Case Name:   Nguyen v. Mendez

Case No.:       1-13-CV-256134

This is a disturbing case.  Plaintiff Leanna Linh Chi Nguyen (“Plaintiff” or “Nguyen”) and defendant Luis Mendez (“Defendant” or “Mendez”) had an extramarital affair that lasted over nine years.  (See complaint, ¶ 5.)  In June 2013, after Plaintiff informed Defendant that their relationship was over, Defendant threatened Plaintiff to expose the affair to Plaintiff’s family and thereafter gained unauthorized contact to Plaintiff’s cell phone and downloaded all of her contacts’ information.  (Id.)  On October 10, 2013, Defendant forwarded a video revealing Plaintiff naked with Defendant to Plaintiff’s husband, and, on October 19, 2013, Defendant contacted Plaintiff’s daughter, offering to show pictures of a sexual encounter with Plaintiff.  (See complaint, ¶ 6.)  On October 24, 2013, Defendant sent an email to Plaintiff’s daughter, stating that her mom was a “sexual sick addicted [sic].”  (Id.)  On November 4, 2013, Defendant sent a mass email containing three graphic videos of sexual encounters with Plaintiff to over 70 recipients, including Plaintiff’s family members, relatives, colleagues and patients.  (See complaint, ¶ 7.)  On November 7, 2013, Defendant sent an email to Plaintiff’s son, stating that he has pictures and videos of his mom in a hotel room.  (See complaint, ¶ 8.)  Counsel for Plaintiff sent Defendant a letter instructing him to cease his malicious conduct.  (Id.)  On November 11, 2013, Defendant sent a text to Plaintiff stating that he was aware that Plaintiff had seen a letter and had spoken to police, and then threatened to send videos to everyone if he received another letter from an attorney or police.  (See complaint, ¶ 9.)  On November 15, 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant for intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy.

On February 3, 2014, the Court [Comm. Copeland] issued a DV-130 Restraining Order After hearing, enjoining Defendant from the posting, publication or sending of any videos, photographs or materials involving Plaintiff naked or engaged in a sexual encounter and was further ordered to take down from any internet source such publication.  On July 11, 2014, Defendant filed a cross-complaint, asserting causes of action for: declaratory relief; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and intentional interference with prospective economic relations and advantage.  Nguyen demurs to each cause of action on the ground that they are uncertain and fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The first cause of action of the cross-complaint alleges that Mendez suffered a stroke, rendering him incapacitated, but that he was unable to sell his business for a profit due to Plaintiff’s malicious and false statements.  Here, there are no alleged facts showing the existence of an actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties under a written instrument or with respect to property.  (See Wellenkamp v. Bank of America (1978) 21 Cal.3d 943, 947, citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1060 and Maguire v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Society (1944) 23 Cal.2d 719.)  In opposition, Mendez does not make any argument with regards to the declaratory relief claim.  (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976)18 Cal. 3d 335, 349 (stating that “Plaintiff must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading”), quoting Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 627, 636; see also Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 723, 742 (stating that “the burden is on the plaintiff… to demonstrate the manner in which the complaint might be amended”).)  Accordingly, the demurrer to the first cause of action of the cross-complaint for declaratory relief is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

The second cause of action of the cross-complaint for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the third cause of action of the cross-complaint for intentional interference with prospective economic relations and advantage are premised on alleged “false statements” and “malicious rumors” that “impugned his moral character.”  Here, to the extent that the claims are relying on those statements, Mendez is required to allege the substance of the statements, and, as Nguyen states, the claims do not allege the nature or content of the statements, or any other details as to them.   (See Okun v. Super. Ct. (Maple Properties) (1981) 29 Cal.3d 442, 458.)  Without such allegations, the claims neither allege extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to constitute a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress nor do they allege sufficient facts that support intentional acts designed to disrupt any economic relationship.  (See Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 209; see also Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4^th 1035, 1051 (noting that “[w]ith respect to the requirement that a plaintiff show severe emotional distress, [the California Supreme C]ourt has set a high bar”; also stating that “[l]iability for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities”); see also Venhaus v. Shultz (2007) 155 Cal.App.4^th 1072, 1078.)

Accordingly, although it is uncertain whether Mendez can state any valid claims on the facts of this case, the Court will give Mendez an opportunity to try to do so, and the demurrer to the second and third causes of action of the cross-complaint on the grounds that they are both uncertain and fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is SUSTAINED with 10 days leave to amend.

The Court will prepare the Order.  The parties are reminded of their case management conference on October 14, 2014 at 10:00 a.m.