Filed 6/2/20 Nehoray v. Binur CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE
MAC E. NEHORAY,

Plaintiff,

v.

AVI BINUR,

Defendant and Appellant;

INJURY MEDICAL NETWORK,

Defendant and Respondent. B290972

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC625348

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Daniel S. Murphy, Judge. Affirmed.

Avi Binur, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

The Soffer Law Firm and Benjamin E. Soffer for Defendant and Respondent.

_______________________________________

INTRODUCTION

This appeal arises from an action in interpleader relating to the disbursement of settlement proceeds as between defendant and appellant Avi Binur (Binur) and several medical providers, including respondent Injury Medical Network (the Network), that treated him after he was injured in an automobile accident. After accounting for Binur’s attorney’s fees and costs, the settlement proceeds were insufficient to satisfy the debts owed to the medical providers and the court, in accordance with a stipulation among the medical providers, ordered a pro rata division of the proceeds to the medical providers. Binur received nothing. Binur, who represents himself on appeal, claims the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Binur was injured in an automobile accident in 2013. He received medical treatment for those injuries on a lien basis from numerous medical providers including, as pertinent here, Starpoint Surgery Center, Shahab Mahboubian, DO, MPH, and Bahman Omrani, DO. Starpoint Surgery Center later assigned its lien to the Network. Collectively, these medical providers were owed over $85,000.

Binur filed claims with both the insurer of the other driver involved in the accident and his own insurance company. He received policy limits settlements from both insurers totaling $50,000. After accounting for attorney’s fees and costs, proceeds of $28,815 remained (available settlement proceeds). Binur claimed he was entitled to $50,000 relating to loss of earnings and pain and suffering.

After Binur’s counsel was unable to negotiate an agreement regarding the distribution of the available settlement proceeds, counsel filed a complaint in interpleader naming, as pertinent here, the Network, Mahboubian, Omrani (collectively, the medical providers), and Binur as defendants. The medical providers claimed substantial outstanding amounts owed of $60,000 (the Network), $23,755 (Mahboubian), and $2,145 (Omrani). Rather than litigating among themselves, the medical providers stipulated to a pro rata distribution of the available settlement proceeds by which they would receive $20,126.89 (the Network), $7,968.57 (Mahboubian), and $719.54 (Omrani). The court entered an order approving the stipulation on March 20, 2018.

Because one defendant remained—Binur—a short bench trial took place on April 3, 2018. Binur testified regarding his injuries and confirmed that the amounts claimed by the medical providers ($60,000 for the Network, $23,755 for Mahboubian, and $2,145 for Omrani) had not been paid. But Binur asked the court not to award any portion of the available settlement proceeds to the medical providers because, in his view, they had overcharged for their services. Aside from Binur’s testimony, no other evidence was presented to the court.

Based on Binur’s testimony, the court found that the charges by the medical providers were reasonable and necessary. The court rendered a judgment dividing the available settlement proceeds among the three medical providers on a pro rata basis and in accordance with their stipulation. The court entered the judgment on May 3, 2018 and Binur filed this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

Representing himself on appeal, Binur argues the court’s decision to distribute the available settlement proceeds to the medical providers is unsupported by substantial evidence. We disagree.

Whenever conflicting claims are made on a person relating to personal property, that person may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their claims. (Code Civ. Proc., § 386, subd. (a).) “An interpleader action is an equitable proceeding. [Citations.] In an interpleader action, the court initially determines the right of the plaintiff to interplead the funds; if that right is sustained, an interlocutory decree is entered which requires the defendants to interplead and litigate their claims to the funds. … Thus, the interpleader proceeding is traditionally viewed as two lawsuits in one. The first dispute is between the stakeholder and the claimants to determine the right to interplead the funds. The second dispute to be resolved is who is to receive the interpleaded funds. [Citations.]” (Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 32, 42–43.)

The issue in the present appeal concerns entitlement to the available settlement funds. Binur argues the award to the medical providers is unsupported by any evidence and, therefore, we should award the available settlement proceeds to him in full. More particularly, Binur suggests that because the medical providers did not present any evidence during the bench trial, no evidence exists to support the court’s ruling. Binur is wrong.

Where, as here, the amount of interpleaded funds is insufficient to satisfy the claims of all the defendants named in the complaint in interpleader, the rights of the defendants as against each other may be tried to the court sitting in equity or, in some cases, to a jury. (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleading, § 256, p. 332.) In this case, the medical providers eliminated the need for a trial among themselves by stipulating to the amount of their respective claims and a pro rata distribution of the available settlement proceeds.

One additional defendant was named in the complaint in interpleader, however: Binur. He claimed he was entitled to $50,000 in compensation for lost wages and pain and suffering. But as Binur concedes, he was not entitled to any portion of the settlement proceeds unless and until the medical providers’ liens were satisfied. (See, e.g., Gilman v. Dalby (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 606, 617–618 [noting “equity and public policy favor giving medical liens … priority against a recovery obtained by the plaintiff”].) Because the available settlement proceeds ($28,815) were plainly inadequate to satisfy the medical providers’ outstanding bills ($85,900), the court had to determine whether the total amount of the medical providers’ bills was still outstanding. Binur testified that the providers’ bills had not been paid. And to the extent the medical providers had to establish that their charges were reasonable and necessary, the court expressly found they met that burden based on Binur’s testimony concerning his injuries. Contrary to Binur’s suggestion, no additional evidence was required.

Binur cites to several cases, none of which is of assistance to him here. Binur quotes at length from State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Huff (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1463, for example, regarding the burden of proof applicable to a medical provider’s claim presented under the Hospital Lien Act (Civ. Code, §§ 3045.1–3045.6). But the Hospital Lien Act is inapplicable here and, in any event, Binur’s testimony established the reasonableness and necessity of the medical providers’ charges. Similarly, Binur quotes McAllister v. George (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 258, 264, as stating that where “ ‘plaintiff introduced no medical testimony that the dental work was reasonably required as a result of the battery,’ ‘no dental costs were recoverable.’ ” But in that case, the plaintiff filed a tort claim for assault and battery and, in order to recover his medical expenses as damages, was required to show that those expenses were caused by the battery and were reasonably required. (Ibid.) This case, unlike McAllister v. George, is not a personal injury case and the court’s causation analysis is inapplicable here. Finally, Binur quotes Guerra v. Balestrieri (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 511, as stating that “ ‘[t]here should be some evidence concerning the value of professional services of a physician and surgeon.’ ” Again, that statement by the Court of Appeal relates to the burden of proof regarding damages in a personal injury case—a matter not at issue here.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Injury Medical Network, LLC shall recover its costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

LAVIN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

EGERTON, J.

EPSTEIN, J.*