Case No.: 1-12-CV-232640

Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant O’Connor Hospital on the Complaint of Plaintiffs Li Li and Sin Hai Han

On September 19, 2012, plaintiffs Li Li and Sin Hai Han filed a complaint against defendants O’Connor Hospital (“Defendant”) and Margaret Chu, M.D. alleging claims for medical malpractice and loss of consortium. On January 16, 2014, Defendant filed the motion presently before the court: a motion for summary judgment on the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c.)

Evidence

As a preliminary matter, the court notes that Plaintiffs served objections to Defendant’s evidence. (See Proof of Service attached to Plaintiffs’ Opp.) However, Plaintiffs have not filed any evidentiary objections with the court in support of their opposition, in violation of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(a).

Defendant’s evidentiary objections are OVERRULED. (See People v. Villarreal (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1142 [it cannot be said as a matter of law that an individual is not qualified to give a medical opinion just because that person is not a licensed physician]; see also Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1318-1319 [work in a particular field is not an absolute prerequisite to qualification as an expert in that field]; People v. Rance (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 245, 255 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony of a registered nurse, even though she was not a medical doctor].)

Motion for Summary Judgment

The sole argument raised on summary judgment is that Defendant’s actions were not a substantial factor in causing injury to plaintiff Li Li.

“Summary judgment is properly granted when no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit by showing that one or more of its elements cannot be established or that there is a complete defense. Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff ‘to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.’ ‘There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.’” (Madden v. Summit View, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1272 [internal citations omitted].)

“In any medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must establish: (1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional’s negligence.” (Powell v. Kleinman (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 112, 122 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted].)

To recover damages in a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must establish “a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury.” (Dumas v. Cooney (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1593, 1603.) Like breach of duty, the element of causation in a medical malpractice case can only be determined by expert medical testimony. (Salasguevara v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 379, 385.)

In general, the issue of causation involves factual questions for the jury to decide, except in cases where the facts as to causation are undisputed. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205; see Constance B. v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 200, 207 [given a breach of duty by the defendant, the decision whether that breach caused the damage is again within the jury’s domain; but where a reasonable person will not dispute the absence of causality, the court may take the decision from the jury and treat the question as one of law].) Thus, where there is no triable material fact on the issue of causation, it is a question of law properly determined on a motion for summary judgment. (Visueta v. General Motors Corp. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1609, 1616.)

Here, the court finds conflicting evidence with respect to causation. In support of the motion, Defendant submits the expert declaration of Amreen Husain, M.D. (“Dr. Husain”), a licensed physician and board certified in obstetrics and gynecology and gynecologic oncology. (See Declaration of Amreen Husain at ¶ 1.) Dr. Husain opines that Defendant’s nursing staff did not contribute to the postpartum complication and eventual outcome experienced by plaintiff Li Li. (See Defendant’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts at Nos. 4-6; Declaration of Amreen Husain at ¶ 8.) For example, Dr. Husain states that the nursing staff appropriately monitored plaintiff Li Li’s post-labor and delivery and communicated their concerns regarding the patient’s bleeding to the Mother-Baby charge nurse and L& D charge nurse who participated in the monitoring of the patient and initiated medical intervention. (See Declaration of Amreen Husain at ¶ 8.) Dr. Husain claims that the nursing staff administered the appropriate medications to plaintiff and did everything possible to control and stop the bleeding. (Ibid.) Finally, Dr. Husain opines that plaintiff Li Li required a hysterectomy to control her postpartum bleeding because every other measure attempted by the nurses and doctors were unsuccessful. (Ibid.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Husain is not qualified to testify because there is no evidence that she has any expertise regarding post-partum hemorrhage. “Cases dismissing expert declarations in connection with summary judgment motions do so on the basis that the declarations established that the opinions were either speculative, lacked foundation, or were stated without sufficient certainty.” (Sanchez v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 703, 718.) This is not the situation here as Dr. Husain states in her declaration that she is familiar with the labor and delivery, post-operative bleeding, and indications for a hysterectomy in patients such as plaintiff Li Li and has cared for such patients in her experience. (See Declaration of Amreen Husain at ¶ 3.)

Plaintiffs also submit the expert declaration of Valerie Yates Huwe (“Huwe”), a registered nurse with an active RN license as well as an active Perinatal Clinical Nurse Specialist Certification. (See Declaration of Valerie Huwe at ¶ 1.) Given her experience and review of the records in this case, Huwe states that Defendant’s actions were a substantial factor in causing injuries to plaintiff because of the following: (1) the nurses’ failure to properly quantify plaintiff’s blood loss; (2) failure to provide continuous fundal massage to control the bleeding; (3) infrequent assessment of vital signs; (4) failure to recognize plaintiff’s lack of response to uterotonic medications; and (5) failure to recognize the presence of oliguria. (See Plaintiffs’ Disputed Facts at Nos. 4-6; Plaintiffs’ Additional Facts at Nos. 36-39; Declaration of Valerie Huwe at ¶ 24.) In addition, Huwe claims that, once the nurses became aware of the hemorrhage, they failed to properly transfuse blood products. (See Declaration of Valerie Huwe at ¶ 25.) Had the nurses done so, the hemorrhaging and/or Disseminated Intravascular Coagulopathy (“DIC”) could have been treated earlier; instead, the delay in transfusion resulted in there being less time to properly treat the hemorrhage and/or DIC with the goal of preventing hysterectomy. (Ibid.) Thus, a trier of fact may conclude that Defendant’s actions were the proximate cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries in this case. Therefore, since factual issues remain to be decided by the trier of fact, the court cannot determine the issue of causation as a matter of law.

Plaintiff Sin Hai Han’s second cause of action for loss of consortium also survives summary judgment as it is derivative of the medical malpractice claim. (See Meighan v. Shore (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1025, 1034.)

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.