRO against Kelly,” and provides the following as evidence of abuse and/or harassment: 1) Kelly “engaged in a retributive campaign to destroy his life” after and because Jeffrey gave ex parte notice of his request that Joseph undergo therapy for parental alienation; 2) Kelly “attacked his job . . . when it was only two months old”; and 3) Kelly victimized him with her “felonious perjurious accusations.”

Although Jeffrey may believe Kelly’s request for child support was filed to harass him because he provided ex parte notice to request Joseph undergo an evaluation for parental alienation, he did not prove this allegation. What’s more, the trial court specifically explained to Jeffrey that Kelly has “an absolute right to contact the authorities and file [child support] actions” and the court “can’t . . . issue a restraining order for her filing a child support action.” The court explained to Jeffrey he did not establish that Kelly’s “sole and only motivation . . . [was] to harass [him]. [¶] Might harassment be a byproduct or one of the effects? Yes. But that doesn’t make it a domestic violence restraining order.” The trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the evidence, determining witness credibility, and concluding that Kelly’s request for child support did not amount to an act of abuse or harassment. We further agree with the trial court that the only individual who referred to Jeffrey as a “deadbeat dad” was Jeffrey himself; the record contains no evidence that Kelly, or anyone other than Jeffrey, referred to him as such.

Similarly, Jeffrey believes Kelly’s cease and desist letter to him, sent to him at his place of employment, constituted harassment and defamation because it was “full of outright lies.” We agree with the trial court, however, that it was a proper cease and desist letter. In the letter, Kelly stated that Jeffrey “crossed every line of decency, decorum, respect and common courtesy” and that Jeffrey’s harassment via email and Yelp posts will not be tolerated. We see no impropriety in this letter and Jeffrey has provided us with no legal authority demonstrating otherwise.

E. Evidentiary Objections
F.
In his opening brief, Jeffrey states the following: “The Court also abused its discretion in overruling Jeffrey’s evidentiary objections. Abuse of discretion is the standard for reviewing a court’s rulings on evidentiary issues. [Citations.]” In support, Jeffrey provides: “Kelly never bothered to oppose Jeffrey’s evidentiary objections. . . . Kelly did nothing – she didn’t have to, because Commissioner Veasey acted as her pro bono counsel. Veasey argued around the objections and then issued a blanket override of them.” These statements are the only argument and authority provided by Jeffrey with respect to his challenge to the trial court’s ruling on his evidentiary objections; this is not enough, not even close.

An appellant who does not provide adequate legal authority and analysis to support a contention forfeits that contention. (Ewald v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 947, 948; Nielsen v. Gibson (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.) Indeed, the cardinal rule of appellate review is that a judgment or order of the trial court is presumed correct and prejudicial error must be affirmatively shown. (Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564.) In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action will be made by the appellate court. (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 186–187.)

Here, Jeffrey has failed to offer reasoned analysis of the issue. He has waived any argument that the trial court erred in overruling his evidentiary objections to Kelly’s attachments to her second DVRO request. We treat an issue and/or argument as waived “ ‘ “[w]hen an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority.” (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.) Here, Jeffrey did not even identify his challenge to the trial court’s ruling on his evidentiary objections in a “separate argument heading” in his opening brief. (Roe v. McDonald’s Corp. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1114.) “The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contentions as waived.” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [“support each point [in a brief] by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority”].)

Based on the foregoing, Jeffrey’s challenge to the trial court’s ruling on his evidentiary objections is deemed waived.

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed. Respondent has not appeared; no costs are awarded.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, J.

We concur:

BIGELOW, P. J.

GRIMES, J.