Case Number: 14K04337    Hearing Date: October 06, 2014    Dept: 77

Defendant Ladan Abdollahi’s Special Motion to Strike is DENIED. CCP §§ 92, 128 and 425.16.

As a general rule, the plain text of a statute governs, as it is a guide to legislative intent. E.g., Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 672.

“Economic Litigation Rules”, CCP § 90-98, which have been adopted to reduce litigation costs and delay in limited civil cases, limit and permit only certain litigation procedures. In limited civil cases, motions to strike are allowed only on the ground that the damages or relief sought are not supported by the allegations in the complaint. CCP § 92(d). An anti-SLAPP motion pursuant to CCP § 425.16 (b) (1), is “a special motion to strike” because it seeks to strike the entire cause of action. For that reason alone it exceeds what § 92(d) permits. The text of § 92(d) alone thus requires the Court to deny the instant motion.

This reading of CCP § 425.16 (b) (1) reflects a reasonable legislative choice to bar anti-SLAPP motions in limited civil cases (even if the opposite choice also reasonably could have been made). The Code of Civil Procedure provides parties to these cases “economic litigation”; “economic”, because these cases involve smaller dollar amounts than in unlimited civil cases. See CCP §§ 90-100 (section heading for Article 2 and efficient litigation procedures provided). For instance, special demurrers – a fixture of unlimited civil cases – are prohibited in limited civil cases, even though general demurrers are allowed. See CCP § 92(c). While a special demurrer might in some situations make a particular limited case proceed more efficiently, the legislative determination apparently was that, on the whole, such motions are better prohibited in these small-dollar cases.

It is a reasonable choice to disallow special motions to strike pursuant to CCP § 425.16. Given that the choice appears to be a reasonable one, the Court sees no cause to depart from the plain text of § 92(d).

Additionally, the provisions governing appeals provide an additional statutory reason to conclude that a CCP § 425.16 motion cannot be brought in a limited civil case. CCP § 425.16 (i) makes a prejudgment denial of an anti-SLAPP motion appealable pursuant to CCP § 904.1, and § 904.1 likewise specifically provides for the appealability of § 425.16 rulings, see § 904.1(a) (13). But § 904.1 does not permit appeals in limited civil cases–see § 904.1(a). Appeal in limited civil cases is governed by its own statute, CCP § 904.2. Yet there is no authorization in that provision for appeals from prejudgment rulings on anti-SLAPP motions. Thus, the Code of Civil Procedure rules permit appeals from prejudgment rulings on anti-SLAPP motions in unlimited civil cases–but not in limited civil cases. See Citibank, N.A. v. Tabalon (2012), 209 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 16 (appellate division lacks jurisdiction over prejudgment rulings on § 425.16 motions in limited civil cases because § 904.2 does not provide for such appeals).

“The right to appeal a denial of an anti-SLAPP motion is important because it protects the interest validated by the anti-SLAPP statute.” People ex rel. Lockyer v. Brar (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1318. The fact that the Code of Civil Procedure does not authorize this important part of the § 425.16 statutory scheme in limited civil cases further supports this Court’s determination that anti-SLAPP motions are not permitted in such cases and supports the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend § 425.16 motions in limited civil cases. Even apart from legislative intent, the absence of an equivalent appellate procedure supports applying CCP § 92(d) as it reads to preclude anti-SLAPP motions in limited civil, so that anti-SLAPP motions are not applied differently than they are in general civil (i.e., without the immediate appellate right that is important to the scheme).

Plaintiffs Layne Kumetz, M.D., Inc. and Layne Kumetz, M.D.’s Motion to File Records Under Seal is TAKEN OFF CALENDAR. CCP § 128. This motion is moot in light of the court’s ruling on Defendant’s Special Motion to Strike.

Moving party to give notice.