Tentative Ruling

Judge Thomas Anderle
Department 3 SB-Anacapa
1100 Anacapa Street P.O. Box 21107 Santa Barbara, CA 93121-1107

CIVIL LAW & MOTION
Larry W. Lawson, et al. v. Shadlow Hills Single Family Lots Owners’ Association
Case No: 19CV00454
Hearing Date: Tue Feb 18, 2020 9:30

Nature of Proceedings: Demurrer to First Amended Complaint

Demurrer to First Amended Complaint

ATTORNEYS:

Namson Pham for Plaintiffs Larry W. Lawson, Nancy Duong, aka Ngan My Duong, aka Nancy Lawson, John Coggi, and Melinda Coggi

Dan E. Heck for Defendants Shadow Hills Single Family Lots Owners Association and Shadow Hills of Santa Barbara Master Association

RULING: Defendant Association’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ FAC is overruled. Defendant shall file and serve its answer to the FAC on or before February 28, 2020.

BACKGROUND:

This action concerns a private unit development called Shadow Hills in Santa Barbara, California. There are 18 single-family homes within the development. Plaintiffs Larry W. Lawson and Nancy Duong (the “Lawsons”) are the owners of real property located at 4433 Shadow Hills Boulevard South, Santa Barbara, California 93105. Plaintiffs John Coggi and Melinda Coggi (the “Coggis”) are the owners of real property located at 4463 Shadow Hills Boulevard North, Santa Barbara, California 93105. Defendant Shadow Hills Single Family Lots Owners Association, a non-profit mutual benefit corporation, and defendant Shadow Hills of Santa Barbara Master Association, a non-profit mutual benefit corporation, (together, “Association”), are homeowners’ associations with concurrent authority over the Shadow Hills development. Defendants George R. Guffey and Mary Ellen Guffey (the “Guffeys”) are the owners of real property located at 4453 Shadow Hills South, Santa Barbara, California 93105.

Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint (“FAC”), filed on December 11, 2019, alleges causes of action for (1) breach of equitable servitudes (governing documents), (2) negligence, (3) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (4) breach of fiduciary duty, (5) nuisance, (6) trespass, (7) violation of the Open Meeting Act (Civ. Code §4900 et seq.), and (8) declaratory relief. The first, second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, and eighth causes of action are asserted against Association, while the fifth, sixth, and eighth causes of action are asserted against the Guffeys. The Lawson and Coggi plaintiffs allege that Association does not provide their properties with equivalent landscaping and irrigations services as it provides to other homeowners within the development. Plaintiffs further allege that the Guffeys have improperly constructed and maintained improvements in the form of hardscaping, walls, and bushes on Association common areas adjacent to the Guffeys’ property, preventing plaintiffs and other homeowners from accessing and using such common areas.

Association now generally demurs to plaintiffs’ first, second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, and eighth causes of action on the ground that plaintiff Nancy Duong aka Ngan My Duong aka Nancy Lawson (“Duong”) does not have standing to sue Association. Association also demurs to all seven causes of action for uncertainty because the FAC does not distinguish between the harm the non-Duong plaintiffs allege and the harm Duong alleges. Plaintiffs oppose the demurrer.

ANALYSIS:

Requests for Judicial Notice

Association has requested that the Court take judicial notice of (1) the unrecorded July 12, 2019, Quit Claim Deed attached to the FAC as Exhibit 1, (2) the Amended Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Shadow Hills Single Family Lots, attached to the FAC as Exhibit 2, (3) the Amended Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions of Shadow Hills of Santa Barbara, attached to the FAC as Exhibit 3, (4) excerpts from plaintiffs’ initial complaint filed on January 25, 2019, (5) excerpts from Duong’s responses to defendant’s Form Interrogatories, Set One, (6) excerpts from Duong’s responses to defendant’s Requests for Admission, Set One, (7) defendant’s Requests for Admission, Set Two, (8) excerpts from Duong’s responses to defendant’s Requests for Admission, Set Two, (9) excerpts from Duong’s supplemental responses to defendant’s Form Interrogatories, Set One, and (10) excerpts from Duong’s deposition testimony.

Items (1), (2), (3), and (4) are court records for which judicial notice may and will be taken. Evid. Code §452, subd. (d). Items (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), and (10) do not fall within any of the categories of matters subject to judicial notice under Evidence Code Section 452 and the Court declines to take judicial notice of these items. Defendant cites Del E. Webb Corporation v. Structural Materials Company (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 for the proposition that the court may take judicial notice of the plaintiff’s responses to interrogatories and requests for admission when considering a demurrer, but in Webb, the plaintiff’s discovery responses were already part of the court record because the plaintiff had filed them as part of its opposition to an earlier summary judgment motion. That is not the case here. The hearing on a demurrer may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing through the guise of having the court take judicial notice of discovery responses that are filed on behalf of the demurring party and that purport to contradict the allegations of the complaint. Id., at 605.

Plaintiffs request that the Court take judicial notice of (1) Interspousal Transfer Deed recorded on November 22, 2019, as Instrument No. 2019-0054138 in the Official Records of the Santa Barbara County Recorder’s Office, (2) Amended Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Shadow Hills Single Family Lots recorded in the Official Records of the Santa Barbara County Recorder’s Office and attached to the FAC as Exhibit 2, (3) 2012 Amended Bylaws of Shadow Hills Single Family Lots Owners Association filed by Association in support of its earlier summary judgment motion, (4) Amended Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions of Shadow Hills of Santa Barbara attached to the FAC as Exhibit 3, and (5) 2012 Amended Bylaws of Shadow Hills of Santa Barbara Master Association filed by Association in support of its earlier summary judgment motion.

