Case Number: LC098579 Hearing Date: July 03, 2014 Dept: 92

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT

MALIHE RABBANI,
Plaintiff(s),
vs.

TRADER JOE’S COMPANY, ET AL.,

Defendant(s).

CASE NO: LC098579

[TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; IMPOSING SANCTIONS

Dept. 92
1:30 p.m. — #16
July 3, 2014

Plaintiff, Malihe Rabbini’s Motion for Reconsideration is Denied. Defendant, Trader Joe’s Company, Inc.’s Request for Sanctions is Granted. Plaintiff and her attorney of record, jointly and severally, are ordered to pay sanctions to Defendant, by and through counsel of record, in the amount of $2187.50.

1. Allegations of Complaint
Plaintiff, Malihe Rabbani filed this action against Defendants, Trader Joe’s Company and Pepper Lane-Branham, LLC for damages arising out of a slip and fall incident. The operative FAC, filed on 1/11/13, contains causes of action for premises liability and general negligence. Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ property was dangerous as a result of a foreign substance on the floor and/or because the floor was inherently slippery, and that Defendants had actual and/or constructive notice of the foreign substance such that they should have remedied the condition or warned Plaintiff of same. The foreign substance has since been identified by Plaintiff as soup that Defendant was providing as samples to customers in the store.

2. Prior Ruling
On 1/30/14, the Court heard Defendant’s MSJ; the Court took the matter under submission. On 3/05/14, the Court issued an order denying the MSJ.

3. Motion for Reconsideration
At this time, Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the Court’s prior ruling. Plaintiff argues the Court should reconsider the ruling because (a) Defendant failed to meet its burden of production by failing to present any evidence that the floor was not inherently slippery; (b) the Court erroneously applied the law to the facts; and (c) the Court improperly rejected Plaintiff’s theory of liability.

a. Jurisdiction
On 4/15/14, the Court entered judgment in favor of Defendant in this action. Plaintiff concedes that the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the motion due to the judgment. Plaintiff argues the Court erred in entering judgment while the motion for reconsideration was pending, and this motion is necessary to preserve the issue for appeal. Plaintiff cites Apri Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 176, 182 to support this position. The Court therein noted:
Here, APRI submitted its proposed order granting the motion to quash and dismissing it from the action before the motion for reconsideration was filed. The trial court should not have signed the order of dismissal while the motion for reconsideration was pending. Under section 1008, plaintiff had 10 days from service of notice of entry of the order to bring her motion for reconsideration. The court should have considered the merits of the motion for reconsideration, and then, if it was still appropriate, signed the order of dismissal. But, once the trial court entered judgment, it could not reconsider the ruling on the motion to quash.

The Court held that, because the Court did not hold off on signing the judgment, the Court lost jurisdiction over the motion for reconsideration. Similarly, here, the Court does not have jurisdiction over the motion for reconsideration. The motion is therefore denied.

b. Sanctions
Defendant seeks sanctions in connection with the opposition. CCP §1008(d) provides:
(d) A violation of this section may be punished as a contempt and with sanctions as allowed by Section 128.7. In addition, an order made contrary to this section may be revoked by the judge or commissioner who made it, or vacated by a judge of the court in which the action or proceeding is pending.

The Court would not be inclined to impose sanctions merely because Plaintiff continued to pursue the motion after judgment was entered. The Court is only inclined to impose sanctions if it finds that the motion was frivolous in the first instance.

Defendant argues the motion was frivolous in the first instance because the motion contains no new facts, law, or circumstances to justify pursuing the relief sought. Plaintiff argues, in reply, that reconsideration is proper under Johnson v. Corrigan (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 553, 556, as the motion is based on the Court’s utter failure to consider an issue before it, as opposed to the Court’s allegedly erroneous legal analysis.

In Johnson, the Court denied a special motion to strike on the ground that the moving party failed to file any points and authorities in support of the motion. The moving party filed a motion for reconsideration and presented evidence that it had, indeed, filed points and authorities with the original motion to strike. The trial court granted the motion for reconsideration. The opposing party appealed, arguing that there were no new facts or law presented in the motion. The court of appeals agreed with the trial court, and held that the mistake of not realizing that points and authorities had been filed constituted a new fact for purposes of reconsideration.

Johnson is not applicable to the instant case. Plaintiff’s primary argument herein is that Defendant failed, in moving papers, to negate a material allegation of the complaint – that the floor was inherently slippery. This issue was discussed at length by the parties during oral argument, and is not “new” in any way. The issue was also discussed by the Court in its ruling on the submitted matter, at pages 18-21 of the order. This is not in any manner similar to the situation in Johnson, where the trial court failed entirely to consider a brief that had been filed and based its ruling solely on the lack of a brief.

Plaintiff’s second and third arguments in the motion for reconsideration consist entirely of Plaintiff’s position that this Court mis-construed the law; Plaintiff does not even attempt to argue that there are new facts, circumstances, or law to support her motion for reconsideration on these grounds.

Notably, Defendant attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff at length in connection with both of these issues (lack of jurisdiction and lack of new facts, circumstances, or law), and Plaintiff refused to withdraw her motion. The Court therefore finds sanctions are appropriate. Defense Counsel fully supports his request for sanctions in the amount of $2187.50 in his declaration. The Court finds the amount is appropriate in light of the complexity of the issues and grants the request in full.

Defendant also asks the Court to impose sanctions against Plaintiff payable to Los Angeles County per CCP §177.5. §177.5 provides:
A judicial officer shall have the power to impose reasonable money sanctions, not to exceed fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500), notwithstanding any other provision of law, payable to the court, for any violation of a lawful court order by a person, done without good cause or substantial justification. This power shall not apply to advocacy of counsel before the court. For the purposes of this section, the term “person” includes a witness, a party, a party’s attorney, or both.

Sanctions pursuant to this section shall not be imposed except on notice contained in a party’s moving or responding papers; or on the court’s own motion, after notice and opportunity to be heard. An order imposing sanctions shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order.

It does not appear Plaintiff has violated a court order, and therefore the request for these additional sanctions is denied.

Dated this 3rd day of July, 2014

Hon. Elia Weinbach
Judge of the Superior Court