Case Number: BC595626 Hearing Date: May 09, 2016 Dept: 34

SUBJECT: Motion to compel further responses to requests for production

Moving Party: Plaintiff Kenya Hicks

Resp. Party: Defendant Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Los Angeles, LLC

Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to request for production number 46 is DENIED. The Court imposes sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel in the total amount of $1,250.00.

PRELIMINARY COMMENTS:

This is the fourth formal noticed motion filed by counsel in the past five months. In the court’s rulings after both the December 17, 2015 and March 14, 2015 hearings, the court admonished counsel about their apparent unwillingness or inability to resolve these issues through a serious process of meeting-and-conferring. The Court would again suggest that counsel make use of the court’s offer to informally resolve these issues without the unnecessary expenditure of time and fees on formal motions. (See Court’s Trial Orders, ¶ IV.)

The court also notes that Plaintiff’s Separate Statement is of little value in advancing its case before the Court. The Separate Statement simply cites textbook California cases on discovery, with no analysis or discussion of how these cases apply to the facts of this case. It appears to the Court that the first four paragraphs of this Separate statement were simply downloaded from counsel’s computer without any concern for its applicability to the case at hand. (Separate Statement, p. 2:21-p. 3:26.)

BACKGROUND:

Plaintiff commenced this action on 9/24/15 against defendants for: (1) family and medical leave discrimination; (2) family and medical leave discrimination; (3) retaliation; (4) retaliation; (5) disability discrimination; (6) disability discrimination; (7) retaliation; (8) retaliation; (9) failure to accommodate; (10) failure to engage in the interactive process; (11) disability harassment; (12) failure to prevent harassment; and (13) failure to prevent discrimination and harassment.

ANALYSIS:

A motion to compel further responses to requests for production “shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(b)(1).) “To establish ‘good cause,’ the burden is on the moving party to show both: [¶] Relevance to the subject matter (e.g., how the information in the documents would tend to prove or disprove some issue in the case); and [¶] Specific facts justifying discovery (e.g., why such information is necessary for trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial.) [Citations.] [¶] The fact that there is no alternative source for the information sought is an important factor in establishing ‘good cause’ for inspection. But it is not essential in every case.” (Weil & Brown, Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2015) ¶ 8:1495.6.) “For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it ‘might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement.’ [Citation] Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence. [Citation] These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery.” (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.)

“If ‘good cause’ is shown by the moving party, the burden is then on the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure (the same as on motions to compel answers to interrogatories or deposition questions.” (Weil & Brown, ¶ 8:1496.)

Plaintiff seeks to compel further responses to request for production number 46. This request seeks “any and all PeopleSoft or other personal computer data system printouts or screenshots that identifies and describes DEFENDANT’S workforce at the time of PLAINTIFF’S termination, including each employee’s name, date of hire, job title and department/division.” Defendant responded with objections based on privacy and burden. Plaintiff argues that she has good cause for seeking the information because she has a right to contact witnesses and persons possessing relevant evidence. Plaintiff also argues that the evidence is related to the statistical makeup of plaintiff’s department and could be used to determine if defendant engaged in disparate treatment.

Defendant argues that the request seeks private and confidential information. “California accords privacy the constitutional status of an ‘inalienable right,’ on a par with defending life and possessing property.” (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 841 [citing Cal. Const., art. I, § 1; White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757].) In determining this issue, “courts must balance the right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts against the privacy interests of persons subject to discovery.” (Id. at p. 843.) Employees have a right to privacy in their own personnel files. (See Teamsters Local 856 v. Priceless, LLC (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1514-1515.)

The right to privacy is not absolute and is limited by the right to discovery. (Lantz v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1853.) “Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) However, “when the constitutional right of privacy is involved, the party seeking discovery of private matter must do more than satisfy the section 2017 standard. The party seeking discovery must demonstrate a compelling need for discovery, and that compelling need must be so strong as to outweigh the privacy right when these two competing interests are carefully balanced.” (Lantz, 28 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1853-1854.)

“However, determination of the nature of the compelling state interest does not complete the constitutional equation.” (Palay v. Superior Court (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 919, 934.) “An impairment of the privacy interest ‘passes constitutional muster only if it is necessary to achieve the compelling interest.'” (Ibid. [quoting Wood v. Superior Court (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1138, 1148].)

“That means that the conflict between the competing values must be unavoidable, i.e., that it does not arise from the choice of means by which to secure the compelling interest. It can readily be seen that if the conflict is avoidable but is not avoided the real conflict is not between the compelling interest and the constitutional interest but between the means chosen to achieve the compelling interest and the constitutional interest. Thus, a logical corollary of the compelling interest doctrine is the alternatives test. It requires a reordering of the values to be placed on the constitutional scales. If an alternative means of securing the compelling interest can be devised by which to avoid or minimize the conflict between the values protected by the constitution and the values found to be of compelling interest, that must be done. [Citation.] This results in a prohibition, among other things, of overbroad means of enforcement. It requires that the state utilize the ‘least intrusive’ means to satisfy its interest. [Citation.]”

(Palay, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 934 [quoting Wood, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1148].) “The scope of methods used must be tailored to avoid disclosure of protected records.” (Palay, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 934.)

“The burden is on the party seeking the constitutionally protected information to establish direct relevance.” (Davis, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017.) “Mere speculation as to the possibility that some portion of the records might be relevant to some substantive issue does not suffice.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff fails to show that the documents sought are directly relevant or that the scope of the request is narrowly tailored. The request seeks personnel information about all of defendant’s employees. Though plaintiff states that she is willing to limit this to the employees at the LAX location, plaintiff still fails to show why such extensive information is needed. To the extent that plaintiff is seeking witness information, the request is not limited to only those employees who worked with plaintiff or others mentioned in the complaint. To the extent that plaintiff is seeking statistical or demographic information, it is unclear why the employees’ names or other data that would be disclosed in response to this discovery demand needs to be disclosed.

Defendant also objects that the request is burdensome. “The objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required.” (West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) Plaintiff has offered to limit the request to defendant’s workforce at the LAX location. However, defendant offers evidence that approximately 500 employees worked at that location at the time of plaintiff’s termination. (See Signater Decl., ¶ 3.) However, there is no indication showing the “quantum of work required” to comply with Plaintiff’s request. Thus, if there were no privacy issues involved, the Court would not sustain defendant’s objection on the grounds of burden and oppression.

Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to request for production number 46 is DENIED. The Court imposes sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel in the total amount of $1,250.00. (See Kepler Decl., ¶ 7.)