Item (1) is a recorded document for which judicial notice may and will be taken as the document “[is] not reasonably subject to dispute and [is] capable of immediate and accurate determination.” Evid. Code §452, subd. (h). Items (2), (3), (4), and (5) are court records for which judicial notice may and will be taken. Evid. Code §452, subd. (d).

Judicial notice does not extend to the truth of any factual assertions appearing in the records. Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 483.

Demurrer to FAC

The legal authority for a demurrer is found in Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.10, which provides, in relevant part:

“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one of the following grounds:

“(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

“(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, ‘uncertain’ includes ambiguous and unintelligible.”

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the complaint or from matters outside the complaint that are judicially noticeable. Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Company (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994. This means that a court cannot consider facts asserted in a demurrer which, if true, would disclose a defect in the complaint. Ion Equipment Corporation v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881. Moreover, in reviewing the sufficiency of a cause of action against a demurrer, the court assumes the truth of all facts properly pleaded. Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 558. The court also assumes the truth of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the properly pleaded facts. Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075, 1083.

Association challenges plaintiffs’ first, second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, and eighth causes of action on the ground that Duong does not have standing to sue defendant because she is not an owner and member of Association. Property ownership is a prerequisite to asserting a claim against a homeowner’s association for violation of the property owner’s rights. Civil Code Section 5975, subdivision (a), of the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act provides:

“The covenants and restrictions in the declaration shall be enforceable equitable servitudes, unless unreasonable, and shall inure to the benefit of and bind all owners of separate interests in the development. Unless the declaration states otherwise, these servitudes may be enforced by any owner of a separate interest or by the association, or by both.”

Both the Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (“Master CC&Rs”) and the Single Family Lots Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (“SFL CC&Rs”) state that they bind and inure to the benefit of a person having right, title, and interest in property subject to Association’s control. (Dfd. RJN, Nos. 2 and 3; FAC, Ex. 3, p. 3, §1.18; FAC, Ex. 2, p. 3, §1.18.) Every person who is a record owner of a lot within the development is a member of Association. (Dfd. RJN, Nos. 2 and 3; FAC, Ex. 3, p. 11, §4.2.1; FAC, Ex. 2, p. 11, §4.2.1.) Only a member has the right to enforce the governing documents. As the SFL CC&Rs state:

“4.2.3. Rights: Each member shall have the rights, duties, and obligations set forth in the Governing Instruments as well as the rights, duties, and obligations set forth in the Master Declaration and in the Bylaws and Rules of the Master Association.”

(Dfd. RJN, Item 2, FAC, Ex. 2, p. 11, §4.2.3.)

Association’s demurrer will be overruled. Association does not dispute that plaintiff Larry Lawson has standing to sue because he is one of the owners of record of one of the properties within the Shadow Hills development. (FAC, ¶¶ 1, 12.) However, plaintiff Duong (aka “Nancy Lawson”) also has standing as the FAC specifically alleges that she is an “owner . . . of the single family residential property at 4433 Shadow Boulevard South, Santa Barbara, California 93105” and that she acquired her interest in 2019. (FAC, ¶2.) The Interspousal Transfer Deed recorded on November 22, 2019, as Instrument No. 2019-0054138 in the Official Records of the Santa Barbara County Recorder’s Office confirms that Duong is a record title holder of the Lawson property. (Ptf. RJN, Ex. 1, Interspousal Transfer Deed, recorded 11-22-19.) Association argues that Duong was not an owner when the initial complaint was filed on January 25, 2019, and that she cannot be given retroactive standing, but defendant’s relation back argument is misplaced. Duong was clearly an owner of the Lawson property when the FAC was filed on December 11, 2019. Moreover, while Duong’s lack of a record ownership interest prior to November 22, 2019, may limit her damages, the FAC alleges ongoing maintenance violations by Association, continuing through the present. (FAC, ¶¶ 14, 16.)

Association’s demurrer will be overruled for the additional reason that defendant is attempting to “split” plaintiffs’ causes of action. A general demurrer may not be sustained as to only part of a cause of action. If there are sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief, other allegations cannot be challenged by demurrer. Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1167. Here, the four plaintiffs have asserted causes of action for (1) breach of equitable servitudes, (2) negligence, (3) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (4) breach of fiduciary duty, (5) nuisance, (6) trespass, (7) violation of the Open Meeting Act, and (8) declaratory relief. Thus, even if Duong was not a record titleholder of any property within the Shadow Hills development, the eight causes of action would still survive, unchanged, because it is undisputed that plaintiffs Larry Lawson, John Coggi, and Melinda Coggi are all homeowners and members of Association.

Lastly, Association argues that plaintiffs’ FAC is uncertain because the complaint does not distinguish between the harm done to Duong and the harm done to the non-Duong plaintiffs. There is no need to make such a distinction, however. The Lawson plaintiffs (like the Coggi plaintiffs) are not suing for injury or damage to their persons, but for harm to their joint ownership and property interests in their residential property at 4433 Shadow Hills Boulevard South, Santa Barbara, California 93105. “As a direct and proximate result of the failure of Defendants to comply with the obligation in the Governing documents to provide landscaping and irrigation to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ property have been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial but in no event less than $50,000.” (FAC, ¶36.) Specifically in regards to their property interest claims, plaintiffs allege that they engaged in alternative dispute resolution pursuant to Civil Code Section 5925 et seq. in an attempt to resolve the claims before filing suit, but their efforts were unsuccessful. (FAC, ¶28.)

Based on the foregoing, Association’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ FAC will be overruled. Association shall file and serve its answer to the FAC on or before February 28, 2020.