Case Name: Lena Barbaccia, et al. v. Valerie Previte, et al.
Case No.: 17CV315122

This action arises from a dispute over the profits from a real-estate development project. The parties now have a discovery dispute over contention interrogatories, particularly special interrogatories, set one (“SI”) propounded by Valerie Previte (“Previte”). Previte claims plaintiff and cross-defendant Barbaccia Properties Holdings, LLC (“BPH”) served initial and then supplemental responses that contain improper boilerplate objections and lack complete and responsive answers to the questions posed. In opposition, BPH does not attempt to defend any of its objections and affirmatively states it “did not stand on any of its objections.” (See, e.g., Sep. Stat. at p. 5:28.) It insists it provided complete and straightforward responses to the interrogatories and should not be required to include additional information encompassed by the prefatory definitions and instructions for the interrogatories. The parties could not informally resolve their dispute on their own or with the assistance of the Court at an informal discovery conference. Accordingly, the Court now considers Previte’s motion to compel BPH to provide further responses to SI Nos. 6–16, 18, 20–26, 30–35. Both Previte and BPH seek an award of monetary sanctions.

“On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that…[a]n answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete…[, or] [a]n objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).) “While the party propounding interrogatories may have the burden of filing a motion to compel if it finds the answers it receives unsatisfactory, the burden of justifying any objection and failure to respond remains at all times with the party resisting an interrogatory.” (Williams v. Super. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541.)

As a threshold matter, because BPH does not attempt to justify the boilerplate objections it interposed to each request on grounds such as undue burden, vagueness and ambiguity, and overbreadth, these objections are OVERRULED. Accordingly, the sole issue before the Court is the sufficiency of BPH’s substantive responses.

“The party to whom interrogatories have been propounded shall respond in writing under oath separately to each interrogatory” with “[a]n answer containing the information sought to be discovered….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.210, subd. (a).) “Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (a); see Coy v. Super. Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 216.) “If an objection is made to an interrogatory or to a part of an interrogatory, the specific ground for the objection shall be set forth clearly in the response.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.240, subd. (b).) “If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (b).) Similarly, “[i]f only a part of an interrogatory is objectionable, the remainder of the interrogatory shall be answered.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.240, subd. (a).)

Here, BPH answered the interrogatories “[s]ubject to and without waiving” its objections. (See, e.g., Sep. Stat. at p. 8:9–10.) When a party responds in this manner, it obfuscates the scope and completeness of the substantive response provided and the extent to which information is being withheld based on objections, particularly when the objections are not stated with specificity. For this reason alone, further responses to the interrogatories are warranted. And BPH’s relinquishment of its objections further buttresses this conclusion. That said, this does not end the Court’s analysis.

The parties next dispute whether BPH properly stated the facts supporting its contentions as required by the SI or whether it simply restated its theories or contentions in general terms. While BPH’s responses are not completely devoid of responsive facts, a number of its responses consist of broader descriptions of its version of events rather than statements of the evidentiary facts supporting the contentions that are the subject of the interrogatories. A number of the responses contain language—such as “for example”—reflecting the responses are not complete. BPH’s responses to SI Nos. 6–7, 10–13 , 15–16, 20–26, 30–35 are insufficient because the responses either restate contentions and allegations or summarize facts at a high level and in a manner that reflects, from the face of each response, that underlying facts upon which the summary is based have been omitted from the responses. In other word, while it is not true that all of these responses are entirely off-topic or devoid of facts, it is apparent that they are incomplete. The same is not true with respect to BPH’s responses to SI Nos. 8–9, 14, 18.

