LARRY BRUNSON VS EL RANCHO UNIFIED SCHOOL

Case Number: VC064673 Hearing Date: May 05, 2016 Dept: SEC

BRUNSON v. EL RANCHO UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST.
CASE NO.: VC064673
HEARING: 05/05/16

#6
TENTATIVE ORDER

Defendant EL RANCHO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. C.C.P. § 437c.

Plaintiff alleges a sole cause of action for race discrimination. The following facts are undisputed. Plaintiff LARRY BRUNSON was employed as defendant’s Director of Student Services (“DSS”) from August 2013 through June 2014. Brunson depo., p.11, 45 (Exh. B). Superintendent Martin Galindo was his direct supervisor. Id. at 48. Galindo was part of the seven-person panel who interviewed plaintiff. Id. at 55-56.

When plaintiff was hired, he signed an employment contract for the 2013-2014 school year. Exh. C. The agreement provides that the Board of education may elect not to renew or extend plaintiff’s contract. Id. In November 2013, plaintiff learned that the District was facing a financial crisis and he began seeking employment elsewhere. Brunson depo., p. 70-75.

On March 11, 2014, Galindo informed plaintiff that his DSS position was being eliminated for financial reasons. Id. at 121-122. Plaintiff was given written notice a few days later. Id.; Exh. D. In fact, plaintiff’s employment contract was not renewed or extended.

The DSS position was replaced with a Director of Special Education. The tasks for the two positions were similar, but the Director of Special Education was not responsible for student services, which was about 30% of plaintiff’s job. Brunson depo., p. 48, 133-34. Kathryn Aguirre, ah Hispanic, was hired as the Director of Special Education. Id. at 129.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant, in failing to offer him the substantially similar position, discriminated against him because he is African-American. He alleges that Galindo preferred an Hispanic candidate when he was initially interviewed, and that she was hired to replace him. FAC, ¶¶10, 18. Plaintiff also alleges that Galindo failed to give him a performance evaluation. ¶17.

In order to state a discrimination claim under FEHA, a plaintiff must establish (1) his membership in a protected class, (2) discrimination, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action and (4) some other circumstance suggests a discriminatory motive. See Slatkin v. Univ. of Redlands (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1147.

A defendant seeking summary adjudication of such a claim can meet its burden by showing that either one of the elements of the cause of action cannot be met, or the adverse employment action was based on legitimate, non-discriminatory factors. Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189, 203. Defendant has met its burden under both.

Defendant has met its burden of proffering evidence that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 802. First, plaintiff admitted in deposition that he never actually applied for the job he claims he was denied. His explanation is that because he believed the positions were substantially similar, he did not need to apply and that he was told he would be “wasting his time” if he applied. Id. at 175. Assuming plaintiff can establish an actual adverse employment decision, the evidence upon which he relies is insufficient to support an inference of racial discrimination.

The Court notes that plaintiff admits that no one at the District, including Galindo, ever said anything to him that was racially inappropriate. Depo. at 123. He also admits he never heard Galindo say anything negative about him. Id. at 152. His theory of racial discrimination is purportedly supported by inferences to be drawn from the largely undisputed facts.

The fact that Galindo selected Aguirre, who plaintiff claims was less qualified, does not itself support an inference that his preference was based on any racial considerations. Galindo’s failure to answer plaintiff’s calls, or do a performance evaluation or plaintiff’s alleged exclusion from meetings do not suggest racial animus. Unlike in Kelly v. Stapms.com, Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1088, plaintiff did not proffer statements or conduct from which a discriminatory motive could reasonably be inferred.

In sum, the Court finds plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to create a triable issue of material fact with respect to his race discrimination cause of action. The motion for summary judgment is granted.

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