For these reasons, further responses to all of the requests at issue are warranted.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejects the argument that BPH must also list documents based on Previte’s definition of the term “IDENTIFY” to provide a complete response to each SI at issue. Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.060 establishes the permissible form of interrogatories as follows: “(d) Each interrogatory shall be full and complete in and of itself. No preface or instruction shall be included with a set of interrogatories unless it has been approved under Chapter 17 (commencing with Section 2033.710); (e) Any term specially defined in a set of interrogatories shall be typed with all letters capitalized wherever that term appears; (f) No specially prepared interrogatory shall contain subparts, or a compound, conjunctive, or disjunctive question.” As the First District explained in Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, these statutory requirements operate to prevent the propounding party from evading the 35-interrogatory limit that applies to special interrogatories (see Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.030–2030.050). In accordance with this purpose, courts ordinarily will not entertain efforts to avoid responding to interrogatories based on mere technical violations and in the absence of evidence that the propounding party’s approach results in a true violation of the 35-interrogatory limit. (Clement, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1287–1288.)

Because the parties’ dispute concerns a defined term, which is permitted, BPH’s reliance on the prohibition on prefaces and instructions is inapt. Additionally, in light of Clement, BPH cannot raise a technical violation without more. While BPH also asserts that the definition of “IDENTIFY” results in an evasion of the 35-interrogatory limit, it does not provide a reasoned and clear explanation to persuade the Court to adopt its position. And, as Previte articulates, it does not appear BPH interposed an objection to this defined term sufficient to preserve the issue for consideration now. (See Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. Super. Ct. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 263, 273–74.)

With all of that said, the Court simply does not read the SI at issue as requiring the identification of documents. Previte states that the term “IDENTIFY” means—“when used in reference to any DOCUMENT”—“the type of document (e.g., letter, agreement, memorandum, e-mail); the media (electronic or hard copy); the date of the document, the author of the document, the present location of the document, and all individuals or entities with custody or control of any copies of the document.” (Waslif Decl., Ex. A at pp. 1:21–2:3.) The term “IDENTIFY” is not used in reference to the word document or the defined term “DOCUMENT” in any of the SI at issue. Arguably, the only way for the term “IDENTIFY” to be “used in reference to” a document is if the request itself seeks or requests the identity of a document(s). But here, Previte asks BPH to identify facts. Although not especially clear, to the extent Previte believes the term “IDENTIFY” is “used in reference to” a document when a document happens to be identified in or discussed in a response, the Court does not find this to be a reasonable construction of the requests and the definition.

Ultimately, as BPH points out, Previte has already propounded document requests. Requests for production seem to be a suitable means for following up on any documents revealed by the interrogatory responses. Alternatively, it is possible Previte could meet the statutory requirements for propounding additional special interrogatories. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.030–2030.050) The Court expresses no opinion on which avenue she should pursue. The Court solely concludes that the SI at issue here cannot fairly be construed to require BPH to include the information about documents specified in the fourth clause of her definition of “IDENTIFY.”

In conclusion, Previte’s motion is GRANTED. BPH must provide further, verified, code-compliant responses without objections to all of the SI at issue—SI Nos. 6–16, 18, 20–26, 30–35—because the supplemental responses are unclear as worded (e.g., subject to and without waiving the now-overruled objections) and are incomplete and not entirely responsive with respect to a majority of the requests. Although BPH may identify documents in these further responses to the extent necessary to state the facts supporting its contentions in a code-compliant manner, the Court does not specifically require it to include the information in the fourth clause of the definition of “IDENTIFY” in its further responses. BPH shall serve these further responses within 30 calendar days of the Court’s order.

Both parties request an award of monetary sanctions. Previte seeks an award of monetary sanctions against counsel for BPH in the amount of $6,435, while BPH seeks an award of monetary sanctions against counsel for Previte in the amount of $8,400. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (d): “The court shall impose a monetary sanction…against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” Here, while the Court ordered BPH to provide further responses, Previte did not entirely prevail in obtaining the scope of relief requested. It would be unjust to impose monetary sanctions because, among other reasons, there were some meritorious and unmeritorious positions taken by both parties. BPH was sufficiently justified in opposing the motion in light of Previte’s focus on the definition of “IDENTIFY.” Accordingly, both parties’ requests for monetary sanctions are DENIED.